

THE SPIRIT OF WORLD POLITICS

With Special Studies of the Near East

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NEW YORK

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1932

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Set up and printed. Published March, 1932.

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEDICATED TO MY SON

PREFACE

The dealings of nations with one another are governed neither by clear principle nor by crude self-interest, but by a spirit which in the midst of a clash of interests still gropes for principles. But the search for principles is a business by itself. If much experience were sufficient to produce a knowledge of principle, the men of experience, or the "men of action," would have completed their code long ago. Naturally, the thinking done by these men is of the first importance; but they work at a disadvantage. The world-scale of facts eludes direct grasp; and immersion in action at last submerges all but the sturdiest thinkers. The best hope is in a mixture and interplay of reflection with masses of selected fact.

In selecting the facts for the present study, I have considered that the temper of world-politics today is controlled more profoundly by the incidents of inequality or supposed inequality than by any other circumstance,—by our treatment of peoples held to be backward, and the malaise which insistently requires an examination of the ethics of that relationship. For problems of this sort, the Near East and the African region adjacent to it present the compactest field: all the varieties of our political invention are assembled there. To be sure, international relations are everywhere,—no one need travel to find them. But they are not everywhere alive with the same intensity, nor everywhere subject to the same intelligent regard and continuous novel adjustment. The situations in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, are being newly thought out almost from

month to month; the experimental side of the mandate is here most problematic and igneous, giving heat and arousing it. It was such notions as these which governed my choice when in 1928 an opportunity to travel presented itself through the Bureau of International Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe College.

I had been in the way of completing a book of theory about the rights and duties of nations. The period of travel I then undertook has not facilitated the completion of that book; it has produced a quite different book, more engaged than I had planned with specific situations—which always refuse to accommodate themselves to the rôle of merely illustrating a theory. No one can enter the world of the Arab and of Islam and come out the same person in either outlook or affection. My essential ethical conviction remains the same, but with an added confidence that we are bound, even in the interplay of world forces, to get and apply standards of right and wrong, so far as these forces work through our agencies.

I am led by this belief into two or three major points of hostility to current tendencies. Hostility, first, to any kind of determinism, economic or other, which resigns the affairs of the world to the contest of interests and Powers. Then to pragmatism and to the belief that morals and manners are relative to time and place, which would destroy in advance the possibility of an ethical understanding among men, and of a well-founded international law. Thirdly, hostility to the pernicious theory that government has nothing to do with ethics or with general culture.

Suppose that we undertake to administer a dependency, and that we succeed in bringing about order, an improved economy, regularity of accounts and a modicum of western

education. That would be sufficient to allow any official annual report to bristle with proud points of "progress." But suppose that in achieving these things a national art is killed, a culture undermined and the customary moral life of a people contaminated,—circumstances unlikely to figure in official annual reports. Shall we still count the total result a success? If these latter effects mean something to mankind, by what agency if not that of government is mankind to protect its concern? If government will not consider the imponderables for the sake of their inherent value, then it will find itself forced to consider them, as Bismarck was forced, because the incidental consequences of ignoring them begin in due time to weigh more than the positive eye-catching ponderables.

My choice of the Near East as a field, and the subsequent absorption in certain of the special problems of that region, has had at least one inconvenience. It has involved me in comments more or less critical on French and British administrations, while the question remains unexamined whether the United States in its corresponding relationships is subject to similar strictures. I should have desired, had there been a physical possibility of doing so, to extend my travel and to include an equally careful study of this theme. It will however be evident to the reader that the principles arrived at are general in their application and are destined to alight at home. I count that nation definitely in arrears in the ethical work of the world which declines to become a partner with members of the League of Nations in inviting, as France and England do invite, the public opinion of enlightened men to be brought to bear on its international conduct.

It will also be apparent that there is no inclination here, in pointing out political evils, to undervalue the good that

is present and has been present with them. Good and evil are so entangled with one another in the hard business of international action that it is easy to despair of getting them apart. There are not a few able men who, like Sir Arnold Wilson, definitely believe the work of empire to be at once a holy religious mission, burdened with the whole gravamen of Christian nurture, and a labor of unshrinking masculinity in which moral squeamishness is peculiarly out of place. If men and women will eat meat, someone must be the butcher; and to become a vegetarian is not the right response to the unpleasantness. Such a view will always have a strong case. But I add that in so far as severity enters the political ordering of the world there must be an *ethics* of severity and not an ethical evasion; and more particularly that there must be no sly smuggling in of a greedy privilege under the guise of a heroic duty. To attack the obvious evils of our imperial procedures is therefore anything but an unfriendly deed: it is an act of confidence in the possibility of an honest magnanimity in the great undertakings of world government.

It would be impossible to name here all the persons to whom I owe an acknowledgment for aid in the preparation of this book; and frequently where my obligation is greatest it would be unfriendly to reveal my sources. These friends will understand the reason for my silence. But I may freely express my gratitude to the Bureau of International Research, and especially to my colleague Professor George Grafton Wilson, for the wholly benign obstacles which he placed in the way of an early completion of my earlier proposed book. It is a peculiar pleasure also to acknowledge a most gracious rescue brought to the work of proof-reading by Miss Marietta Neff, co-editor

of *Asia*, at a moment when a new journey to the Orient threatened to interpose an indefinite delay in the completion of the task.

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Paris, October 7, 1931.

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PART I

BACKWARDNESS AND ITS MEASURES

CHAPTER I

BACKWARDNESS

IN the small world of Europe and America, the doctrine that all men are equal in their natural right has had a hard fight for its life. Within any one nation the obvious differences among men are enormous, and strike deep. A man's a man, we say, in his moral nature, and therefore in his civil rights; but we say it knowing that the appearances are against us.

When we take the entire world into account, the gamut of difference is greatly increased. And if we compare communities with one another, they seem to differ more than do the members of any one community. France is more different from Timbuctoo than one Frenchman from another. Even more than the "rights of men," the "rights of peoples" strike at the outset upon this insistent inequality.

In any one state, the political community of men does something to make them alike. If they are not born equal, they are bred, selected, encouraged into a certain equivalence. But the peoples of the world have had until now no common history nor common hope; no common political wind has been blowing over them for centuries. They enjoy all that variety which geography and climate, philosophical angle and long seclusion have given them. They have in common the planets and the stars, the racial stock—from some untraceably distant point of ancestry, and the germ of the mind: with this common substance

they are differently *bent*, and have been diverging for tens or hundreds of millennia. If there is to be a decently defensible world order, it must begin by taking into account this deep-rooted fact of difference.

Our men of action have been facing this fact for some time: the differences among peoples have suited their purposes only too well. It is as if, once away from home, they felt themselves out of the range of that common axiom of Locke, Rousseau and Jefferson, that "all men are created equal"; and were rejoicing in the liberty of Aristotle,—"some men are born to serve." They have been dealing with the "lesser breeds" on the basis of improvised axioms, over-rude and over-simple, according to which mankind in all its variety is to be dressed in a linear up-and-down scale of degrees of civilization!

In sum, they are calling upon the nations of the planet to stratify themselves into progressive peoples and backward peoples. It is not merely that you and I, the general public, are expected to recognize certain peoples as definitely backward. It is that (these peoples are being summoned to *think of themselves* as backward.) To many of them, especially such as form part of the proud Islamic world, this is a new idea!

If it were purely a theoretical opinion they were asked to form, it might well be debated, (but the idea is being pressed home by these men of action in the form of another and coincident stratification, that of the dominant peoples and the subordinate peoples. They are being invited to accept the principle—as a sort of cornerstone of world-structure—that *backward peoples are, and of right ought to be, unfree and dependent states.*)

Neither to the Islamic states of the Near East, nor to any reader of history, can this doctrine set itself forward as a self-evident truth. (Egypt, Palestine, Syria and Iraq

are well accustomed to be in subjection, that is true. But their military inferiority to their conquerors, including the Turk, like the military inferiority of the Greek to the Roman or of the Chinese to the Manchu, was entirely consistent with a cultural superiority. In the long sweep of history, backward peoples, endowed with plenty of ferocious vigor, have commonly dominated the more highly civilized, and after a period of tragic suffering, destruction, and darkness, the current of human affairs has emerged rejuvenated.) Perhaps it is time that this costly method of vitalization should be stopped. In any case, the status of the Near East under the dominance of Europe is radically different from its status under the dominance of Turkey. (With the exception of a part of Syria, none of these states has been conquered by its present master: they are presumed to be allies rather than enemies. But they are allies in tutelage because they are held to be backward; and the power of Europe stands by to require that they accept, if possible with thanks, this subordinate position as a just and rightful one, by virtue of the principle above stated.)

No part of the world is exempt today, except by suffering, from the operation of this new principle. There are a few states left which are both backward and independent. Abyssinia, the Nejd, and the Hedjaz are surely backward, if Egypt and Syria are backward. Persia and Afghanistan,—are they to be reckoned among the progressive peoples? But each of these cases has its peculiar plea. In general, there is now no part of the earth's surface on which a backward people can lurk unobserved, independent, conserving its latent vigor. Why? Because its territory can no longer be let alone.)

The ancient and comfortable "right to be let alone" has, in fact, finally disappeared. That which chiefly can-

cels this old immunity is not abstract backwardness, and the corresponding need of moral tutelage; it is concrete backwardness in the management of territorial domain. The principle that backward peoples must be dependent gains its chief support from a new development of the right of property. The natural resources of the world are no longer to be considered the property of those who happen to be their occupants or possessors: *the world's resources are to belong to those who can best use them!* It is because of this principle that the political power which protects the backward property-right must become subordinate to the power which protects the progressive property-right.))

Under this new conception, the "economic penetration" by the West into the life of the rest of the planet receives a justification. But what is to happen to the economic habits of the backward peoples, and therewith to their entire cultural program? Shall the new interests enter only so far as they are compatible with the preservation of the modes of life, the philosophy, the art, the religion of the backward peoples? Or shall these modes of life be preserved *only in so far as they are compatible with the material interests of Europe?*

The clear implication of the new idea of property, as well as the practice of our men of action, makes for the latter view. The dominance of the progressive over the backward is carrying with it, not precisely what "tutelage" would seem to imply, the eliciting of latent cultural power, but the *annihilation of cultural power* in the interest of a uniform planetary civilization.

But why do I call this idea of property a new idea? The world to those who can best use it! Did not our ancestors act upon it when they brought their hopes to the New World, displacing the American Indian, while Spain first

subdued and then destroyed the civilizations of the Aztec and the Inca?

The principle in question was doubtless latent in this, and much previous, historical conduct. But it was then veiled under another notion, the so-called "right of conquest." There is something ridiculous, to be sure, in naming a status established by conquest a "right." For a right is a status which all men may be called on to acknowledge apart from any use of force. Unless it was right before the fighting that the stronger should control the weaker, it could not become right by means of the fighting. There is no such thing in reason as a right of conquest; though it is conceivable that conquest may be necessary, or may have been necessary, to manifest or enforce an existent right such as this right by power to use.

On this principle Europe carries its requirements into Africa and Asia, judging that it, Europe, can make better use of these lands than do the peoples who occupy them, and unquestionably making some uses of which those peoples never dreamed. This imperial movement is now carried out preferably by peaceful methods, because overt destruction and oppression have become abhorrent to the race, and can no longer be practised without getting into the news. Cultural destruction, a common incident of its march, excites less concern. For such non-violent invasions it is an evident advantage to have a conception of right which can be used to lend them moral support.

But, even so, this principle that property belongs to the best users gets as yet no whole-hearted recognition. For note a strange inconsistency. It does brave service,—outside our frontiers. Cross the frontier, homeward: the opposite is true. Here property is property; and why not? Shall the internal wealth of a state be judged the rightful prize of those persons or classes who can best use it? When

wealthy men misuse their property, shall the community succeed to its control, or assign it to others? Just this experiment has been and is being tried in one great state today; and the mere mention of the Soviet Revolution serries the ranks of property holders elsewhere. Let not any such principles cross our boundaries. Here at home, the right of the possessor is to be an unchallenged fact, to be dignified, if needful, as "sacred"! The question whether Demos, or any other, could use my wealth better than I shall not be raised, shall be tabooed with determination. Besides, who could decide among the various self-nominated best-users? It will thus be seen why I call the principle of property by capacity to use a new principle, not yet tried out in all its bearings. Meantime, however, there can be no doubt that economic Europe and to some extent America,—let us say the Western World, acting as judge in its own case, is employing this principle in the world-wide extension of the circuits of its life.

As self-appointed judges of backwardness in the world, we naturally find several degrees of it. The mandate-idea has given an occasion to put them into a-b-c order. The former Turkish possessions including Palestine, Syria and Iraq are least backward; the former German colonies of Africa are more so; the mandated Pacific Islands most of all. The various other part-sovereignties and dependencies in the world are not yet plotted on this scale; but in theory they might be. Thus, as Europe measures backwardness, Egypt is backward: the Capitulations and the army remain as the mark of it. All such judgments imply some measure. What, then, are our measures? And by what right do we apply our standards of civilization to cultures other than our own?

CHAPTER II

THE MEASURES OF BACKWARDNESS

THE Orient is engaged in making a distinction which we of the West have never achieved, the distinction between western civilization and civilization. To be civilized, within due limits, is an acceptable social good: the Orient has understood this fact far longer than we have. To be westernized is a different matter. From Algeria to Egypt, from Turkey and Syria to Japan, the crucibles are effecting the refinement. We stand to learn something from the process.

In some degree we have been long on our guard against our own local prejudices. Addicted above other mortals to wandering, we early learned that a traveler's tests of the value of a strange social order are fallacious. The traveler inclines to condemn the unfamiliar because it is unfamiliar, even when it is only for the unfamiliar that he travels; he is dominated by the anxious reports of his nose, his ear and his eye, even while he is aware that sensuous irritation for himself wholly misrepresents the subconscious habit of the observed; he is bribed by the conditions of his own physical comfort; he tends to identify the difficult-for-him with the barbarous, be it only the inflections and characters of a foreign tongue. He compares the stranger-people with the ideal; but (as Gilbert Chesterton remarks) he does not at the same time compare himself with the ideal,—he identifies himself with it. We know these things; we are prepared to make allowance for them.

As to the more vital concerns of alien manners and customs, certain of our wise men, not content with warning us that there may well be other experiments than our own in the management of trade, family, religion, civil law, have set up a theory of universal relativity, according to which there are no better and worse in social orders, but only differences, for "the *mores* can make anything right"!

This latter doctrine is so far from reason and common sense as to be totally useless in checking our natural self-assurance. For by all the gods of all the nations there are a better and a worse in modes of human life: to lose that sense of values in a pseudo-hospitable indifferentism is to lose all capacity to judge and therefore to act. Total relativity is essentially a closet-philosophy. It has no effect on the temper of the West, which is the temper of expansive action. While it is nominally the precise opposite of that cultural self-confidence which makes us so willing to impose our own type upon the rest of the world, it is in effect the same thing; for it, too, refuses to do the one thing necessary, namely, to discriminate between what is universal and what is local in our brand of civilization. To a bumptious, self-satisfied imperialism, everything in our culture is universal: what is good for us is good for everybody. To the theory of relativity, everything is local: there is nothing which is good for everybody. Both are false; but only the latter is futile.

It is this which makes it so imperative that we, too, should learn to distinguish between western civilization and civilization itself. For the West has at present the power to impose itself, and, in so doing, to ruin, even without knowing what it destroys. To take the most poignant example within my knowledge, Arabic culture is being driven to the wall by processes not more intentional than

automatic. Yet Arabic culture is not a thing that the world can afford to let die: *Arabic culture must be preserved*. And it can only be preserved if we learn to distinguish between our medicine and our poison.

The measures we actually make use of in judging degrees of backwardness are many. Each good that civilization attains, each evil that it avoids, supplies a test. But it belongs to human nature that the evils take our first attention; in our perceptions of a strange land, we are less aware of the satisfactions it achieves than of the ills it has failed to remedy.

One who enters for the first time the harbor of Alexandria will almost certainly make an unfavorable note upon any society that tolerates the horde of able-bodied brigands who quarrel for your luggage and inverting every honest idea of service demand to be entrusted with your property at the peril of your personal comfort and dignity! In this tell-tale phenomenon we read idleness, vagabondage, mendacity, unscrupulous egoism; and in the social order unemployment, shiftlessness, incapacity of the guardians. Seeing the strange contrast between these brutal brawlers and the caparisoned crews of the customs boats in perfect and agile tenue, ceremonious to the finger tips, one rushes to generalize: the Orient, glittering at the top and sprawling at the bottom, with no care for the bottom on the part of the top! This haste of judgment is, no doubt, in part an overcompensation for a thrill of alarm at finding yourself beset and devoid of a tongue. You have not yet seen the bandits smile!

But the tendency is radical: the anxieties of the civilized visitors will be dominant in their choice of standards. The European will look out upon the Orient from the refuge of his hotel in the European quarter, considering first how he can be personally guarded from the objects of his pet

antipathies, and asking, then, of the alien world about him such questions as these:

How does this people get over the ground, save time, lessen the irks of travel, fight disease, dispose of dirt and offal, manage the other problems of congested human habitation, ward off excesses of heat and cold, excesses of wet and drought? How does it remove the fear of hunger, minimize the perils of childbirth and infancy, dispel the ignorance of daily affairs and deeper ignorances, curb the cruder outbursts of temper? If one is technically disposed he looks into vital statistics, laws, courts, prisons, schools. And only after all this is he ready to consider the positive measures of civilization: what of the durable satisfactions of life come to this people, what refinements of sense and reason, what sport and amusement, what luxury and adornment, what art, what literature, what philosophy and religion, what joy in the greatest of the improvisatory arts, the art of personal intercourse among friends and in the family?

Now all of the questions here mentioned are relevant to the measure of backwardness. But the substance of them all reduces to two or three points.

The first of these is the *mastery of nature*, that is to say, science and its applications, economic and military.

This is our chief criterion of that "capacity to use" the land, so fateful for economic penetration; for it is through science that the possibilities of nature have become known and controllable. "Backward peoples," for the most part, are peoples who have not caught the spirit of controlling the physical conditions of life through the knowledge of natural law. This spirit, with us, is one which does not wait for knowledge to happen and for inventions to occur: it has created an aggressive and united campaign of discov-

ery, and a marvelously reliable technique of invention. The "progressive peoples" are defined most simply as the peoples who are taking a productive part in this pan-human campaign. The rest are backward.

Now there are no peoples on the planet wholly innocent of the idea of natural law. This idea is built into the structure of the animal mind in general. What has happened once, we, the animal kingdom, expect to happen again in the same circumstances: otherwise habit, the basis of regular living, would have no foothold. But peoples differ enormously in the degree to which they trust themselves to this idea, and especially in the degree to which they conceive supernatural, incalculable factors to mingle with the impersonal, calculable factors of physical events. Though there is no hostility in reason between religion and science, it remains true that the peoples who have given most to religion have become backward in science. The West for three hundred years has followed the maxim, Science at all costs, and as much religion as science allows. The East for as many thousand years has followed the maxim, Religion at all costs, and as much science as we then find leisure to notice. Thus the East has condemned itself in advance, by this measure, to backwardness. Superficial observers have often reached the conclusion that religion itself is the enemy: they note that within progressive communities there are "reactionary" or backward parts and that these are the ecclesiastical parts. They call upon a new Russia and a new Turkey to abolish the religious system of the people that the methods of science may have free play.

Thus, when the priests of the Russian Church propose to meet an insect-pest, threatening to ruin the crops, by making a ceremonial procession around the fields and sprinkling holy water, they place themselves and their

faithful in the backward class, not so much by what they do, as by what they prevent being done. Likewise, when village sheikhs of Egypt oppose the efforts of government and school to promote the use of clean drinking water in place of the filthy and stagnant waters of Nile canals, they hold themselves in so far backward. If Islam were committed to the proposition that any effort we men make to control our physical fortunes is impious, since the will of Allah has fixed all things in advance,—health and disease, life and death,—Islam and backwardness would be coextensive. But, inasmuch as no good Moslem would fail, through piety, to step out of the path of a mad bull, there is nothing in his logic to prevent his avoiding a microbe. The premise of Islam, *necessity*, is the premise of science itself: it is not in this note of determinate order that the backwardness lies, but in the do-nothing conclusion, resignation (Islam) *in advance* of action. This conclusion has no particular pertinence to Islam: more science does not require less religion, either in Islam or elsewhere.

Our second measure is *public morality*. This is the most searching and at the same time the most dangerous criterion of civilization. Every people uses it in judging every other people; and every people has reason to shrink from applying it too searchingly to itself. Its use invites hypocrisy and self-righteousness. Nevertheless, it would be folly to attempt escaping what is really at the bottom of this western judgment of backwardness. For, at its source, the scientific spirit is also a moral attitude.

Though morality itself eludes observation, not to say measure, there are certain objective signs of its cruder degrees, such as the frequency or infrequency of crimes of violence, the ability of people, and especially of strangers, to move about unarmed and unmolested, to transport and

display goods without danger of banditry, to express opinions, however opposed to those of the hearers, without meeting physical hostility. Thus, when a Serbian deputy in the Jugoslavian Skupshtina at Belgrade kills two Croat deputies and wounds three others, a caustic British editor sees in the issue the question "whether Jugo-Slavia is to belong to civilized or to Balkan Europe."¹ Acquiescence of a community in organized crime, through fear of witnessing against the criminals, is rightly taken as evidence of backward morale. If there is a "reign of terror in Asiut,"² that is pertinent to the status of Egypt. If "amongst Indians of the better classes . . . there is a growing disposition to assist the police, sometimes even at considerable personal risk,"³ that is pertinent to the status of India. If Chicago and New York or the Southern states acquiesce in orgies of lynching or murder, these facts are justly taken as pertinent to the soundness of American civilization. If Italy uproots the Mafia, Italy removes a notorious mark of backwardness.

But the index of public crime is sensitive to certain less obvious phases of public morality: the honesty of administration, a traditional honor of service, superior to that form of personal enrichment at public expense commonly called "corruption," and the reliability of justice, whereby the least favored (including the alien) can be sure of his due as against the most favored in the land.

Though the Capitulations were at first simply privileges granted to foreigners to invite trade, it was doubt as to the quality of the oriental brand of justice which fastened them, and especially the capitulation of extra-territoriality, upon oriental countries. The Capitulations

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, Fri., July 13, 1928.

² *Egyptian Gazette*.

³ *Crime in India*, S. M. Edwardes, rev. in *London Times Literary Supplement*, Mar. 12, 1925.

were in every case something more than institutions of privilege: they were instituted judgments of moral backwardness in the official fiber of the peoples involved. In the case of Islam, the disparagement was at first mutual. Japan, Turkey, Siam and now China have reached the point of rejecting this mark of backwardness. It would be well, as these institutions pass one by one into history, if the West could say that they had not been habitually used to protect western criminals in oriental trade from receiving the punishments which oriental law would have given them. They will leave behind them a note of disillusionment as to the moral quality of the West. But they will have recorded the inescapable importance of public morality as a measure of advancement.

There is a third measure, which is, in a sense, a union of the first two. It is the *condition of the common people*, perhaps the most patent and reliable of all tests of civilization.

The presumption is that, if the economic problem has been well and scientifically faced in any community, the common people will not be in misery,—dirty, diseased, threatened at every change of season with famine. And, if the moral problem has likewise been met, the common people will be decently educated, indisposed to crime, free of mind and capable of adding something to the intelligence of government. However attractive the élite of any civilization may be, however refined, luxurious, intelligent, hospitable, the acceptance of squalor and ignorance and serfdom on the part of the human masses, for the sake of producing this human flower, conveys a sense of rottenness and unreality. The western traveler and the western official alike are inclined to take their cue directly from the aspect of the common people; even the aristocrat, the

confirmed believer in landed privilege at home, will become immune, like Cromer in Egypt, to the charm of landed privilege in the Orient, until he is sure that the kurbash, the corvée, and the load occasioned by corruption have ceased to depress the peasantry. The genuine advancement of a nation cannot far outpass the quality of its masses.

These are the primary measures. Have they any general validity? Or are they western prejudices, due to the history of western ideas?

CHAPTER III

ARE THESE STANDARDS LOCAL?

WE have mentioned three ways in which we estimate advancement or backwardness. There is always a suspicion that the measures we use have something local and relative about them: other peoples, other standards. How is it with the measures we have proposed: are they valid everywhere, or are they simply the ideals of western communities, subject to the law of change with time and place?

On the face of it, one is inclined to say that good and evil are good and evil, for the East as well as for the West. That it is the business of every civilization to get rid of poverty, disease, and corruption by every means available. We may poetize about the wildest dreams of Kew being the facts at Khatmandoo, and the crimes of Clapham chaste at Martaban; but we treat the defaulting of interest on debt, or the danger of brigandage on the Damascus-Baghdad motor-route, as if they meant the same in Asia as in Chicago. Unless the question is raised, we use our standards as human standards, not as western; and, if this is the case, the circumstance that it is we who happen to apply them is an accident which ought not to be held against them.

It is prudent however to face explicitly the possibility of localism, especially since it has become a mental fashion in the West to consider every idea as "relative." The Orient, in particular, as a mental world incomparably older than Europe, must be estimated with a certain diffidence: it has its own reserve of wisdom, and its own ad-

justments of life to life. Human nature has been distilled here into its subtlest essences: the chances that we do not understand, and cannot judge, are at their maximum. Has it not often been said that these aged cultures are inscrutable to our sense? The "mystery of the Orient," a stock phrase for literature and travel, if it has any substance, should be allowed for in politics as well; for politics must respect the differences among men, not obliterate them.

Our politicians and statesmen have not failed to pay a conventional respect to the "oriental mystery." In their deeds, it is true, they seem most determined to resolve the mystery into western daylight: is it not a clear improvement to run a straight, wide, "modern" thoroughfare through the infinitely fascinating and tangled mesh of the souks of Cairo or Damascus? For such a program, the Orient is mysterious chiefly in the sense that it is crooked: its "mystery" is synonymous with its perverse inertia; its queerness of habit is a moral miasma which must be met by the moral drainage in which our political engineers are skilled. The same disease, the same cure. But in their writings these very statesmen infallibly quote Kipling and emphasize the traditional mental gulf.

Thus Lord Cromer becomes eloquent on the incomprehensibility of Egypt. When the British entered, "they had to deal with a society which was not only in a backward state of civilisation, but which was also, from their point of view, well-nigh incomprehensible . . . even in the most trivial matters, the Oriental will generally do or say the opposite to what the European would do or say under similar circumstances."¹ If the contrast of mentalities really runs so deep as to produce "opposite" judgments, Lord Cromer's effort to bring the blessings of European civilization into Egypt would have been, not alone fore-

¹ *Modern Egypt*, ii, pp. 165, 164.

doomed to failure, but essentially reprehensible. But when one examines the clearest instances of this opposition which Lord Cromer gives, it reduces to very modest dimensions.

Four of them consist in contrasts which are, in Cromer's own terms, simply the contrast between today and yesterday in Europe. (1) In the Moslem world, civil and religious law are united whereas "in all civilized European states" there is a *tendency* to separate them. (2) In the Moslem view, it is the state's business to oblige its citizens to be religious and moral, a view "long since abandoned in the West." (3) In eastern theory the state is supreme owner of the soil, a theory which in the West is "well-nigh forgotten." (4) The Moslem theory condemns the acceptance of usury, whereas in the West (since the Middle Ages) the use of credit is recognized and encouraged. Cromer adds that, "in general, Oriental punishments are cruel, whilst European punishments are mild"; to which we must again append the note of very recent time. If such contrasts as these constitute incomprehensibility, one must infer that the feudal age in Europe is also beyond our understanding. In many of its most striking peculiarities, the Orient is, indeed, simply medieval.

But there are other contrasts. Oriental alphabets, we are assured by Lord Cromer, are intricate, European simple! Again, many Orientals begin to write on the right of the page, Europeans begin on the left,—a mystery of the same order as that whereby vehicles in France pass on the right while in England they pass on the left. These profundities represent, I think, the depth of Lord Cromer's case. Nothing is alleged which can in the least justify the remark that in languages, art, architecture and music "it will be found that on almost every point the practises and tastes of the one are opposed to those of the other," unless

in Lord Cromer's vocabulary every difference is an instance of "opposition." It is true that oriental music is to us only beginning to be enjoyable, while also "European music fails to please Orientals." But is there nothing in oriental beauty which is recognized by us as beautiful? Is there no architecture, no tapestry, no fabric, no poetry, to which our perceptions admit us? Is the oriental sense so "opposite" that its beauty is our ugliness, and vice versa? If so, then indeed we must abandon not alone the effort to understand the Orient, but every effort to exchange ideas, to make agreements, to co-operate, and most certainly to propose standards. The whole idea of "backwardness" loses its footing, and all political structures, such as mandates, built upon it become criminally inept.

But what absurdity! To the great achievements of human art the assent is human, not Oriental nor Western. The gods of beauty are the same for all mankind: localisms are intriguing variants on a central common spirit. The same is true of the gods of right and of reason. When therefore a western writer asserts of the Egyptian mind that it "is eminently wanting in symmetry and in the logical faculty"; that "accuracy is abhorrent to the Egyptian mind"; that the Egyptian will accept rumors "in the inverse ratio of their probability"; that "with number or quantity he goes hopelessly astray" and that he "has no idea of time and distance," we are obliged to infer that the writer is reckless of the accuracy and even the truth of his own statements.² The Egyptian has, in fact, a remarkable natural sense for number and quantity. The philosophy of unlimited relativity is the negation of all international politics, both in thought and in practice. The only philosophy which can sustain any international understanding or undertaking or law is a philosophy which can

² J. E. Marshall, *The Egyptian Enigma*, pp. 187-189.

recognize the common, universal, necessary element in our human standards of judgment. We must declare open war on the frivolities of our current pragmatisms, instrumentalisms, relativisms, agnosticisms and other modes of abandoning the necessary basis for all hopeful international life. Men enjoy and live in an identical reason.

The Orient is indeed mysterious to us, as one manifestation of life is mysterious to another, as woman is mysterious to man and man to woman. But this mystery does not condemn us to believe in a diversity of principle which would defeat conversation itself. Whatever the mystery of the Orient—and we shall be much in its presence—let us have done with this idle, self-indulgent and sinister superstition that the point of view of the Oriental is wholly different from that of the Westerner, that “never the twain shall meet.” They have met. For we cannot forget that much of our logic, our mathematics, our philosophy, our religion has passed over directly from the oriental mind to our own.

We say, then, without hesitation that something in our measures of backwardness will be valid in the Orient and elsewhere. To begin with the first test, *the mastery of nature*, I am prepared to say that the claims and the advantages of science and economy are the same for the East as for the West. Science cannot be a private nor local possession. As a body of well-tested truth, it can bring no damage to any valid human interest; rather, there is no human interest that can afford to be handicapped by the absence of that scientific knowledge which is available to it,—I include poetry, art, religion.

There is a difficulty, a psychological difficulty. Attention to science and its applications requires the full stretch of mental power, and therefore contests the field with other

interests. Every man must choose, and has the right to choose, what things he shall occupy his mind with. The scientific mentality taken alone is on the whole a dreary and barren mentality: the world would die of a pure diet of science. It has all the more reason to treasure those parts which have not yet been devastated by its dominance. Individuals, I say, must be free to choose their preoccupation, and such choice may shut science out. But it is no longer possible for *nations* to choose with the same sharpness. No nation may today excuse itself from facing in all literal definiteness the facts of poverty, population, economy, disease, on the ground that its genius and interest are in meditation; that it despises organization as a western obsession; that the relations of cause-and-effect belong to a minor level of truth within the whole of metaphysics. The national life must find room for both directions of thought; recognizing that the meditation which feels obliged to retreat from facts is unreal and unspiritual.

This truth touches closely the most intimate seat of cultural differences, the indigenous religion, which modern politics has learned to let alone as far as possible. Politics has only insisted that a true religion will require no breach of public morals or order, assuming that we know what those words mean. Henceforth it becomes a further test of true religion that it requires no hostility to science, but actively promotes the scientific mastery of nature. If any religion tends to take its followers away from concern for the physical conditions of human welfare, or from interest in human suffering, that religion shows itself to be somewhere false. I do not say it is scientifically false: I say it is religiously false.

For the world is not made on the principle of hostility between spirit and matter, whatever Paul or Plato or Sankaracharya may have said. The mind is not an enemy

of the body, nor the body of the soul. The world is made on the principle that matter is capable of aiding the spirit, and is destined to do so.

Let me be very definite about this. I do not say, with Bruno, that "matter is a divine thing": I say only that it may be,—it has the capacity for being divine or devilish. I do not say that "the body is the temple of God": it has that possibility, and many other possibilities. It is not true that "work is worship," unqualifiedly: *laborare est orare* is a savage mockery in a great body of the world's work. But work can be *made* a part of the program of a life of worship; and all honest worship will make of its devotees honest workers.

At the present moment the world's social programs—which always have a philosophy of some sort behind them—veer toward one of two opposite falsities: the falsity of scientific materialism, which pretends that devotion to the economic interest is the gateway to human welfare and happiness; and the falsity of abstracted piety, which places the safety of the soul and so the prime motive of living in the unseen apart from the seen. It is the bad conscience of the West that—having failed to grasp the sense of its own religion—it has lived uneasily in both falsities, and now lunges toward the material side. It is the danger of the East that in reaction against abstracted piety it will misinterpret western history and fall bodily into the opposite falsity, the pseudo-scientific materialistic world-view.

Since science and religion belong together, there can be no sound culture where a necessity is felt to cancel either in the interest of the other. Either one could be used as a measure of advancement or backwardness: religion is intrinsically the more perfect measure, but for obvious reasons we must count it unavailable—to use it we should

have first to reach general agreement on its true nature. Science involves no such embarrassment: it is universal in its claim without arousing party-spirit. In the ancient world, Hindu physics was one thing, Greek physics another: today physics has no national tag. The professor of biology from Harvard, Oxford, Berlin, steps into the laboratory of the Imperial University of Tokyo, inhales the odor of all biological laboratories, and feels himself at once among brethren. And, as there is nothing local about science, so there is nothing local about the value of its applications. Here is one thing, at least, on which men everywhere can unite as in a world-enterprise. The "mastery of nature" is a universal measure of advancement.

It would be worth enquiring what it is that makes the nature-mastering mind. Let us note simply that it is not purely an intellectual affair. Power over nature, though it show itself in vulgar aggregates of wealth or waste itself in war, has required character to achieve; and springs from the moral as much as from the mental side of human quality. Power itself is without ethical color; but it cannot be gained without morale. For example, one obvious ingredient of the nature-mastering mentality is consecutive application, or, on the physical side, the *love of work*. Perhaps as a crude measuring-stick, within this scientific-economic field, there could be no better clue than this to the stage of civilization.

The peoples of the world can be strung along a wide scale of degrees from those who regard labor as the chief curse of the race to those who find delight in it. The love of steady work requires a stretch of imagination. There are men who will exert themselves without limit under the excitement of the chase, or show great endurance in the pack train, who yet lose interest in the sustained, im-

personal, interlocking efforts of organized industry. The European who wants a labor supply in the tropics often finds his problem as one of forced labor or none. The plantation owner in Mexico, finding that his native workers have a strictly limited interest in wages, may try to hold them by the ancient device of keeping them in debt, only to find that there is a limit of toleration beyond which the Indian will abandon goods and family and take to the forest as an outlaw rather than continue the routine. It is not possible to identify the love of work with the love of working *for us*; but there is such a thing as believing in work and enjoying systematic effort toward a distant end, which throws mankind into a significant series.

In the use of this love-of-work test, it is necessary to distinguish sharply the backward from the decadent. After a successful period of exertion in which all take part, a society frequently develops a gospel of leisure-as-the-greatest-good, and comes to regard labor as a sign of personal or class inferiority. This way lies national decay; but it does not by itself mean backwardness.

"The strenuous conditions of the modern world" are created not by deliberate western will, but by the inexorable movement of history. Mankind can live on the planet in greater numbers only at the price of greater intelligence and greater exertion. The preservation of leisure itself, and its priceless fruits, is only possible through the general habit of work; and work is death to the soul unless it is enjoyed. Here, then, in this love of work we have a very rough and variable, but usable, test of backwardness.

But how is it with the second of our common measures of backwardness, that of *public morality*? The case here is more difficult. Moral conceptions must be expected to vary more than scientific conceptions.

Shall the western form of the family be the rule for every tribe and race? To insist on this as a standard, though it has been done, would seem to pass out of the region of stupidity into that of scandal. Or shall we expect, at a moment when our own conceptions of property are undergoing development, that every nation recognized as progressive must have the same institutions as our own, the same individualism, the same competition, the same production for profit? When Captain Carbillet ruled the Jebel Druze (1923-1925), he saw with great clearness that the prevailing system of land-tenure, whereby the great chiefs redistributed the land every three years, prevented tree-planting and every other long-time improvement of the soil, with results disastrous to agriculture. He forthwith introduced, or tried to introduce, the European system of peasant ownership in small permanent holdings. But, aside from the offence he thus gave to the chieftains,—which may have been a part of his intention,—he was unable with the land to transfer initiative to hands unaccustomed to planning. His view of the western measure was too absolute.

Nevertheless, for morality as for science, there must be a kernel of which we can say that it is right for everybody everywhere. The idea that in morals everything is relative to time and place is demonstrably false. There is, for example, no tribe which does not regard indiscriminate man-killing as a major moral offence, although almost every tribe on the planet—as our moral relativists infallibly point out—regards some form of man-killing as virtuous. What they fail to emphasize is that these virtuous head-huntings or other killings are strictly defined and limited. Everywhere, murder is a crime.

An ethical standard is necessarily universal if it is a normal condition of every viable form of social life. As

an instance, take commercial integrity; we might fairly paraphrase Locke's words and say that "Truth and the keeping of faith belong to man as man, and not as a member of this or that society." Exchange is a device implied in the division of labor; and exchange cannot develop if each party must bring pressure on the other to get him to perform his part. The man who, after receiving the goods of another, then refuses to carry out his side of the contract is burdening future transactions of the kind with a load of distrust, is helping to make them impossible, and so far becomes an enemy of his social order *whatever that order may be*. This logic is not western, but universal; for the division of labor is a device to which every society getting beyond the rudiments is committed. The same logic applies to those agreements, written or not, which determine the reward of public servants. Bribery is not a method which may suit some lands and not others: the clandestine swelling of private incomes by admitting the purchase of functions professedly disinterested is a cancer in every possible social order. Experience brings every nation in time to this view; but experience works more rapidly in teaching commercial integrity than in teaching integrity in public office. For in the one case the consequences of a breach of honor are likely to be visited on the head of the culprit in loss of trade; in the other they may fall only on the group and at a later time. The *clientèle* of the official may not have the privilege of the merchant's customers of changing their favor. Hence in China, where the level of commercial and personal integrity is uncommonly high, integrity in public office is far more difficult to secure. But in the one case as in the other there is an inescapable logic which confirms the measure as universal.

There is something, then, in our standards of morality, public and private, which cannot be tarred with the brush

of “merely relative” or “merely pragmatic” principle. We are not engaging here in the enterprise of finding all of these stable elements of right and wrong—an enquiry in which Kant has made a memorable beginning. We shall be satisfied to have singled out one typical point of “integrity” as necessary and universal, sufficient evidence that such elements exist as can be shared and applied without self-righteousness by all peoples of the earth. Other such elements will appear as our enquiry proceeds.

CHAPTER IV

ARE THE MEASURES SUFFICIENT?

THESE two measures, scientific and moral, may fairly be taken as universal: they give an index of civilization, not merely of western civilization. But before we hasten to apply them it is prudent to ask whether they are sufficient.

Certainly, they are not the only measures. They answer only two questions about a civilization,—vital questions, no doubt, but still questions we happened to think of partly because we have recently done rather well in those lines! Let us try other questions. In Ellsworth Huntington's book, *Civilization and Climate*, there is an attempt to grade the civilization of a number of the leading nations. The chief measures used are: the power to lead and control other races; the ability to carry out far-reaching enterprises; inventiveness. Not quite the same as ours, more interested in special kinds of achievement. Enterprise and inventiveness are special traits contributing to the "mastery of nature." Power to lead and control others may be a special outgrowth of this same mastery, plus a degree of moral self-control. When these tests are applied, China and India fall far behind Japan, which is rated beside Italy. A Chinese writer notes that Japan's leap forward came when the Japanese showed their ability to carry out the "far-reaching enterprise" of conquering a western state. And, after detailing other incidents of control, enterprise, invention, he comments, "If this is civilization, let me go back to the cave." I fear that in these proposals Professor Huntington

has left the ground of what is universally valid. But let us try again; for something is doubtless missing from our set of criteria.

Suppose, for example, we include in our judgments that simplest of all measures, the positive satisfactions of life. We have already referred to the ease with which we overlook it. How would China, India, Arabia, stand if we align the nations in terms of fine art, religion, personal relationships? I am not ready to say that the great art of the Orient, which has been the product of a luxurious and aristocratic society relatively careless of misery in the social base, should be esteemed in forgetfulness of that cost. Nor am I sure that the state of mind in which that art was born can be recovered under modern conditions. The persistent racial stuff will have to come to flower in a new way and within a new balance, if the impulse of creative imagination is to renew itself there. But I am ready to say that, even now, there are many respects, as in grace of life, dignity of thought and language, courtesy, hospitality, conversation, intuitive poetry and metaphysical sense, in which it is we who are the backward peoples.

This circumstance enforces another ground for caution in the measuring process: no society is uniform,—the measures seldom read all the same way.

According to our economic measure, the Orient at present stands low. Apart from the slow rate of scientific life, the love of labor is feeble, negligence is high,¹ resistance to change from ancient methods is enormous, financial logic is primitive.

¹ Negligence is an interesting quality, an economic defect which is also a moral defect. To be "shiftless," to "let things slide," to be "irresponsible" or "unreliable,"—these are different ways of naming a state of mind in which the task in hand has less hold on one's interest than one's personal sensations, fatigues, whims, pleasures. "Let it go!" It is one form of that lack of objectivity which comes close, I think, to being the psychological essence of all backwardness.

But these judgments are all too sweeping. The disposition to work, for example, withered in one group or stratum of any persistent society is likely to be the more deeply rooted in some other part of the same society. In many peoples, a relatively idle and vain male population is balanced by a highly laborious female population. The great capacity of the typical Arab landlord for leisure, magnificent leisure, implies unremitting industry on the part of some group of fellahin. Backward classes are more numerous than backward peoples.

Then again, on our chosen grounds of comparison, we are bound to remember that in our pride of attainment there is something of the vanity that attends a rather new accomplishment.

We have to look back barely more than a hundred years to find our own society devoid of railroads and of everything we would now call an engine, as well as of much science. Our public education was in a primitive state. A Swiss treatise on geography dated 1847 compares the "enlightenment" of certain peoples as follows:

"Ireland is certainly less enlightened than England, and *especially than Scotland*. . . . Nevertheless, its situation in this respect has been much exaggerated. It counts fewer students than the two kingdoms mentioned, but approximately as many as France. In France the number of male students is *one in twenty-three*; in Ireland, *one in twenty-six*."

The *goût-de l'instruction* among the common people of France is a product of the years 1830-1880.² In the forty years following the Revolution, the only free schools were those of the *frères* authorized by Napoleon, and two-thirds of the communes had no schools at all: public opinion

² Georges d'Avenel, "Le Goût de l'Instruction et son Prix depuis trois Siècles," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 août, 1929. With a new economy and a widely distributed well-being has come the amazing change in the program of childhood.

was antagonistic—children had better ways of growing up, gathering fagots, caring for the domestic animals, or smuggling tobacco.

No doubt, all that has come out during the century was latent in us at that time, because we were on the trail of the method. Very good! Then, if we are thinking of the value of existing cultures, and not merely of their momentary status, *latency* is one of the things we should do well to be careful of. And what should you say is now latent in Egypt or Arabia? Judging by what their peoples once produced, there is good stock there, and the possibility of another crop. Let us not plow so deep on the score of backwardness that we mutilate the stock. Is it so surely to the by-and-large advantage of the world that we shall become the impresarios of the East merely because its past hundred years have not been *our* past hundred years?

Even in these well-justified moral standards, there is something suggesting the scheme of a modern "social survey." The existence of social surveys in the West indicates that all is not well in the moral structure of our own industrialized society; it indicates, further, that we expect science to help us out of the trouble. Soviet Russia and ourselves agree in this expectation; I fear we are both going to be disappointed. For not even the strictest logic of commercial morality can get into operation without what we called a point of *honor*, a willingness to do something that could not be compelled: and this, science cannot furnish. Recently I saw a very excellent book, the first social survey of Peking. One found there a systematic view of poverty, the slums, crime, privilege, prostitution, water-and-light, health, and the rest. It should have been most helpful to the municipal government; yet I do not hear that the authorities have been using it. Do they like these evils, and this backwardness? Probably not more than we

like our unemployment, corrupt elections, crime waves and cancer. But perhaps they have an intuition that such things must be shed primarily by inner growth, and only partly by administration. There is something artificial and ephemeral about our subdivisions of vice and virtue, our categories of social defect. There are faults of individual character which need not be attacked one by one, because with a new current of life they will (in Ruskin's phrase) "drop off like dead leaves." Likewise with the social order: its chief cure is not the social engineer—still less the foreign social engineer—but a new burst of social imagination, perhaps a new national impulse. In our moral analyses, "science" is getting out of its proper cage, and intruding on the sphere of a living unity of which the Orient is still soundly aware.

The real ground for hesitation, then, in those cock-sure judgments of backwardness which have been sustaining our attitudes toward the Orient, and especially toward the Near East, is no crippled and crippling philosophy of relativity in regard to the standards which we have, but a genuine deference to qualities which may escape us. Over all the Orient, there broods this sense of *latency*, of an immense and unfathomed capacity for new life, the potency of something radically different from our type, if it can be given its own time and mode of growth. We have no need to deal fearfully with the "mystery of the Orient," but we have every reason for dealing respectfully with qualities which, varying as they do from ours, give promise of still other variants, not poisonous and weird, but noble, humane, and also universal.

In that mystery we can detect even now numerous auspicious qualities. One is an inexhaustible *power to wait*. The relation of the Orient to the sense of time is full of reward for the explorer. To some, as to Walter Bage-

hot, it appears as a genius for fixity in contrast with the western genius for change. But let us rather say, instead of "fixity," which suggests death, a persistent sense of the eternal element in change, a background and cure for the dizziness of unmitigated flux. This sense of the eternal gives stability, a certain scorn of small anxieties about time, a tantalizing lordliness about the ebb of time which we of a thousand engagements cannot work into our organization. This implies no hostility to change itself, nor even to intense action or rapid reform, when the moment for that change has come: it implies merely a premonition that this moment will announce itself in Allah's good time, and that meantime one's cue is to wait! One marvels at the vitality of the Orient under scourges which would mean the death of less vitally tenacious types of consciousness: the mystery here is the vast subconscious reserve into which awareness withdraws itself from the outer locus of evil. I grant, the oriental demand on the human will is, in general, too mild: if one enters on the policy of mastering nature through science, the power of patience will not be enough. But we, on the other hand, rely too implicitly on the union of plan and effort. We have become deluded by our phrase "mastery of nature" into the fancy that we literally achieve it,—make grass grow, cure disease, add cubits to our stature, regulate the mind, society, history. The Orient knows better, and is therefore more at home with time.

Another of these qualities is a keen sense of the *personal element* in what we take to be impersonal affairs.³ In science and in law, where we conceive personal factors eliminated, the Orient tends to find will, choice, the recognition of personal differences, always relevant.

³ The converse may also be true,—as is commonly said,—that the Orient takes the world impersonally where we are prone to detect a personal accent.

It happens that we are beginning to see the deficiency of impersonal rule in the legal order. If regularity of procedure becomes sacred, unique conditions fail to get due hearing. Especially into criminal law, where no case is precisely like another, where personal histories create the essence of events, we have begun to introduce that "discretion" which to the genius of the Orient has been at the heart of all justice.

The Cadi, at Fez, is confronted by two litigants.⁴ They contradict one another, and there are no witnesses. Which of the tales is true? A British court, in the same dilemma, falls back on the intuition of the judge. The Cadi has two resources. He sends out an enquirer from the court to investigate the circumstances,—a dangerous expedient, giving the enquirer much opportunity for private reward. But further, he recalls a circumstance which a western court would find it its duty to forget, a personal circumstance, irrelevant to justice and to procedure. The litigants are both Jews. The circumstance is highly important; for to the Jew an oath in the Cadi's Moslem court has no value,—it is only the oath before the synagogue that he holds sacred. The Cadi decides that the decision shall run in favor of whichever of the two is willing to make his statement on oath on the following Saturday in his own synagogue. Thereupon, one of the litigants steps forward, makes payment to the other, and the case is settled.

The personal element in law is hard to keep in its place: a system of justice requires a note of impersonality; the legal and social burden of the modern world cannot be carried without the rules and fictions of equality which enter into all organization. It remains true that every law by itself is an abstraction, and that to live on abstractions alone is the prescription for social death. Fortunately,

⁴ I owe this instance to Mr. George Wickersham.

personality is the sort of thing which, rightly taken, can absorb an unlimited amount of the impersonal: the problem is capable of solution. In working it out, Orient and Occident are destined to assist one another.

It belongs to the irony of history that just at this moment when, after a long latent period, the Orient is stirred by a new impulse of growth, discarding many of its old abuses and choosing freely from all sources what it can use,—just at this moment the West should be seized with a new impulse of self-propagation whereby, with other things, a large part of the Near East comes for the first time under its direction. The element of irony is visible in the confusion of principle with which the event is ushered in. It arrives in the modest form of “aid and advice” while announcing the emphatic note of “self-determination.”

Leaving aside at this time all questions of perfidy in the lines of event, the most hopeful approach to the situation is that principles are genuinely confused. There is an ideal of self-determination of peoples; and yet it is obviously not an absolute and unrestricted principle. Taken in an unlimited sense it would display its absurdity by reducing the world to a dust of petty nationettes. So too with that note of aid and advice, and the principle of control lying behind the euphemism: mingled with an amount of unmysterious, grasping self-assertion there has been some honest sense of duty. Imperialism in our day has developed at least so much compunction that it dares not parade under its own name; it cannot work with the ruthless non-conscience of earlier times; it hardly ventures to distinguish its defensible ingredients and defend them! It is mentally confused about its own essence. Among the unsolved problems of the present world-order none is more pressing than this: to disentangle the right from the wrong

in the theory of self-determination and in the policy of expansion which curbs it.

The conflict of principle is not new. Since the dawn of history there has been in the world something like a variegated national will to live; and since the world has become sensibly filled the more virile types have tended to overflow their limits and impose their manner of being on the rest of mankind. The self-determination of peoples has been checked by the self-determination of other peoples whose "self" has reached the pod-bursting stage. The impulse of ripening Persian, Macedonian, Roman types to spread their sway and their likeness abroad has meant torture and national mutilation for Syrian, Jew, Greek,—and a unitary world for the dispersal of Greek, Jewish, Syrian thought, a result not wholly mischievous, whatever the quality of the impulse. This same impulse is alive today, though now it works simultaneously from many centers of maturing nationhood. But what has happened in the world of today is, first, that the political means of cultural expansion has no longer the ancient pertinence, since the viable elements of culture have found numerous ways of spreading themselves; and, second, that what is now wanted in this spreading is not the type of mind of the individual nation, British, German, French, American,—it is something more nearly universal.

It is the organization of a world which is going on; and our problems are made by the fact that, while the world-consciousness is rapidly and spontaneously forming itself, the world organization will not effect itself, but requires its aggressive agents. And these agents, well disposed in the main objectives, are also disposed to reward themselves well for their efforts. It is because western nations have first felt the coming necessity for a world mentality that they have assumed a major rôle in world control.

Fortunately these nations are vulnerable at one point: they profess a regard for principle! So long as principles are confused, the egoisms of national conduct as of individual conduct take advantage of the obscurity. If we can effect valid definitions of the nation and its rights, of backwardness and its implications, of the world-order and its universal requirements, the western world will compel itself, however reluctantly, to take the consequences. And we may be in time to save the new life of the ancient East! To contribute to that end, through clarifying the principles of world-order, is the object of this book.

Let us undertake these problems in the light of particular examples which present lively national movements at different stages, struggling with problems of backwardness, and equally vigorous limiting forces of various types, national and international. Our first example is Egypt.

PART II

THE BURDEN OF EGYPT

CHAPTER V

NATIONAL EGYPT

EGYPT is one of the lands possessed of a lively national movement. In my judgment this movement has a peculiar claim to our interest: it has reality; it is not a passing disorder due to the vanity and ambition of a few superficially intelligent young "leaders,"—an Anglo-Saxon word finding its way into the world vocabulary. There is an easy formula with which nationalist disturbances may be dismissed,—I have recently heard it on the lips of an American colonel of infantry returning from the Philippines by way of Cairo: "You have a random crowd of office-seekers; they find foreigners in possession of the posts; they have no sense of what constitutes competence; they therefore agitate to get the stranger out on the assumption that this will be tantamount to getting themselves in,—salaries, titles, decorations, a career! The last thing they think of is that an official has something to do for his nation which will take ability and hard work." My colonel was speaking of the situation in Manila: he said he had not looked into things in Egypt, but had no doubt they were the same.

If the case of the Philippines comes perfectly under the formula—and even without having been there one may hold a reasonable doubt—I am satisfied that that of Egypt does not. On one point of principle underlying the formula we may agree: a genuine national movement is always a movement of a people, not of leaders alone, certainly not of office-seekers, nor of a faction. The idea of nationality is democratic. It grows out of the fact that there is a "char-

acter" in a nation, a peculiar way of thinking and feeling which begets unique customs, and therefore laws and public deeds. The principle of nationality maintains that such impulses ought to have the expression they require; that this is precisely what we mean by political life; that men are not quite men until their moral outlook can get a political shape molded by itself; that as against any foreign organ of expression, an organ of the same stock as the populace is best fitted for this end. Hence an honest national movement grows from the soil upwards. A national party composed purely of intelligentsia or of an aristocracy of any sort is a contradiction in terms. For the same reason, nationalism in countries deeply cleft by class or religious antagonisms must be weak. A national movement is a solidarity between mass and leaders on the basis of a common land and life and a common character. The Egyptian movement has this democratic quality. Consider some of the evidences for this judgment.

There exists an Egyptian people. No matter what racial strands have entered into it, no matter whether they are Copts or Moslems, the Egyptians are the people whose home is the lower valley of the Nile, whose bodies and minds have been shaped by the working of that valley, under that sun, between those deserts, in the shadow of those monuments, tombs, vague memories of ancient greatness all gone from consciousness. They are the people who can live there as others cannot. European stock in Egypt is said to run out in four or five generations. Other stocks in times past have likewise succumbed or melted into the persistent Egyptian character, recognizable throughout the monuments of seven thousand years: Jews, Arabs, Turks, Armenians, Nubians, Syrians, Kurds,—all who remain in Egypt are drawn, if not out of their own trait, yet always into the Egyptian.

It goes with this deep assimilation between people and land that the Egyptian cannot easily find himself at home elsewhere. His sense of *patrie* is compelling; no other land will suit him. Egyptian students go abroad, now, by the hundreds; but almost never do they settle abroad. The relationship between man and habitat is individual.

This people, since the time of the Persian occupation (525 B.C.) chiefly under alien rulers commanding alien soldiery, was long without a political *self*. What those rulers did, and ordered done, was never, for them, what *they* did: it was not "We, Egypt" that acted.

There was an Egypt of culture, learning, tradition, that held its own and commanded the respect of Persian and Macedonian, of the Ptolemies and of Rome itself; this Egypt only slowly under the rule of Byzantium and the lure of Islam lost conscious touch with its own antiquity, to become the chief center of Moslem thought. Meantime the Egyptian peasant had the reputation for docility, submissiveness. He was helpless, had no opinions, bowed his head to necessity; he was wealth to his masters. National consciousness begins with a contrast-effect: it is "we" against "they," the aliens. Such a "we" requires a focus, namely a mind who is aware of this "we-against-they," one that can give this self the power to act.

This mind, for Egypt—at least for modern Egypt—was Mohammed (Mehemet) Ali. Himself an alien, slaughterer of aliens, ridding Egypt of Mamelukes and Albanians, he made for himself an army of Egyptians, of fellahin. An army instructed and led by imported French officers, but nevertheless doing things as Egypt-in-action, and disproving the rumor almost believed by themselves (and still by some) that the Egyptian had no fight in him,—that is, no ultimate I-will, no resistance, no character. This was a proof worth giving, in face of that rumor. Under

Mohammed Ali, Egypt achieved a self, a pride, a set of memories which were not the dying memories of greater ancestors. It is just a hundred years ago that Mohammed Ali, with ninety thousand valid Egyptian troops at his back, knew that Egypt could command respectful attention from Arabia, suzerain Turkey, Europe; could issue acts over its own name in his contemporary world; and Egypt began waking to a new national existence. The fiscal separation of Egypt from Turkey was a sign of something; that something was the union of a people and its leader.

A generation of incipient national life under Mohammed Ali was enough in this fertile soil to create a popular habit of selfhood, a habit which could survive another generation of mediocre rulership, not meaningless, but fumbling and fantastic. During this generation, the fellah-mass of Egypt had a composite head for its body,—the army. An army of peasants is a sort of peasant-school, a rude education in action, valuable to those who have no other school, uprooting them, breaking their somnambulism, shifting scenes, compelling versatility of a sort, inducing comparisons, much Arab talking with varied companions, criticisms, thought. The Egyptian, able to fight but no lover of fighting, hating conscription, could be stung by it to new seeing and thinking. Through the army, for a generation, Egypt observed *official* Egypt, with the question in mind, Is this official Egypt “we,” or is it “they,” the alien?

Official, Khedival Egypt had its undoubted opportunity to be “we” with Egypt. It was well-launched on the way of contrast with Turkey, that particular cleavage bound to deepen. For, to the populace, the chief visible signs of that suzerain power were the Turkish officers of the army and the annual tribute, neither sign being of the endearing type. Said and Ismail were clear enough that Egypt is no

POLITICAL CHRONOLOGY OF EGYPT SINCE 1800

The French Invasion

Napoleon enters Egypt to embarrass England, 1798
 Nelson destroys the French fleet at Aboukir, 1798
 Napoleon slips back to France, 1799
 France evacuates Egypt, 1801
 Egypt reverts to Ottoman rule

Mohammed Ali, Viceroy, 1805-1849. Founder of modern Egypt

Expulsion of English detachments, 1807
 Destruction of the Mamelukes, 1811
 Arabian campaigns, 1811-1819

Conquest of the Sudan, 1820

Campaign in Syria and Asia Minor, 1831-1839

Abbas I (grandson of Mohammed Ali), Viceroy 1849-1854

Nerveless, ineffective, reacting against European ideas

Mohammed Said (youngest son of Mohammed Ali), Viceroy 1854-1863

Well-meaning, a mild reformer, prodigal, leaving Egypt in debt to Europe

Suez Canal begun as French concession, 1859

Ismail (grandson of Mohammed Ali), Viceroy and Khedive, 1863-1879

Uniting enterprise and prodigality, completing the financial bondage of Egypt to European creditors

Suez Canal opened, 1869

Gordon sent by Ismail to Sudan to suppress slave trading, 1874

Europe, anxious about its loans, sets up commission of debt, 1876

Ismail deposed by Europe; Gordon resigns from Sudan, 1879

Tewfik (son of Ismail), Khedive, 1879-1892. Europe's Khedive

Arabi, spokesman of Egyptian vs. Turkish element of army, 1880

Arabi, spokesman of Egyptian vs. foreign budgetary control, 1882

Riots in Alexandria; *Arabi* fortifies Alexandria, June, 1882

Alexandria bombarded by British, July 11, 1882

Arabi defeated by British at Tel-el-Kebir, Sept. 13, 1882

British Occupation of Egypt, 1882-1914

Sir Evelyn Baring (Lord Cromer), Consul-General, 1883-1907

Gordon sent by England and Egypt to evacuate Sudan, 1884

Capture of Khartoum by the Mahdi; death of Gordon, 1885

Abbas II (*Abbas Hilmi*, son of *Tewfik*), Khedive, 1892-1914

Sudan reconquered by Kitchener in name of Egypt, 1898

Establishment of Condominium in Sudan, 1899

Anglo-French Convention acquiescing in British Occupation, 1904

Sir Eldon Gorst, Lord Kitchener, Consuls-General, 1907-1914

British Protectorate, from outbreak of World War, 1914-1922

Abbas Hilmi deposed by British, December 1914, who substitute *Hussein Kamil* (son of *Ismail*), Sultan 1914-1917

Fuad I (youngest son of *Ismail*) Sultan 1917-1922, King, 1922-

Saad Zaghlul, head of *Wafd*, 1918-1927

Lord Allenby, High Commissioner 1919-1925

Lord Milner's commission studies Egypt, 1919-1920

Declaration by Great Britain of Egypt's Independence, Feb. 28, 1922

Lord Lloyd, High Commissioner, 1925-1929

Sir Percy Loraine, High Commissioner, 1929-

Abbas renounces claim to throne, 1931

longer to be Turkey: they sharpened the definition of the political parting. Only, leaning away from Turkey meant, for them, leaning toward Europe; and their union with national Egypt was wrecked on that rock. Mohammed Ali himself was prescient enough to see the danger. Cultural Europe was to be courted; commercial Europe was to be used and dreaded.

Cultural Europe had come, and continued to come; had seen no nation in the valley; had set up its schools; had impressed its languages, codes, ideas,—all chiefly French, on intellectual Egypt, not disturbing nor helping the national base, supplying tools for later labor. Commercial Europe came also, not merely permitted, but invited, stirring up much business, bringing a railroad and also a Suez Canal, both of which served Europe first and Egypt second if at all, and both built chiefly at Egyptian cost.¹ Commercial Europe, favored by Capitulations and other privileges extended in its behalf, grew in numbers, reaching one hundred thousand canny, scheming heads within a nation of five million peasants who had nothing but an army to think with. Commercial Europe came, among various forms, as money-lender, dazzling ruler and fellah alike by the glitter of easy credit, weaving the silken net of usury. Farmer Egypt might well take pride in Egypt's "progress," in the public works of Ismail, the magnificent in imagination, builder of roads, bridges, telegraphs, light-houses, an Alexandrian harbor and a city—Port Said, founder of postal services, steamboat lines, and of the water, gas, and sewerage systems of Cairo and Alexandria,

¹ The Canal cost some £16,000,000. "In 1875, Disraeli, on behalf of the British Government, had taken advantage of Ismail's insolvency to buy through Rothschilds for £4,000,000 Ismail's founders' shares; while Egypt's fifteen per cent share of the profits was later ceded in payment of a debt of £700,000 to French financiers, who in the following seven years collected therefrom about double the total of their original loan." George Young, *Egypt*, p. 72.

the engineering modernizer of Egypt. The fellah might, now that his head was in action, drink up the brave beginnings of schooling to whose waters Mohammed Ali could not so much as drive him; he might take new hope in the prospect, now legally open, of becoming a private owner of land. But, blocked in that hope by his own debts, he was now further burdened by the debts of his Khedive; he was flogged, tortured, robbed, starved to extract from him wealth,—for whom? ² For the dynasty and the European, now alike alien. If the national movement were to complete itself, it must generate its own leaders from its own stock and blood. The significance of Arabi is that in him Egypt provides its own head.

Arabi was a fellah, a student at El Azhar,³ a soldier, a barracks lawyer, a man who could obey and also command, not skilled in either diplomacy or intrigue, honest, tenacious of purpose, audacious and timorous, shrewd and stupid in spots, impulsively active and dilatory, with a strain of rude fun in him to confuse solemn mockeries, no knower

² Lady Duff-Gordon's letters from Egypt give the best account of the experience of the Egyptian villager during this period:

"The hand of the government is awfully heavy upon us. All this week the people have been working night and day cutting their unripe corn, because 310 men are to go tomorrow to work on the railway below Siout. This green corn is, of course, valueless to sell and unwholesome to eat; so the magnificent harvest of this year is turned to bitterness at the last moment. From a neighbouring village all the men are gone, and seven more are wanted to make up the *corvée*. The population of Luxor is 1,000 males of all ages; so you can guess how many strong men are left after 310 are taken. . . . When I remember the lovely smiling landscape which I first beheld from my windows, swarming with beasts and men, and look at the dreary waste now, I feel the 'foot of the Turk' heavy indeed. Where there were fifty donkeys there is but one. Camels, horses, and all are gone; not only the horned cattle, even the dogs are more than decimated. Mankind has no food to spare for hangers-on."

Last Letters from Egypt, pp. 128, 137f.

³ Arabi was a contemporary, though not a pupil, of the reformer and nationalist Mohammed Abdu, Grand Mufti of Egypt, himself pupil and associate of Jamal-ud-Din-al-Afghani, prophet of Pan-Islamism in Egypt. Jamal-ud-Din founded the first national party in Egypt, al-Hizb-ul-Watani, to which Tewfik while heir to the throne showed more than feeble leanings. The pupils of Mohammed Abdu, Zaghlul among them, have manned later national activities. Cf. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *My Diaries*.

of Europe, but knowing his army, thinking of the body of his army as *Egypt* over against the general officers of the army, the Turks. He could perceive, and make the folk of Egypt perceive, that the doings of that army could not be *their* doings so long as directed and tied by the Khedive and his alien appointees. He had the wit to trace out the needs of the army to the ministry, the budget, the constitution; and the courage to present his demands to the source of power. He brought before Riaz, President of the Council, a demand that Osman Rifki, Turkish Minister of War, should be dismissed; for which "hanging-offense" he was called before this same Osman Rifki in court martial and disarmed. As the proceedings moved to their predestined conclusion, members of a fellah regiment, forewarned, broke tumultuously into court, overturning furniture great and small, with especial attention to the inkpots which were spilled on the Turkish heads as the owners were driven out of windows, and Turkish Osman having lost his dignity found it best to retire. He claimed for Egypt the right to vote its own budget, even while the foreigner claimed the right to control that budget for the security of his loans. The Powers set their moneybags against the claims of the army, preferring not to see the nation through the army; the character of the army, and of Arabi, was thereby fixed for European eyes: here was a "lawless uprising, threatening the Khedive and the established order in Egypt." As for the charitable idea "that the military party was the popular party, and was struggling for the liberties of Egypt," says Mr. Gladstone, "there is not the smallest rag or shred of evidence to support that contention." Nevertheless, the witnesses of Lord Cromer and of Sir Auckland Colvin—no lovers of national movements—have convinced posterity: "nothing can be more certain than that at that time there existed in Egypt

a national party who were working more or less in co-operation with the military party. . . . [The Arabi "revolt"] was more than a mere military mutiny. It partook in some degree of the nature of a *bona fide* national movement. It was not solely, or indeed, mainly directed against Europeans. . . . It was, in a great degree, a movement of the Egyptians against Turkish rule."⁴

Arabi's army, threatening "the established order in Egypt," alarms Europe. Commercial Europe brings political Europe to its side. The "established order" with an unquestioned Khedival head stands for the security of investments, payment on debts: Arabi and his army stand for resistance to European budget control, and heaven knows what else besides,—possibly an Egypt with a mind and will of its own, *ergo* dangers of many sorts. DeFreycinet and Gambetta, Gladstone and Granville become severe, menacing, screw themselves up to the unwonted point of armed intervention. The Egyptian Chamber claiming the right to vote Egypt's budget,—outrageous! Down with such a Chamber, says Granville: "it must end in their being put down by force"!

Under such threats, Arabi's Egypt, not knowing Europe, knowing nothing but its own national right, and not denying the due claims of the moneybags, steels itself. No craven submission such as we expect of Egypt: Arabi, ready with ten thousand Egyptians and ten thousand reserves to fight Europe! Standing at Alexandria in face of the British fleet. Blown out of Alexandria,⁵ standing again at Tel-el-Kebir. Broken to bits at Tel-el-Kebir, surprised

⁴ Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, i, pp. 226, 324.

⁵ Five months later an American traveler writes: "December 10, 1882. It was curious to see the results of the war so close at hand. The great square of Alexandria is all in ruins, and looks like Liberty Square in Boston after the great fire. The forts which brought on the bombardment are all banged to pieces and the guns are standing on their heads. There must have been some wonderful firing on the Englishmen's part." Phillips Brooks, *Letters of Travel*, p. 229.

at dawn, scattered in a hundred directions, thousands of them fell in desperate fight. Then, surrender, and the dissolution of the army, by order of the Khedive,—now sure that he sides with Europe. Great Britain, with the full consent of Europe, occupies Egypt, beginning a longer residence than any one in that day supposed. The Egyptian nation, losing Arabi, losing its army, has lost its head.

But fellah Egypt has developed a political sense, and now it is clear about Europe. Around the villages at night-fall there is talk about Arabi, and the fight “we” made against Europe. There is no shame in the story; there is the talk of peaceful, courageous men, who can laugh again over the *coup* of the inkpots, and lament the moral collapse of their ruined Arabi, but remember that they had a righteous cause and a leader of their own blood and bone. Legends enough for a nation of farmers to live on for another generation.

That generation was the generation of Cromer. Egypt finds itself in strong hands; it learns that they are just hands, and—the Sudan excepted—wise hands. Cromer does not want to be interfered with in his work of financial restoration by amateur popular bodies, any more than by a lively Egyptian army. National vocalizing means confusion. For order, he has the British army of occupation; for economy, the British advisers and controllers of the debt. Cromer is an honest man; he means well by Egypt, and *does* well in his own lines. The fellah needs a spokesman, and his army has been taken away from him: Cromer makes himself that spokesman. The fellah shall have, each one, his due share of the Nile, and no more; his share of the tax-burden, and no more; justice shall come to him, not rarely and as a special favor, but as the daily business of his government. What the fellah might have got by his army or his parliament, he gets through Cromer, who

serves Egypt as a sort of concentrated parliamentary organ. He intends no aid to any national movement in Egypt; he does little or nothing to train native officials or educate Egyptian youth. He is willing that the fellah should remain the unlettered, unaspiring and therefore undisturbing, poverty-bound tax-paying base of the Egyptian social pyramid. When Mustapha Kamel appears in the nineties with a national Idea, and a program, Lord Cromer will have none of him, and forbids the Khedive his company! He has not labored to hasten the day when Egypt shall stand by itself, and naturally enough he believes that day indefinitely distant. Yet, under Cromer, Egyptian nationality slept and grew strong.

It was not only that thinking Egypt had learned that an honest government is in some ways simpler, and easier to run, than an intriguing and corrupt one, and that it now seemed quite possible for Egyptians to run one themselves. It was that the individual Egyptian had acquired a new self-respect. It was not possible that he should be trained to believe in his civil rights and to claim them, and at the same time remain indifferent to his political right. Lord Cromer had treated Egyptians in some respects like men: it is neither their fault nor his if, so treated, they *become men*, and in other ways than he intended.

The total result was that, when Lord Cromer left Egypt, and even before that time, the nation gave unmistakable signs that in its view the moment had come when the often-promised end of the Occupation ⁶ should occur, or begin to occur.

⁶ There was no ambiguity about the original intention of Great Britain to make her occupation of Egypt a temporary affair. In view of the interest of other Powers in Egypt, it was a matter not of choice but of necessity for Great Britain to declare her policy. And to a France jealous and susceptible it would presumably have been impossible to announce an intention to make of Egypt a British Protectorate. Lord Dufferin was instructed to devise a plan for administering the country which would admit an early withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. And in January, 1883,

No doubt the eloquence, the unbridled polemic and genuine political ability of the young firebrand, Mustapha Kamel, had had their effect. No doubt also, the extreme and public punishments at Dinshawai⁷ had shaken general faith in the justice of Great Britain, her strongest claim to loyalty. But the fundamental fact, I believe, was not occasional: it was a sense of *timeliness*,—"There can be no other Cromer;—and we are ready!"

Ready for what? Some few nationalists, effendiat of Kamel's vintage, were bold enough to answer, "Immediate autonomy." It cannot be said that the nation had traveled

Lord Granville sent to the interested Powers a note explicitly defining the intentions of Great Britain, as follows:

"Although for the present a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, Her Majesty's Government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it."

This understanding was repeated many times in official utterances in and out of Parliament during the next ensuing years. It is easily possible that Lord Dufferin knew from the first that the date of withdrawal must be relatively long distant. No statesman can be held guilty of bad faith for a pure miscalculation on the point of time. Cromer's judgment was definite: "It was certain that in the early days of the occupation, the British Government stated publicly their desire to withdraw the British garrison, so soon as circumstances admitted; it was equally certain to all who considered the subject impartially, and with a full knowledge of the circumstances, that the British Government could not, with due regard to all the interests involved, carry out their declared intention." Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, ii, p. 390.

On the other hand, Egyptian statesmen are wholly justified in the resolve that these original engagements shall not be forgotten.

⁷"Dinshawai village is famous for the pigeons which the inhabitants breed; and the four or five officers with the column [engaged in minor manoeuvres, June, 1906], aware of this fact, asked permission to shoot the birds. There was some misunderstanding, and when the guns arrived at the scene they were met by a crowd of angry villagers. Neither party understood the language of the other, and in a scrimmage which followed, one officer received injuries [or according to other versions had a heat-stroke] from which subsequently he died. . . . Of twenty villagers found guilty of taking some part, four were condemned to death and the rest sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment and lashes. The Egyptian public was stupefied by the infliction of such terrible penalties. That feeling of anger was deepened by the archaic method adopted to carry out the execution of the sentences. The condemned Egyptians were hanged or flogged in public at the scene of the assault. Local British opinion was far from giving unanimous approval." P. G. Elgood, *Egypt and the Army*, pp. 23f.

so far.⁸ The intellectual having now come vocably onto the scene, with much ignorable shrillness and haste, the voice of the nation must be listened for somewhere underneath the surface babble. But we can no longer make the mistake of supposing that there is no national voice besides this clamor of party-men with their Programs and Solutions. There is, too, announcing its readiness to strike out with its own muscles, that subconsciously maturing national selfhood brought by degrees into normal action. The greatness of Cromer lay in the fact that he had created a *national experience*, an experience which had reached the entire population of Egypt: and the thought and feeling of Egypt are henceforth on a national scale. The party-man is now as much of an effect as he is a cause.⁹ And as "leader" he has found himself, more than once, outstripped by the popular passion which he could no longer control.

It was the nation, not the effendiat, that felt the struggles, the moral strains, the hopes and the disillusionments of the war; supplying the increasing demands of Great Britain in camels and men without which Allenby's

⁸ Sir Eldon Gorst's Report, 1907. Cf. P. G. Elgood, *Egypt and the Army*, p. 26 and note. Sir Eldon Gorst succeeding Cromer had to receive the brunt of the demand for immediate autonomy; his judgment was that the majority of the upper and middle classes did not want it. But he made a beginning of bringing Egyptian officials into responsible positions, inspiring President Roosevelt's impertinence: "Govern or get out."

⁹ The reluctance in Conservative Britain to recognize the reality of a national movement in 1907, as in 1882, is explained in part by a persistent diplomatic theory, namely that all signs of unrest in Egypt were due to the secret workings of French agencies. France had never at heart forgiven England for reaping so readily where France had so carefully plowed, sown and watered. On this theory the Declaration of 1904 should have put an end to all this nationalistic pother. France now promises to stop making things awkward for Britain in Egypt, either by asking when the Occupation is to end, "or in any other manner"; and, since there is no trouble in Egypt except of French devising, nothing original to the soil, we should hear no more from that quarter! When this perfectly good diplomatic theory seemed contradicted by the stream of journalistic vitriol that accompanied the close of Cromer's régime, there were personal explanations to be given. It was Mustapha Kamel and his school-boys that were making the noise. Theories of this sort, like Gladstone's, flourish best at a distance.

campaign against Turkey would have failed; and it has been the nation, not the effendiat, nor the leaders, which has given head and range to the post-war joys and resentments. It was not the official classes, it was the land of Egypt that in 1919, incensed at the arrest of Zaghlul and his fellows of the Wafd, their Delegation to Versailles, tore railroads to bits, closed Government offices, and brought life in Egypt to a momentary standstill.¹⁰

It needs but this glance at the rootages of the national movement in Egypt to put the action of Woodrow Wilson upon the national movement into its rightful setting. President Wilson is frequently credited with, or accused of, having stirred Egypt, and various other peoples, by his phrases about "self-determination" into precocious and impossible expectations, arousing ill-advised and troublesome national movements where hitherto soberer judgments prevailed.

Wilson's phrases had their influence. That influence during the war was welcome to the Allied Powers, who took pains to publish the notion of self-determination, as an aim of their warfaring, in the Near East. If the ideal of self-determination, taken abstractly, is intoxicating and even dangerous—and it is—the responsibility for offering the draught is not wholly Wilson's.

But, while Wilson became, in Egypt, a name to conjure with,¹¹ and war-time hopes grew freely about his prin-

¹⁰ For a fuller account, see below pp. 72f.

¹¹ What people have been thinking about comes to the surface in moments of great elation. In the general joy at the release of Zaghlul by Allenby in 1919, cries of Long live the Nation were mingled with Long live Wilson. Wilson's speech of Sept. 27, 1918, appears to have made an especially deep impression. W. T. Ellis in the *New York Herald* of June 21, 1919, wrote, "There could be no doubt of the appeal of patriotism to the hearts of even the humblest. . . . Something new happened in the long dormant East. The words that they shouted were the same all over the city, 'Yahia el Watan!' Long live the Nation." Royalty and fellahin mingled in the crowds, bedouins and cosmopolites, men and women. The cross and the crescent were joined on banners.

ciples, the fact remains that the national movement in Egypt is nigh a hundred years of age, with long roots in the memories, even in the traditions, of the common people.

A national movement in a Moslem country may be suspected of having a sectarian inspiration, born of Islamic separatism, perhaps of Pan-Islamic fraternity, as against Christian faith and practice.

So far as Pan-Islamism is concerned, if there has ever been a political movement of that stripe outside European imagination, it has never gained ground in Egypt.¹² The Christian Copts of Egypt have their differences with the Moslems; but they unite in being Egyptians. On the land, Copt and Moslem live side by side in peace, observing in many things the same customs. I am told by an Egyptian friend that "In celebrating our village feasts, the mosque is likely to borrow vessels from the church, and the church to borrow candlesticks from the mosque." In the cities the relations, more intellectual and dogmatic, affected by rivalries of various sorts, are less easy. But in the service of the state, in the ministries and elsewhere, the Copt is always found with the Moslem, and in a proportion usually greater than his numbers in the community. And in the Wafd, the dominant national party, Copts and Moslems work together.¹³

The political parties of Egypt are products of the national movement, either by direct generation or by oppo-

¹² P. G. Elgood, *Egypt and the Army*, pp. 18ff.

¹³ In dangerous times it is hard enough to determine the real political sentiment of any man, unless you are bound to him by friendship. The Copt is cautious. Painful experience has taught him that he cannot prudently accept the favor of a foreign ruler if at the cost of alienation from the Moslem who is his permanent neighbor. On the other hand, rapprochement with the liberal Moslem group has at times cost him the enmity of the Moslem zealots. (*Ibid.*, p. 22.) But Mustapha Kamel is still remembered as having achieved a political union between El Azhar, the extreme center of Moslem orthodoxy, and the Coptic leaders, in the interest of common political action. The conditions of his success are still extant.

sition. Except for the Ittehadists (Unionists, or "The King's Friends") all parties are "nationalistic," their differences consisting merely in the different degrees of their willingness to compose a common life with the British and other foreign elements in Egypt.

The Wafd is the popular party, commanding usually 80 per cent of the vote. It owes its origin to the Wafd, or Delegation, which proposed to represent Egypt at Paris. The rebuff administered to this delegation, of which Saad Pasha Zaghlul was head, made it the political organ of remonstrant Egypt. Its first leader and hero rising on waves of anti-British passion was driven at last to an intransigence from which he was unable to retreat, even to meet the actual sense of his party. The Wafd is not opposed to an understanding with Great Britain. Zaghlul was able to negotiate with Lord Milner in 1920; and later negotiators (as Sarwat) have gone back to this position of 1920 as a point of departure.

The party of complete and literal intransigence is not the Wafd, but the Nationalist party (Hizb'ul Watani), which dates from the days of Mustapha Kamel, 1905, and in an earlier form from Jamal-ud-Din. Its present leader, Hafiz Bey Ramadan, opposes all negotiation, on the ground that any agreement with Britain will give the signature of Egypt to a compromised independence. This party has a relatively small following.

More inclined than the Wafd to agreement with Britain is the Liberal-Constitutional party, also small in number, but counting some influential and able men. Mohammed Pasha Mahmoud, Prime Minister 1928-1929, is of this party, which was founded in 1922 by Adly Pasha as an opposition to the Wafd. It contains much of the wealth of Egypt, as well as various members of the former "Turkish" official class, and is inclined to work with the Palace, and

thus at second remove with Great Britain, hoping to harmonize the national interests of Egypt with those of the Empire.

There is, however, a definite Palace party, the Ittehadists above referred to, got up in 1925 by one Neshat Pasha. This party stands ready to supplement, if not supplant, parliamentary government by the easier method of royal decree. It represents in Egypt the familiar disposition to find relief from the confusions of democracy in seasons of dictatorship. In the nature of the case the numbers of this party are limited and its tactics opportunist. But during the present year (1931) it has gained new power and a new ally in the elections following the Constitutional overturn of October, 1930. For Sidky Pasha, the present Prime Minister called by King Fuad to break the power of the Wafd, has evoked a party of his own following, the Chaabists, or Popular party, which now shares with the Ittehadists control of the Chamber, though with what real support among the public one must hesitate to judge.¹⁴

This efflorescence of party life represents an essential stage of a national movement on the way to a conscious knowledge of its aim. Parties with their competing programs are so many efforts to interpret the national sense: they aspire to be the intelligence for the vaster subconscious striving which is the nation's will. Without the struggle of parties the nation cannot learn its own mind; without the existent national impulse, parties are mere nests of politicians. The parties of Egypt are symptoms of the reality of the Egyptian nation.

¹⁴ A more detailed account of the present situation will be found at the end of Chapter x, below.

CHAPTER VI

EGYPT'S CAPACITY FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT

EGYPT today finds itself a nation, endowed with a will of its own in the form of a national movement, well rooted, well-equipped with organs of thinking, debate, resolution. As a nation it drives toward the goal of all national movements,—getting the nation's thoughts done into acts which are its own acts,—“self-determination” as against determination by a foreign power. Is Egypt capable of this kind of self-government? In its own eyes, it is or shortly will be. Can Britain accept this favorable self-judgment? Can we, the public, accept it?

There was a time when the public might have been excused from answering this question. There was one universal and sufficient test of a people's ability to stand alone, war. The people that could conquer its master was fit to be its own ruler. That test remains valid. Any subject people that today can throw off a foreign ruler under the extreme disadvantages of the subject position shows qualities that make states: ability to make common cause, to sacrifice, to build a working economy, to think as well as the over-state and better, to beget a few men who can do superhuman and impossible things.

But it does not follow that *inability* to conquer a present ruler or indisposition to try it shows unfitness to be independent. The test of war is rude and accidental in its outcome: it has now become destructive past human tolerance. It is a sufficient test; but it is no longer necessary. Whatever war can settle there is some other way to settle: for

when war is done, its results have to be justified, and the reason that can justify them might have spared us the war. The alternative, then, to freedom *via* revolution is the discovery of rational ways of testing fitness: such as, experimenting with a little responsibility as a prelude to more, or getting into the place where competence dwells, the mentality of the people. Those who take seriously the peace-method as against the force-method are bound to take with equal seriousness this task, ungracious as it is, of judging the character of a neighbor people. The price of peace is the rational intrusiveness, almost the impertinence, of public opinion.¹

Is it possible to draw up the mental chart of a race? Ethnologists have made learned descriptions of racial traits, and other ethnologists have denounced them. Psychologists have not yet come forward with a set of mental tests for the political maturity of nations, and may the day of that folly be long deferred. All characterizations of peoples are caricatures. Nevertheless judgments are inevitable, reached by every man who lives among a people, observing and thinking. And such judgments are the data for a composite public judgment. Thus Cromer had his judgment of Egypt, dogmatic and clear; and Egypt today still feels the weight of Cromer's unmitigated unbelief. We can now weigh Cromer's with later judgments, with much pertinent experience, together with some personal impressions that last, and with our own judgment of the judges.

What is it that Lord Cromer and others fear, when they

¹ Judging the fitness of *individuals* for self-government would be a still more intrusive business, if each one had to be separately tested. Adopting the mechanical scheme of an age of automatic majority-reaching saves the community this pain and friction, at the serious cost of admitting a large proportion of incompetents to the management of their affairs and the public suffrage. There are too few states in the world to allow such reckless methods.

hold that Egypt ought not to be turned over to the Egyptians? We are bound to exclude from the picture at present all misgivings as to what might happen to foreign interests, or to the communications of the Empire, or to the safety of Egypt itself from foreign invasion. We are asking solely whether Egypt is ready to govern *itself*. We shall also exclude those various proofs of incapacity which have in recent years been so amply drawn from public disorders. It is an old game of respectable rulers to sting a people past all endurance, and then hold up the resulting turbulence as a sign of deficient self-control. The same rulers holding up the absence of disorder as a proof of complete contentment, what is to be the public evidence of discontent? ² One may fight with pamphlets and speeches; and pamphlets and speeches may be suppressed. What, then, is left? Or, must a civilized people be content with everything? Were British liberties won by remaining always within the bounds of decorum? Mr. Gladstone is authority for the contrary. I have no brief for a turbulence which runs to assassination; but I loathe the hypocrisy which holds up turbulence *per se* as evidence of backward moral control, without giving full account of the occasions which led to it.

In the case of Egypt, another talking-point of anxiety may with good conscience be excluded,—that of the murderous ill-feeling between Copt and Moslem. There is a delicate turn in mental history when theological divergences begin to be felt irrelevant to political co-operation. This turn comes later in Moslem lands; because Islam is a source of public law as well as a religion. It is not long since Egypt has made this turn. But modernity, which brings everywhere a release of polemic tension among

² Thus, the *Evening Post* (London) reproaches Egyptians for submitting to the loss of their Constitution (1929), while the same organ pounces on any lack of submission as evidence of unfitness for liberty.

creeds, is doing its work in Egypt; and I estimate that this danger may now be left out of the present question. Copt and Moslem have felt the unity of Egypt.

There remains the kernel of the matter, fear of *bad government*. On this point, I shall quote a few summary judgments from present-day dwellers in Egypt:

An official: "The Egyptians are doing pretty well. Their defects are obvious,—especially these, which interfere sadly with political effectiveness. (1) Vanity,—a love of being in office, and a conceit of one's own powers, without a sense of the severe exactions of public duty. (2) Nepotism,—an old custom of using position to provide other positions for family and friends without regard to fitness. (3) Indolence,—an easy-going temper, lacking in persistence, omitting the last effort needed to bring a piece of work to completion, going off to rest and play no matter what happens to public business. (4) Egoism,—putting one's interest above the public good, a trait which may shade into venality. These are, of course, the vices of political immaturity everywhere."

A clergyman: "Speaking as one who esteems and likes the Egyptians, I must say to you most earnestly, their ability in public affairs is mediocre. They have no men of first rate caliber. The Sudan may be taken as a test; they have made a mess of it every time they have been there."

An educator: "When western books and methods are put before him, the Egyptian, at present, does not shine. He is behind other Near-Eastern people, as the Syrian Arabs. This is partly due to the fact that during childhood, as a rule, there are no books, pictures nor playthings at home: his ear is cultivated at the expense of his eye; he is stronger in all branches requiring memory than in branches requiring thought. He is deficient in initiative. But he has his own type of mental power. The native capacity of the Egyptian is as good as that of any race; it is certainly not less than that of the Balkan peoples."

A soldier, noting a lack of resolution and grasp in dealing with important public projects such as the Assuan dam: "No one now will accept responsibility, no one will take initiative" . . . nevertheless "the administrative chaos predicted has not arrived."³

³ P. G. Elgood, *Address to Royal Institute of International Affairs*, London, 1927.

A judge: "The Egyptians are a kindly, humane, gentle people, not highly gifted in politics, not strong: it is too early to pronounce what power they may or may not develop."

This apprehension of bad government is not pure distrust: it is based on experience and directs itself to specific weaknesses in the Egyptian political armor which we are bound to consider.

What of the fellah, now taking his first step in public-mindedness? he is 90 per cent of the population, and 90 per cent of his strength is illiterate. "He is ignorant," says Judge Marshall;⁴ if this means ignorant of political history and the sciences, I should take it as an axiom. He "has not the mentality to form a judgment of existing facts," continues this authority: very serious if true. No doubt a permanent position as the milch cow for a long succession of alien governments has left its mark:—a desire to let alone and be let alone, to dodge political issues, to serve an interlocutor with the answer he would like, and to take political fortunes with the weather and health as the will of Allah. So far, an unpromising unit of national feeling and intelligence: a clear zero, if that were all. But just here a century of national life has made a breach in habit: the fellah now knows that politics is *not* weather, and that Islamic resignation is no fit mood for it. As party-follower and voter he now talks politics, has views and airs them, is willing to make journeys and take

⁴ *The Egyptian Enigma*, p. 186. This writer makes the usual remark about the Egyptian love of the strong hand: "His sympathies have always been with tyrants who ruled him with determination. His friendship is not to be obtained by a caress, it is rather to be had by a blow and a pat on the back, leaving him with the conviction that if that does not suffice the blow will be repeated" (p. 187). One can only wonder whether Cromer was wise in abolishing the kurbash! But Judge Marshall then avers that the Egyptian "is truculent and ever ready to revolt against his ruler . . . always inclined to back disorder"; from which it might appear that tyranny works no better with him than with the rest of mankind. These observations, if they are such, cancel each other, and leave us with nothing in hand, except that the fellah is a son of Adam.

other trouble to do his part. You can say of him as of all beginners that he is moved by loyalties, prejudices, emotions, interest, more than by thought; that he is credulous, a crowd-maker, ready to be spell-bound by sonorous speech. The "independent voter" is surely not much in evidence in rural Egypt,—and perhaps not elsewhere on the planet in countable numbers. Yet "judgment of existing facts" the fellah does form. And one further political quality at least is to be credited to him—the fundamental quality for a democratic people—a fair instinct in his choice of political heroes. He has not followed non-entities.

The fellah, and the man just over him, the local authority, village head-man (*omdeh*), are the persistent groundwork of political life in Egypt. Government has a few heads, a thousand arms, many thousand fingers: the critical point in its working is there where these fingers grasp the private citizen. Remotest from the influences which affect the cities, these local notables in Egypt have been little made over by the changes of fifty years. They are ready, no doubt, as during the war, to resume the personal favor-trading, kurbash-swinging policies of the old régime,—many of them. Those who genuinely fear an Egypt under the Egyptians are largely moved by the helpless lot of the fellah under any government not aggressively omnipresent and alert to these local relationships. Let a government of Egypt be affected even slightly by resignation toward the deeds of subordinates, cruel or venal, as in the nature of things, and the fellah is driven once more to animal cunning. But whether *omdeh* and landlord have changed, the change in the fellah himself renders this fear less needful: he is no longer the man to endure silently the old abuses.

As magistrate, charged with justice in the higher courts, the Egyptian has not yet won the confidence of the foreign

litigant. It is not clear to the Egyptian, on the other hand, that the preference of the foreigner for the consular jurisdiction is always inspired by a love of justice. Egyptian justice has nothing to learn from the current uses of the Capitulations. The Mixed Courts are another matter; and this unique institution manned by Egyptian and foreign judges sitting together, one of the few successful international arrangements, in which each group learns from the qualities of the other, is due to the talent of Nubar Pasha, the Armenian-Egyptian Premier of Ismail. Egypt has at present no inclination to challenge this institution:—though there are signs that Great Britain would be willing to substitute British judges for all other foreign judges—clearly, Egypt recognizes the substance of genuine justice when it sees it, and all the practice of the Egyptian courts is affected by this influence.

As parliamentarian, the Egyptian is said by his critics to be eloquent but not substantial, loquacious, fertile in schemes, especially in schemes to obstruct opponents, infertile in workable plans of action, interminable in committee, hence slow in reaching decision . . . in all of which the Egyptian seems much like other parliamentarians and partisans.

As administrator, he is said to be amateurish in most technical matters, impatient of organization in general and inept in working within it. Since Egyptian administration has become responsible for the schools, the school-standards are said to have declined.⁵ The all-important public work of irrigation suffers from lack of engineering capacity and directive headship; the work of sanitation proceeds but lamely. General absence of assured and forceful push of progress, absence of mettle, drive, controlling will! Public security is complained of, is now only nom-

⁵ Cf. pp. 79ff., below.

inal in the country districts,—1400 murders per year,—reminiscent of Chicago.

It is not necessary to dispute these indictments. Egypt is not unaware of these difficulties, as traits of her present political physiognomy. But, since she is aware of them, she is not identified with them. There is self-consciousness in Egypt,—this fact must be set against all other facts: self-consciousness with willingness to make great efforts for great ends. The only important question, then, is, What can Egypt *make* of Egypt?

On this question, do you not find all these descriptions too much on the surface of things, and too many because they are superficial? There are, in all, only two that seem worth enquiry, egoism and *laissez faire*. The root of the other qualities is in these two.

Egypt is said to be a nation of egoists in its available political material; that is to say, a nation of men lacking the true nationalism in which sacrifice for the public interest is natural and usual. I suppose mankind is egoistic in this sense, having to overcome its egoism by slow stages. The principle of losing one's life in order to save it has been announced to mankind these three thousand years in China, Judea and elsewhere, and yet men act on it but hesitantly. But egoism in Egypt, it is said, cripples public service: riches are not held in trust to be given; men will not forgo ease and comfort to meet an emergency; office is tacitly considered a private opportunity for the holder. The true patriot is an exception.

I must confess a doubt whether the contrast between Egypt and other lands runs as deep as these words imply. But, if it were so, I cannot follow the reason for attributing this fact to a racial quality, fixed in the blood. Public service is in large part social habit and tradition. It is a way of looking at things. There is, let us say, an empire;

men have done their part, in times past, in building it; and other men have found that these empire-builders spent their lives well. That is a discovery, surely one of the greatest, the discovery of something worth living for: but the discovery has to be made and the rumor of it spread anew in each state. Let any such rumor find its way into the mental currents of Egyptian youth, and the coming generation will transform its egoism. A new experience will remake their philosophy; and philosophy is more plastic than blood.

Aristocracies have often brought forth great public servants under the sentiment of *noblesse oblige*; but the tendency of aristocracy is in the reverse direction, an education in selfishness. For the essence of aristocracy is to believe in such human difference that the high are and ought to be served by the lowly. If the aristocrat serves, it is with head-service: he thinks, advises, and preferably directs. "Never drudge" was a maxim of Jowett to his young statesmen at Balliol; expanded, this means, "Let the drudgery be done by your inferiors." This cleavage between head and hand is disastrous in its long effects: it is what one does with his muscles that becomes wrought into his system. The man who evades concrete, material helpfulness is perhaps unaware that his "service" is becoming a theory, a sentiment. He makes his speech or writes his book, and satisfies himself that he has done good; he feels no need of tracing his "contribution" to its effects. Conversely, he loses the habit of connecting abuses, miseries, wrongs, with his own motor apparatus. His escape from egoism in Egypt and in other lands may well begin with a revised attitude toward physical labor, definitely rebuking in his own organic habit the aristocratic alienation of the classes. When every man knows in his own person what hand work is, the primary bond of sym-

pathy is established in the nation, and the separations of egoism lose ground.

Let no one say that Egypt is lacking in generosity of temper: it is a land of great and lavish kindness and devotion. No doubt this outgoing current of life is chiefly personal, after the genius of the Orient: but all that friend has given friend, that, tomorrow, both will share with the nation. In a people incurably egoistic a national movement cannot so much as begin, still less endure and grow during a century.

But Egypt is said to be soft and pliable of temper, lacking in force, cursed with an inherent *laissez faire*, mother of a hundred brands of ineffectiveness, disappointing performance, stopping well this side of the mark. The comment is ominous; for it connects the mind of Egypt with the land of Egypt, its inescapable sun and sky. It is impossible that the climate should not have penetrated the Egyptian soul. Certainly, the Egyptian is not aggressive, if this means fighting for fighting's sake, even against natural hardship. Discomforts that have been borne continue to be borne: the idea of cushioning life has not got into him, the idea that a point of habitual malaise need not exist. His capacity for wrath spends itself on the human offender: he takes up no arms against the miserliness or resistance of nature. This means, simply, that he is not by instinct a scientist and an applier of science. In these terms, Egypt is backward. Yet, as in all the East, engines are invading Egypt and bringing with them an interest in engines and the engine-running psychology. The automobile begins to pre-empt the locomotion of cities, and not content with the broad streets of the European quarters honks its way down the old Mouski scattering Egypt right and left,—Egypt at the wheel. Here and there on the Nile fields tractors are at work, while camel and

water buffalo gaze lazily at the tugging marvel, shortly to relieve them of labor and eventually of life. Inertia and patience, it seems, are not to be everlasting even here: it is possible they may disappear too fast.

But this same lack of initiative in political life leads to more than negligence and shortness of breath: it begets pliancy, a lack of force and resolution. Let us note here that power in practical affairs is something more than pure will: it is, in part, experience mentally digested. Having put a thing through, one then knows how to estimate the obstacles for another such deed. Having put several things through, one gains a shrewd estimate of what obstacles are surmountable and what are not. Lack of this experience leaves one unable to distinguish clearly the two cases, and the presence of a difficulty is likely to be taken as the sign of a wrong start. Non-persistence is thus in large part a transitional mental state.

But is there a moral factor here also? Is there in this friendly complaisance the touch of the African sun, melting out the negative, resisting, critical and self-critical disciplinary rock-basis of human quality, leaving a deficiency of stern, masterful fiber? The Briton, as well as other imperialists, is apt to see here the mark of a calling-to-obey, the destiny of the East and South to be dominated by the North and West. In its presence he feels his own will-to-master swell and contemn. Cromer finds himself regretting that Egypt is not more *Turkish*, with the guts of a fighting people, and about its head the aureole of dominion.⁶

⁶ Thus Cromer of the Turco-Egyptian: "The glamour of a dominant race still hovers as an aureole . . . round his head. He is certainly not more corrupt than the Egyptian; he is more manly. . . . He is sometimes truthful and outspoken after his own fashion. He has a rude standard of honor . . . can . . . to a certain extent command. . . . The individual Englishman will get on well with the individual Turk. . . . The northerner and the Oriental meet on the common ground that the Englishman is masterful . . .

Certainly, Lord Cromer is talking about real things in human nature,—iron, power to follow rules and to set them, power to oppose, to see the limits of debate, soft talkativeness, amiable palaver, and put an end to them. Within all our arbitration, democratic brotherhood, and sweet reason, there must lurk the *will*, ready to reduce parley to business. But I suspect the lordliness that is so well aware of itself of being a partial (and not wholly native) virtue. The complete man has something in his will less damaging to sensitiveness, less hostile to it. The battle ax and the trumpet, which have been flourished of late by other northern races also, have thus far produced but limited results in putting civilization forward. The Orient remains the better artist.

It is an all-too-simple psychology which sees it the manifest destiny of oriental and northern races to stand to each other as submissive and dominant. The type of weakness which deserves this fate, that of the sly Levantine, incapable of face-to-face hostility, whose methods are an everlasting intrigue and purchase,—this is a disease of oriental politics, not its nature. The Orient can join the West in hating and ending it. Between that disease and the disease of political bullydom there is nothing to choose: the despot creates the sycophant; the unheroic swagger of hopelessly superior force drives the opponent, if he has no taste for martyrdom, underground. To develop manliness in any nation, the overtly masterful manner is the worst of recipes. Lord Lloyd's ⁷ strong line is the way not to succeed, whether in Egypt or in India, no matter how well it may secure the forms of obedience. What, let us soberly

belongs to an imperial race, and the Turco-Egyptian to a race which but yesterday was imperial." *Modern Egypt*, ii, pp. 172f.

From this point of view, Mohammed is a distinct improvement on Jesus of Nazareth, who had nothing of the "glamour of a dominant race hovering as an aureole," etc. And the Egyptians, as a rule, follow Mohammed.

⁷ High Commissioner of Egypt, 1925 to 1929.

ask, is the lasting use of a royal-sounding bang, followed by much silence in the subject masses, when the field is sown with hatred? Lord Lloyd is a young man; but he belongs to an outworn tradition in politics.

I believe there is much reasonable misgiving in Britain about this policy of the "strong line." It can never work unless it is followed with complete consistency; it cannot be used consistently without conviction; and in this age conviction is riddled with doubt. Kitchener and Allenby, Milner and Gorst, Lloyd himself, are found blowing hot and cold. For the theory of the strong line is romantic, namely, that you must supply oriental peoples with the "arguments they understand,"—a fine show of resolution and finality, done in regal swank. This theory, which by some strange perversity prides itself on its realism, is wholly *a priori*, and insulates itself carefully from all danger of learning by experience. How many times in recent years has this strong line, which ought to have brought the temporizing craven to his senses, impressed Egypt? How many times has it failed to impress?

It was tried on Zaghlul in March, 1919. Zaghlul Pasha, Egyptian Prime Minister, had audaciously proposed that, the war being successfully ended in the East, with invaluable Egyptian aid, an Egyptian Delegation concerned to re-define the status of Egypt might be considerably heard in London and elsewhere. For this impertinence, and for the campaign of agitation he conducted in face of refusal, even at the Sultan's gate, Zaghlul was seized, together with three other agitators, members of cabinet, and shipped to Malta. This strong line, according to theory, should have brought Egypt to its senses. Instead it "fairly blew the lid off the whole seething pot of sedition."⁸ "Egypt from Alexandria to Asuan was in . . . open revolution."⁹

⁸ George Young, *Egypt*, p. 238.

⁹ J. E. Marshall, *The Egyptian Enigma*, p. 161.

In December, 1921, a letter was presented by Lord Allenby to the Sultan of Egypt. It was a strong letter. In Mr. J. A. Spender's view, "whoever was the author of this letter, he must be congratulated on having packed into a thousand words the largest number of expressions calculated to wound the susceptibilities of Egyptians and to kill their gratitude. . . . Egypt was now sternly reminded that she was 'a part of the communications of the British Empire.'" The manner and aureole of this admirable letter far overshadowed its substance. But "the Government was compelled . . . to revise its opinion that Egyptian Nationalists would succumb to the firm language. . . . While this letter remained the last word of British policy, Lord Allenby found himself unable to obtain the services of any Egyptian Ministers or to discover any way of governing the country which would not have required a far larger army than any British Government had ever stationed permanently in Egypt." ¹⁰

All accounts of the eventful winter of 1921-1922 agree that the policy of repression and dictation including yet another deportation of Zaghlul caused Egypt not to weaken but to stiffen her demand. Lord Milner having been sent to enquire into Egypt, and having made a veracious report, the way of conciliation was open; but the imperial and masterful minds of Westminster, "obsessed with false beliefs, pronounced for repression, and England has lost Egypt." ¹¹

¹⁰ "The Egyptian Problem," *Quarterly Review*, April, 1922.

¹¹ P. G. Elgood, *Egypt and the Army*, p. 362.

The British Foreign Office had, it will be recalled, just reached a settlement with Ireland. Feeling that settlement as somewhat of a surrender, they were less disposed than usual to meet the needs of the Egyptian situation in the same conciliatory vein. They could not believe that the same psychology and the same ethics would hold good in the two cases. Yet on the mental side, Egypt is for England another Ireland: the rate of passion is different, but the sense of justice which animates that passion is the same.

In view of these events, the idea that Egypt is lacking in spirit does not seem to be well founded. One must distinguish between strength of will and the rate of flow of passion, which latter varies much from people to people and from man to man. The speedier temper shows the more dramatic and impressive marks of volition. The slower temper, if it is resilient as well as flexible, may well be for longer efforts the stronger will,—especially where biological bluster is less significant than steady insistence on a clear-held point of reason. The will of Egypt, joined with the patience of Egypt, appears well fitted for its present task.

Mettlesomeness, as a biological trait, has an attractiveness of its own, and a utility in the world. It lends to the tang of discourse, ensures that opponents shall not fail for lack of plain speaking to understand one another. In a world determined to take things out in war, it would set the northern races in authority over the rest. But can humanity not be edited also on a southern and even tropical scale? I believe that it can be edited on every scale, tropical to polar. The logic and ethics of mankind remain identical and tie all together; but there is a tonus for every region, a regimen of life which brings the human fiber to its best in that place. Egypt has its tonus, and will find it. In the end moral strength is never a problem of climate. But men under stress must look to their way of life and especially to their pleasures. The Egyptian of Pharaonic days was sanely pleasure-loving, a sportsman in his way, the first fisherman of history to insist on the fighting chances of the fish! Ptah Hotep understood the function of pleasure: "Diminish not the time of following the heart," said this canny old chancellor. "The archer reaches the target partly by pulling and partly by letting go." It is well that Egypt inherits the sense for this vital rhythm.

CHAPTER VII

FACTORS OF GROWTH

MAKE your descriptions of national traits as accurate as perfect realism will allow, bring on the scientific mental tests,—you can never by this road get the truth about any people. All these efforts try to capture the human being where he is. But the living thing, being in motion, is *not there*; what you catch in your net of “actual fact” is a mere residue; the important thing about the mind is the direction of its movements and the energy behind it. Peoples as well as individuals have their drifting periods, their shooting-forward periods, even their conversions. To judge Egyptian capacity for self-government we must think chiefly of the forces now at work making the Egypt of tomorrow.

On this point, the ancient and latent genius of the race no doubt has something to say, though nothing very audible to our ears. It is reasonable enough for present Egypt to take pride in the qualities once evinced there; but ancient fertility, whether of Egyptian, Jew, or Greek, is poor ground for prophecy. We have to say of Egypt (as of the Near East generally) that the old creative power is not now in evidence; the centuries of foreign domination have been empty of notable workmanship; of recent years, the political struggle has blanketed all other interests. In art and architecture, no new life. In letters and philosophy, a few stirrings. A university devoted to learning in the modern manner, where Egyptian scholars and European

offer lectures to young Egypt, has been opened in the Abbasiyeh Quarter of Cairo. Here Taha Hussein and Mustapha Abd el Razik, too alert of mind to suit well the authorities of old El Azhar, renew the life of Arabic poetry and speculation.

In Cairo the conditions are present which make for a contest of traditions, and for cross-fertilization. Of the entire world of Moslem learning, the hoary university of El Azhar is still the undisputed center: the burden of faithfulness to the spirit of Islam is upon it. For the present, two currents symbolized by the two universities stand apart, hardly recognizing one another's existence, entertaining much mutual distrust. To the new, the old is the halter of Egypt; to the old, the new is its disloyalty and destruction. El Azhar is recruited largely from the country: its students are the poor and pious fellahin, untouched by modernity except as it excites their hatred. Their learning is the learning of fidelity,—authoritative, mnemonic; nothing in their training rouses the mind to critical and independent thought. Among the conditions for admission to El Azhar is the verbatim knowledge of the whole Koran. Their destiny has been, in the main, to become imams, sheikhs, readers and teachers of the word in their own localities, enjoying there the authority of the word itself. In growing numbers, however, they now aspire to public offices, and here the traditions begin an effective mingling, attended with deep boilings and inner heat; for El Azhar students as public servants must *qualify*, and qualifying no longer means offering an acceptable personal front and record of Koranic engorgement. There are impersonal standards of attainment, specific fitness is required for specific functions—a great turn in the physiology of any public service; and students whose Alma Mater has not prepared them for this type of test have a grievance which

calls for redress. Through its students, then, El Azhar feels the impact of new demands; the ministry of instruction also applies judicious incentives; and the old university responds by supplying new programs of study reaching backward into the local preparatory studies, including instruction in science.¹ El Azhar is now lighted by electricity!

On the other hand, the new university, while it includes no instruction in theology, makes no clean breach with Islamic past. The history of Arabic thought and literature is part of its work. Its main object is to provide at home what hitherto Egyptian students have had to seek, and continue to seek, in Europe, instruction in science, engineering, medicine, law;² also to relieve foreign colleges in Egypt of the brunt of the task of fitting its men for public and professional life. No doubt it looks far forward to a time when it can render these foreign foundations in Egypt, European and American, unnecessary. For the present, it works with them; there is not enough instruction all told for the numbers who want it. They are the private endowments; it is the public school. But it is free from

¹ El Azhar has not been literally devoid of science. The topics of astronomy and "science" have appeared among the subjects for lectures. The science was without laboratory, and set in the fag hours of the afternoon, as relatively unimportant; and no doubt it was. Now the students of the second stage, preparatory, will come initiated to science with its peculiar rules of evidence and measure; and the mind will be strained and cracked to hold the old and the new. A government minister is appointed to El Azhar (Mohammed Khalid Hassanein Bey appointed Oct. 1, 1925) and is charged with bringing the new elements of the program into good effect.

² The present university is the remodeled inheritor of a number of schools, some of which were founded a century ago. The dates are as follows: Medicine and Pharmacy, 1827; Nurses and Midwives, 1831; Engineering, 1866; Law, 1868; Agriculture, 1890; Veterinary Science, 1901; Commerce, 1911. The new foundations of 1925 include the Faculties of Arts, Sciences, and Dentistry. These earlier foundations have had no brilliant history; a complete renovation was essential to their continued life. While the inspiration of this new beginning is national, the Faculties of Arts and Sciences have invited European scholars to co-operate in the lectures.

creedal commitments, Islamic or Christian; it leaves the mind free from all duty to believe.

In other lands, as in Turkey or Russia, this might imply something like a duty or pressure to disbelieve. It is a distinction of Egypt that this is not the case. The tendency of modernity to reject religion, Islamic or other, with all its works, root and branch, for a thoroughly naturalistic view of the world, is present in Egypt as always when the medieval merges too fast with the modern. But, as I judge the general trend of Egypt, the young intellectuals quietly dropping the more difficult Moslem observances, holding themselves free toward Ramadan, the month of fasting, toward the athletic round of daily prayer, the foot-and-hand ablutions at the mosque, still have no wish to abandon the spirit and sense of Islam. There is, in Egyptian history, a motive for their not desiring to follow the lead of Turkey; but there is also, I judge, a fine and balanced wisdom somewhere within them, saving them from too mutilating dismissals.

In truth, Egypt is now ready to make large use of philosophy, such philosophy as can preserve for this generation the root of its inherited piety while giving it free conscience toward science and all its fruits. Philosophy, the effort to rethink the world and our place in it, is a necessary implement of every cultural transition; and, while fulfilling this function, philosophy is naturally a local growth. Yet the philosophy of the West, some of it, may be of distinct service to this local thought-work, inasmuch as the West has now spent some three hundred years in going through a similar transition. In this sense that notable scholar, Taha Hussein, man of insight, courage, poetic discernment, spoke to me of his hope that William James's philosophy of religion might be put into Arabic,

James having perceived that religion has its irrational and subconscious part as well as its vocal discussable doctrine, has therefore its means of life while its argumentative front is being demolished. Egypt can use such philosophy as an aid to philosophy of its own production. Assuming that Islam cannot pass away from the lands that have been nourished by it these thirteen hundred years, it follows that Islam must be reinterpreted for the new world of the Near East by Moslem thought and prophecy. The needed prophet has not yet arisen in Egypt. But Egypt has already shown that she can produce a head for that labor: for the beginnings made in a previous generation by Mohammed Abdu³ have left a foundation which will sooner or later be built upon with adequate genius.

The greatest of the forces for the deliberate remaking of a people is public education undertaken by the people itself. And public education in Egypt, long a matter of village Kuttab and Mosque school Koran-learning, supplemented by sporadic foreign-mission-school teaching and feeble governmental experiments, is now in Egyptian hands. Since the measure of local autonomy granted in 1922, official Egypt has taken charge. The slump foreseen by such writers as Mr. Murray Harris⁴ has not occurred. The alleged *laissez faire* of the Egyptian administrator can hardly be recognized in the management of this ministry, even though the numerous changes of Cabinet since 1928 have invited laxity. Mr. Harris regards the Egyptian as "by nature a *mauvais payeur*" to the extent that parents begrudge funds for educating their own children. Yet the national budget for education doubled during the first five years.⁵

³ Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt*, pp. 104ff.; *Future of Islam*.

⁴ *Egypt under the Egyptians*, p. 68.

⁵ Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement* (Survey of International Affairs, 1925, vol. I), p. 583.

Egypt attacks education everywhere at once, top, middle and bottom. Its university is built before there are students prepared for it; professors lecture profoundly to puzzled benches. Nevertheless, staff and plant are developed; a mark is established to which the nation is summoned to grow up. Everywhere in the land, the hum of education is heard. National movements, conscious of the world's eye, believing in the virtue of modernity, realize that they dare not slumber on this matter. Egypt shares the almost universal and pathetic belief of the world that education in institutions can produce crops of citizens prepared for national life. This belief assumes that citizenship has its modicum of technical equipment which can be taught, and this is true: it also assumes that the *virtue* of the citizen can be taught,—this is too sanguine. The chief conditions of capable nationhood today are moral; and these elude the processes of the schools. Morale has to be communicated rather than taught: moral life must emanate from moral sources. If these moral sources are in the schools, citizenship will come out of them: but they cannot be put there by the governmental departments.

Why has British education been so notable a builder of British character, a great type of manhood, at its best none better in the race? Largely, I think, because it has enlisted the instinctive sources rather than any pedagogical analysis of right living. In their sports and in their special school-communities, boys impose group standards on each other by a thousand subtle and unspoken reactions: the code is thus ingrained, not expounded. For obvious reasons, training of this sort cannot be readily shared with non-Britishers.⁶ The alien can be admitted and mingle

⁶ Another reason for the relative failure of Britain to propagate British character in Egypt may be read in the attitude of the following editorial

with the rest; but the currents of that moral battery, working largely by subconscious understanding, do not flow through *him*. With other European peoples, moral training has been more explicit, rational, doctrinal; and when planted abroad, usually associated with theology, hence at an initial discount to the Moslem or to the student of Moslem background. The American University at Cairo has adopted still another plan, that of engaging the interest of Egyptian youth in accessible social problems, laboratory-wise, as by giving to villagers microscopic demonstrations of their drinking water. The success of this plan, favored by a position of political disinterestedness, shows a way by which a school may reach habit as well as intellect, and so far help in making citizens. But all these institutions presuppose a human material already prepared and bent by earlier educational doings. What is happening to Egyptian childhood and infancy?

The Egyptian home is not yet the man-maker that it ought to be. The father holds himself too well apart from the *Egyptian Gazette* of March 17, 1928, entitled "Egypt's Youthful Aspirations":

"It is said with much truth that the child is father of the man, but it may be said with greater force that a nation is no better than its youth. One of the facts that has emerged from the turmoil of political discord in Egypt has been that the schoolboys have again taken advantage of the opportunity thus presented them to indulge in an exhibition of 'hot air.' An Egyptian youth is so far removed from a Western youth in both thought and outlook, that any comparison is out of the question. Politics to the Western youth is a game that he does not try to understand, and he is content to leave it to his elders, whilst he devotes his spare time to Rugger or cricket. The interest taken in their country's politics by Egyptian schoolboys would be laudable if it were not laughable. Their emissions of political opinions, their solemn conclaves, in which Ministers are approved or condemned, and their effervescent demonstrations to influence these same Ministers, are all signs of swollen-headedness which can be likened to a lad outgrowing his strength. The youth of Egypt have had a great opportunity to shine in a suitable sphere,—that of sport; and yet in no civilized country in the world is it so neglected as in the Valley of the Nile, where everything favours its development. Athletics, football, boxing should all flourish, and yet they do not. Football is the only game at which Egyptians are at all prominent, and that is only on account of the weakness of their opponents. . . ."

his offspring during early years. The average place of the *harim* is poor in food for the minds and characters of children. Pictures and playthings are almost non-existent: the Islamic disapproval of all representation of animals and men, now yielding, still leaves childhood poor in the tools for self-training.

As for the mothers, Egypt with the whole East is well alive to the need of a freer life for women, if only as a means to a mentally livelier motherhood. The life of women in ancient Egypt was remarkably free and influential: Egyptian women today are beginning once more to take an effective part in social and political affairs. Yet in every era of social change, domestic habits yield slowest. The elementary school will come to the children of Egypt before their homes will help them forward. By 1943, according to the program of the Ministry of Education, all children between 7 and 13 are to be in school. Let Egypt see to it that these schools shall not displace the home in the business of giving children their earliest moral set.

For apart from the fact that the school is too late on the scene, and too impersonal, Egyptian primary schools will be for a long time as overweighted with men as the place of the *harim* with women. The school-mistress is a rare person in a Moslem land, where it is traditionally a scandal for a well-bred woman to undertake a gainful occupation. Still, there were in 1927-28 eighteen elementary training schools for woman teachers (and others for nurses) with 2,369 students, a remarkable beginning.

In many ways the lesser needs of children are being met,—by scout-groups, boys' clubs and girls' clubs, athletic societies experimenting with games that may suit Egypt as well as other lands; even football and boxing, better fit for colder climates, find their devotees. There is

in all these fraternal groupings the possibility of moral training,—no assurance of it: but through them precocious young Egypt gains at least this, an alternative for the use of its leisure; it need not adopt the street, nor through tedium go in for subjective pleasure.

Egypt is measuring the extent of what it must do for its children: it is beginning deliberately to do it.

What sort of ambition will the youth of Egypt develop? For after the first psychological set, moral growth hangs almost wholly from the objects which seize the will. (As in all lands of peasantry, schooling brings difficulties with it. Education has meant a white-collar career; there is a school esthetic which turns away from the farm and from all physical work. But the farm is the life of Egypt. It is not mere selfishness, even today, which leads certain landlords to look doubtfully on this wholesale manufacture of literate youth who ride the family donkey while the father walks behind. As Cromer well knew, a type of education which chiefly begets hopes of personal preferment is not wanted in Egypt. How to create a lettered peasantry which will remain peasant might well be too great a problem for any foreign administration; but what Cromer failed to see is that it might be well dealt with by Egypt itself. Egypt has a promising idea. The fellah-lad is to have a half-day of school, with a half-day of farm-training; and in the school-room he is to wear his farm clothing. By which it is clear that the Ministry of Education has understood the psychology of clothes!

There are other arts and crafts in Egypt, threatened like every family skill by machine products and "modern-ity." It is worth an effort to save them; why not by a plan of education like that of the farms? The school for waifs in the Shubra Quarter of Cairo, where lads drill

and drum with marvelous rhythm, learn letters and figures and any one of a dozen handicrafts, in baskets, brushes, textiles, is an example of what may be done. This school was founded by Harvey Pasha, and is carried on by Egyptian masters.

As the student approaches adolescence, one thing is sure to capture his interest,—politics. Under present circumstances, what would you have? It has been no small part of the preoccupation of the British control to keep within bounds this effervescent student patriotism dubbed by its critics school-boy patriotism. Mohammed Mahmoud's Government, during the suspension of parliament 1929-1930, took drastic measures to repress the "manifestations" of student opinion: an agitator was to be expelled from his school and admitted to no other. "Let these boys attend to their books." It is not pure vanity, this haste to take part in public doings; vanity does not allow itself to be laid out by machine-guns, as did the student-demonstrators of 1921.⁷ Nor do British machine-guns turn out against mere

⁷ The following signed statement is made by an eyewitness of these several events:

"In March, 1919, immediately after the arrest of Zaghloul Pasha and his deportation to Malta, bands of students and others holding aloft branches of palm and other trees went through the streets shouting for Saad Pasha Zaghloul, and they were repeatedly met by British soldiers with machine guns who deliberately fired on the unarmed students to disperse them. Many were wounded and some killed.

"On Zaghloul Pasha's return from Europe on April 6, 1921, he went the same evening with other members of the Wafd to visit the graves of the students who were killed by the British during these harmless manifestations.

"Then again following the arrest of Zaghloul Pasha and five others on December 24, 1921, and their exile to the Seychelles Islands, there were demonstrations by the students and others; and those who went to the house of Zaghloul Pasha were shot down by British guns. Madame Zaghloul Pasha herself ministered to the wounded boys and students on the floor of her husband's library, their bodies riddled with bullets."

In interpreting these events, the words "students and others" are significant; for it has been the usual course of these demonstrations that what has begun as a harmless student parade has collected a following of the

school-boy vanity. Young Egypt demonstrates sometimes at the instigation of its elders; sometimes for the benefit of its elders, exhorting them to realize that they have the support of the Egypt next to come. The nation, having become something to these boys, is, for the moment, everything; and the legitimate business of the books does suffer. But, while crises are on, bodies which are mature enough to bear arms will contain minds which are mature enough to take sides; and the desire to count is of itself a good augury.

Less good is the magnification of the political career which goes with this absorption. Law, medicine, engineering, which have their public aspects, gain in the reflected light. Economy and finance would seem to have similar public application; but the genius of Egypt moves reluctantly in this world of accounts. Wealth to the Arabic soul means tangibility, and in Egypt, real estate, not securities. Nevertheless, there are beginnings also of Egyptian financial thinking: besides the National Bank of Egypt, whose directors are chiefly Egyptians, though the management is largely British, there is the Banque Misr recently created, wisely or unwisely, by Egyptians for Egyptians, whose shares may not be held by any foreigner. Egypt must have a thoroughly non-romantic, non-patriotic confidence in Egyptian competence and integrity to sustain an all-Egyptian bank; it must draft some of its able youth into this field, where the concrete is habitually thought through the abstract.

It is essential for Egypt to multiply its conceptions of careers for educated men. With the passing of the crisis of national status, it will do so: for it is not a people to

lower elements of the population, ready to take advantage of disturbance. The police have had a mixed target. But the means used to deal with it were indiscriminate and inhuman. Compare the attitude of the editorial above quoted from the *Egyptian Gazette*.

live long without a large place for reflection, philosophy, fine art, architecture, literary expression.

We are still conceiving education too narrowly. Besides these efforts, *the times* are educating Egypt, as they educate all lands exposed to the knowledge of the times.

Here one finds an advantage in the tendency to learn, as Egyptian habit is, *via* the ear rather than *via* the eye. Learning by the eye is indeed quiet and quick; by the ear, noisy and slow. Learning by eye may be solitary; learning by ear is necessarily social. What is learned from record may be preserved in record; what is learned by ear must be preserved in memory. Memory is a dimension of intellect in which eye-learners grow weak. The Arab does not carry his philosophy in libraries; he carries it with him. Nomad, farmer, merchant, publicist, he has not sold the integrity of his soul to books; he is not lost without them; he has no duty to them; his mind distils wisdom and poetry in its native speech, for its depths are living. The selected mental goods of a lifetime are ready to his tongue, his bearing, his action. He reaches great personal nobility, oftentimes, through being from the beginning a noble selector; and yet he feels no impulse to record himself for the benefit of posterity, and for its burdening: Allah has produced him and will produce many others with like inner quality. Who will say that Arab lands have not gained through reticence in book production? If we deplore the lack of new literature in Egypt, its ineffective journalism, reflective criticism, publicity, then remember that much of the stuff of literature runs out over Egyptian lips and through Egyptian lives, makes a perceptible oasis of personality where it goes, and loses itself in the desert that the world be not encumbered with its paper-ashes. Learning by the ear is not

enough for our age: but let not Egypt lose its benefits in personal depth and social alertness. The illiterate fellah, reading no news-sheet, is better informed than many literates. He is read to; he gains his daily news through the ear, interpreted by the teller, for better or worse. The hour for story telling is now the hour for communal, one may almost say, national fact-telling and commenting,—swift, noisy, emotion- and interest-laden education by the times.

Thus Egypt by its own methods does modernize itself throughout the mass. Parliament considers legislation which but a few years past would have excited public horror. "Had I suggested to my grandfather the projects for altering the law of divorce, or the regulations of the Wakf [pious foundations] now before Parliament," said a Moslem magistrate, "he would have felt justified in killing me on the spot." Islamic fatalism, once a formidable obstacle to advance in medicine, sanitation, public use of clinics and hospitals, rapidly lessens its resistance. When, therefore, any one still speaks of "the unchanging character of the Oriental"⁸ he betrays rather an undue resistance to change in his own judgments.

The times are great teachers, but not the greatest. They are a sort of mental world-weather, emanating from everywhere and nowhere: their gifts are perishable. The greatest of educators, considered simply in terms of the immensity of the lifting work it can accomplish, is the ideal and hope of a people.

Men live and act, not according to their best dreams, but according to what they conceive attainable. To awaken a new ideal in a people is something; to bring at the same time a definite hope of attaining it is to ensure that this people will change in the direction of the ideal. A somno-

⁸ Murray Harris, *Egypt under the Egyptians*, p. 22.

lent Orient does not mean an Orient satisfied, nor self-satisfied; it means simply an Orient lacking belief in the possibility of change for the better. Fatalism is not so much a religious conviction as an economic and political condition of hopelessness. This state of mind has been losing its hold on the Orient: the War has done its part in shaking it off. Words of the Allied Governments have done their part, and more than their part. For, although words such as those of Woodrow Wilson about self-determination of peoples, welcomed by the Allies and broadcast by them, may have been intended to do a temporary work of war-waging, words have a way of being remembered and of working according to their own meaning, not according to our wishes. The ideal of self-determination, with a certain prospect of reaching it, tends to *produce its own qualifications*, in due time. For after all, the first qualification for self-government is a desire for self-government sufficiently genuine to pay the cost in terms of self-discipline. There is no inalienable and costless "right of self-determination": to announce such is immoral and misleading. But there is an open right to earn self-determination; and to believe this is the beginning of a national transformation.

Is Egypt ready for self-government at the present moment? As compared with various other self-governing states, the Hedjaz, Abyssinia, it is absurd to question Egypt's readiness: Egypt, the center of Moslem culture, and, except Turkey, the most progressive of Moslem states.

The difficulty lies in the comparison. It is due to Egypt's geography and history that Egypt must reach a higher standard of political attainment than her neighbors. For the self-government of Egypt means the government of all that Egypt now contains: the extent of Egypt's obligations has grown out of her own hospitality and her own past.

To Egypt's honor, therefore, she is asked to compare herself not with the least fitted, but with the better fitted, of sovereign states.

The thing to be guarded against in the sentiment of self-determination, taken unconditionally, is that a nation find a mediocre level of political existence out of which it does not move. If to be let alone means to stagnate, there is no right to be let alone. If to be let alone means to make mistakes and to learn by them, there is such a right. The test of readiness, then, is not political perfection: it is the capacity to profit by one's mistakes. This means: admission of mistake, party modesty, justice to opponents, gratitude for the services of imperfect servants, persistent self-criticism and fitting of new means to the steady ends of politics when the old means prove faulty. In these respects, Egyptian politics is not yet mature. Nevertheless, Egypt is so far conscious of her lacks that she can be trusted to adopt her own necessary helpers toward maturity.

CHAPTER VIII

CAPACITY OF BRITAIN TO GOVERN EGYPT

THERE is a natural presumption of British ability in dealing with backward peoples in general. But we cannot take for granted the capacity of the best of governors when dealing with a people of marked individuality, alien to themselves. Questions of mutual fitness arise, in a relationship as difficult as marriage. Capacity to govern any given people varies also with time, with the changing mood of that people, with the existing temper of the world. To enquire into the fitness of Egypt to govern itself would be an impertinence unless we enquired as carefully into the fitness of Great Britain to do the governing.

It is easy, looking backward, to draw up a list of the mistakes of governors and of governing states. It is a natural way of convicting a foreign ruler of incompetence, as the Declaration of Independence of 1776 may show. But since all governments make mistakes, such lists provide no argument. It requires to be shown that another government would not have made those or equally serious errors. There is, however, one fact of political psychology always in point, namely, that the mistake of a foreign governor is more grievously resented than the same mistake made by a governor of one's own nationality. In this apparently irrational fact there is a profound ethical principle, to which we shall later refer; it is chiefly this which makes nationality a matter of political importance. It is also true that the same benefit is less esteemed when bestowed by the alien government.

There can be no doubt about the substantial benefits conferred upon Egypt by the British occupation. Lord Cromer was indeed a great administrator. He rescued Egypt from a morass of insolvency, involving subservience to a group of Christian and Jewish creditors willing to grind the Egyptian peasant to the limit of misery in order to exact upon debts honest and dishonest a rate of interest outlawed in Europe. He set into the heart of Egyptian public life the primary logic of economic soundness and civil integrity. He practically eliminated from that society "the kurbash, the corvée, and corruption." In an entirely personal and aristocratic way he represented the fellahin in the distribution of Nile Water and other matters of elementary justice. Prior to his coming, justice was a favor to be begged for with presents and appeals to grace and mercy: after his work, justice was a right to be required of rulers as the subject's due. The benefits which an instructed people might secure through parliamentary government, an uninstructed people received at the hands of this one man; except, indeed, the benefit of working things out for themselves,—an impossibility in the early stages of reform. As Rousseau well saw, a people cannot make fit laws until it has first been made by laws: Cromer was for Egypt the legislator of Rousseau's vision.

Such work as Cromer did, is rightly the vestibule of self-government. Instead, it was an introduction to political disorder. As he advanced in years, he became less concerned to liberate the Egyptian mind than to ensure from loss his work for the Egyptian body. Liberal in detail, he became illiberal in the greater lines of his policy; and at the end of his splendid administration he delivered over to the Empire an Egypt well in hand, manned with a rapidly increasing staff of British officials, scantily provided with organs for public education, and devoid of

every tangible prospect for that liberty which had been repeatedly pledged in the public announcements of British statesmen. It was as though Lord Cromer, lacking faith in the capacity of Egypt, was willing to let this personal judgment lead his country into a course of gradual appropriation. The older Khedive, Tewfik, had been amenable: his son, Abbas Hilmi, spirited and independent, had to be taught subordination to British authority; Cromer broke him. There is nothing constructive in this process of unmanning a potential ruler; it is a course of diseducation in which a human will is first humiliated, then used, and then despised.¹ By 1904, it was possible for Salisbury, having secured from France a promise "not to obstruct the action of Great Britain in Egypt by asking that a limit of time be fixed for the British occupation or in any other manner,"² to assume Egypt all but formally incorporated into the Empire. France consents: the rest of Europe is silent; Egypt need not be asked!

Not knowing how far Cromer led Britain, and how far Britain led Cromer, one dare not attribute to Cromer personally that strange union of honor and dishonor which characterized British policy in Egypt during his time. Personal, no doubt, was a certain contempt for the Egyptian character and the possibilities of Islam which allowed him, even while serving Egypt, to conceive it as means to the greater ends of the Empire. Only partially his were those dealings with the long-range interests of Egypt which time and again at critical passes subordinated them to the ambitions of the Empire, or the momentary demands of creditors,—as in the case of the Sudan.

Cromer well knew the Sudan to be necessary to Egypt: "the effective control of the waters of the Nile from the

¹ Cf. Earl of Cromer, *Abbas II*; A. H. Beaman, *The Dethronement of the Khedive*; Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *My Diaries*.

² Declaration of April 8, 1904.

Equatorial Lakes to the sea is essential to the existence of Egypt.”³ And yet, in the interest of a more rapid recovery, he abetted the policy by which Britain refused Egypt the means to retain this province.⁴ He must bear his share of the responsibility for the subsequent miseries of the Sudan and for the death of Gordon.⁵ Later, when Great Britain began to conceive for herself a new strategic value in this region, now ravaged by all the four horses of the Apocalypse, and, when the Assuan dam project emphasized the necessity of control of the Upper Nile waters, Cromer found himself obliged to promote its reconquest

³ *Modern Egypt*, ii, p. 110.

⁴ Cromer came to Egypt in September, 1883. The Sudan was in revolt under the Mahdi, whose successes were carrying the region; but no one can say the Sudan was past recovery by an energetic action. Colonel Elgood, it is true, supports the view that Egypt was already too poor in men and means, prior to 1882, to continue holding the Sudan. And his judgment carries great weight. Nevertheless, the size of the garrisons already stationed there indicates that, apart from money-cost, no great addition of man power was required to hold on. In December, 1883, the British Government was recommending to Egypt the abandonment of all territory south of Assuan or Wadi Halfa as “of doubtful advantage to Egypt.” The Khedive and his Prime Minister Chérif Pasha objected that “The Egyptian Government cannot agree to the abandonment of territories which they consider absolutely necessary for the security and even for the existence of Egypt.” Granville and Cromer insisted on the withdrawal, and to secure Egyptian co-operation forced the resignation of Chérif Pasha. “It will no doubt be possible to find Egyptians who will execute the Khedive’s orders under English advice”—Granville to Cromer. Cf. *Modern Egypt*, i, p. 383.

⁵ Gordon had a double mission in the Sudan in 1884; by the British Government he was charged to effect the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops remaining in the Sudan; by the Khedive, he was commissioned Governor-general and required to leave some sort of government which would operate to keep the country in order, when direct Egyptian forces were retired; he was given a firman, for optional use, announcing the return of the Sudan “to the ancient families of the Kings of the Sudan.” There was still a chance that the Sudan might be held in close alliance with Egypt. While Gordon in the Sudan was desperately proposing to London, *via* Cromer at Cairo, measures by which his missions could be carried out, Cromer as interpreter was persistently derogating to London Gordon’s mentality and character. When at last Cromer began to realize that Gordon was right and had been right, it was too late to undo his own work of undermining Gordon’s credit. Hence if Gladstone has a share of blame for the disaster at Khartoum, Cromer cannot escape responsibility for Gladstone’s miraculous ignorance of the situation, and thus for the final catastrophe. Cf. *The Journals of Major-Gen. C. G. Gordon C. B. at Kartoum*; Jules Cocheris, *Situation internationale de l’Egypte et du Soudan*, p. 299.

at the cost (chiefly) of the Egyptian Treasury, but this time with a British claim which, in the fashion of imperial claims, tends to advance from condominium to annexation.

Cromer's position required him to serve two masters, Egypt and the Empire: he proved that the thing can be done,—he served both well. But he could not avoid conflicts of loyalty; and the servant of a great Empire cannot forget that its honors go to those who aid in building its body. This was compatible with doing much building in Egypt also; under no other contemporary Power could, nor would, so much have been done. The roughest physical measure of the achievement is the population of Egypt. This population doubled during Cromer's administration. Besides radical reforms in sanitation and public health, great works of irrigation, notably the Assuan dam, made it possible for the same land to support these added five millions, today an added nine millions, of Egyptian souls. Though a feeble beginning of these works had been made by Egypt prior to Britain's entry, Britain put them through: in this sense she had become the mother to, let us say, five million new Egyptians by the year 1907, when Cromer retired. People are seldom grateful to the authors of their being, rather assuming their existence as a favor to the earth; neither these new millions nor the others appeared grateful for what Britain *via* Cromer had visibly done. When Cromer's great work is finished, and he drives, departing, through the streets of Cairo, these streets are silent and empty.⁶

Cromer comments sadly on the circumstance that there seems to be something in the relationship itself which cancels gratitude. This is a myth: the reason lies in that unhappy mixture of motive. Egypt felt through the reforms the ominous presence of an ulterior and dominant inter-

⁶ P. G. Elgood, *Egypt and the Army*, pp. 24f.

est, capable of uniting with its own,—capable, too, of putting its own aside. When gifts yield to the giver their own *quid pro quo*, gratitude is checked; when they are subject to a major self-will, gratitude is neutralized: when injuries due to this major self-will are mingled with the benefits, gratitude is reversed.

The shadow of this over-interest of the Empire has been upon Egypt since its early aspirations toward independence. When under Mohammed Ali, Egypt was on its way to a small empire of its own, it was Britain, speaking through Palmerston, that intervened to prevent it. There was no pretence at this time (1840) that Egypt would be unable to govern itself at least as well as it had been governed by Turkey. But an expanded, independent and up-pish Egypt, straddling the route to the East, was an uncertain factor: had it not already refused to permit a railway across the Isthmus of Suez? Further, Turkey must be kept hearty and strong in Constantinople, as a buffer against Russia. And so England with Turkey and Austria put Egypt back into its place.

Likewise, when Britain intervened in 1882. The national movement under Arabi might have won British sympathy: it was the sort of thing which, under other circumstances, British ministers had been exhorting Europe not to put down. But this national stirring had been accompanied by a disposition to take Egyptian finance into Egyptian hands, breaking the control by Great Britain and France. Arabi and Mahmoud Sami thus mark themselves out as dangerous; they do not even submit to being dismissed from office at the behest of these great Powers. They defy Khedive Tewfik, and thereby England and France. They fortify Alexandria, and again refuse to accept orders from the British admiral. The populace scents the excitement: there are riots and killings. These are challenges which great

Powers cannot permit: Mr. Gladstone reluctantly finds himself off on a crusade to "convert the state of Egypt from anarchy and conflict"—to what? To peace and order, and humble acceptance of European fiscal control, humble debt-paying. This is Britain's "mandate," and therefore Cromer's primary mission.

The surrender of the Sudan was dictated, as we have observed, by this over-interest. No doubt, Egypt had been "making a mess of it" in the Sudan. The Sudanese had the same reason to hate Egyptian rule as had the fellahin of Egypt: Ismail's tax-gatherers were winning no lovers, and the remoter the subjects the more ruthless the methods of extortion, the less tolerable the rule. They had in addition a grievance peculiar to themselves: their trade in slaves had been shut down! "Most of the supporters of the Mahdi, more especially the Baggara tribes, owe all their wealth to the traffic in slaves, which the Egyptian Government has now for many years been taking measures to put an end to."⁷ Prohibitions are always resented as interferences with honest liberty; and the Sudanese slaver, like the American wine-sop, is ripe for revolt. The virtue of the Egyptian Government is as irksome to him as its vice. A shrewd and promising Mahdi, messenger of God, sensing the moment of Egypt's weakness in the net of the foreigner, gains willing ears and arms to "drive the Turk into the sea." He has only to beat an Egyptian detachment and capture an Egyptian stronghold, and he is a certified Mahdi, a man of authority, each victory making the next easier. Egyptian power begins to fail, and now, with the defeat of Arabi, Egyptian armies, blown to fragments by British guns, can give but feeble aid to the faltering garri-sons in the Sudan. What, then, is Britain to do?

At first, nothing at all: it is Egypt's affair, let Egypt

⁷ *The Journals of Major-Gen. C. G. Gordon C. B. at Kartoum.*

deal with it. Let them send a few officers to Khartoum, Hicks, Lieutenant-Colonel from India, at their head. Let them sweep up a few thousand fellahin, remnants of Arabi's defeated army among them, bring them in chains to Cairo, keep them there until they can be sent, still in chains, to Khartoum, where Hicks, now Hicks Pasha, is ready to try a raid against the Mahdi. Let Hicks lead these men blind-eyed into the wilderness of Kordofan, communications closing behind him, and get them ambushed and cut up, himself included: all ten thousand of them dead in the forest, not from lack of valor but from lack of water and lack of head, the British-Indian head not serving in these parts. Then the Mahdi is a made man, clearly too great a man for Egypt to fight alone. And neither Turkish troops nor Indian troops nor British troops will be permitted to help: the Sudan must be abandoned.

One might think that England had now incurred a double obligation to aid Egypt in securing the Sudan. First by engaging Egypt's whole military strength in an unequal contest, which ends in demolishing Arabi's army. Second—though Hicks's expedition was no deed of official England—by failing to sustain Egypt's faith in British prowess: was it no matter of pride to Englishmen that Egypt at that time *spontaneously* looked to them for leadership? ⁸ But British statesmanship sees no obligation; and sees no value in the Sudan to Egypt. It is a waste of desert, wilderness, swamp, torridity: its tribes are black and savage, with a wicked taste for slave-trading: it is not worth the cost. Precisely here, the Egyptian eye is better

⁸ Gordon's view, as expounded by A. Egmont Hake, the editor of his journals, was clear: "We were morally to blame for General Hicks's defeat, for had we prevented the fellaheen conscripts being dragged in chains from their homes and sent up to recruit Hicks's army, Hicks would not have left Khartoum and his troops would not have been annihilated. Through this disaster we became morally responsible for the extended influence of the Mahdi." C. G. Gordon, *Journals*, Introduction, p. xxxiv.

than the British eye,—better for Egypt: the Egyptian sees the necessity which the British a decade later begins to recognize.⁹

Everyone knew that the relinquishment of the Sudan meant the lapse of what little civilization had begun there. Poor tool-Khedive Tewfik knew that in spite of misrule some net benefit had got itself planted in that region: in his firman of relinquishment he recalls how his great grandfather, Mohammed Ali, having brought Egypt up, then “saw the necessity of taking the Sudan region to spread out the lights of civilization therein, and God Almighty prospered him in that enterprise.” Gordon alone foresees how much will be lost: for it is largely *his* work that is abandoned. “It would be nobler to keep the Soudan,” he wrote mournfully, “but it is too much to expect our taxpayers to agree to.”¹⁰ When the white man’s burden becomes burdensome, we lose interest. But no one measured the extent of the disaster. Out of eight million people, barely two millions survived the years of Mahdism, —six millions perished through war, pestilence, famine. The land itself became a ruin, devoid of domestic beasts, of food-trees, almost of wells. Seldom in history have thirteen years (1885-1898) been so seared with misery and horror. To this fate the Sudan was released, at Britain’s demand, from Egyptian oppression: not, however, be it noted, from Ismail, the oppressor, nor from Tewfik; it was at the moment of inner revolution in Egypt, of a turn

⁹ I avoid here the interpretation held by certain French diplomats that Great Britain required Egypt to loose her hold on the Sudan in order that she might later seize it for herself—already well aware of its value. Jules Cocheris, *Situation internationale de l’Egypte et du Soudan*, pp. 286, 294, 429. The seizure, in 1884, of Suakin, the Red-Sea outlet of Sudan trade, by Admiral Hewett lends a certain color to this view; though the “protection of Red Sea ports” and of the railroad built by Britain—1883 and following—may be a sufficient justification for this act.

¹⁰ *Journals*, Book V, p. 223. But also, in an outburst of indignation—“I hate Her Majesty’s Government for their leaving the Soudan, after having caused all its troubles.”—Book I, p. 25.

toward better things, that the Sudan was let fall into the furnace.

Under these circumstances, if there were a dominant moral continuity in international affairs, the recovery of the Sudan in 1898 by the joint efforts of Egypt and Britain should have meant a recovery *for Egypt*. I do not say as a subject territory for Egyptian imperialism to exploit, but as an integral part of a single Nile-Valley state. It was in the name of the Egyptian title that the French expedition in Fashoda was summarily shown the door.¹¹ In the organization of that enlarged territory there would have been ample reason for prolonging the period of Egyptian tutelage under British genius; in order that united Egypt might persist, with still more light spread out in it. If the Sudan had been in 1898 a no-man's-land, the French were in their right in occupying a part of it by way of conquest *de novo*. If it were not a *res nullius*, it was only because the prior Egyptian-Ottoman title retained its validity.¹²

But there were other considerations, such as a desire to avoid extending the region to which the Capitulations applied and the scheme of the Mixed Courts (both of which admitted other European Powers to a parity with Britain), and these prescribed a separate political status for the Sudan. Why not a "condominium," an equal partnership

¹¹ See official report of Kitchener, *Blue Book*, No. 2. Kitchener to Marchand, commanding the French Expedition, "Dois-je comprendre que vous êtes autorisé par le Gouvernement français à vous opposer à l'érection du drapeau de l'Égypte et au rétablissement de son autorité dans ses anciennes possessions . . . ?" Jules Cocheris, *Situation internationale de l'Égypte et du Soudan*, p. 460. He continues, "Le 20 septembre, à quatre heures du soir, le pavillon égyptien fut hissé."

¹² The Ottoman element, having become a dead-letter, played no part in subsequent negotiations except in answer to questions raised by France. Thus Salisbury, 6 Feb., 1899: "We hold the territory of the Porte for two reasons: it is an indisputable part of Egypt, which we occupy, and also by the more ancient and easier to understand right of conquest." P. G. Elgood, *The Transit of Egypt*, p. 180n. In establishing the condominium, England treated directly with Egypt and not with the Porte.

with Egypt in governing? An honest condominium would have been a reasonable arrangement: a condominium in which the brunt of the costs was borne by Egypt while all of the authority and most of the new benefits were absorbed by Britain, could hardly commend itself to the ordinary ethical sense.¹³ It is another sort of ethics which dictates the actual arrangement, with British Governors-General and higher control, able to impose terms upon Egypt and on occasion to expel their military, unhampered by obligations to the rest of the world, treating the Sudan with increasing decisiveness as part of the Empire.¹⁴ This ethics is built on a sense of the special

¹³ The money cost of the reconquest was hardly £2,500,000, of which Great Britain contributed one third and Egypt two thirds, more or less. Egypt contributed most of the man-power and Great Britain most of the higher officers. Since 1899, Great Britain has paid £200,000, Egypt £1,000,000 per annum toward the costs of joint military occupation: Egypt, five sixths of the total. In addition, Egypt has paid £150,000 per annum toward the cost of British garrisons in Egypt and Sudan, materially reducing Great Britain's one sixth. This is not all. Egypt has made annual contributions to cover deficits during the first thirteen years of the Sudan administration, amounting to over £5,000,000 sterling. "In addition, she made advances to the Sudan Government for capital expenditure on such public works as railway building or the construction of Port Sudan, which was stated to have amounted, merely for the years 1901 to 1909 inclusive, to £4,378,000." Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement*, pp. 238-240 and notes. Egypt continues to make these contributions because unwilling to relinquish her claim to the Sudan: Great Britain allows her to make them, while assuming the right to determine by unilateral declaration how much authority Egypt shall enjoy there, i.e., playing the part of suzerain.

¹⁴ Already in 1884, in treating with King John of Abyssinia, territories belonging to the Sudan were transferred to Abyssinia without consulting either Egypt or the Porte. Of this extraordinary procedure Gordon writes:

"Mitzakis writes to the Greek Consul here to say that a treaty has been made between Her Majesty's Government and Abyssinia, to give Abyssinia Kassala, Galabat, Katarif, and Bogos! and that the King is preparing an army to go and take possession. What an action. These lands (except Bogos) are entirely Mussulman, have held their own, and are in no way threatened, and WE go and send a wild so-called Christian people (who have nothing to do with the quarrel) against these peoples, who have held their own against the Mahdi. . . .

"Admirable treaty, let us think,—yes, spread of Christianity, regular missionary movement. . . .

"It may not be generally known, but by the firman which named Towfik, there is an express injunction that no part of the Egyptian territory is to be ceded, except by permission of the Porte. Also by the Treaty

rights which go to enterprise, capital, intelligence, the power to organize and military power to match, the power to bring up, and the power to *use*,—the imperial ethics of the 19th century. If only Britain had not accepted so much from Egypt! ¹⁵

The sum of it is this. Without the Egyptian claim, Britain would have had no special right in the Sudan; without Egyptian troops and men, she could neither have won it nor have held it; without her position as administrator of the Egyptian debt, she could not have gained control of these necessary instruments. She has used the advantages conferred by her position as trustee to possess herself of some of her ward's property. If there is any justification for this departure from the principles of personal integrity, it is not the "right of conquest": it is that it is better for the Sudanese. But it remains to be shown that the advantages to the Sudanese need be gained so completely at the cost of Egypt.

I am not drawing up a bill of complaint against Britain's policies in Egypt: I am singling out the major points at which British judgment and Egyptian judgment have visibly diverged in the larger issues of public welfare. I shall mention more briefly several other such points, beginning with the matter of education.

We have already adverted to the fact that the Egyptian administration is showing much energy in this field. Great Britain was not wholly inactive in this respect; but if after forty years the illiteracy was still 90 per cent, the show-

of Paris, and also by that of Berlin, the integrity of the Ottoman Dominion is guaranteed by the Powers. What a farce it is to say that Egypt ceded Kassala." *Journals*, Book V, pp. 200, 201, 206.

¹⁵ Note Curzon's remark in the House of Lords in 1924 (quoted by Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement*, p. 241) that "The Sudan would be bankrupt at this moment if it were not for the financial expenditure undertaken by Egypt." Also Toynbee's statement that "Egypt supplied all but the highest and the lowest public employees." Twenty-five years later "their services were still indispensable."

ing is feeble. Rushdi Pasha's over-bitter words make this the principal point of complaint against British rule:—"Its utter disregard of the obligation of spending a fair part of the money derived from taxes on the education of the people. The British are deliberately keeping the Egyptians from getting an education, and then they tell the world that we are incapable of governing ourselves."¹⁶ Less deliberate keeping-down, surely, than economy, meeting insistent obligations toward bond-holders, public works, the Sudan campaign: and in part, the aristocratic conviction,—higher education should not be too common. Lord Cromer had his thoughts for a future national system of education, but felt bound by his major aim to move slowly.¹⁷ What he did had a quality hitherto unknown to Egypt. But an Egyptian judgment would have used a different proportion: tending to temper the rate of debt-paying in order to maintain the reach of the schools, it would have developed in 1922 a better instructed nation.

Nor can we omit from the account of public education the moral effect on the nation of its own subordination and the breaking of its sovereign's will. With the increase of wealth and population in Egypt has gone a startling increase of crime.¹⁸

Or consider the war-story of Egypt. An Egyptian Government acting on its own initiative in 1914, preferring, no doubt, to maintain neutrality, would have been forced to co-operate with Great Britain in order to protect its

¹⁶ H. A. Gibbons, "Great Britain in Egypt," *The Century Magazine*, May, 1920.

¹⁷ On Cromer's work in education see Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement*, pp. 583f.; P. G. Elgood, *Egypt and the Army*, p. 367; *idem*, *The Transit of Egypt*, pp. 144f.

¹⁸ This increase is attributed by J. Alexander (*The Truth about Egypt*, pp. 42f.) to the abolition of the kurbash, and to other leniencies of the Cromer régime. I suspect there may be a quarter-truth in this, the main point remaining that, when the punishment of crime is punishment by the foreigner, crime tends to acquire a certain psychological merit!

own territory. In this case, however, the agreements with Britain would have been written by an Egypt having a definite bargaining power, and Egypt as an ally would have had its place with the Hedjaz at the Conference in Paris. Our obligations to Egypt were peculiarly salient, because of the promised immunity from contribution at the opening of the Great War. When Great Britain found itself obliged—or let us say, pressed—to break this too-sanguine promise, Egypt accepted the situation and gave to the breaking point, both of beasts and of men. Without their assistance, the Palestinian campaign,—that is to say, the settlements of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan,—would have been impossible. These obligations were none the less real because Egypt found itself at the end improved in financial condition: such general improvement, moreover, being compatible with widespread havoc in village life. There was a debt of honor to Egypt; and how it was treated, the world knows. It was for the British administrators of Egypt especially to have felt its justice and to have pressed it upon a preoccupied Great Britain at Versailles and London, so that they could not have treated as non-existent those Egyptians who attempted the reminder. I fear it must be said that this is as clear a case of ingratitude as can be brought against any nation. But it lies in the situation of a foreign ruler, requiring as of right what he would have asked of a free people as a favor, that the sense of indebtedness is blunted. Great Britain cannot see the position of Egypt as Egypt can see it for herself.

It lies in this situation also that the wealth of Egypt, which a local administration would apply to local ends, becomes regarded as a legitimate resource for British ends. Thus Egypt is led to invest public moneys in Transvaal paper, a very good war-loan on apparently good security,

—an ingenious way of obliging Egypt and England at the same time. No intention to defraud, much regret when the paper turns worthless! Still, the question will persist: would it have occurred to Egyptians to make that investment, and without safeguard against just the contingency of failure? Other incidents, connected with the management of Egyptian cotton for the benefit of Manchester, or with the heavy charges on the Egyptian Treasury, legitimate in principle, for bonuses and indemnities for retiring British officials, may be passed as lesser episodes in the history of a relationship which on the whole has been a credit to the integrity of British government; details nevertheless symptomatic of a difficulty of seeing the interest of Egypt as Egypt sees it. I am not at this moment concerned with the major economic motives which underlie the policies of the Empire, in which a sublimated idea of tribute is always assumed appropriate.

All this raises the question, then,—Do these difficulties decrease with time? Or does time now operate to deepen them?

There are three stages in the history of foreign rulership. When the stranger first enters he is dazzled by the sense of difference; he uses his own perceptions because he has no others to guide him. Necessity, interest, and effort lead him to the second stage,—that of an acquired intuition of the mind of the native; in his own measure he learns to think and feel with the people among whom he lives. In the third stage the interest of novelty is gone, generalizations become fixed, and the foreigner reverts to the easier methods of judgment of his early habit. His capacity to govern suffers in accord with a law of diminishing return.

In the case of Britain in Egypt, these stages can be

clearly seen. In the first, the Sudan was relinquished. In the second, there was a growing intimacy and understanding. Then, with the increase in numbers of the English colony, the temperamental aloofness of the Briton reasserts itself: he keeps much to his own society, and loses touch with the native mind.

It is especially disastrous for any people to live long among a population which it holds in contempt. It is perpetually drawn to adopt an inferior morality because it supposes itself dealing with inferiors. It buys elections and consciences, because it supposes that elections and consciences are customarily bought. It creates faction, because it assumes faction and intrigue to be the order of the native soul. It allows itself cruel and unjust punishments because of the theory that these are the punishments necessary to impress. It cuts itself off from all those sources of knowledge which only reveal themselves to good will and good faith. It forgets that just in proportion as men are different in their presuppositions they must be approached with humility and a willingness to learn what is beyond one's native circle of thought. Though individuals achieve this attitude, it is hard for a government—perhaps impossible for a foreign government. If so, it indicates that there arrives a point where the best foreign government may be worse than a native government of very moderate attainments.

No race has bred so large a proportion of outstanding governors, men of superior stature in several dimensions, as the British. This fact implies something in the stock, as well as in the type of training. The civilization built by this stock is rich in moral quality: England is so honest that the dullest can survive there, and often does. The British have a sound sense of honor, both substantial and sentimental, brought out in them during public-school

days, when an unwritten fighting code supplements the Christian code, with the ideas of doing one's bit, of taking without whining, of loyalty to the pack, scenting also from afar the romance of the Empire. They get a reticent and decent attitude toward women, which makes for a race with good reserve energy and second-wind, not weakening off at forty as do nine-tenths of the world's gentry into a relaxed weariness of public, thought-requiring affairs. These qualities build a great state. They do not necessarily produce great versatility in apprehending the needs of other states. Hence Britain abroad is perpetually compromised and misrepresented by its duller members, to whom it is resolutely loyal even in their most abysmal stupidities.

It is a fair question whether the vast commitments of the British Empire, suddenly enlarged at the close of a great war when man-power was seriously depleted, have not become too great even for British capacity. There are signs that England is spreading itself out too thin; and that the quality of the young men who now go out to Egypt and elsewhere does not stand up on the average to its former levels. Speaking of the situation toward the end of Cromer's régime, Colonel Elgood says:

"The educated Egyptian noted bitterly that Englishmen replacing Egyptians frequently were without the technical knowledge which would have excused their appointment. Men were posted to high commands in the police who had no knowledge of criminal law; others obtained places in the Ministry of Finance without any qualification for their important duties save that of unimpeachable honesty. . . . British Advisers had to find staff as best they could, and they were not altogether to blame if some of the chosen fell short of that standard required by Egyptians. Frequently the second-best had to be taken, because Egypt could not afford to pay the market-price commanded by the first-rate."¹⁹

¹⁹ *Egypt and the Army*, p. 17.

Colonel Elgood does not agree that in 1919 the average Englishman in Egyptian service was of a lower standard than his predecessors²⁰: and naturally there is no objective history of this change of quality. My own impression is that, at present, after the very remarkable men in the higher posts, the quality rapidly falls off. Besides those whose only quality is their honesty, there are others, one suspects, whose only quality is that they are Englishmen. It is when the Egyptian compares himself with these that the sense of his own relative fitness is most secure.

At least this is true,—and it is the difficulty of the present moment,—that the postulate of British superiority is no longer accepted instinctively in Egypt. The obverse postulate, Egyptian inferiority, is consciously rejected. It is therefore no longer the decisive point whether Egypt has still much to learn from British tutelage. The decisive point is that the *disposition to learn from that quarter is lacking*. Without any change in the British genius, its capacity to govern Egypt well now tends to the point of no advantage.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

CHAPTER IX

FOREIGN INTERESTS IN EGYPT

HITHERTO we have considered only the interests of the Egyptian people in their own land. But Egypt, like many another land, has a foreign colony and a set of foreign interests claiming a concern beyond that of mere guests in the government of the land. Beyond doubt, also, Egypt is peculiar in the extent of this foreign colony—now 225,000 in number—and in the depth of these foreign interests.¹

There are evident reasons for this invadedness. Egypt is a land of desire for trade-makers, war-makers and lovers of antiquity. In so far as the history of Egypt is a part of the history of all the rest of the world, the world as historian and reflective philosopher has property in Egypt prior to that of all contemporaries. There is no property so private as the property men have in the tombs of their ancestors; but the tombs of Egypt have outgrown that privacy,—they are the tombs of the ancestors of all of us. As the hoary source of civilizations, Egypt is—except Palestine—the least private of all lands. Fortunately, the native Egyptian has an unexampled power of keeping

¹ A rough analysis of the population at different periods is as follows:

	1896	1904	1917
Total:	6,800,000	9,734,405	14,055,000
Foreign:	90,000	112,000	150,000
Greek	37,000	38,000	57,000
Italian	18,500	24,500	40,000
French	15,700	14,100	21,000 (with Tunisians)
British	6,100	19,500	24,400

his own privacy in the presence of the returning progeny of his sixty centuries: there is hardly another mentality on the planet so imperturbably at home amid the wash of the world's travel. If the man in the fields is still the living counterpart of the man on the monuments, it is because nature and history have found the identity worth preserving: we may well regard his conservatism less with impatience than with filial piety. In Egypt time becomes transparent, and the present is the presence of the past.

If the ideal element in property constituted the first claim on the soil, Egypt would belong primarily to those who can keep alive there the Egypt of the Pharaohs and the Ptolemies, of the priests of the Sun and the first dreamers of personal immortality, of Joseph and Moses, of Ptah Hotep and Amenophis, of Pythagoras and Philo and Augustine, of the anonymous artists and architects of the Dynasties. Contemporary property-claims, whether of Egyptians or of others, claims to cotton land or to trade rights, detached from this major interest which is the world's interest, appear to us in this light as comparatively superficial and morally fragile, however well documented in the records. As for making a claim on Egypt as a "corridor," whether for the Empire or for any other passage-maker of today, let us be clear that all such rights of way are among the last of the world's concerns in that soil. Ideally speaking, no one except those who consciously or subconsciously care for the Egypt of history, yesterday and tomorrow together, has any property-right in Egypt at all.

Having thus put first things first, we turn to those minor things called "interests," tangible and actual, which have come in from outside, have taken root more or less in good faith as useful to the place, and claim protection not because they are Egyptian, but because they are human and

therefore "real." For every human interest confers its measure of reality on its objects: a Greek fishmonger's shop in Alexandria is real-estate, quite as much as the feddans of the Pharaohs. He, the Greek, makes a habit running daily through that point of latitude and longitude; and there is a law in all statute books signifying acceptance of that sort of will-circuit, as a part of the general life. He can use Egypt and Egypt can use him. As a fishmonger he is welcome to his place: as a foreign subject he has other will-circuits of doubtful fitness in Egypt.

The Mamelukes were no lovers of foreigners and foreign interests. They invited the French to leave, very much as the Turks have recently invited Greeks, Armenians and Jews to leave. They were a sufficient foreign colony to themselves.

The same Mohammed Ali who got rid of the Mamelukes with such despatch opened modern Egypt to European settlement.² His successors continued his hospitable temper. Thus the foreign colony in Egypt is not, as in various other cases, one which forced itself in: it is an invited colony. It has primarily that trade-work to do to which the Egyptian, like the Turk, is little inclined. He, the Egyptian, can produce beyond belief with his Blue Nile mud; but his mind flags at finding a purchaser for his surplus. His tyrants formerly relieved him of that necessity. Mohammed Ali's omdehs took the whole crop and gave him back his pittance. The foreign trader inherits a part of this business: Jews and Syrians are no newcomers to Egypt, having provided for centuries the necessary modicum of mercantile brain.³ Likewise the Greek: since the

² Colonel Elgood notes that Saladin was the author of the earliest Capitulations (1171 A.D.). Mohammed Ali merely followed suit in this respect, extending the facilities offered to foreigners.

³ A letter, discovered in 1914, from Emperor Claudius to the Alexandrians urges them to "show yourselves forbearing and kindly towards the Jews and permit them to observe their customs." Quoted by J. Y. Brinton, *The Mixed Courts of Egypt*, p. 1.

days of Herodotus, there have been mutual curiosity and mutual use between these peoples. 19th-century Egypt has its 19th-century Greeks, disputing commerce and lending with the Jews and winning the business, winning also the odium that attends successful bargain-wit tainted with shrewdness.

The Italian colony has made its place almost entirely in recent years. The Italians are producers, contractors, small factory managers and workers skilled in the European arts, selling to Egyptians a type of constructive ability into which Egypt but slowly begins to enter. With the French and the British another sort of interest begins to preponderate,—the political and military, the scholarly give and take, the mission: in business they are fewer in number than the others, but their individual investments are larger, and their influence incomparably greater. For this group represents the science and economy of modern Europe, working its goods and ideas into the fabric of Egyptian life, and profiting by the transitional hour. It makes markets for sewing machines, watches, lamps, fabrics, furniture, cars, ornaments, foodstuffs, such as old Egypt knew nothing of, and many of which Egypt would be better without. Of the many things we of the West make and find good, some few are good for Egypt also, some machines, some medicines, some few books out of the vast stewing caldron of uneasy intellect: with these are mingled an unknown proportion of trash and poison, with which we are willing—having degraded our own taste—to corrupt any foreign stock foolish enough to take them. This variety of foreigner, selling Europe and some fraction of America to Egypt, is indispensable for the present, while Egypt is learning to choose and to discard among the masses of truck for which we and our drummers pretend universal value.

We have distinguished three varieties of foreigner, the Levantine-Greek semi-domesticated in the nation, the political-diplomatic, including the personnel of Occupation, the recent European. There is another important group of foreigners, not included in the census because they are *passagères*, guests of the nation: they are the students from abroad, pilgrims to ancestral Egypt, antiquarians, excavators, appreciators, and with them a seasonal horde of tourists. Among the tourists, some amiably vagrant, others—too many—vapid, sensation-hunting loafers, the scum of America and Europe in the sense of having risen to the top above all the honest working of their respective societies, and now drifting without aim through the planet's places of rumor, attracting to themselves all the loose, begging, lying, ungentle elements of the proletariat as servants, dragomen, sellers of scarabs, mock antiquities, mock oriental production, purveyors of locomotion, amusements, bodily cushioning and comfort, eatables and drinkables, time-tables and admissions. Unhappy Egypt! Thus in the category of visitors and guests one must include the best-entitled and the worst-entitled to be in Egypt. And here, unfortunately, Egypt cannot select. There is no telling where under the tourist mask lurks the honest lover of Egypt; and all these miscellaneous drifters have the "rights of man." Egypt need not cater to them unless it pleases: but it must keep them safe, them and their pocket books and their purchases. And it must admit them all, wheat and tares, until it learns an art as yet unknown to mankind of telling one from the other.⁴

Egypt then must admit foreign quarters into its great cities: if not among the original rights of man, then next

⁴ They are said to contribute to the wealth of Egypt, these sight-seers. I doubt it. They contribute to the wealth of hotel-keepers and traders, mostly foreign. Only the minor services, cab-men, baggage-brigands, polyglot guides, have Egyptians in their membership.

to them, is the right to visit Egypt! A right so well-used that in Cairo the foreign quarter is the city, and the natives *have* a quarter where such life as is not lured out by the hope of gain hides.⁵ The great port and the cosmopolis are everywhere hybrid and meretricious; but Cairo is unique in the volume of its foreign life and the complacent sense of right in the minds of these squatters, and withal in the serene adequacy with which Egypt flows around and through the foreign districts, imposing its quality everywhere, and maintaining without effort its character as the capital of Arabic culture, one of the three greatest centers of Islam, and the gateway to the deepest vistas of history.

When I say that the world as visitor has full right to come to Egypt, I do not say an unconditional right. Nor do I say as much for the world as trader, seller of Europe to the East: *his* right exists only so long as he is wanted by Egypt. It is pertinent, when we ask who must be protected in Egypt, to be clear by what right one is there at all. The trader, I say, is for this generation useful to Egypt: but you and I have not the slightest interest nor obligation in keeping him there beyond the moment of his Egyptian welcome. No matter whether he is of your nationality or of mine, he is there for himself alone; he deserves no thanks,—he has his reward! And he deserves no political pains in his behalf, beyond the care for his life and property in passing. As Egypt grows in mental completeness his numbers will decline of their own accord.

Let us remember that the foreigner in Egypt is, in general, but half a good citizen, having a one-sided concern in the community, namely, in its *purchasing power*, and

⁵ I speak of what is distinctively Egyptian. Cairo and Alexandria have, of course, their more elegant quarters and suburbs, the Gezira, Heliopolis, Maadi, etc., where Egyptians and Europeans alike reside. Such quarters are much the same everywhere.

none too intelligent at that. The purchasing power of Egypt is not widely distributed. The fellah, thirteen-million strong, is buying of us a few trinkets,—cotton goods, sewing machines, lights, perhaps a talking machine,—not much all told. Egypt will thus be Europeanized not all at once, but first in those spots where the surplus of the land-produce has gathered. So far, the general poverty of Egypt's people is of some advantage to Egypt; though not an unmixed advantage to this foreign trader. It lessens the cost of his living in Egypt, provides him with abundant service, lets him sustain an ample scale and so supports a commanding manner in him. But as salesman, his cause would be helped if purchasing power were filtered downward in that society *via* higher wages, higher prices for fellah-produce, more small holdings, an altered incidence of taxes. Does he then clamor for such a change? On the contrary, he perceives it coming and joins with the landed Egyptian in fearing it. An agrarian movement of some sort clouds the social future for the Egyptian notable—not a communistic movement, for Egypt is set toward private land holding—but a trend to reportioning incomes whereby peasant families may begin to plan a life in two mud-brick rooms instead of one. The foreign trader, who has heard of Russia, instead of favoring this process, holds rigidly still lest something be shaken down. Growth-events, happening in the basal stratum of society, have been accompanied by rumblings, and in some oriental lands by rough-handling of foreigners. Egypt itself has had its murderous moods. Feeling himself in an exposed position, the foreigner lets the timorous side of his nature become his counsellor: the great need, he feels, is for protection, security, public order. Truly a great need: but it is well for a growing state that these interest-made conservatives are not citizens in full right, makers of

Egypt's domestic policy. At the same time, since they have been accorded rights under the Capitulations as well as by custom, in excess of what either citizenship or an ethical reason would now grant them, they hold to these with the greater tenacity because they themselves are not a part of Egypt.

The word "Capitulations" covers no special mystery: it implies simply the headings (*capitula*) under which special privileges accorded by treaty to foreigners were listed. There was a time in the dealings of the West with the Ottoman Empire when such headings of special privilege were needed if exchange was to go on. There were head taxes and various other nuisance taxes impeding commerce; the foreign trader must be exempt from those. There were searchings of houses from which he should be immune, unless his consul were present. Above all, there were laws and punishments and court-methods which left him insecure: a court under his own consul promised him an understandable type of justice. A nation desiring western intercourse, as Turkey dealing with Francis I in 1535, will offer an attractive list of such reassurances: so 19th-century Egypt, inheriting a good list as a subject of Turkey, inclines to extend it, even while Turkey, becoming jealous of the foreigner, tends to narrow it down. Egypt allowed foreigners not alone their consular courts in all cases, but also their own national law, making them immune from the law of Egypt, as well as from nearly all taxes. From this wide-open system, making it easy for fourteen varieties of foreigner thus favored to dodge all ordinary accountability, Egypt needed to rescue itself: and in 1875, under Ismail, made the sweeping reform of which the Mixed Courts are a part. In these Mixed Courts, Egyptian and foreign judges sit together to hear all civil litigation involving foreign interests. But of criminal cases, the

chief business for foreigners is still done in their consular courts: only their "police offences," punishable by one week or five pounds Egyptian, can come before the Mixed Courts. Hence the smuggler, the trader in narcotics, the offender against public decency, evades Egyptian law, and renders Egyptian legislation helpless. In 1904, Cromer held the closing of consular courts imperative.⁶

Our western concern for rights has in it a dash of abstraction. We glorify the right in its distilled beauty, regardless of the persons who happen to be holding and claiming it. Let a right be in the hand of the veriest thug and outlaw, still, tomorrow the same right may be needed for a visiting angel: then let us impersonalize the right and protect *that*, shutting our eyes to the rascal to whom we thereby become a friendly destiny. So it is with the undoubted rights of the foreign gentlemen in Egypt, among whom there are not many more than the average percentage of rascals: they must be guarded, we think, as holy things. And, if Egypt's hands are unsteady to the task, some reliable Might, like England, will be called to take responsibility, doing justice to the just and to the unjust. England is there in the first place to protect the foreign interests, those which in 1882 appeared to need protection, and others which have accrued since.)

In the days of Ismail's staggering debt and of Arabi's uprising, Britain had no pressing desire to intervene. She would have chosen to act with France in a task not too sweet to the conscience. But France was unready;⁷ and Britain finds herself alone in Egypt! And once well there, in spite of various unhappy aspects of the job, disposed to stay on, and indeed to keep others out. Today, if one

⁶ J. Y. Brinton, *The Mixed Courts of Egypt*, p. 332.

⁷ Clémenceau, in the Chamber of Deputies, denounced the proposal on the grounds that the Egyptian race was too full of promise to be held in subjection.

may believe Sir Austen Chamberlain, after many attempts to leave Egypt, Britain finds herself thwarted at every turn,—surely an indication of Providence. No one of us, he reflects, can escape from the situation in which God has placed him.⁸

If Providence had failed in the selection of Great Britain for this task, the elections of the foreign colony would doubtless have alighted on the same custodian. Each of the non-British foreign residents would give her the second choice! Thus she has still an all but unanimous “mandate” on their behalf. It is no small thing to have retained this general confidence for so long a time. Is it then a happy accident, or shall we say another deed of Providence, that this skilled protector of the foreign debt and of the foreign colony should be at the same time the potent defender of another great foreign interest, its own interest in the Suez Canal?

The Suez Canal was finished in 1869. It was in no sense a British project. Said, Viceroy of Egypt, fell into the trap which his father Mohammed Ali had avoided: he yielded to the persuasions of French enterprise, believing that this much-dreamed-of waterway would bring the commerce of the world toward Egypt, to the glory of its builder and the enrichment of the land. He did not see that commerce would seize this opportunity of slipping through Egyptian fingers, and Egypt itself become vulnerable to whatever great Powers should require the military service of that Canal. For every local interest of Egypt, the Suez Canal was a calamity. The brunt of its cost fell upon Egyptian fellahin both in taxes and in the agonies of forced labor; the public Treasury began its career of plunging indebtedness to Jewish-European bankers; the political intrusion of

⁸ “Circumstances had been too strong, and the moment of withdrawal had never come.” *Papers regarding Negotiations for a Treaty of Alliance with Egypt*, Cmd. 3050. No. 1. July 13, 1927, p. 4.

Europe became inevitable. Though Great Britain appears at first to have been but languidly alive to the new situation, no nation was ever more thoroughly converted to a "vital interest" than was England by Disraeli, assuming that Britain must control India, no other Power can be allowed to control the Canal.

A state is where its vital interests are. Egypt, having created a shortest-route for England (and for France also) through its own borders, manufactured out of nothing a vital interest for this Power; and thereby, in all innocence on both sides, established a piece of England on Egyptian soil. Through any one region of air, waves of a hundred sorts may pass and cross at the same time: so on any spot of earth, interests may interpenetrate,—new ones shooting out to make common fortune with what is already present. England's arrival as Canal shareholder in 1875 means no visible displacement of Egypt: it is simply that Ismail's shares are gone, and Egypt is no longer even part owner in her Canal. Neither then nor in the early days of the Occupation did it occur to British statesmen that a military force in Cairo would be necessary to hold the Canal. The various declarations by Gladstone, Salisbury and others that the Occupation was temporary were given in good faith. A few ships near the Canal, of course, but why an army in Cairo? However, the military art changes; and so also the state of belligerent weather in the world: tensions in Europe, rivalries in the Mediterranean; above all, strategical imagination, busy in peace time with questions of what might happen if Italy did this or China did that; all these now combine to create a dogma, an article of faith,—ten thousand British soldiers at the Canal, or at the nearest livable city, which is Cairo. The interpenetration of interests begins to be physical, dislocating, disquieting to Egypt. The Canal cannot be unbuilt: England

must be a permanent neighbor, perhaps must be a resident.

Providence, having opened Great Britain's eyes in time to its vital interest in the Canal, has nicely arranged that the necessary army need not be sent *ad hoc* with all the flurry and fuming attendant on such deeds: the Occupation finds the army in Cairo,—it is only necessary to stay there. Meanwhile, as we have seen, this same presence in Egypt allows the creation of a new foreign interest, the British interest in the Sudan, hitherto purely Turkish-Egyptian hunting ground. India may some day drop out of the picture, and thereby the source of much British pride and of not a few ill-deeds in the world be removed. Then the Canal may be held with less absolute emphasis; even now, there are divisions of judgment about its military worth. But the Sudan remains, a foothold for a great foreign interest overshadowing Egypt.

The Sudan means to its owners limitless fine cotton land, if men can be had to work it and water to irrigate it. It means also a long segment of Cape-to-Cairo railway; East Africa, rescued from German to British hands by irrelevant war-time diversions, provides other segments; making the dream of this long route "under one flag" an all-but-realizable fancy.—Too bad Egypt will not make it complete, under one flag?—The Sudan also supplies needed airports, as does Egypt proper. And air stations *may* be under one flag. For when in 1917-1918 Great Britain requisitioned land in Abukir for the use of the Royal Air Force⁹ she made claim to that spot as an integral part of the Empire, a small Gibraltar within the Delta. She simply "proclaimed" it her own; and ignored the wrath of Egypt. Thus the Nile River, the railways, the

⁹ A war measure, extending without a shadow of legal justification into permanent sovereignty. P. G. Elgood, *Egypt and the Army*, p. 340.

airways and stations tend to become, besides the Canal, "communications of the Empire."

It is clear that of all the foreign interests in Egypt that of Great Britain has expanded most: the Britain which might consider withdrawal from Egypt today is not the Britain which entered in 1882 as relatively-disinterested trustee of debt and order. The Empire has taken root all around Egypt, and the roots are running underground everywhere through the soil. If anyone is to blame for this process, geography must bear a share of it; Egypt lies at the crossing of many modern roads. And the main users of these roads are pretending a sort of international right-of-way principle—highways to those who use them—to be enforced, for lack of a higher authority, by themselves.

Certainly the Empire has its rights, even when it continues to grow! Given the Empire as a vast world-concern, its cohesion becomes a matter of moment to all earth-dwellers. Granted that this Empire is on the whole an engine of good-will and no mere self-interested octopus, a civilizing agency with much good work yet to do, the while it is battling for its economic future and its pride,—granted this: then those lines of communication are not to be put down as mere objects of cupidity on the part of self-enclosed Londonese arrogance,—they are in some measure objective claims on this spot of earth. Our ethical judgment of the Empire governs our sense of international right. If you and I, disinterested onlookers, think well of that Empire, we shall incline to regard this part of the foreign interest in Egypt as having a degree of "reality,"—to be reconciled in some way with what Egypt otherwise must require. Some sort of symbiosis or common organic life is to be sought for.

It is no doubt this view which Sir Austen has in mind when he finds Providence pointing to something more than

a friendly association between Britain and Egypt and advances to a proposal of marriage! "Could not the Egyptian Government and Parliament," he asks, "frankly realise that Providence had decreed a marriage between our two nations?" But a marriage is a permanent bond in England, if not in Egypt, and puts an end to prospects of withdrawal; an implication which Sir Austen accepts when he notes "that the ties which bound us were too strong for separation."¹⁰

This is the point at which Egypt, quite reasonably, hesitates. Her future depends on how she conceives these foreign interests within her own national life: shall they be dignified with an equivalent status, and allowed to play perhaps the masculine part? Sarwat Pasha, representing national Egypt at the time of Sir Austen's proposal, does not at once reject it. If he does not love England, he realizes the elements which make for at least a *mariage de convenance*. Providence has unmistakably put an end to the free teetering of choice which Egypt might once have enjoyed, coquetting with various possible European protectors: it is Britain or nobody. And there is little hope that she may in the end, like Turkey, reject all of them, preferring permanent Old Maidenhood. Nevertheless, Sarwat, chary of both the plain indications of Providence and of Marriage, satisfies the occasion by signifying vague agreement in the desirableness of amity or brotherhood, fails to report either of Sir Austen's intimate terms to his sovereign, and secures a phrase in the proposed treaty whereby Britain for the first time in such negotiations admits that withdrawal is possible! Perhaps in Sarwat's mind, marriage implied a preliminary status of equal freedom. And, if Sarwat was not ready, still less is National

¹⁰ *Papers regarding Negotiations for a Treaty of Alliance with Egypt*, Cmd. 3050. No. 1. July 13, 1927, p. 4.

Feeling ready for the nuptials. The Wafd, incensed that Sarwat concedes so much friendly duty, rejects his work and breaks his Cabinet (March, 1928). Does Egyptian nationalism, then, like its hero Zaghlul in his later days, still reject "realities" and so require coercion? Or does it perceive these actual, non-exorcisable foreign interests in some other workable plan of management? This we answer as we consider in closer detail the mutual working of Egyptian and British minds in their efforts for a treaty.

CHAPTER X

THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE

IN February, 1922, disturbed and rebellious Egypt—having shown a vigorous will that the war-time Protectorate should not be mistaken for an acceptable permanency—was by a unilateral Declaration of Great Britain proclaimed an independent sovereign state. This Declaration was secured from Lloyd-George's Government with much difficulty by Lord Allenby, then Special High Commissioner in Egypt, after Lord Milner and Lord Curzon had failed to reach a treaty by negotiations. For this deed Allenby is sometimes referred to in England as "the man who gained us Palestine and lost us Egypt," a phrase whose sense of ownership in each case is worth pondering.

Has this Declaration in truth "lost us Egypt"? Egypt's independence is proclaimed; but there are certain reservations. And it is a peculiarity of genuine independence that it cannot bear as a price so much continued subordination. "You may have your freedom on condition that you will tie your fortune to mine, on terms agreeable to me": such a purchase price contradicts the nature of freedom. On the other hand, it is a peculiarity of responsibility that it cannot be irresponsibly transferred. He who passes it on to another must first bind that other. If Egypt's independence means assuming certain duties now carried by Great Britain, that independence can only be under bond. The paradox is not artificial: it is of the essence of the situation which the Declaration of 1922 tried to define. Let us recall its terms:

"The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign state."

This is its first article; and at least one hated word is done away with. It was an unfortunate term, Protectorate, which Britain substituted in 1914 for the Occupation and for the Suzerainty of the Porte. No doubt protection was what Egypt at that moment needed; for she was in danger, because of the presence of the British army! She is duly notified that "la présence en Egypte de l'Armée d'Occupation . . . rend le pays susceptible d'être attaqué par les ennemis de Sa Majesté." And, when her Turkish suzerain openly avows himself one of those enemies and declares his intention to be "The Savior of Egypt" from the clutches of its Occupier, Britannic Majesty assures Egypt that she is to be protected from all such Savors. Whether she will or not, she is to be brought under that humiliating protégé relationship (*himaya*) by which the foreign Capitulatory had often sheltered rascals of some other nationality. A hateful and undesired relation: Occupation and Dependency far preferable. Some say, Britain at that moment of dismissing Turkey from Egypt might, by choosing some other word, have quietly slipped into Turkey's sovereign place, making Egypt solidly part of the Empire. Not, I think, without war upon Egypt also. But now, at any rate, Protectedness is done away with.

At the same time, four points are reserved. For what? For future discussion and agreement "by friendly accommodation on both sides." Yes, but in the meantime? They are reserved "to the discretion of His Majesty's Government,"—which seems to mean that H. M. G. will do as it thinks best in respect to them. They are not reserved to an interim of common counsel: they are reserved

with an emphasis. "Absolutely reserved" is the phrase employed.

The four points thus absolutely reserved cover everything which could be of interest to Great Britain in Egypt, namely:

"(a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt.

"(b) The defence of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect.

"(c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities.

"(d) The Sudan."

These four points are neatly formulated so as to make no mention of two of the sorest spots—the presence of the British army in Cairo, and of the British officials controlling public debt, finance, justice, police. But if (a), (b), and (c) require an army, and (c) a set of functionaries, why mention them? The four points, let us say, cover six issues. Thus this Declaration of Egypt's Independence by Great Britain might be construed as a gentle public notice that Great Britain hereby takes a few properties as her absolute own which had formerly been regarded as common concerns with Egypt. There is some reason for the comment that the sovereignty conferred in Article I of this Declaration is withdrawn in Article III, and that in sum Egypt is granted nothing, or somewhat less. Such was emphatically the opinion of Zaghlul. "I repudiate the Declaration," he said, with the applause of the Egyptian Chamber.¹

But the comment goes beyond the truth. Something *had* been conveyed. A status was assigned to Egypt which en-

¹ Session of May 10, 1924. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald replied to this position to the effect that the fact that one or the other party to a negotiation explained his position in no way obliged the other to recognize that position. 15 May, 1924.

abled the discussion of the reserved points to proceed as a discussion between equals. This status, furthermore, called for a Constitution, providing for a large extension of Egyptian self-management in internal affairs, and for diplomatic representation of Egypt abroad. A Constitution battered out with exemplary speed between Wafd, Palace and Residence, leaving to be sure a Royal British road into the heart of legislation, but giving Egypt much to do for itself. Furthermore, although this Declaration is unilateral, it cannot be inferred from that fact (as is often contended) that what is given by one can also be withdrawn by one. The deed being one of acknowledging or conferring a status, that status so far as accepted *now exists*, and cannot by any reversal in the British mind be unconferrd or unacknowledged.

Something valuable has been given to Egypt by this Declaration. At the same time, something has been taken away. Of the four points reserved, (b) and (c) cover certain functions already exercised by Great Britain. But the formulation of (a) is a new assertion of servitude upon the land of Egypt; whereas the "absolute reservation" of (d) destroys the balance of the condominium. British claims are thus advanced beyond all previously recognized boundaries; and the implication is that if Egypt evinces protest and desires to restrain this advance, she must be prepared to pay for it. The price of her independence will be an acknowledgment of dependence. We cannot fairly say that Allenby has "lost us Egypt," unless that brave word "independent sovereign state" outweighs in effect all that follows it.

And note that until Egypt signs some settlement of the four points, the cards are all in British hands, having been taken there. That which is absolutely reserved to H. M. G.'s discretion will of course be administered in the meantime

solely according to British ideas: desiring nothing more, Great Britain need be in no haste about the "friendly accommodation" which may leave her with somewhat less. There is, to be sure, an underlying unrest in Egypt, with much military expense, which recommends finding a settlement; so, too, the sympathetic interest shown by other parts of the Moslem world. But in substance Britain is well content with things as they are; and we need not expect that treaty-projects put forward by her foreign ministers in the years following 1922 will offer great concessions to Egypt.

It was a law of ancient Egypt that a thief caught with stolen property must restore *half of it*. In Egyptian eyes, Great Britain's treaty proposals have been of this character. She has been willing to restore to Egypt half of her own, if Egypt will but give her a legal deed to the other half. The failure of the several efforts so far made has been due, not to the lack of inducement in the British drafts, but to something withheld or silently left in British hands—omissions inaudible to the western public—so that Egypt's acceptance of the draft would have the force of a permanent relinquishment,²—too great a price.

² Prior to the Declaration of Independence, two significant proposals were made, one by Lord Milner in 1920, one by Lord Curzon in 1921.

Milner's scheme promised to recognize Egypt as a constitutional monarchy and to support an application for Egypt's admission to the League; it opened the way for parleys regarding the place of cantoning the army and for reforming the Capitulations. But it failed expressly to withdraw the Protectorate; it allowed Egypt no sovereignty in the Sudan; it made everything dependent on a transfer by foreign Powers to Great Britain of their rights under the Capitulations; and it not only confirmed but extended the control exercised by the financial and judicial advisers.

The Curzon proposal, in some ways more liberal to Egypt, maintained a cautious control over Egyptian foreign affairs as well as over finance and justice, touched on Sudan interests without admitting Egypt's share in the sovereignty, allowed a permanent British garrison in any part of Egypt, and required free passage for British troops through Egyptian territory. "This," as Adly Pasha commented, "constitutes Occupation pure and simple."

For an excellent brief account of these proposals consult P. G. Elgood, *The Transit of Egypt*, Chapters xiii and xiv.

Perhaps the best assistance we can offer to the western public in appreciating the situation in Egypt will be to bring out this unevident Costliness in two or three of the salient efforts to reach agreement.

So long as Zaghlul Pasha led public opinion, nothing could be done. For Zaghlul, under provocation, advanced from some perception of "realities" to none at all. His eventual program had a stark simplicity: the British out of Egypt, army, advisers, officials,—bag and baggage.³ This scheme, though Zaghlul knew it to be one of the abstract ideals, does justice to his imagination rather than to his judgment. He was thinking Egypt back into the situation prior to 1882, when as yet there was no British army in Egypt, and no one clamoring for such an army, least of all the British. He was asking himself the question (not easy to answer), Why, if foreigners could live unperturbed in the Egypt of that day without a British army, they cannot be equally serene in a present-day Egypt, incomparably more sensible and self-conscious. If it were said, this present Egypt appears more liable to anti-foreign brain-storm than the old Egypt, his answer was clear: the occupying army, an irritating foreign body, is itself the occasion of these hostile emotions. No argument for its continuance can be drawn from the disease its presence causes.

³ As stated to Mr. MacDonald, September, 1924, he required: (a) the withdrawal of all British forces from Egyptian territory; (b) the withdrawal of the financial and judicial advisers; (c) The disappearance of all British control over the Egyptian Government; (d) the abandonment by H. M. G. of their claim to protect foreigners and minorities in Egypt; (e) the abandonment by H. M. G. of their claim to share in any way in the protection of the Suez Canal. *Egypt and the Sudan*, Cmd. 2269, 1924.

It should be said that Zaghlul understood these demands to be impossible. He knew that MacDonald's Government was on the way to expiring, and that no agreement could be accomplished at that moment. Hence both he and MacDonald made their statements for the public rather than for each other.

Undoubtedly this is the case. The army creates the need for its own services. As an instance, an event at the end of April, 1928. A group of patriots, not unwilling to twist the Lion's tail while promoting public business, have introduced into Parliament a trio of bills, among them a "Public Meetings Bill" aiming to make a free Egypt safe for expressions of the public mind both quiet and noisy, providing, *inter alia*, exemplary penalties upon police officers who should mistake a Public Meeting for a riot. Lord Lloyd, not an advocate of patient waiting, satisfied that the mere proposing of such a measure partakes of the nature of a riot, posts an ultimatum to Parliament with an army behind it, warships and customs-seizure in the offing, to blast that item off the agenda. Truly a gigantic gesture to frighten a minor impertinence out of existence; not tending to make the army loved in Egypt, but rather to excite a few more Public Meetings. Thus the army starts the Meetings, the Meetings start the Bill, the Bill starts the Army, from which procedure we foresee more Meetings and Bills will arise.

My own belief is that so far as the actual protection of foreigners is concerned that army of Occupation is now a constant source of danger. The nerves of the timorous are soothed by its presence, upon which soothing a drug-habit is developed whereby a British army becomes a pseudo-necessity of sound sleep if not of life. But it is equally true that the nerves of the native are as continually exasperated as those of some few aliens are soothed by this display of force devoid of ingratiating manners, storing up in the Egyptian subconscious self the reaction, "Something to be beaten, Something to be expelled!" Could we isolate this protection-of-foreigners business from the rest of Britain's duty, we might fairly say that the need of an army is a vast illusion of the auto-suggestive variety.

It is clearly not this point (c), protection of foreigners, that now requires the army, nor yet point (b), the defence of Egypt. Diplomacy, like the nursery, has its bogies. The diplomatic bogie for Egypt is: "If Britain left Egypt to-day, Italy would be in Egypt tomorrow." Egypt herself might well be frightened at this thought! Unless, thinking again, she should remember that Britain in Palestine and at Malta is still nearer than the nearest over-desert marcher or over-sea cruiser. And even were this not so, there is no one so desirous of Egypt as to risk for its sake a war with Great Britain. If Britain should withdraw, underscoring the same warning given in 1922 that no other Power is to step in, Egypt would be as secure as Switzerland. To withdraw is not to abscond without sufficient understandings in the right quarters. Enough of this diplomatic farce.

(What now requires an army in Egypt, if anything, is point (a), the communications of the Empire, and (unmentioned point) the negotiations themselves. These latter promise a prolonged labor of mind-changing, policy-clashing, and so of mutual maddening. The army must be there to hold surface serenity during this process, and perhaps also to lend its silent argument to the I-will of the great Power, when impartial reason fails to give the right answer. Neither the League nor any other umpire can be brought in at this stage. A British Monroe Doctrine, Sir Austen Chamberlain has lately suggested (and we recall that the American Monroe Doctrine was of British ancestry), veils the great lines of Empire policy from the weakening intrusion of world-committee thinking. Behind every absolute reservation there is an I-will; and behind every such final I-will there must be an army—for Egypt and also for you and me, the public.

What Zaghlul tangibly meets, then, when he proposes

a clean sweep of all British out of Egypt, is point (a), the communications of the Empire, more particularly the Suez Canal. Its spokesman is Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the first Labour Government of England. There is some possibility that a Labour Government will be able to take an Egyptian point of view, as a Conservative-Liberal Government could not. This more sensitive perception of other-mind is a gauge of higher evolution: for intuition is, after all, a mode of intelligence,—to lack it is, so far, to be ignorant. Yet this same sensitiveness has its public danger. For simple yielding to the other's views, through inability to endure the hostile atmosphere, is weakness; a fatal weakness in diplomacy. Christian turning-the-other-cheek is no complete guide to statesmen; and the fraternal sentiment much cultivated in the ranks of labor the world over, an excellent binding-and-holding material, is but half good for changing and growing entities. Hence conservative Great Britain fears the foreign policy of Labour, imagines soft surrenders here and there weakening the joints of the imperial harness, stands ready to break the Government if things go too far.

But Ramsay MacDonald shows that he can be both fraternal and resolute, estimating a necessity at its true value. Having to deal with Zaghlul, who would clear the decks of all British, Mr. MacDonald lays down certain dicta, relating to Suez and the army:

"Absolute certainty that the Suez Canal will remain open in peace as well as in war for the free passage of British ships is the foundation on which the entire defensive strategy of the British Empire rests. . . . The effective co-operation of Great Britain and Egypt in protecting those communications might in my view have been ensured by the conclusion of a treaty of close alliance. The presence of a British force in Egypt provided for by such a treaty freely entered into by both parties on an equal

footing would in no way be incompatible with Egyptian independence." ⁴

This seems to me both firm and reasonable, with perhaps an excess of optimism about the independence possible with the British army at hand. For it is not the mere presence of that army that counts; it is the necessity, likewise felt, that Egypt's army shall not be in a position to give it any embarrassment! So far as the point of the presence of this army is to defend the Canal against attack from any quarter, *including the Egyptian quarter*, the army cannot be in Egypt as a guest; it must be there as master, and with the psychology of the master, if it is to be there at all.

It would aid the relations of the two countries if this army need not be *in Cairo*, where this psychology makes every day for ill-will. No doubt the Canal Zone is an inhuman place to live. A city could be built there, supplied with fresh water by canal from the Nile, whose cost Egypt has proposed to pay: but fresh water is not the only desideratum of European existence; and further, if the water supply is vulnerable in war-time, so is the army. The alternative to Cairo is not easy to find, whether for the worth of life or for tactical position. Hence all this vagueness and delay about coming to agreement on the place of cantonment. Nevertheless, if Egypt must take the consequences of her geographical position on the planet, so must the Empire take the consequences of the unfortunate geography of Suez. A justifiable interest in making this waterway secure cannot be expanded into a justifiable intrusion upon the domain of a friendly Power.

There are changes going on in the world which may in time mitigate the finality of Mr. MacDonald's dictum.

⁴ *Egypt and the Sudan*. Cmd. 2269, 1924; Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement*, p. 209.

The military value of the Canal grows visibly less, as we have hinted. For operations in East Africa during the War, Great Britain often preferred the way around the Cape, finding the Mediterranean route a line of excessive hazard. The submarine may at any time make this Sea a *mare clausum*. Unless the navy can keep the Mediterranean clear, the Canal is a poor asset: and if this can be done, the Canal needs no great land force to protect it. For any dangers from the East, Palestine and Transjordan are bases preferable to Egypt. An enemy-Egypt might block the Canal; against this, a land force in Cairo would seem less potent than some way of securing Egypt's friendship, for which end an army, ready to march on Parliament, indistinguishable from an occupying force, would seem an unpromising advocate. For all lands, the growing importance of air-routes alters all strategical scales: from London to Karachi, India, is but three or four days by air instead of three weeks by the Canal; and, as the Canal ceases to be a matter of life and death to the Empire, it becomes less a vital object of attack for any presumable enemy. When a nominal force, non-competing with Egypt's own army, can be seen to form a satisfactory *Wacht am Suez*, Egypt will be able to agree with MacDonald that its presence is compatible with her independence.

Zaghlul and Mr. MacDonald cannot reach the point of negotiating: they can only state opposing dicta. Succeeding ministries in both states, with Sarwat Pasha for Egypt (1927-1928) and Sir Austen Chamberlain for England, get farther; they arrive at a formula satisfactory to Britain which can at least be submitted to an Egyptian Parliament.

In all such negotiations we see not so much a play of pure ethical reason as a play of national I-wills, born of

national states of mind. To the British state of mind now represented by Sir Austen, Zaghlul's feats of imagination have become impossible. Long control in matters great and small begets an impression of ownership. Having made good use of a borrowed pencil, I naturally slip it into my own pocket, and feel it a certain outrage to be reminded of the technical claim of the original owner: even in law, do not time and custom work substantial alteration in property-right? It is of little use, then, at this date to cite the speeches of Gladstone on withdrawal from Egypt. That corner was turned as long ago as 1904, when the French gave us a free hand in Egypt. Sir Edward Grey acting on this line did not hesitate to declare in Parliament British determination to stay on in Egypt.⁵ Lord Milner, speaking in 1920, is better worth listening to; he uses what emphasis he can muster to impress his contemporaries that "Egypt, of course, is not and never has been a part of the British Empire." Churchill, succeeding him in the Foreign Office, has already forgotten, or has not heard: he speaks publicly of Egypt (February 13, 1921) as part of the Empire, and needs a storm from Egypt to remind him that there is still a question there. The War went far to establish this habit of thought. For though at first, in the confusion and leakage of men, Egyptian ministers enjoyed unwonted freedom of action, Great Britain accustomed herself to the shorter language of command, at times of martial law, in brief, to administering Egypt as a colony. It is this custom, agreeable to British temper, with which Egypt has now to negotiate.

The direction of British will is visible in the characters of High Commissioners. Thus Kitchener, who after Sir Eldon Gorst succeeded Lord Cromer, was the man to carry out a tightening process. Under Kitchener there was less

⁵ Speech of 22d July, 1910.

and less patience with Egyptian *laissez faire*, loose ends, delay, personalisms: British officials began to displace Egyptians with startling rapidity. Likewise after the War, if Allenby with his Declaration had raised fears of losing us Egypt, it was high time to send a High Commissioner of another stripe. When in 1925 Lord Lloyd takes Allenby's place,—Lloyd, suppressor of Bombay turbulence and daring arrester of Gandhi,—we are reassured that Egypt will be held to her place. Lord Lloyd has to deal with a Constitution; but he knows how to use Parliaments, Kings and Constitutions. Too independent Khedive Abbas Hilmi⁶ having been long since got rid of (1914), by means of which we think less as we learn more, and Kings being now in order, King Fuad I, a collateral of Mohammed Ali's line, a quiet prince, not without ambitions of his own,⁷ gives promise of ruling as Lord Lloyd wishes him to rule. Since the King may, and for the present does, dissolve Parliaments, determine whether they shall be permitted to function,⁸ who shall serve as Prime Minister, what laws shall be considered, and may even suspend the Constitution, Great Britain has, through the King, this thoroughgoing control over independent Egypt. It is able to secure that the local Egyptian army shall not grow too strong nor be too well equipped—a necessary incident of protecting the Canal; that this army shall have a British In-

⁶ Elder son of Tewfik, who regularly succeeded his father in 1892; his impetuosity cost him severe lessons from Cromer, who turned toward him the side of imperial resolve. Sir Eldon Gorst found him amenable to human intercourse. At the outbreak of the War he was in Constantinople, where he had relatives and also a Turkish suzerain, and where he received a wound which prevented instant return to Egypt. This conjunction was taken as occasion for removing a troublesome prince.

⁷ Ahmad Fuad, sixth son of Ismail and uncle of Abbas Hilmi, succeeded his brother Hussein Kamil, as Sultan of Egypt, in June, 1917. The Constitution which followed the Declaration of 1922 altered the title to King.

⁸ As in the case of the Parliament of March, 1925, allowed to exist for a few hours, when Ziwar found himself confronted by a Wafdist Chamber.

spector-General with adequate staff and power of naming officers to the King for appointment or dismissal. If Egypt ventures to relieve itself of these military advisers by proposing in Parliament to cut off their appropriations, three warships will appear in Egyptian waters (June, 1927) to remind her that all such arrangements must be worked out in agreement with Great Britain. Lord Lloyd will not relax one point of this detailed control.

And Sir Austen Chamberlain, with whom Sarwat Pasha in 1927 comes to negotiate, is mightily under its magic. It seems to him only fitting that Great Britain, not Egypt, should determine what Britishers are to be employed by Egypt in government service; or whether, if Egypt prefers a non-Britisher, this alien is in fact better qualified than some discoverable Englishman. He is sure the Egyptian army must not take into its service men trained in any other foreign country than Great Britain, nor order munitions through any other than the British Government. All this and much other minute regulation appearing the normal thing to Sir Austen's conception, he avers, in answer to Sarwat's protest, that Britain "*can not afford to lose any guarantees now in her possession,*" which can only mean that the "friendly accommodation" must be all in one direction. I judge Sarwat entirely justified in his comment on Sir Austen's proposed treaty: that "interference in the country's affairs could go no further under the Four Reserved Points than under the régime of this draft," that its precautions "merely result in emphasizing a lack of confidence in Egypt, and a desire to keep her in a state of tutelage," and in sum that it "simply legalizes interferences now considered illegitimate." In Sarwat, Egypt has a mind both clear and adroit in statement. What is the use of negotiating, he asks, if you begin with the axiom that the present intrusions are only to be precisely de-

fined?—"Quelle utilité trouvera l'Egypte à la définition des questions pendantes, si cette définition aboutissait sur toute la ligne à un accroissement et une précision de l'ingérence britannique dans les affaires d'Egypte?"

He therefore draws Sir Austen into an analysis of the reserved points. "What *are* these responsibilities of Great Britain toward foreign interests?" The original foreign debts are now largely paid off; but there is still tribute money to go to Turkey—by agreement—for a few years longer; there must be an oversight upon all new foreign loans; the regular annual payment for the Sudan must be assured—Egypt now deriving from the Sudan chiefly her ancient Nile Water, formerly a gift of Nature; so also the budgets for the Mixed Courts, the pensions and other annuities due to retiring foreign officials, the budgets for British financial and judicial commissioners' offices, and for the British staffs of army and police. Clearly, among the heavy responsibilities of Great Britain is the responsibility for seeing that Great Britain is paid for assuming responsibility. It is a fair question which Sarwat raises, whether some of these items could not be sufficiently, and more economically, secured by way of a modicum of confidence in Egyptian administration.⁹

Sarwat's reasonings have a measure of effect. There are in the treaty which he brings back early in 1928 concessions. Great Britain agrees to use its good offices to secure the admission of Egypt into the League, without the conditions that had burdened all previous motions in this direction. After ten years, the question of the place of

⁹ Egypt does not carry with ease the great cost of this dual government, or perhaps one should say threefold government, since the Royal budget must be added to the rest, an item of nearly £E1,000,000 a year. The cost of government has more than doubled since 1914. Of the civil service alone, "In 1914, personnel cost £E5,900,000, in 1924, £E12,600,000. Permanent officials had risen in number from 16,600 to 32,800, provisional officials from 2,500 to 11,300. . . ." P. G. Elgood, *The Transit of Egypt*, p. 303n.

cantonment of British troops is allowed to become a question for the League,—a material step. Again, as a result of much persistent reasoning by Sarwat, there is mentioned the possibility of an ultimate withdrawal of the army, and a confiding to Egypt of the defence of the lines of communication. To be sure this possibility is referred to *en passant*, without assurance that the time for such act of trust will ever come: and in his covering note to Lord Lloyd, Chamberlain notes the fact as between diplomats that Britain is not committed to the coming of such a day. It is, in fact, a mere phrase whereby Sarwat (who feels the impending storm) is enabled to come before his people with an apparent Something, which between ourselves we know to be a Nothing. Nevertheless, such diplomacy plays with fire; for expectations of a people are also among the realities.

Further, Great Britain will seek the reform of the Capitulations without requiring, as heretofore, that other foreign Powers should first transfer all their rights to her.¹⁰ She will allow her consular courts to be put aside with the others; and promote the cause of the Mixed Courts as a sufficient substitute. And there are also relaxations in the surveillance of Egypt's foreign relations.

Sarwat deserves well of his nation for winning these acceptances. But the Wafd rejects his scheme, and compels the fall of his Government without thanks, even with execration. *Al Balagh*, Wafd organ, pronounces the draft treaty, "the worst ever proposed." In which indiscriminate, ungrateful, and untruthful blackening of the hard-won results of its public men, I see an ill spot, perhaps the illest,

¹⁰ This transfer, upon which Milner's scheme of 1920 had especially insisted, may have been a necessary intermediate step to the abolition of the Capitulations. In Colonel Elgood's judgment, France and perhaps Italy would never consent to relinquish their capitulatory privileges except in this way.

in Egyptian political quality. One is reminded how American patriots burned John Jay in effigy because his negotiations with Great Britain did not achieve an impossible everything. But there were valid reasons in Egypt's case for rejecting the total work, which Sarwat himself knew to be unfinished.

No human power could have brought Sir Austen's imagination *enough* out of the influence of the specter of "losing guarantees." The things he wants guaranteed are worth guaranteeing in the main. But it might be considered that in forty years, if our education has been worth anything, the all-importance of debt-paying and of keeping foreigners provided with safety and contract-justice would, by now, have been borne in upon Egyptian consciousness, which is not of the slowest. The fact that Chamberlain cannot diminish this British *ingérence* in Egypt's political life of itself shows the defect of the teaching-process. The teacher of genius does not insist on doing for the pupil what the pupil must some day do for himself: he is more concerned with eliciting native power than with exact performance; he senses the inherent treachery of the "guarantee"-principle. *Education demands a sacrifice of guarantees.* Not a throwing of them to the wind; but a knowledge of the time when the ship must be lightened of that burden.

On other reserved points, the treaty cannot be accepted. The Sudan question being left wholly out of mention, His Majesty's absolute reserve holds good: and silence on Egypt's part might be construed as abandonment. On the presence of the occupying force, attention may be turned to the end of ten years, when the League may be brought into consultation, or to the duration of the ten years during which Great Britain is authorized to keep on Egyptian soil "such troops as His Britannic Majesty judges neces-

sary." The Wafd refuses this act of justification. And since in its disillusioned eyes an appeal from Britain to the League is an appeal from Britain to Britain, the great concession reduces to a mere zero,—much too low a rating.

Thus the Sarwat-Chamberlain treaty bears the character of all the other proposals for Egyptian settlement prior to 1930. It makes certain definite advances toward meeting Egyptian aspirations. It withholds other matters so vital that in signing the treaty Egypt would sign away some important part of her birthright. But there is no possibility that Chamberlain will be able to see things in this light. Preoccupied with what he has done, and ignoring what he has left undone, he feels, and makes the general British public feel, the perversity of an Egyptian mind able to reject so fine an offer. It becomes clear to the Foreign Office, however, that no treaty can be floated with Egypt which is simply silent on the Sudan. So far, all proposed treaties have side-stepped, or merely whisked, this problem as too thorny to close with. Yet, until the Sudan is settled, nothing is settled; and the next effort to secure a meeting of minds, under Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's second Cabinet (1929-1930), will face that issue.

It is in regard to the Sudan that we find conservative Britain most inclined to reach a dogmatic position which, encountering an equivalent Egyptian dogma, makes settlement impossible. The British dogma is based on history and extensive doings of civilizing and investing which may be jointly labeled good works: the Egyptian dogma is based on history running back to Mohammed Ali's conquest and great costs and the fact that the Nile—Egypt's life—is entertained by the Sudan, on its way to Egypt—the Nile Valley Upper and Lower is One. If there is an

apparent deficit of good works on Egypt's part, it may be because she has been allowed only a silent partnership in what has been done there.

Since both claims appeal to history, it is likely that someone is misreading it: of the true reading, we have already given our view. The "mess in the Sudan" which led to Egypt's losing it was as much of Europe's making as of Egypt's-Turkish-Rulers' making; and of Egypt's making hardly at all. For it was when Europe set puttyman Tewfik in Ismail's place that Gordon's great work in the Sudan became impossible, and he was forced to resign. Though this one full-dimensioned person alone could make no beginning of administering a million wild square miles, he was making spots of order, bringing new habits to pass, establishing *ideas* which, once grafted, work without cost or effort, supplementing and whipping into shape as poor a lot of aids and subordinates as one needs to be tormented with, and, on the whole, *getting on*.¹¹ With Gordon out,

¹¹ It is to be remembered that Gordon's work as Governor-General in the Sudan between 1874 and 1879 was done under Ismail and at his instance, Ismail having the disposition to employ European officers where European help was needed, and showing excellent judgment in choosing them. Of Gordon's relations with Ismail, A. Egmont Hake has this to say: that Ismail "supported him through thick and thin against his own pashas and his own people . . . openly acknowledged him as his superior, and fought his battles as those of one who was above the murmur of men." What it was in Gordon that provoked this attitude in Ismail may be seen in part in a note in which he states his views on the duties of foreigners in the service of oriental states:

"To accept government only if by so doing you benefit the race you rule;

"To lead, not drive, the people to a higher civilization;

"To establish only such reforms as represent the spontaneous desire of the mass;

"To abandon relations with your native land;

"To resist other governments, and keep intact the sovereignty of the State whose bread you eat;

"To represent the native when advising Ameer, Sultan or Khedive on any question which your own or any foreign government may wish solved; and in this

"To have for prop and guide that which is universally right throughout the world, that which is best for the people of the State you serve." *Journals*, Introduction, p. xi.

weaknesses elsewhere count for their full value, and the way was clear for the mess, the Mahdi, the retreat of civilization, the thirteen years' horror, the reconquest in the name of Egypt's unrenounced title, the reconstruction.

In this reconquest and reconstruction, Great Britain having been mounted on the Egyptian horse and waving the Egyptian banner, the efforts of both peoples were everywhere united,—each a pure zero if deprived of the other. Some would raise the question how much actual fighting was done by Egyptian troops in the reconquest, making a petty much of the low Egyptian list of casualties in a campaign in which neither casualty list was high; others note that preliminary victories of Egyptian units over Sudanese (at Toski, 1889, and Tokar, 1891) had shown the enterprise possible.¹² But this is clear, that the costs of the joint labor have been chiefly Egyptian, the positive advantages chiefly British, while Egypt has gained the negative advantages of not being molested from the Sudan borders, and of not having Nature's Nile Water cut off,—a feat which the Sudanese alone would neither think of nor be able to effect. It is surely one of the most admirable works of modern diplomacy, this whereby Egypt shall hereafter pay toll for Nature's Nile Water.¹³

If titles are to rest on joint-labors and joint-contributions, there is no good way of making one of two necessary factors greater than the other: so far, an honest condominium would have been a fair solution. If they are to

¹² George Young, *Egypt*, pp. 139, 141; cf. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement*, p. 238.

¹³ Curzon expressed the matter neatly in his memorandum of 1921: "The peaceful development of the Sudan being essential to the security of Egypt and for the maintenance of her water supply, Egypt undertakes to continue to afford the Sudan Government . . . military assistance, or, in lieu thereof, financial assistance." Article 17.

Of course, there will now and hereafter be more or better-regulated Nile Water, as the great works of irrigation go forward in the Sudan and beyond; but Egypt will pay her part of these, *in addition* to the toll-money, whose *quid pro quo* Curzon has exactly stated.

rest on ancient conquests and recognitions, Egypt and the Porte have the prior claim. If they are to rest on furnishing the head for the enterprise, the rider of the horse properly takes the major functions and reward. To our mind, neither former possession, nor military, nor monetary contributions can furnish today valid claim to rulership. They are at best merely collateral evidence. The "right of conquest" is no right at all,—merely an assertion of will, a mode of creating statuses and presumptions while the evidences of right are brought up, an intrusion of *avoids* into questions of morals. The common conscience of mankind now tends to rest any claim to rule on *ability to rule well*, and on the *enlightened consent* of the human beings ruled over. No one pretends that the consent of the Sudanese has been asked or got by either Egypt or Great Britain, both reasonably assuming that an enlightened sort of consent cannot in that region be had for some years to come. Enlightened consent in this case means eventual consent, a future state of will-blending retroactive in effect, which ultimate harmony may conceivably be forthcoming provided present rulership is doing as well as may reasonably be expected, and possesses the mental ingredients which can make a good chemical mixture with those of the subjects. Giving Britain the benefit, for the moment, of a sizable doubt on this latter score, there is no question about the well-doing. Why not, then, while envisaging a distant "Sudan for the Sudanese," be content to allow Great Britain a free hand there for the present, regarding the situation as in effect another mandate, and trusting Great Britain to pay herself as she finds convenient for the trouble of bringing the region up?

The chief reason against this simple solution is that the conscious interests of Egypt have run their lines through the Sudan, much as those of Great Britain have run their

lines through Egypt or about Egypt. Whatever show of right Great Britain can allege to property in Egyptian earth and water, Egypt can match with a stronger claim to the Sudan. The Nile Water is far more directly, intimately, and completely Egypt's life than the Suez is the life of England. It is not reasonable to expect Egypt to vest the control of this vital business in any political friendship, if she can help it. There was a time when Britain might plausibly have said to Egypt, "Let me manage the Nile Water, for yourself and for the Sudan: I am your friend and cannot conceivably use this power to harm you." But, since 1924, this line has become impossible. For then, when Egypt or somebody in Egypt needed punishment, control of the Sudanese Nile was used as a threat:¹⁴ Egypt was reminded that a noose was around her neck, and the end of it in the hand of a friend who could cease on occasion to use the friendly manner. Even if Great Britain's will were always perfect and disinterested, this noose-hold over Egypt destroys Egypt's independence of action. If Egypt is to be a free state, she must be able to veto any throat-constricting politics, whether by friend or enemy.

True, Egypt cannot get at the higher sources of the Nile. The Blue Nile springs in Abyssinia, the White Nile in Uganda. These lands too are growing, learning the magic

¹⁴ The occasion was the assassination of the Sirdar, Sir Lee Stack, in Cairo, November 19, 1924, by seven or eight persons of the student class. Great Britain held the Government of Zaghul indirectly responsible and took prompt action. Among the demands presented by Lord Allenby to Zaghul was this one:

"(6) Notify the Competent Department that the Sudan Government will increase the area to be irrigated in the Gezira from 300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure as need may arise."

This demand was soon recognized as excessive by those who had made it, and Sir Austen Chamberlain, much to his credit and Great Britain's credit, publicly withdrew the "unlimited terms" (House of Commons, Dec. 15, 1924). But the claws had been shown, and the possibility of claw-using can no longer be forgotten.

of engineering, which can make vast lakes and alter the flow of great rivers; they may some day desire to do Egypt harm. Then there must be war or some other way of bringing the world to decide the fate of nations. But that day need not be anticipated: Abyssinia at this moment contemplates lending her great Blue-Nile headwater to damming for Sudanese-Egyptian benefit.¹⁵ Nor need the fact that Nature and History have not thrown the Nile into one nation's outline be used to prevent Egypt from standing guard over her life-stream where she can. In the Sudan she commands at least the *confluence* of the Niles, and comes within treating distance of the headwater-neighbors.

Let us recall that while world-changes may make the Sudan less valuable to England, no world-changes can lessen the need of Egypt in the Nile. England's arrival in Egypt is a geographical accident; Egypt's arrival in the Sudan is predestined by an ever-acting cause. England's relation to Suez is artificial; Egypt's to the Sudan is fashioned by Nature. Recall, too, that Great Britain cannot now nor in any near future, govern the Sudan without Egyptian aid,—any more than Egypt without Great Britain. Sudanese run in a small rill through British schools, by far not enough nor good enough as yet. Englishmen cannot survive in the Sudan as permanent residents: their term must be short, their salaries large. Nor is Egypt wholly acclimatized: Egyptians, too, find central Sudan severe and its malaria unbearable. But malaria can be conquered; and the northern Sudan is a natural extension of Egypt. Egypt's population multiplies: make Egypt sanitary, and Egypt will be put to it for living room; whereas the Sudan cries out for man-power. So far, there is a case for political federation of some sort.

¹⁵ This engineering is a necessary preliminary either to benefiting or to injuring the regions lower down. It brings new interests and new lives into existence, and holds them at a turn of the lever.

What of the chemical mixture of tempers?

Is it true, or is it not true, that the Sudanese as a rule get on badly with the Egyptians? Khedival Egypt took slaves when it could from the Sudan; and still Sudanese, especially Berberines (Gr. *hoi barbaroi*?), are a servant class in Cairo. There is an up-and-down sentiment in Egypt toward Sudanese; and the master-and-servant feeling is not auspicious for a government responsible for education. It is said, too, that Egyptians do not consider, in their concern for their own Nile Water, that Sudanese have a comparable interest.¹⁶ I am prepared to believe that Egypt, as sole governor, would as yet be a poor Providence for the Sudanese. Nevertheless, Egypt with England at hand might learn the fine art of condominium! No education is so effective as that of essaying to teach. Among Moslems, the servant-master distinction leaves an underlying fraternity of great strength; on this score the mutual understanding between Sudanese and Egyptian will long be better than between either and the European. An amalgam of Egypt and the Sudan, with British mandatory advice, would have in it a better chemical promise than any pair you could make of the three.

Considerations of this sort were before Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. Arthur Henderson, his Foreign Minister, when in 1929 he again had occasion to turn his mind to Egypt. He found Egypt governed by King Fuad and Liberal-Constitutional Mohammed Mahmoud Pasha, without a Parliament and in effect without a Constitution, a formal dictatorship with an eye to business. The Wafd Parliament with Nahas as minister had been too much bent on the major issue, independence, concocting nettling bills,

¹⁶ Sudanese use of Nile Water on a large scale for irrigation is of course recent and of British stimulation.

Public Meetings Bills and the like, stinging Lord Lloyd past patience. Nahas is a lawyer by training and rather less a statesman; there is no getting on with him; he must be somehow set aside, in the interest, let us say, of getting public business ahead. How to manage it? Four good members of his Cabinet (after conferences with the King) successively resign; the "coalition" character of the Cabinet is thus destroyed, and Nahas may be asked to retire. A new Cabinet is then formed under Mahmoud, in which these same four resigners reappear, Mahmoud himself being one of them. Mahmoud, however, can do nothing with a Wafd-controlled Parliament, and so Parliament is by Royal decree sent to Coventry. It is not a Parliament to take dissolution passively: it holds clandestine meetings, denounces, resolves, gets its case accurately stated, lets the world know what manner of government Egypt has, but beyond this can do nothing. Mahmoud, who is not without talent, carries on and accomplishes much of value to Egypt, including an arrangement with England whereby Nile Water in the Sudan may be proportioned under Egyptian eyes and with Egyptian consent.

Now MacDonald is willing to treat with Mahmoud, or at least to begin treating, but not under the disadvantage of Lord Lloyd's atmosphere. Lord Lloyd's invited resignation is warning or promise that a new temper is to reign. Within a month (August, 1929) draft of a new proposed treaty with Egypt is ready. It makes concessions in earnest, straining Tory nerves to the breaking point. "The military occupation of Egypt by the forces of His Britannic Majesty is terminated": there will be troops in the Canal Zone, but not in Cairo. The protection of Egypt and the protection of foreigners in Egypt is left to Egypt, provided any foreign military instructors needed shall be British. As for the Sudan:

“While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future modifying the conventions of 1899, the High Contracting Parties agree that without prejudice to Egypt’s rights and material interests the status of the Sudan shall be that resulting from said conventions. Accordingly the Governor-General shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers conferred on him by the said conventions,”—

and since the Governor-General, by these conventions of 1899, the condominium plan, is “appointed by Khedival [now Royal] decree on the recommendation of Her [now His] Britannic Majesty’s Government,” and since all legislation is in his hands, this means that Great Britain here proposes to keep her control of that territory unimpaired by any effective co-partnership. Mohammed Mahmoud submits, as the only practicable road to a settlement, the price of independence; for Mr. Henderson has made it plain that the British Government has offered the uttermost limit.

England and the Dictator have come to terms; but a Labour Government cannot in conscience accept the signatures of Dictator and King as conveying the consent of the nation. It is now Mahmoud’s turn to lay down his office, and for the King to evoke from nothingness a Parliament and a minister who has its confidence. The ground must be retraced, with Nahas Pasha and the Wafd. Nahas Pasha comes to London prepared to arrange a treaty which his nationalists at home will accept. For partisan reasons, no doubt, there must be some changes: there is a trace of vanity in Nahas which makes it difficult to report the same treaty his political opponent had secured. But in the main he knows that on three points England has given Egypt reasonable satisfaction. It is on this Sudan provision that he falters. On the 8th of May, after six weeks of effort, the negotiations break down once more. In spite of the

fact that Britain has budged a point or two, the Sudan proves insoluble. Great Britain is willing to restore the "status of 1899," but not the "status prior to 1924" with reservation of the question for future negotiations; she was willing that there should be no discrimination in the Sudan between British subjects and Egyptian nationals, but not that the Sudan should be open to unrestricted Egyptian immigration. The reading public is baffled by these apparently trivial or intangible differences, becomes amazed or impatient with both obstinate sides. But impatient we dare not be until we enquire farther.

What was there, then, in these rejected proposals so serious as to destroy a treaty within an inch, one would say, of achievement? White Papers reveal no reasons. One may conjecture, however, that (1) the postponement of the Sudan question, given the rest of the treaty, might have thrown the case before the League of Nations, with Egypt as a member, thus admitting world-committee-thinking into a region now decently veiled by the British Monroe Doctrine; and that (2) the unimpeded flow of population from Egypt into the Sudan, such as would take place if they were one state, normal enough in good weather, might be exploited by an angry Egypt to run in trouble-makers, with a recurrence of the events of 1924. Governments must have the right to control immigration—a fair rule-of-thumb test of sovereignty: Great Britain, unwilling that her control on this point should yield to an Egyptian no-boundary theory, gives notice that the effective sovereignty is to remain in her hands.

In our own view, Great Britain might well have yielded the first point, and Nahas need not have raised the second. The result reveals in the clearest light the present British will: her dominance in the Sudan, as contrasted with equal condominium, is to be the price of Egyptian independence.

The treaty having failed, there are no commitments,—the four points remain as in 1922 absolutely reserved to His Majesty's Government's discretion. When the news is reported to Parliament, the Conservative benches receive it with hearty cheers!

But one moral effect remains. With each successive effort, so far, the concessions have been more substantial, the price of Egypt's independence less severe. The public conscience wins a slow advance.

Since the failure of the Nahas-MacDonald negotiations, the political life of Egypt has entered a new and revolutionary phase. The Wafd has suffered eclipse; the King and his party have assumed a positive and dominant rôle; Parliament has lost its ascendancy.¹⁷ The outer world is mystified: it knows only that the Nahas ministry locked horns with the King (June, 1930) and was thrown; that the King, with the aid of his new Prime Minister, Sidky Pasha, abrogated (October, 1930) the Constitution of 1923 and proclaimed another; that in spite of continued Wafd opposition, and against all prognostications, this King-Sidky coalition has engineered an election upon the new pattern (May, 1931), has evoked (by dint of electing and appointing) a Parliament after its own heart, and has opened the same with due *éclat*, a proper "speech from the throne" read out by Sidky in the Royal presence, and world-wide press notices to the effect that all Egypt now welcomes the new régime and is satisfied,—notices receivable by the thoughtless at face value.

For our purposes the question now is, Have we here an altered and unsafe basis for discussing the price of Egypt's independence, and will England accept it? To answer this,

¹⁷ For an accessible and admirably judicious account of the situation to January, 1931, see Elizabeth MacCallum, *Egypt, a Decade of Political Development*, Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Vol. VI, No. 22.

we must look for a moment behind the face of the news.

The strength of the Wafd has lain in the direct popular vote secured by an addendum of 1924 to the Constitution of 1923. An intelligent opposition, irked by the persistent 80 and 90 per cent majorities held by the Wafd in successive Chambers, would be led to lay its mines under this electoral law. The King having already shown a pronounced disposition in this sense, Nahas entered his ministry with a solemn pledge to maintain the Constitution; and not being a man to avoid issues, walked forward to a clash with the King by concocting a bill providing imprisonment, fine, and the name of traitor,—not for any King—but for any Cabinet minister who might try to overthrow the existing Constitution. Now this bill, like all others, had first to receive a formal Royal permission before it could be so much as presented to Parliament: at this point the King refused, halted the bill,—so weighty a matter (he said) must not be rushed through at the fag end of a session. Nahas, willing to stake his Government on this one cast, offered his resignation; and the King, after a preliminary request that he reconsider, accepted it. He knew that one major circumstance favored his defiance of the Wafd: the share of Egypt in the world's depression, which the Wafd had unskillfully deepened. He had at hand an economist of rare parts, and this man, Ismail Sidky Pasha, made minister, was able within less than a year to turn the tide of Egyptian finance. The ground was then firm enough for another act of daring, a new Constitution, with an altered electoral law.

This instrument provides for a two-stage election of Deputies. Every male over 25 votes, as before; but he votes first for someone he knows, and then these gather as a college to elect the Deputies. It provides for a smaller

Parliament, 150 Deputies instead of the former 235, a Senate of 100 members, of whom 60 are Royal appointees—royalty no longer hiding its light under a bushel, an abolition of certain traditional parliamentary immunities for *lèse-majesté*, a strengthening of the King's veto power and decree-making power, and the like more.

The Wafd, conscious of power and of right, believes that it can prevent the operation of the new charter by boycotting any election held under it. It succeeds mainly in stirring up a degree of disorder and in keeping its own most loyal voters from the polls, affording Sidky a free hand, which he smilingly accepts. The Wafd is out of power, and this time the deed of election done, according to one wise editor, "*pour la rigolade*" ¹⁸ *keeps it out*. The Wafd is out of power, excluded by its own tactics from all regular share in an irregular government; but government goes on nevertheless, actually achieving something, and meanwhile firmly stopping all the natural vents for Wafdist utterance,—party papers, meetings, travels and appeals to voters, news to the outer world. One dully realizes that a process of choking is being carried out in Egypt, and that the vital lines of communication between leaders and led members of the Wafd body are being cut. One episode shows the trait of the time:

Several days before the date set for election, Wafdist and Liberal leaders, intending to preach non-participation to the voters, in spite of Sidky's interdiction and a cordon of police, boarded a train in Cairo bound for Tanta. Trouble-makers who will not be argued with, and who must not be made martyrs of, may better be played with. Their carriages are deftly detached from the rest of the train, taken off on a side line around the city and well away, and left on the edge of the desert in the neighbor-

¹⁸ William Martin in *Journal de Genève*.

hood of Helwan. Would-be speakers, robbed of a chance to speak, in no playful mood, are not disposed to quit the carriages until the railroad has fulfilled its contract and delivered them in Tanta. But as the day passes and night draws on they are persuaded to enter automobiles sent by the Government to fetch them home. Nahas holds out until he is informed by Russell Pasha, head of Cairo police, that the proffered accommodation will be enforced! Voters must do without their orators and guides.

In all this, Great Britain is standing aside, with repeated assurances that she will not interfere in the internal politics of Egypt. Only, she will permit no rioting: she will hold both sides responsible for the protection of the interest of foreigners. When disturbances in Alexandria result in the death of an Italian citizen, two British warships are sent to the port (July, 1930). Is this sort of neutrality neutral?

Disturbances will arise from only one source, from those whom the *coup* excludes from power and from the normal ways to regain it. If there is choking going on in Egypt, the choker would be pleased to have someone insist on quiet. Curb disorder, and you curb the outs, not the ins. When in 1928 the King undertook to govern *via* Mahmoud without Parliament, and with only such part of the Constitution as he liked, Lord Lloyd not only stood aloof, he proclaimed loudly through the world that he was standing aloof: it was Egypt's business. A Wafdist minister, noting that prior to the deed Lord Lloyd's carriage had stood daily at the Palace, commented that Lord Lloyd did not like Pontius Pilate wash his hands of the matter, he rubbed them! A Labour Government will entertain different sentiments. Its High Commissioner, Sir Percy Loraine, is instructed to assure the Government of Egypt that Great Britain will not permit itself to be used as an instrument to attack the Egyptian Constitution. We imagine Fuad's Government as

replying *sotto voce*, "Certainly not to attack; but—in spite of yourself—to secure the results of our attack."

The Labour Government now finds itself dealing with a monarch more nearly a dictator than most. He rules without fear of an opposition in Parliament, or of a hampering Constitution; also without fear of an exiled heir to the throne. For Abbas Hilmi (through the agency of Sidky and for a consideration which Egypt will pay) has signed a complete abdication of his claims (Lausanne, May 12, 1931). In his address from the throne this King-to-be-reckoned-with now indicates that the welfare of Egypt lies in agreement with England.

Here, surely, all parties except the Watanists, the old Nationalist party, will concur. But is it to be an agreement without the Wafd, or without those Wafdist voices which have been clear about the price of independence? In the King's address, there is no mention of the interest of Egypt in the Sudan. Will a politically lethargic Egypt, soothed by internal benefits such as Sidky's Government will not fail to effect, return to its daily tasks and let the Wafd succumb, while its defenders of ten years lose their labor and their hope? Or will it retain, as it has retained through other decades, its sense of direction? And will England see, as it saw in 1929, that to negotiate with a King is not to negotiate with a nation?

In these diplomatic exchanges, the national movement in Egypt has shown itself on the whole not lacking in astuteness, nor in courage, nor in energy, nor in power to wait, nor in positive constructive enterprise. If it has been at times more contentious than wise, this is due not to an essential trait of the Egyptian mind, but to the persistent irritation of an unsettled problem, and to absorption in the cause of a self-determining Egypt. What this principle

of self-determination is worth in the making of a new world can only be learned through such persistent and wholehearted efforts as this, mixed with a degree of philosophical reflection on their results. To such reflection let us now address ourselves.

PART III

NATIONALITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION

CHAPTER XI

THE MANY NATIONS

WITH the case of Egypt before us, we are now broaching a chapter or two of theory. What is this disturbing entity called the nation which divides the world not into organs but into separate parcels, capable of co-operating, capable also of mutual obstruction and enmity? It seems no necessary entity: it is likely to slumber for centuries. Then it comes to self-consciousness, asserts itself, demands a separate place under the sun and a name of its own. All such national movements are movements of alienation: "We are something other; we cannot masquerade nor be masqueraded under this foreign cloak." And the alienation seems to be stimulated from outside. It is because the unity under which the nation is mantled has first felt itself foreign, dealing with aliens, that the nation has begun to feel its own alien-ness from the mantling power: otherness is always mutual. To nationize the world, then, means to divide and subdivide the world,—to what advantage and to whose? Or is it to any advantage, other than that of relieving the mutual irritations of local groups which in the sweep of history are momentary?

It was the nineteenth century, they say, which first came fully to the light about the importance and justification of national separateness, and which propounded the "principle of nationality" as a burgeoning of the older "principle of consent" whereby all government derives its authority from the consent of the governed. It was nine-

teenth-century England in particular which spoke up vigorously in behalf of "peoples rightly struggling to be free." Here were certain sizable empires, Ottoman, Austrian, Russian, conglomerate masses becoming inwardly groggy, while some of the component chunks, Greece, Balkan blocks, Italy, mightily shook themselves loose. Rebellion against constituted authority, of course. The empires fully justified in holding themselves together by any sort of military cement obtainable. Justified in calling for help from friends and well-wishers against such breaking up of the world. But the friends, for their part, are justified in hesitating, sympathizing with Greece, let us say, against the Ottoman Empire, and casting about for some legal principle which would give the Greek effort a character better than plain rebellion. Perhaps government ought to claim something more than implied consent; perhaps there should be *a certain congeniality* between governor and governed from which consent would naturally flow. If there is an evident incompatibility of temperament, there may be a case for public divorce, a "rightful" struggle to be free, which, then, we shall not intervene to put down.

This new principle comes out without much regard to future consequences for the British Empire, or for the corpus of existing international law. It is a finely impulsive principle, not yet well digested. (The "right of conquest," one of the oldest and respectabest aids to world-order, has no room for a principle of nationality: all the point of conquest would be gone if conquerors must first make sure that their new domains are of the same national stripe with themselves! Conquest may forge new nations out of old: it asks no permission of the old, no consent, no warranty deed, no plebiscite. To be a good and valid conquest, seized of all the rights of government,—*uti nunc*

possidetis eum fundum,—the requisites were simply actual control, power to hold, and a proclamation of annexation. A gesture, a toot or two of the horn, a note to the Powers, and the fact of victory becomes a settled “right” in the eyes of the outer world, to which absorbed nations would better adjust their minds without further fuss. The right of conquest makes for the quick resumption of business: the principle of nationality makes for rankling, conspiring, rebelling,—encourages a certain disrespect for established facts. Likewise with the old “right of cession”: it, too, is indifferent to nationality; and the principle of nationality disturbs its peace. Shall not a sovereign state do what it will with its own,—sell or cede it if it so desire? Grotius, it is true, thought otherwise: “in the alienation of a part of the sovereignty, it is required that the part which is alienated consent to the act. For those who unite to form a state contract to a certain perpetual and immortal society.”¹ But the veto of Grotius has been overridden by the practice of states, which practice has been justified on the ground that the act of a state is the act of its people, *ergo* the act of the portion transferred to another sovereign.² In these and other ways the ingrained assumptions of interstate behavior made little account of the national bents and prejudices of included peoples. The new principle had its way to make.

(But now comes the “principle of self-determination,” a twentieth-century formula, branching out, as we have said, from that same ancient stem of consent, and carrying it a step farther. It seems to carry an invitation to national minorities in all lands to plead rights of some sort, rights of choosing their over-lords, of eventual autonomy, apart from all struggles for independence. It adopts the prin-

¹ *De jure belli ac pacis*, II, c. vi, § 4.

² William Edward Hall, *A Treatise on International Law*, Eighth Edition, edited by A. P. Higgins, Part I, Chapter II, Section 9.

ciple of nationality as part of itself: it puts conquest and cession more definitely out of countenance.

Now extension of the principle of consent is undoubtedly the line of progress for the human conscience. For where consent stops, compulsion begins: and where men act on compulsion, their behavior is no more human but mechanical.

Compulsion is, in a sense, the native air of government: all government commands, not requests. But this is its manner, not its substance: good government commands what it more or less accurately ascertains to be our will. Anciently merged with family control, government grows out of a reason and temper one instinctively understands. And when government abandons the tribal and racial basis, this remains its standard: that the acts of the ruler shall be for each subject *his* will in action, not the will of an alien.

Equally without doubt, every extension of consent carries the risk of mischief. The "consent" to state-deeds of minds not politically alive runs into mythology and abuse. Like all great social conceptions, "self-determination" is born naked of definition. It appears as a right without price; a prospect of liberty without conditions or degrees; opening the mind at once to hopes of sovereign independence, lending halos of nobility to impetuous assaults on intervening obstacles. In particular, it suggests that self-determination pure and unlimited is possible; whereas in truth there is no such thing as a purely independent sovereign state.

What state is there which thinks or behaves as it would if the rest of the world were a political vacuum? Europe is a nest of "independent sovereign states"; yet what one of them acts as it would act were any other of them not there? The United States is more jealous of its "sov-

ereignty" than most states with sovereigns; yet where does the United States not bend its policy because of the purposes real or supposed of Great Britain, France, Japan? The unlimited sovereignty which figures in diplomacy has become a myth, a phrase by which political realists fool themselves, while idealists wonder at their folly. The world has not yet seen the end of the toll of blood spilled and occasions wasted because of the pursuit by "hard-headed men of action" of the purely fantastic goal of pure independence, Sinn-Feinism, Ourselves-Alone-ism, such as can no longer exist on this planet.

The nearest approaches to perfect self-determination are found in the governments of the great Powers in their relations to minor Powers or to minor concerns. This outpost of self-sufficiency is likely to express its conclusive will in the form of a "reservation," "I reserve here the privilege of being judge in my own case, excluding other views and wishes from debate." Such is the kernel of all Monroe Doctrines. But the fact that such pronouncements are made confesses that in the far greater unmentioned scope of that state's will, accommodation with other wills is understood. And such partial positions of finality are not justified on the basis of an existing perfection of judgment or moral sense, but if at all only on the ground that no other state's will, and no devisable committee-wisdom, would be more nearly perfect in the premises. Sovereign independence in this sense is a temporary position, pending the arrival of a better organized public mind and conscience.³

Let it be understood, then, that there is no self-determination possible on earth, if that means complete and splendid isolation of purpose. The tendency is for every mature state to be everywhere with its interests, as it fol-

³ Sovereignty, in the sense of the recognized capacity to give final judgment, is a real and important attribute of existing states. Cf. William Ernest Hocking, *Man and the State*, Chapter xxvi.

lows its nationals, its traders and trade-routes, its treaties; thus states become interpenetrating entities. Germany, France, Ireland, England, Italy, have their preserves in the United States, and conversely. *Invadedness* is the chronic condition of modern life. But what, in view of this, can be the positive meaning of nationality and of self-determination?

Let us first ask what difference it makes to a man what state he lives under. If it is simply a matter of better or worse government, it would be wisdom for all mankind to place themselves under the rule of the most efficient state. The state has police duties,—peace, order, security of property,—everywhere recognized and more or less badly done: let us find the state which does them best and give it commission to police the planet, on condition it does no exploiting. If this is an unwelcome program, it can only be because states are not groups of public services, impersonal in character, but have personal qualities of their own essential to their nature.

During the early days of the War, we were told of a citizen of one of the Allied states who “made it his business to go daily among the laboring class and reason with them about their lack of patriotism, only to receive invariably the same answer, ‘Let the Germans come. We don’t care. We couldn’t be worse off, and we hear there are no poor ones there.’” The teller of this tale declared that his own land had “the most ungrateful and laziest poor to be found in any land.” Their state of mind, however, is commonly professed in all western states wherever class consciousness running across state boundaries leads workmen to feel or suppose that they have more in common with workmen abroad than with their own employers as fellow-citizens, or with their rulers. This kind of class-consciousness began ages ago among the ruling classes,

when "a princess carried a monarchy in her wedding portion"; and the strength of the national consciousness broke it down. The number of persons in whom national indifference is more than skin-deep is very small; most of those who talk in this vein have never tried living under a different set of laws, and so have not experienced the misfit. There is a spirit of the laws of England which does not fit the German, and conversely.⁴ Swiss codes may be adopted in Turkey, Egypt, Japan; but they must be *adapted*, and work with other laws; they cannot be bodily transferred. Common principles there are; but as there is individuality in the customs out of which laws emerge, so is there in the laws themselves and in the agencies which administer them. To a finer sensitiveness it is patent that no set of institutions is interchangeable with any other.

The reason for this individuality is that every state is or ought to be an *experiment in living*. Its business, besides maintaining order and security, is to put the whole social will into effect, showing in the laws and history-making deeds of government the moral and esthetic qualities of the citizens, their "character." It ought to be possible for every citizen to see in the major laws of the state his own way of judging; for, willy-nilly, *the acts of our state are our acts*. For this reason, it is a situation morally wrong

⁴ G. K. Chesterton puts the case for nationalism in an inimitable way in his *Irish Impressions*:

"If the Germans conquered London, they would not need to massacre me or even enslave me in order to annoy me; it would be quite enough that their notices were in a German style. . . . Suppose I looked up in an English railway carriage and saw these words . . . : 'The outleaning of the body from the window of the carriage is because of the therewith bound up life's danger strictly prohibited.' . . . By every cosmopolitan test, it is more polite than the sentence I have read in my childhood: 'Wait until the train stops.' This is curt; this might be called rude; but it never annoyed me in the least. The nearest I can get to defining my sentiment is to say that I can sympathise with the Englishman who wrote the English notice." pp. 195f.

for any person to live under a government whose will is alien to his own. It is disastrous also to government to be set over an alien people. For laws can never cover the ground of the citizens' duty: they must rely on being loyally interpreted. The most objectionable members of any state are those who keenly learn the laws and obey them in such wise as to defeat their purpose. The "Spirit of the Laws" must be behind the laws in any sound community. It is true, disagreement with many laws and acts of state is the universal lot; under this disagreement, however, we remain free men if government is so far of our own mental stuff that persuasion to our view is not impossible. The state as human-will can do wrong, flounder in mistakes of its own making, create needless diplomatic confusion, involve us in wars, sink our welfare in futile expenditure, mix a strain of chaos into codes and administrations;—if the state is my state, these are such wrongs and mistakes as I myself might have made, and also such as I know how to rectify. The state which suits me is not the impeccable state, but the state which is carrying out my experiment in living.

It is for this reason that the mistakes of an alien government, though they may be less serious than those of my own government, are more hateful, and ultimately unendurable. They are the malodorous blunders of another mind, for which I have no native compensation, nor biological tolerance. And for the same reason the benefits of the alien government fail to provoke normal appreciation. Near the end of his account of modern Egypt, Lord Cromer quotes Gregorovius' remark concerning the experience of Theodosius in Italy:

"The unhappy King now learnt by experience that not even the wisest and most humane of princes if he be an alien in race, in customs and religion, can ever win the hearts of the people."

To the same effect Lord Cromer had already just written, regarding the relations between Britain and Egypt, "Neither by the display of sympathy, nor by good government, can we forge bonds which will be other than brittle."

It is not merely that the mistakes of my governors reach my own personal fortunes: I have to share the good or ill fame of my nation throughout the world. There is a foolish pride in national repute, since the very jealousy of states leads each to enjoy and magnify the defects of other societies, and lend hasty credence to disparaging report. There is a folly, too, in national-snobbery which leads minor Powers to emulate the expense, display, and war-like-might of great Powers, to the emaciation of their economic substance. But these are the diseases of a just national pride, not so tiresomely concerned with the *prestige* as honestly solicitous for the worth and recognition of one's nation. Do you come from Italy, Portugal, America, Turkey? What kind of civilization have you there? Tyranny? Slavery? Lynching? Cruelty to minorities? Be sure that these will be on your critics' lips. Are these then the misdeeds of some fragment of my nation, not my own misdeeds? No: I cannot escape my participation,—the stresses may be local, but it is my sort of human stuff that works this way under those stresses. I must bear this reproach, as I enjoy my nation's credit. National weaknesses are private weaknesses made manifest on the larger scale: an indulgent, over-sexed private life will appear in public mediocrity, quarrelsomeness, shortness of breath, lack of international vision. A materially grasping and envious state of private temper, whether noble, bourgeois, or proletarian, will be evident in diplomatic brutality, failure of public spirit, imperial callousness. It belongs to the health and discipline of the world that an informed world-judgment should play on the characters of states,

and thereby on their inhabitants. But this whole discipline is lost if Egypt, for example, must say,—“These are not my doings, but the doings of my alien rulers.”

In sum, then, the positive meaning of the principle of nationality is that state-governments express in group-form through their laws and deeds the characters of their members. Their histories are histories of individual experiments in living which have their own continuity. And no one of these can substitute for any other.

It follows directly from this view that the ideal of a single all-inclusive world state is a false ideal. For it is not enough, in view of the multitude of unsolved social problems and of the many hypotheses worth trying, that there should be but one vast experiment. Nor is it possible for people to join whole-heartedly in an experiment whose moral presuppositions are very different from their own—witness the difficulty of a prohibition law in any non-Moslem state. It is important that many experiments should be carried on abreast, each one taking current notes from the progress of the others. Hence it is desirable that there should be *many nation-states* in the world. The division of the world into a plural community or family of nations is not a mere matter of administrative convenience: it lies in the nature of the nation and of law.

To see that law-making is experimental is to understand one reason for the failure of ancient empires—Persian, Alexandrian, Roman—which aspired to universal scope. Each one of these, while more or less indulgent to local custom, was well convinced of the finality of its central principle of organization: the toleration of a degree of provincial autonomy implied no disposition to *learn* from those local ways. This sense of finality was fatal. To know that all law-making is tentative is the modern discovery. It is this that justifies the modern state in requir-

ing obedience; for obedience simply means accepting the corporate nature of social experiment. We must try our hypotheses together in order that they may be genuinely tried.

How many nation-states should there be? At least as many as there are significantly different experiments in living. There may be other grounds for the separateness of states; but on this particular ground we may say that a nation which is not experimenting, *i.e.*, not reflecting on its experience, not admitting its errors, not studying and correcting those errors, would have no excuse for existence. A nation which should recommend itself for independence on the ground that it should "attain European standards," *i.e.*, reproduce something already extant and not too good, would by that plea fortify the doubters who ask, "Why one more nation-state in the world?" The only presumption we so far find for multiplying state-boundaries in a world that is avid for unity and sick of splittings and sub-splittings is the presence of a marked and significant uniqueness of character.

Nationhood, then, is a psychological fact, a sort of composite selfhood. The kernel of a nation, like the kernel of an individual self, is a hopeful impulse to definite policies of self-expression, contrasting with those of other selves. The presence of this mental state is shown by the spontaneous use of the pronoun "we" to indicate the national group. It is a tribute to the insight of Vico that he recognized as early as 1725 this essentially mental character of nationhood. A nation, he said, "is a natural society of men who, by reason of unity of territory, origin, custom and language, are drawn into a community of life and of conscience." It is the "community of life and of conscience" that is the substantive national fact.)

If there is enough conscience in the community to make

it alive to the justice and decency of the laws it lives under and to keep it actively critical of the moral quality of its leaders, it will not stop short with being a judging community, using like standards of approval and disapproval: it will tend to be *an acting community*. Enjoying together a distinctive set of laws, it will also have the impulse to make history together, to set up a conjoint organ of will, in brief, to become political. Nationhood is not made by the mere inertia of adhering to local custom because change *per se* is resented: such inertia may be the mental sludge of a former national life, or it may be the pig-iron of a future nation, needing the ordeal of the furnace to bring it to the level of living steel. The national mentality is positive. We might fairly define a nation as a *community disposed to act together for political ends*.

As we observed of the Egyptian national movement, nationhood is a *democratic* fact: the impulse to act and to suffer together belongs to the mass of the people. Joan of Arc wanted England out of France, nominally because of loyalty to the French monarch, really from an instinctive revolt against foreign dictation to these, her people. Wholly without democratic forms, and surely without conspicuous merit in the king, the French people, she instinctively knew, required a home-grown rulership for that unimpeded loyalty, that normal morale which is the monarchical equivalent of consent. Because it was a matter of popular *ethos*, it could become for her a matter of religion. Likewise Machiavelli's appeal to "The Prince"; it arose not from devotion to monarchs but from a profound sense of the rightful unity of the Italian people. This democratic root, implicit in the nation-forming era in Europe, has become explicit in contemporary nationalism.

In this national mentality, further, there is a union of the rational with the intuitive. It is the rational political

sense which accepts the territorial rather than the racial basis for defining the national group: whoever dwells within these borders belongs to the "we." But,—as the example of the United States may illustrate—this community of rationally accepted compatriots does not constitute a nation until it becomes a sort of second nature to co-operate politically with just that group. The national intuition arises, not merely because one feels at home with this group of neighbors, but because one shares with them a sense of mission or of cultural pregnancy in the group, an indefinable and perhaps indefensible presentiment of historical destiny. The national mind is *prophetic*: it has a forward-looking will-to-power in the field of social ideas. Hence it is too little to describe the mind of a nation as a sense of present kinship, or, with Vinogradoff, as "a body of convictions," unless one includes among these convictions that obscure element of group self-consciousness which carries assurance of an undefined historic rôle to be fulfilled,—an assurance which may well be unevident to any but itself, but which may be firm in proportion as it is incapable of demonstration.

Thus nations are likely to find themselves—like infants—in a world occupied with much other business and feeling no need to add to the existing population, helpless before any committee, world court, or council, which should demand proof of their right to be there. It is on this account that new nations have heretofore been obliged to fight their way to recognition.

CHAPTER XII

NATIONS AS BORN AND AS MADE

VICO's definition of nationhood contains another point of wisdom. Besides recognizing that a nation is a state of mind, he also observes its *plasticity*: nations are not everlasting, but makable. No doubt, nations are facts, at any given moment of history: objective facts, hard facts. It is as reasonable to enquire whether a nation exists as to ask whether a mountain range exists: in politics all the primary realities are just such mental facts. But they are also changeable facts: they are forever being born and forever being undone.

It is the mode among present-day writers on nationhood to insist that the overt and plausible marks of identification, such as language, religion, race, do not infallibly characterize nations. For (to take the stock instances) is there not Switzerland—a perfectly good nation—with three official languages, various racial stocks and diverse religions? And has not every nation-state of Europe, including the clearest examples—France, Spain, Italy, Germany—a tangled mixture of racial ingredients? All this is important: there is a large practical relief in knowing that we have not to count a separate nation every time we find a racial distinction; that the spotty ethnographical charts of southeastern Europe (for example) do not necessarily forecast the breaking out there of a pox of petty nation-states.

But what we now especially need to know is, What

forces are today *making* nations, *drawing men* into "a community of life and of conscience"? How stable a fact is a nation? Was there something valid in the "right of conquest" which held that a persistent political pressure will in due time create a coherent cake of humanity, as good a nation as any unmixed tribal extract from a single womb? Are we putting the cart before the horse when we consult the nation to outline the state, instead of allowing the state to outline the nation? What, then, are the great nation-making factors?

Look first at Vico's "*unity of territory*." If the world were a uniform plain, geography could draw no national outlines. But, made up as it is of crooked barriered regions, with marked climatic differences, each region begins at once to lure *its* people into a common mode of life, of shelter, of food, of occupation, of managing cold and heat, of travel, of clothing. The effect of habitat is unrelenting, and no corner of personality evades its influence. Affecting all the senses and the flow of energy, it touches the balance of the instincts and the habitual images of thought. Diverse races living under the same sun are melted together: the castes of India show obscure traces of forgotten differences of origin. But, apart from these common habits, which spring from using the same arts in meeting the same traits of nature, locality itself imposes this necessity on politics that men in the same region *must co-operate*, if only in roads and markets. Invading peoples "make their homes" here or there in the earth; then the homes, breeding adapted tempers, remake the peoples.

If a cosmic catastrophe should mix the inhabitants of the world, throw them down on a sizable tract, they would establish a language, form a nation, and make the best of it. The rational element accepts geography as decisive be-

cause it knows that neighborhood means "common lot" and that neighbors can work together if they will.

Conversely, whatever weakens the fact of *residence* weakens the national sense. Modern mobility reduces the force of local inherence and belonging, while expanding the sphere of co-operation and tending to develop a network of secondary homes. Understanding moves easily along isothermal lines. Modern seasonal migrations of the wealthy move across them. Hence the influence of region tends to become ambiguous, uncertain in its boundaries; and if it operated alone would merge at their edges the nations it had formerly separated. But the nuclei remain to confirm the national type. The Jewish people, deprived of its ancient local footing, shows by the intensity of its piety toward Zion the normal union of land and people. It shows also that a local attachment once had may persist for ages, sublimated in imagination, and doing there the work of an actual land, while the central national fact is sustained by other factors.

Among these factors, and inseparable from the region, there is a *common history* with its memories and hopes, traditions of hero-worship, sources of custom and observance. Time works with space to create the national sense: pure lapse of time does something to efface strangeness, to heal hatreds, to elicit the "we"-consciousness. But time filled with acts, great and small, and with their emotions, is enough by itself to make the nation, though the original members were a haphazard potpourri of the dispersed tribes and tongues of Babel.

And here note that unity of race is one of the normal consequences of a common history. Racial unity, originally the strongest predisposing factor of nationhood, is no longer necessary in the foundations. The state, we say, has become territorial. But the racial element is not dismissed.

For spatial propinquity ordinarily invites the spinning of new blood-bonds: intermarriage brings heredity once more into alliance with neighborhood. Locality mothers a new race; and the new race deepens the spirit of the nation. For heredity weaves the subconscious basis of understanding, and paves the way for common labors.

The conspicuous nation-states of Europe are often cited as evidence that race has ceased to matter in nation-making. I should rather cite them as evidence that time, place, and common history *bring about* community of race. The surface fact is genuine. The physical heredity of France aids the social and cultural heredity to create the French nation. Without the tendency to intermarriage within the national bounds, and a certain tendency to stop at those bounds, the fact of nationality is not complete. For, as the undertakings of nations become more varied, more weight must be laid on the ease with which primary understandings are established.

Nationhood is racial; but we must include race among the highly plastic factors of the nation, as much an effect as it is a cause. The modern nation has broken the idea of the all-importance of racial homogeneity,—a great step in advance. But if the nation is not built on a fixed racial stock, neither can it be wisely built on an indiscriminate race mixture, but rather on a gradual ingestion of new ingredients, taken for the most part from the nearer rather than from the remoter racial groups. For a deep racial distinction, such as a liberal culture takes pride in bridging, tends to set up a segregated life, and to constitute an impediment in those spontaneous processes which knit the national substance.

But now, when we say that a common habitat, common activity, and common blood will in due time make a nation, all this has to be taken with the proviso that the

mental factors of nationhood are there and are propitious. We have been speaking according to the reckless habit of geographers and other scientists when they speculate about history,—that of taking for granted the human mind, the one indispensable and central factor of the case. Consider the Copts and Moslems of Egypt: twelve hundred years of common country, common sky, common economy and common history left them till 1850 a double community, not a nation. There was a mental factor, a matter of creed, that stood against intermarriage and held the latent national unity in abeyance. As the infusion of modern thought relieves the religious tension, nationhood quickly arrives, in spite of the continuing racial distinction. Until a group of people *think of themselves* as sharing political destiny these physical and semi-physical factors can only create an organic readiness for nationhood. In the geographical conditions of Egyptians and Sudanese there are excuses for unity and excuses for separation; it is chiefly the difference of cultural level—a mental factor—which has hitherto allowed the separative regional factors to count heaviest. It is therefore imperative, especially if we are thinking of eastern nations, to consider what these mental conditions may do toward making or preventing nationhood.

In the West we hardly think of religion as an important element in nation making. The modern state, as we know it, takes some pride in crossing lines of religion as well as of race. Religion has ceased to be tribal or national and has become universal, even when, as with the Jewish religion, it retains a special national or racial reference. When religion thus becomes poly-national and the nation poly-religious, the impression grows that the two have become independent. This illusion is fostered in part by the fact that the religious differences the West has to deal

with—except for the narrowing difference between Christian and Jew—are merely sectarian; it is also fostered by the fact that we take religion less seriously than the East does.

In point of fact national unity can ignore religious difference only by accepting an artificial line between the scope of religion and the scope of politics. Religion is essentially a “purely spiritual” affair,—that is true: but, if it is worth its salt, its creed and worship run out into a code of life, and this code is bound to seek an influence on legal principles. In the case of Judaism, inseparable from its Torah, and of Islam, with its elaborate canon law and Sharia courts, this is obvious. With Christianity there seems room for greater independence, inasmuch as Christianity began with an act of liberation from all legalism, offering men general standards for the spirit of behavior rather than specific rules for its forms. Nevertheless, Christianity has been fertile in applications of this spirit to family life, servitude, personal rights, civil liberty, and has embodied these results in secular law. Christian and Jew have been able to unite in citizenship in western states partly because of the adaptable genius of Jewish theology, partly because of the rapid growth in both groups of philosophic neutrality, and partly because one of these applications, namely civil liberty, has led Christianity to restrain its own legislative program wherever there is minority opposition on religious grounds. In general, differing religions can unite in political life only (1) if public legislation confines itself to themes on which the religions agree, (2) if religion refrains from pressing its claims on points of divergence, and (3) if the community segregates itself for the use of its distinctive tenets. In practice the modern poly-religious nation steers a somewhat irregular and perilous course by using to some extent all three

methods. Some one of the many religions will actually dominate in its influence on legislation: thus, the United States, which makes most of the "separation of church and state," is unable to place Moslem or Mormon family law on a par with the notions of the family which are Christian in origin. Turkey expunges the word Islam from the Constitution, but remains dominantly a Moslem state. The "separation of church and state" is a clean separation of institutions not of ideas: the modern state is not disposed to have official ties with any church, nor allow religious organizations as such to be represented in its parliaments, nor tolerate the ever-renewed political intrigue which ecclesiastical hierarchies are prone to. But the various religious groups will freely influence legislation by way of open public discussion and the personal convictions of legislators: it would be monstrous if a nation were unable to enact its profounder ethical judgments merely because some sect held a dissenting view.

The strain of such legislation is lightened by referring to universal reason what is historically a religious demand: for it is the business of religion to anticipate what reason and human experience later confirm. And there is a pronounced convergence in the social judgments of the greater religious systems today. But it is still true that nations in which one religion predominates come most readily to a code which is at once consistent and adequate. I cannot agree with the judgment that in modern times religion has become an unimportant factor in the creation of nationality.

What we may say is that religion is no longer sufficient to draw the outline of a nation, precisely on account of its universal destiny. Special religious utopias still mark out their communal pools here and there in the world: the Dukhobors, the Shakers, the Adventists. But Roman

Catholicism, for example, being everywhere, could not conceivably constitute a nation. A unanimity of religious confession unparalleled in history has shown no tendency to merge the national lives of South American states. Islam in its infancy took on separate nationhood, as did Israel; the Sikh religion for its life was driven into political solidarity: but all these religions now acquiesce in the political boundaries which cross their membership. Religious differences may obstruct; religious agreements seldom determine the national sense.

And, as for these religious differences, they no longer correspond to the names they bear. It is quite true that most creedal distinctions have become unimportant because the issues have moved elsewhere. The religious map of the world is out of date. Wherever there is a new development of the metaphysical sense of a people, there religion develops likewise, leaving a cleavage with its fundamentalists. There, too, we may look for new starts of cultural fertility; and this, in turn, is a positive nation-building force. The Germany of Goethe's day, which thought itself un-national, reacted violently in the next generation and put on the whole armor of a nation-state.

As for "culture" itself,—that is to say, the set of customs, the language, arts, literature, likewise the laws of a people,—culture is primarily neither cause nor effect of national life: it *is* the national life, and the extent of the nation is the extent of its distinctive culture. Thus, when Lutoslawski in the years prior to the War traveled through the States in the interest of the Polish nation, his plea was not the sufferings of Poland but the idiosyncrasy of Polish culture: there was an epic literature, a group of ideas, a philosophy, a music, an art peculiarly Polish. The continuity of the Jewish nation is the continuity of a culture; and its plea for restoration to a national home in Palestine,

based primarily on history and religious need, is also based on the hope that with a new local rootage there will be new fruitage in cultural life.¹ The reason why culture cannot be listed among the causes nor among the effects of nationhood is simply that *every element of culture is both cause and effect*. The English language is a product of the English nation, and a cause of continued English quality. Once in existence, these elements mold the new human beings born under their influence. Cultures are complex entities: their general type may extend far beyond the limits of actual nations,—as “Arabic culture” or, still wider, “Islamic culture.” Nevertheless, every true national entity will show its own peculiar version of its cultural field. Be it said, however, it is *cultural pregnancy* rather than cultural fruit which constitutes the nation: if the fruit is not yet present, nationhood may still be there.

We have, then, a set of nation-making factors, physical and mental, from whose conspiracy, if they do conspire, that unique sort of group-mind will naturally grow. But we have still to consider the possibilities of artificial growth—“making” the nation in a more literal sense. For the national spirit, just because it is a mental fact, is responsive to deliberate political cultivation.

I am not now thinking of that wilful whipping-up of national feeling which governments resort to in time of war or in anticipation of war: this sort of appeal to group self-consciousness presupposes that the nation is already there. What I have in mind is something more aboriginal, namely, that political action itself tends to make a nation of those who take part in it. A state may be formed before the group who compose it are a nation: in this case, the nation is largely the product of the state. The United

¹ For discussion of the Zionist program, see Chapter xxii, below.

States is a case in point. There was an interesting assortment of ingredients, largely borrowed from other states,—culture, speech, economy, a vigorous yeast of religion ready to work; there was the welding power of a desperate struggle first for existence and then for independence in a land which stretching indefinitely ahead called out imagination and hope. But beyond these, what made the United States a nation was the achievement of political unity, and the continued action within that frame of press, schools, churches, public speech-making and history-making all asserting the “we” of the group thus defined. What first parted the settlers of Canada from those of the States was nothing but an arbitrarily drawn line: political history and education have now created a distinction which can be palpably felt by anyone who crosses the border at Niagara or at Sault Ste. Marie.

Australia may be taken as another and nearer example in which nation-making occurs before our eyes. A distinctive land, with distinctive opportunities and obstacles, a dominating stock carrying an old culture into new conditions, where much of this culture must be dropped and remade, a vigorous experimental temper, a strong ego and a sensitive skin,—there is the stuff for nationhood here, ready some time to spring into a corporate selfhood, a pride and a conscience. The strains of the war-years and the subsequent internal difficulties have brought this transition. “That conception of Australia as a nation was created at Gallipoli,” testifies the retiring Governor of Tasmania.² “The terrible experiences there drew the attention of the world to Australia, gave her a status in the Pacific, made her conscious of herself as a nation. Her pride in her nationhood is expressing itself now during her financial troubles. The Australian people realize their responsibili-

² Sir James O’Grady in *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, April 17, 1931.

ties; they want to pay their debts to the last penny." There is a character in the world which is *our* character; we must maintain that. When this state of mind becomes general, the nation is in existence.

One is tempted to ask whether, after all, the conscious work of the state in nation-making is not more effective than all the natural factors acting together. There is many a nation which maintains its distinction from others—and South America may again furnish us examples—for no other reason so good as the "historic" reason, *i.e.*, that it got started that way, and is now quite confirmedly itself and no other.

It is true that in the Western Hemisphere the materials which political action hammered into nations were not resisting the process: in this underpopulated territory the natives hardly entered the national picture, and they still remain for the most part pathetically marginal to it all. Political action can never make a nation against a persistent will, nor of those who take no part. To force a strange language, a falsely colored history, a set of patriotic blurbs and observances upon an actively hostile minority is no nation-making process; it is largely this sort of effort on the part of modern empires which has evoked the swarm of movements for independence. But even an initial hostility may be conciliated or outgrown; for cultural resistance depends on conviction, not on temperament alone, and convictions may be persuaded. Every nation-state of Europe is a product of slow political digestion: and even of the children of Israel ten tribes are somewhere merged indistinguishably with the local world. Given the will-to-agree, and the belief that agreement is one's destiny, the state can make a nation of *any* human ingredients.

To ensure the quality and fertility of a nation thus art-

fully produced would be another matter,—a problem like the problems of eugenics, still beyond the scope of science. And, until science is ready to replace the fortuitous mixtures of history with some more rational blending of strains, it will be best in our nation-making to give instinctive inclination to joint action the first place.

CHAPTER XIII

THE NATIONAL EGO AND ITS EGOISM

WE have been taking nationhood as a positive fact: a corporate state of mind worth having in the world. With this positive fact there everywhere goes a negation. The national mind implies *limit and exclusion*: otherwise, how could it be a unique individual self? Contrast with other groups is inseparable from its essence: it is a social body with an unsocial periphery, a typical small-group within the formless great-group of humanity.¹

The separation of nation from nation is something more than a physical separation. For the nation cherishes a sense of private property not only in its land and people, but also in its spirit and its ideas. It feels those universal bonds of cultural kinship which melt it with the human world at large as measurable dangers. After all, a nation cannot be built of cosmopolites who, being at home everywhere, belong nowhere in particular and can take no firm side in any conflict between nations. Certainly, the nation must think beyond itself, taking note of world thought and world interests; certainly, it belongs to its health to contain a group of minds detached by history or circumstance, such as non-national Jew or non-partisan philosopher, who spontaneously think first of mankind and only then of the nation: but it remains true that Athens always finds Socrates seduced by his universality, losing some enzyme of local virtue, and hence a peril to the city and its gods.

¹ For the psychological theory of this sort of anti-social sociability, cf. William Ernest Hocking, *Man and the State*, Chapter xvi.

The nation stands between the individual and the world, tending to intercept and monopolize his loyalties, professing in Hegel's terms to embody the meaning of the world, its "ethical idea," in itself. Thus the egoism of the nation, presenting itself as the outer face of the sum of patriotic devotion, is without doubt the chief, the most persistent and plausible menace to the order and peace of mankind.

National exclusion is due in part to the accidents of history; for most nation-states have been outlined by hostilities which hung on physical barriers, so that habitat and people were enclosed by one momentous action. The emotional feel of the nation retains the echo of its martial history, as the physiognomy of the pug-dog reverberates with the rite of ancestral battles, and the *nemo impune* virtue of the thistle. Continuing fear or pugnacious welcome of a common danger has remained the sharpest summons to common deeds and feelings. War cannot be credited with creating nations; for clearly there must be a pre-existent "we" before any danger can be a "common" danger. But wars have added much to the solidarity of nations, both by that element of intense common experience of which we have spoken, the exhilaration a nation feels in sensing the actual united action of its vast being, and by the moral simplification which comes when the rays of sympathy rebound from a sharply delimited shell and one knows decisively, "This is friend; this is enemy." It is futile to decry the moral elevation of such experience. When the nation has something to do, visible, immediate, clear, vast, exciting, it shows to the full how, like religion, it can cross the lines of class, creed, wealth, race, party. But this fusion, unlike that of religion, stops at the frontier. It allows the wine of brotherhood to be tasted, but not to be drunk. It lives in the glory of the unselfishness of its citizens; but, when their sacrifices are for the sake of a

higher being whose only law is its own welfare—"the first duty of the nation is to preserve itself"—even that ethical fervor of the citizen which he calls his patriotism tends to be transformed into a more enlightened and wider circuited self-interest; he seeks his own by way of making his nation strong. The belligerent nation and the competitive nation tend to round-in, and impose their temper on, the moral nation, controlling its experiment in living. There is likely to arise a philosophy which makes it the highest duty of the individual member to abet the self-absorbed interests of the national ego.

However, national exclusion is no mere consequence of these historical accidents of birth in war: it belongs equally to the psychology of the case. Gregariousness as an instinct has little to do with forming the nation: it can form only such groups as one can physically oversee.² But extend the scope of the social instinct *via* imagination as far as you please, there is always a limit to the group for which any one can *mean* the word "we." The limit is elastic: it widens its range with political maturity, but it always draws its line. The line must be so drawn that it does *not* include all of humanity whom one can clearly imagine: for the definiteness of the "others" is a necessary factor in the definiteness of the "self." One needs one's opponent and critic in order to be quite clear what sort one's self is: there is a fundamental craving for reality which cannot be satisfied in merely agreeing with one's environment: it requires to know that one *differs*, and that the difference counts. Thus, even if there were no war in the world, the self of a nation would, by way of natural self-assertion or self-expression, run out to meet opposition and pain of some sort in order to realize its self-consciousness. Further, or perhaps first of all, cultural fertility re-

² William Ernest Hocking, *Man and the State*, pp. 221ff.

quires a semi-privacy in the world: a forced openness to the swish-swash of alien types and ideas or simply being on the world's highway destroys that sensitive domestic certainty without which there can be no genuine novelty of conceit. The great civilizations, as Bagehot truly remarks, have been prepared in secret: the greatness of Greece and of Rome was laid before they had taken the world into their borders.

The life of a national ego, then, is a life in a group of contrasting national egos: history is largely the narrative of their interplay. And this interplay requires of each one a fundamental self-respect, seeking its proper influence and cultural power. How easily this self-respect may become a vicious self-assertion there is no need to enlarge on. National egoism has so deservedly brought on itself the blasts of the modern prophets, Tolstoy and Nietzsche, Acton and Tagore, that one only enquires whether nationalism itself is not a vast fallacy and a disease. We know the symptoms of its fevers; how it becomes irritable, suspicious, anxious for its prestige, intolerant of division at home, afraid of free discussion, muzzling its press, deporting its "radicals," imprisoning its most faithful, honest and courageous critics, testing each man his neighbor for 100 per cent surface sentiment, making life a hell for all who lack the plumage or disdain to parade it. It falsifies the teaching of history to children—the meanest of its crimes. It pillories those teachers and writers who, reaching out toward a juster truth or a better human brotherhood, admit a national error. With the imbecility of all tyranny, it limits the *personae gratae* who wait on its government to the most fulsome flatterers. In affairs professedly international, it poisons co-operation by a covert competitive purpose, bringing a greed for its own into the League of Nations itself. The "international" in its eyes

has no reality beyond a polite cover for profitable bargaining, a speciously peaceful pursuit of aims essentially warlike,—economic advantage, hegemony, domination. It engenders a curious conceit of all connected with one's nation, with incredible credulities and capacities for misjudgment of the corporate characters of other peoples. It colors with the halo of virtue all the vices from deception to disloyalty when they are practised for the supposed benefit of the state. It drives many a true patriot into the ranks of the haters of the nation: "All we gain by being members of communities is lost by being compelled to participate in international chaos and crime."³

The difficulty of the situation is rendered keener by this circumstance, that, since there is no world-police, survival in the international wilderness (which hope sometimes designates the "family" of nations) requires of each nation a type of looking-out-for-oneself to which the citizens of well-governed states have long become unaccustomed. It is quite conceivable in this area of widely differing nations that the best might make itself a prey of the worst by forcing a policy of fellowship beyond the realities of the situation, crying "brother" where there is no brother. The legitimate desire not to be the dupe of one's fraternal emotions checks the simple expansiveness of the international spirit. If we admit an inequality in the worth of nations,—and how can we avoid it?—there is a perpetual moral strain, and even tragedy, in the situation of the worthier. Obscured by all the hideousness of the greed and perfidy of great states there may be an element of inescapable necessity and right in their self-maintenance.

What this ethical element is, we shall enquire in due time. At present I have only to ask whether the claims of growing international order diminish the value of the

³ L. P. Jacks.

strongly separative national mind,—or whether the opposition between them engages only the diseased forms of both.

The primary standards of reason and right, we have argued, are not local but universal. So, in general, is everything that belongs to truth and to the mastery of nature. Ideas in these fields cannot remain as national private property: they find their way to every head that is ready for them. The growth of internationalizing tendencies is spontaneous: we wake up and find the world interdependent as nobody planned it to be. Trade is credited with much of this internationalizing; and that is just, for trade has an initiative requiring no governmental push, sending its rootlets into every cranny where its vegetable instinct suspects gold-dust. And trade builds its own international language. But there is a still subtler flight in the world of the mind. Philosophies and religions born in a corner burst out of bounds and begin a world career, not because anybody commanded it, but because a local metaphysics is a contradiction in terms. Art is better satisfied to be provincial, because art has a body and sensuous filling; it is a tree that tells tales of the soil it grows in. But it, too, has a spirit which wanders, makes alliances, and begets offspring. And since the art of every land has lovers in every other land, every work of art in every nation is the treasure and care,—yes, let me say the *property*, of all the nations: its destroyers, whoever they are, begin to feel the combined weight of the world's resentment. Add to these the steady forces which have been acting through centuries to create a body of common human goods, the almost sudden recent advances in implementation: the arts of movement and communication, the network of an international finance, the finishing changes of geographical knowledge, all these at first silent and private growths have brought a composite

shattering, penetrating force to bear on all excluding walls. The world-economy and the world-markets with their world-prices for wheat, cotton, and the like, are the material framework of a world-history, into which regions once jealously remaining aloof now press forward to have a part.

The elements of a world-civilization have arrived. There is a minimum of common understanding, common self-restraint, common legality which attends the traveler into all ports if not into all the interiors. There is a reality in the status of *Weltbürgertum*, the world-citizenship which Kant foresaw,⁴ with its rights to protection, to property, to conversation, to all the conditions of general hospitality. Why be a citizen of any lesser unit? What we call imperialism, with its high-pressure economic penetration, is an attempt to combine the national end with the international tendencies. It aspires to include within the nation all of the buyer-seller pairs who have one foot in it. It undertakes to enlarge the nation along the lines of the natural spread of world-forces, until it contains within its self a fair sample of the whole world's variety and resource. But this sort of imperialism had already partly failed in its aim before it had well defined it; for the world has not so disposed its resources that fair samples can be distributed among all the would-be empires. A world economy is a necessity for all of them; and the spread of world-citizenship plays havoc with the new fences.

How substantial a fact is this international life? Is it an abstract "common interest" shared by many human tribes or their members, who still remain primarily their unique selves—like a ship's company assembling for boat-drill, and then dispersing? Or is it a still vague but viable super-national life, such as one can belong to in preference to the

⁴ *Zum ewigen Frieden*, 1795: *Dritter Definitivartikel*.

nation, already tending to smear or wipe out its over-clear outlines?

Ideas, we say, are inconfined. Yet they never live long in the free state: they are seized and set into local establishments. Ideas were once deliberately exported: they were sent by post, by book, by missionaries; when accepted they were assumed to create sameness of mind. Students also have traveled to get them: these traveling students have been agents of erosion, going where any spot of culture is high and taking it away in order to build up the home culture to the same level. The student was the typical international spirit and interpreter of world-thought. For a time he lost his national quality; the returning Chinese student found himself unable to reconnect with the local roots, in danger of withering into nothing,—not finding the inter-nation a thing to live in. But now, everywhere, the situation is reversed. The student still travels, but he is a nationalist: steeped in universal ideas, and the most burning of patriots! How can this revolution be explained? Is the student merely reacting against the folly of those who suppose that in the spreading of ideas something of the national claim goes with them? Maurice Barrès rejoices in the spread of French culture through the Orient and elsewhere, and perceives that a bit of France goes with every idea thus emitted. “De siècle en siècle, la France a dégagé une énorme quantité de lumière. On en aperçoit des reflets sur toutes les faces des nations.” So far, plain truth: especially in the Near East. There is no civilized spot of earth which does not owe to France much of its animation as well as of its light. But is it the destiny of this light to remain *French* light? Or is it to become simply *light*, anonymous, international light, everybody’s spoil? Or is it to be locally captured by growing plants and made over into *local light*, no more French but Egyptian, Syrian,

Turkish light, forgetting the lingering traces of its origin? Clearly, the French gift to become a complete gift must lose its French label. It cannot linger in an international limbo, doing no specific work. It must be appropriated, and cease to be the property of the exporter. It must eventually go to build the non-French nation, though with an added quickness to respond to any new product of French genius. So with England: she promotes her type of mind throughout her Empire; but that type forthwith becomes a brood of new types, each one quickly ignoring all strains of ancestry. Ingratitude and plagiarism are, in a sense, the completest successes of the international mind. The mothers of ideas who look for personal attachment as a consequence of their pains will be deservedly disappointed: their reward is in the gradual rise of that level of presupposition,⁵ that promptness of understanding, which humanity achieves as it becomes a corporate entity. The failure of abstract internationalism, with the consequent resurgence of national emphasis everywhere in the world, is due to the experimental discovery that the universal things—ideas, truths, interests—cannot live by themselves: the universal has to live by touching ground in the careers and thoughts of human beings; and human beings continue to *think regionally*, because, with all the wide-flung circuits of their lives, the great mass of their co-operations in family, livelihood, custom and law remain regional. Thus the vast increase in international common wealth now confirms, not obliterates, the separateness of nations.

But if, at the same time, it were to sharpen, as it seems to be doing, the egoism of nations, the result can be nothing but disaster on the new world-scale. It is necessary to learn, and to reiterate until it is believed, that the whole ideology

⁵ For this term, cf. William Ernest Hocking, *Man and the State*, pp. 245ff.

of national egoism has become obsolete. Every national policy which is for itself alone has now become so concretely a peril to all nations that all nations must combine to cure it. It must be made impressively clear that egoism in state life has the same sort of reward as egoism in individual life,—a moral impoverishment which brings other kinds of impoverishment in its train. Let us be explicit.

There is a cause-and-effect relation in national policies which is the more inescapable as it follows the lines of logic. When the nation is born, its outline is drawn: but at the same moment an international fact is born also. Self-consciousness is inseparable from other-consciousness. So far as national selfhood depends on contrast, it is obliged to set a value on the contrasting object. Suppose the new self is a quarrelsome self, feeling some need to fight in order to know itself alive: such a self necessarily requires its opponent, and hence desires if not loves its enemy in a way not contemplated by the gospel! There is thus a logic in the emotions which stultifies in time any purely chauvinistic nation-sense. It is easy for statesmen to suppose that they may, and even must, follow in their diplomatic dealings a radically different ethics from any which they allow themselves personally: there are substantial grounds for this view which we have to consider in detail.⁶ But one point we can establish now, that the principles which prevail in the dealings of citizens with one another tend to agree with the principles which their state adopts toward other states. If the external policy is egoism, the inner fabric of the state will be egoism, an impossible cement for the substance of a nation-state: pure dust when it is dry. There is, of course, no escape from the perpetual reminders of concrete interdependence: hurt me and I will hurt you, tariff me and I will tariff you,—there is plenty of this sort

⁶ Chapter xxvii below.

of conversation in the world today. States tend to set up an intricate mesh of bargains on the principle, When you do anything that affects me—and you are always doing it—take me into consultation; and I will reciprocate. In this way the modern world tries to retain its egoisms and escape the mutual wounds which result; and this patchwork of reminders of mutuality, leaving still the chief cards in the hands of those states which hold the largest means of nettling other states, has a useful work of education to perform. It is a voluminous business and few statesmen get beyond the ambition of “rendering service” to their nation by some bright *coup* in the game. The ethical inevitabilities are only present to them in an uneasy groping for securities and still further securities: they know subconsciously what success in their game *deserves*. I prefer to rest the case on the slow corruption of the national fiber which national egoism brings.

The solution, as I see it, lies in our conception of the “experiment in living.” For an experiment is never of value merely to the experimenter; it is of value to all who have the same problem. Hence the life of my nation, so far as it is experimental, becomes a matter of concern to all nations. France requires the experiment of Germany; Germany requires the experiment of France. Neither, with its eyes normally open, could wish so much as the weakening of the other, still less its ruin. An experiment in living to be highly significant needs to be well-equipped, a well-rounded organism: every nation will desire the well-established selfhood of every national group which is admitted to state-life at all. With this view, the international spirit must grow strong in proportion as the national spirit grows strong.

We reach the following conception of a nation. A nation is a large group, usually having a well-defined geographic

base and a degree of ethnic and linguistic unity, whose common character impels its members to act together in the experiments of political life, while being so far distinct from near-by groups that the inclusion of these groups would lower the worth of the experiment, for them and for all men. A nation is an artificial selfhood, having the limitation of selfhood in place and time, and also the need which every self has of other selves. Like all selfhood, it tends by growth and the practice of common action to increase its internal unity, to "integrate" its character and to deepen its contrasts with other nations. But these tendencies must be compensated on the one hand by a hospitality toward inner variety and dissent if it is not to become static and decadent, and on the other by a sense for the realities of international community if it is not to become a common danger, an enemy among enemies.

So far we have been concerned with what the nation is. We now come to the questions of right, which are our main concern. We shall consider, very briefly, the right of nations to exist, and then the right of independence, or of self-determination.

CHAPTER XIV

THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION

ALL living things have an impulse to preserve themselves, and all conscious things, if they are capable of action at all, desire to act freely. Human groups like human individuals show these traits,—a “will-to-live” and a “will-to-be-free.” When we define a nation as a disposition to act together for political ends we imply that wherever there is a nation there is a striving for independent self-expression.

These are merely facts of social psychology: they settle nothing of the rights of the case; they do, however, carry with them certain presumptions. Given any living being in the universe, then any deliberate destruction of its life or thwarting of its will has a *prima facie* character of malice, or wantonness. We do not require a human being to prove his right to life: his existence is commonly taken as carrying the right with it, until he proves the contrary. Prior to his conception there was in the universe no demand for *him*: but, once he is on earth or on the way thereto, an attempt on his life becomes a crime. The fact of his existence brings the right with it. Can we say the same of human groups?

Our spontaneous attitudes follow the analogy. To destroy or to break up a group is not usually considered a crime: it may be a mere misdemeanor. But if groups exist at all, human purposes are engaged in them, and the burden of proof is on any one who would disperse the group

before its purposes were fulfilled. Strictly speaking, the rights in such a case inhere not in the group itself but in its members. It is a part of *their* life that is at stake. If we speak of the rights that would be infringed by stirring a riot in a theater, it is not "the play" that suffers: it is a part of the life of each of the audience and of each of the players that is broken off. If we speak of the larger and cloudier group called the nation, some part of the will-circuits of each member is engaged in its being; and its right to exist is equivalent to the right of all these fractions of personal life to continue. If we could suppose the value of these strands of will to be nothing or less than nothing, that "right to exist" would vanish: the annoyance of a group of gamblers at being raided may be as intense as the annoyance of the disturbed theater party—the annoyance is not a sufficient evidence that rights have been destroyed. The right of any group to exist depends altogether on *what that group means to its members*,—not in any inherent sanctity of the group-entity *per se*. Whether or not the group has a "soul"¹ apart from the souls of its members, its whole claim on our respect or deference comes back to the intrinsic worth of its value for them. That the nation has a positive and respect-worthy value for its members might be taken for granted; but for the sake of the argument, let us recall it.

And let us get at it by contrast with the mental status of the non-national man. Placed in a community with which he has no disposition to co-operate, a man may either resign politics to others or force himself to co-operation on purely rational grounds,—unable to take for granted any common instinct or sentiment toward any project. The latter course is so difficult that most men in that situation adopt the former and bend to the political

¹ Cf. William Ernest Hocking, *Man and the State*, Chapters xxiii and xxiv.

weather as to the rest of destiny. The fate of portions of the Levant swept over time and again by invading armies may show the point. Where village life persists, as it generally does, by ignoring politics, mental soundness may continue, but on a sub-human level. But those who, through ability, greed, or ambition, are unwilling to remain inconspicuous, tend to adjust themselves to the alien power by an external co-operation devoid of sincerity: then we have the Levantine in the worse sense of the word. If the government is conducting an "experiment in living" he, at least, has no heart in it, he finds it no laboratory for *his* experiments in applied conscience. He is more than likely to end in taking his own conscience lightly because of this absence of public application; he is typically deficient in "principle," *i.e.*, in firm-held hypotheses about the way of living, in scruples regarding family and sex, in strictness about property: he loses in responsibility and character. It is a common saying among superficial judges that the Orient worships only power. That is false: there is no people that worships power. But where the national sense has been frequently outraged, there may emerge an art of survival, by adjusting to necessities, devoid of ethical character. Even in a relatively primitive political community, there is a healthy reciprocal ethical relation between the whole and its several members: each is keeper of the other's conscience. The customary life of central Africa—sub-national as it is,—cannot be displaced by what we regard as a higher life without a degree of moral ruin, a loss of the one thing which makes for human dignity, the free self-critical use of standards of behavior which are *one's own standards*, because they belong to the pit whence he was digged and the rock whence he was hewn. The advance of the national principle is simply the increasing self-assertion of that priceless and irreplaceable democratic

element of all sound political life, the "common conscience" of such communities as already have one. On this ground alone we may accept at once the principle that *a nation, by its very existence, must be presumed to have a right to exist.*²

We cannot, however, say that this right is absolute or inalienable. It has this radical difference from the right to life of a human individual: when a person dies, no one in any literal sense pretends to "take his place"; but, when a group is dissolved, some other grouping of its elements ordinarily replaces it. One might almost say "necessarily replaces it"; for, apart from pure chaos, a given plurality of human beings is always somehow arranged for the elemental necessities of economy and defence. The destruction of their group is not (necessarily) their destruction; and those will-circuits, those active interests, re-establish themselves in other contexts. There has been displacement and interruption, but not murder. Many groupings of men are and ought to be ephemeral. Our theater-group has no right to, nor interest in, eternal existence; and even such right as it has would be challenged if, for example, a far better play could be substituted. In itself the nation is naturally an enduring group,—it has no normal span of life; nevertheless, the frequent deaths of nations, even of great nations, in history have not always been calamities. Would anyone today resuscitate the Roman people—the original nation-group—at the cost of the non-existence of the nation-groups that have replaced it? The right of a given nation to existence depends, not alone on its merits, but on the merits of the possible alternative groupings: it

² "We are called upon to retrace our steps, to take all proper measures which are still possible to restore or preserve the authority of the chiefs, and to maintain the bonds of solidarity and discipline which have supported the tribal organization of the natives in the past." General J. C. Smuts, *Africa and Some World Problems*, including the Rhodes Memorial Lectures . . . 1929, pp. 87f.

can only be established by comparing existent with non-existent arrangements of peoples,—a baffling operation! No one but a prophet can finally validate the claim of any existing nation to perpetuate its own peculiar and limited identity. The unborn nation may have a right-to-become-existent which the unborn and unconceived child does not have: for its members are already there, and *their right* is to the best available experiment in living.

Apply this consideration to the case of a minority within a nation-state. The presumption always is that the national life of the minority should be preserved and given local autonomy within the state, with all freedom to exercise its own religion and speech, and to bring up its youth in its own ways, much as the French-Canadians do in Quebec. But now this decently-treated minority has two alternatives before it—and we eliminate the case in which an independent nation-state of its own complexion lies just across the border: it may either aspire to complete self-determination, or it may accept its position as a permanent minority. In the latter case, it is as much bound to co-operate with the majority in all acts affecting the whole state, and to manage its local life without a nasty factionalism, as is the dominant nation to avoid the medieval policies of assimilation by violence and repression. Where this is honestly done, rancor and caste-feeling being the chief impediments to the political work of nation-making, the result is the gradual merging of the two nations into a composite nation. This process goes on with great rapidity in the United States with all national minorities except the negroes, where it is suspended by the caste spirit; it goes on very slowly but actually between French and English in Canada. Czechs and Slovaks might be regarded as two nations but a wise political order is already melting them into one. Copts and Moslems in Egypt, once tending to

build up quasi-national barriers, now accept the common nation. In such cases, minorities may long retain their distinctness, but their nationhood dies; and its death is wholly auspicious, being visibly (and often painlessly) translated into a larger living entity, such as that of the Egyptian people.

Now a subordinate nation, be it a minority or a conquered majority, will always tend either toward independence or toward such death-by-digestion. The "right to life" of a nation thus becomes equivalent in practice to its "right of self-determination," which aims toward eventual independence. Our problem then is to consider when independence can be regarded as a "right."

If we can show that a nation exists, the presumption is, we think, that it has a right to continue in existence. So with the right to independence: the fact of nationhood carries with it no absolute right to independence, but the presumption is that way. As the world now is, any nation which ought to exist will be more likely to arrive at its best capacities under conditions of freedom than under subordination to outside rulers. Under normal circumstances we should not require any nation to show cause why it should be free: we should rather place the burden of proof on the position that it should not be free. Unless it can be shown that dependence on an advanced nation has a tendency to promote progress in the backward nation *in the line of its own genius* there is no sound basis for the doctrine set up as our first problem, that "backward peoples ought to be dependent peoples."

There is something inverted in the prevalent idea that subordination has lately become a salutary condition for vast areas formerly let alone in unprogressive lethargy or savagery; and that they ought to be educated by us whether they want to be so educated or not. The difficulty

with this idea is not that stagnation is desirable, nor that education is dangerous, but that we do not yet know how to educate. What we call tutelage turns out to be, too frequently, a training out of native ways into ways which fit no man, for the sake of our own private interest. There is no virtue in letting any part of the world alone: no right to be let alone exists, even in Tibet. But if you propose to tamper with the instinct of freedom, *first produce the educators.*

When subjugation is once a *fait accompli*, and you appear to have placed upon the subject people the burden of proving itself fit for independence, it is easy to set up a wholly rational list of conditions to be fulfilled,—an examination such as the examiner himself might find it a tight squeeze to pass! We must set up those conditions and take a long look at them. But remember in so doing that liberty has not ceased to be the native air of mature humanity in any part of the world: it has the same glamour to all people at all times; dependence has always brought forth the same lament, the same resentment, the same ideals, the same heroism, the same songs. What Silvio Pellico wrote for the Italy under an Austrian yoke, that Petöfi wrote for the Magyars, Nicholas I for the Montenegrins, Schevtschenko for the Ukraine, Ljudevit Gaj for the Jugoslavs.

No growth of the world can make political subordination other than a stifling and unnatural posture, so long as the subordinating Power is felt as alien. Even if it be excused on the ground of necessary tutelage, it creates conditions which destroy the incentive to learn, or the ability to experiment, and it preoccupies the mind with political angers rather than with the constructive business of the community. There can therefore be no stable equilibrium in the world until the nation and the free state coincide. So

far, we may say, the right of independence is a "natural right" of nations. The announcement of this right in the "Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations" by the Institute of International Law in 1916, on the analogy of the rights of men, is so far on a sound basis.

But, just as clearly, this is not the whole story. Even if the analogy were sound—which it is not³—we have to recall that even for John Locke men are born free only "as they are born rational," *i.e.*, on the yon side of adolescence. They can be turned loose in a world which their free action is to affect only when they have an adequate inner picture of those important outside interests, and are ready to do by self-management what would otherwise have to be secured by outside control. There is this radical difference between the situation of a nation and that of the individual person: that there is for the nation *no natural period of adolescence* and maturity. The passage of time does not secure that a nation "becomes of age," partly because nations can live for centuries without growing, and partly because the world they grow up into is vastly different at different epochs. The responsibilities of the mature state are not so much as sketched by nature; they are almost wholly man-made. In recent times they have enormously increased. At the same time, the range of action of each independent state has increased, together with the implements of external action, and each state is increasingly vulnerable to the action of others. It is for these reasons that nations which are late comers to the status of independence have far severer tests to meet than the earlier arrivals.

The world is not yet a "family of states," nor a "society of states." But it moves in that direction, and thinks in terms of an ideal not yet attained. If the world were such a

³ Chapter xxvii below.

society, then the "right of independence" would be a "right of admission" to this society; and the society would be justified in setting up conditions for that privilege. Let us, for the sake of the argument, assume that this is the situation; what would be the requirements for the aspiring nation?

An independent state controls its own population, within the limits of nature; determines conditions of travel into and out of its borders, the residence of aliens, and their privileges. This power carries with it a set of duties, in view of that world-citizenship which gives every man an interest in free motion around the planet: the duty to allow travel and the prosecution of peaceful missions so far as they operate by persuasion, the duty to afford travelers the ordinary securities of person and property. An independent state has exclusive possession and use of its territory, with sole power to determine conditions of occupancy and sale of land and the exploiting of resources. It has the corresponding duty—certainly not to throw these resources open to all comers—but to think of them competently in terms of world economy, and to make reasonable conditions for admitting the circuits of trade. A policy of exclusion might once have indicated a proud self-sufficiency; today it indicates rather internal weakness and fear. An independent state is the supreme authority over all persons within its borders, the supreme source of positive law and the final interpreter of that law. It has the corresponding duty to give law to its people, to dispense an honest justice, and to keep order. It is for the moment a dangerous doctrine to lay down that an independent state has the duty to govern its people *well*; for under that indefinite standard stranger states have been only too ready to see a pretext for intervention. Nevertheless, this is what the claim of independence *means*; that we are now prepared to set up

and run a government which can command the general respect of mankind.

In particular the government must be able to maintain unity in the nation; hence those who dread or profess to dread a premature independence will make the most of the extant divisions of the people, and allege, as in the case of Ireland, that there is no power to bridge these divisions.

But more than this: an independent state has the power to converse with other states on equal terms, to treat in its own name, to contract debt, to send ministers and receive them. It has the corresponding duty to receive and send such ministers, to treat with other states and to be responsible in its treaties, to pay its debts, to carry on arbitration; and in all this intercourse to observe international usage so far as this usage is established. In brief, the independence of a sovereign state today is not a condition of free set-apartness but a condition of *membership*. If there are peoples—and I believe there are—which ought to have just that free and isolated existence which an independent state can no longer have, such freedom and protection must be guaranteed by powers other than their own. They must be politically dependent in order that they may be culturally free.

There was a time when we should have added to this review of the powers and duties of an independent state, the power of defending itself, with the corresponding duty to do so. But in a world order in which no state can defend itself against all possible comers, this duty subsides into an obligation to contribute according to its powers to the good order of the world.

Let us resume all these duties in three: the duty of intelligent management of territory and natural wealth; the duty of good government; the duty of competent world-intercourse. It is in this third point that the obligations of

independent states have most heavily increased in the past half-century. As undertakings on the world scale have become more numerous, from the modest beginnings of postal services and the policing of the seas to the present vast network of international services, bureaus, courts, leagues, the requirement that the independent state take a competent part in these undertakings now becomes the severest test of fitness. Let us recall that admission to statehood is admission to *equality*. There is no separate "right of equality": to be independent is to be the equal of every other independent state, in all that marks independence. All states that conspire to carry on a world-order mix their thoughts and proposals with each other on an equal footing, whatever their inequalities in size, wealth, power. To be admitted to this equality is no satisfaction either to the community involved or to the existing family of states, unless the new member is in fact a mental and moral equal.

With all this, the essential obligation has not been mentioned. Cultural fertility is the chief mark of the mature nation: given this, other forms of competence follow. The most pertinent questions, therefore, when the right of independence is being argued are such as these: Is there here a significant experiment in living? Is this nation thinking, reflecting, to effect on the problems of its culture? Are ideas coming out of it? Has it, besides its able editors, politicians, pamphleteers, orators, also its poets, philosophers, prophets? Is it sound in its energy, likely to be pregnant with something of general human value?

Nations presenting a case for independence will always, and justly, point to their men of intellectual eminence. It is an event of first rate importance for national India when a Nobel prize is conferred on a physicist of her own breed-

ing.⁴ But moral fitness is still more important, both for the direct promise of political success and for the promise of cultural fertility. On economic virtue the world has an interested eye. A failure in book-keeping becomes excuse for the subjection of Egypt to Europe: it is clear that the qualities which can balance a budget rank high among the marks of fitness. So with the primary economic qualities of industriousness and honesty, which we are always in danger of taking as fixed national characters, whereas they vary radically and rapidly with desire, imagination and hope.⁵ A judgment on these semi-ethical qualities is more feasible and less tempting to hypocrisy among the judges than one on political or social virtue. Nevertheless, this also is essential, even more essential. The prevalence of faction, inability to arbitrate, derogation of political opponents, are as significant as corruption, chronic assassination or the habit of change by revolution: the presence of moral leaders of more-than-national caliber is a corresponding positive sign. So, also, a positive and systematic concern for the welfare of the masses of the community, though a late development of the social sense in any part of the world, is now an essential trait of any free community.

The chief moral disease of immature nationalism is a misconception of loyalty which regards criticism of one's country and its laws as a form of treason instead of a form of true patriotism. It is evidently impossible to learn by one's mistakes until one can see and admit one's mistakes. The thing to be avoided in all liberations is that the new state shall be freed simply for stagnation or for interminable wallowing in political stupidities. The ordinary national braggadocchio and air of pretended impecca-

⁴ Sir Chandrasekhara Venkata Raman, of the University of Calcutta, discoverer of "the Raman effect."

⁵ As Andalusian peasants wax industrious in Algeria.

bility is a sure promise of such wallowing; the capacity to define and attack national weakness the best augury for coming out of it.

Capacity for self-criticism affords also some security against the most lamentable moral failure of premature liberation, that whereby the *oppressed now turns oppressor*. This is the poison flower of the national spirit: it proves the love of liberty to have been mixed with a vanity and envy which once freed is not content with freedom but aspires to the airs of empire. Thus France of the Revolution accepts the spirit of Napoleon; the Magyars freed turn against the non-Magyars;⁶ dissenters freed in Massachusetts Bay Colony persecute their own dissenters; negroes in Liberia turn slave hunters; Poland plays tyrant to her own minorities; the new Jewish attitude in Palestine spreads fear among the Arabs. So often has this happened that liberal sympathy learns caution: a national movement which consists merely in saying "We want liberty" has to clear itself from the suspicion of that very political egoism against which it rightly rebels. There is a psychological reason for this lamentable reversal, and no one has stated it more finely than Laski: hatred leads us to develop in ourselves the traits we condemn in others.⁷ But its frequency lends a particular emphasis to the demand that independent nations must be at heart right-observing nations; for in a world in which international right has begun to win substance and respect it is fair to require of new-comers that they shall not be such as to tear it down.

Thus, the northern littoral of Africa was for centuries

⁶ The case of Hungary is of peculiar interest. The work of Széchenyi between 1825 and 1840 in developing a national prudence, self-restraint and unselfishness was a necessary preliminary to the political ardor of Kossuth. The failure to attain independence under Kossuth was chiefly due to the unfinishedness of this moral preparation. The incipient state was broken on the rocks of its own egocentric nationalism.

⁷ Harold J. Laski, *A Grammar of Politics*, p. 238.

sunken in a semi-barbarous condition, in marked lapse from the Roman days and from the days of the great Arab culture, a home for pirates, malarial and poor. There was no evident reflection to bring it up. Here the French touch, at first bloody, forcible, and costly, has eventuated in a manifest development, whose end cannot be foreseen; some sort of *modus vivendi* has been established. It does not appear that these African states could have claimed a right to continue their independence, devoid as it was of any prospect of reaching a better level. Yet it is always possible that the general awakening of Moslem lands would in due time have brought to these nations also a desire to share on equal terms with their neighbors in the affairs of the world. In Indo-China, where the native culture is more vital and forward-looking, the European hand has been more cruel and less successful.

Let this be a sufficient account of the conditions of fitness for independence, all of which I am inclined to simplify in this one demand, that *the nation shall be ready to learn from its mistakes*, rather than continue to blunder along or stagnate on a subnormal level. And then let us say that for a direct and objective judgment whether these conditions are present, the criteria are almost wholly lacking. The answers can certainly not be derived from any volume of statistics, nor from the findings of any committee of experts. In practice, the grant of independence is usually an experimental process of numerous stages: a small degree of self-government is tried to see whether more can be ventured. This method is perhaps the best attainable where the doubt is great, though it has the obvious disadvantage that no subordinate official can show what is in him, when his controller is a critic of foreign tradition.

It is something to have in mind what it is we are trying to judge; but the judgment, I say, cannot be freed from

subjective factors. And so long as there is not alone a possibility but a certainty that the subject nation and the ruling state will reach divergent judgments, we are at some distance from a rational, and hence from a peaceful, solution. Our single problem becomes a double one: Who are to be the judges of the right to independence? What considerations, other than these direct qualifications, are pertinent to the creation of a new state? For there are other considerations.

CHAPTER XV

HOW THE RIGHT IS TO BE JUDGED

IF there are to be peaceful solutions of the right to independence, both the subject nation and the governing state must yield the claim to be final judges. The same considerations which make individuals imperfect judges in their own cases apply to issues between nations. But it is not so easy, in the case of nations, to find an acceptable third party to the judgment. For the affairs of individuals are so far comparable and observable that neighbors, or others who are "peers"—*i.e.*, in similar situations—can gain an understanding of the case. But a neighbor nation is at best a remote neighbor and cannot draw near to do the needful enquiry. Only the two parties at issue have complete knowledge of the case; they alone can have what is better than all knowledge-about, an immediate feeling of the strain and exigency of the relation, the direct key to interpreting its history. Neither of these two can transmit to others this knowledge, and neither can abdicate its position in the center of the process of judgment. Both, nevertheless, may accept the following theses:

(1) *No nation is a sufficient judge of its own right to independence.*

Certainly, every nation like every individual will judge its own case, and ought to: no nation could be regarded as ready for self-government which did not believe itself to be ready. But, like all claims of right, this claim is addressed to hearers who must acknowledge it; and no other

body of people could be bound to accept at its face value the introspective judgment of an aspiring nation. With lack of competence there frequently goes the lack of just standards of competence; hence the nation that is not ready for independence does not, in general, know that it is not ready.

It is worth noting, as a frequent special case of misjudging the basis of a plea for self-determination, that the sufferings of a nation oppressed by an alien ruler do not of themselves constitute a claim for independence. The incapacity of A to govern B does not prove the capacity of B; nor is there any logical link—though common feeling is prone to create one—between the premise “I suffer” and the conclusion “I am able to govern myself.” The greater part of the American Declaration of Independence is composed of an elaborate bill of complaints against George III’s Government. Abuses of this sort demand a remedy; and separation may be the only remedy available, but this is seldom the case. A change of guardianship may be called for. Many contemporary national movements weaken their case by building it chiefly on the negative ground of antagonism between ruler and ruled. The feeling of contrast essential to national self-consciousness is sharpened by resentment and deepened by long suffering; but neither the alignments brought about solely by a common hostility nor the strength of emotion so elicited, can be relied on to sustain the positive tasks of national life.

This principle would negate the idea of a plebiscite, if that plebiscite contained the question whether or not to be an independent state.

(2) *No one state is competent to determine the right of any nation, whether outside its borders or within them, to independence.*

Here we strike the sorest spot of our present system.

What we have said means this: that, if the Philippines are not a sufficient judge of their readiness for complete independence, no more is the United States a sufficient judge of that issue; if Egypt is not a sufficient judge of her own right, no more is Great Britain. No doubt the great empire-states have better standards of judgment; and, if self-interest warps the policy of government, each such state contains liberal parties which reach objective views. Hitherto it has been far the easiest way to allow sovereign states to dispose of the destinies of nations under their rule as domestic questions; and it is still the simplest way. But it is rapidly ceasing to be the best way. For, if Great Britain could admit her lack of complete right to dispose of Egypt, Egypt might more readily admit her lack of complete right to dispose of herself. Consider the friction that is saved by relieving each pater familias of the right and therefore the duty to decide when his sons one by one have reached the age of discretion! ¹

(3) *The right of judging the claim of any nation to independence rests with the entire body of independent states at any time existing.*

For every member of a society, more particularly of a numerically small society, is concerned in the character of every new entrant. I am not now speaking of the function of "recognizing" a new government, a function now exercised by each sovereign state separately. I am speaking of a prior function, not as yet exercised at all except in settlements following on war, that of a conjoint judgment upon the readiness of nations aspiring to self-government.

¹ In the absence of any other stipulation, mandatory Powers are inclined to assume that they must be sole judges of the time when the provisional independence of their charges (in A-mandates) shall become actual. This is likely to lead to the situation foreseen by a French writer, "The tests he requires can never be fulfilled, because it becomes his (the mandatory's) business to see that they cannot be"! Cf. below, p. 300.

My contention is that we have here a new function, belonging to the new world order.

What the machinery for this function should be we need not here attempt to determine. It is a judicial function for which the League of Nations was not designed, but for which it possesses too much of the requisite data and resources to make an entirely distinct assemblage of national delegations reasonable. Be that as it may: the point of principle is that we have here a function of peace and not one of war-settlements solely; and a continuous function, since new facts relevant to the destinies of nations are continually arising. In the case of treaties concluding war, this function involves a radical departure from existing practice. For it follows from the principle that

At the conclusion of any war in which questions of national independence are raised, every existing independent state, including neutrals and all sovereign belligerents, defeated or victorious, may be and ought to be party to the solution.

This will secure the maximum attainable freedom from the biases of war-psychology, especially in view of the accumulated knowledge of a continuous institution. And with this degree of assurance to subject nations of a fair hearing, the need of "appeals to God" in the form of armed rebellion should be minimized.

These three theses carry with them the implication of a fourth. To say that independence concerns every existing state is to say that *continued dependence also concerns every state*. So far as the family, or society, of states becomes a reality, so far every dependent group which may conceivably aspire to independence becomes a charge of all of them.

And this position carries with it a further corollary:

that any single Power administering such a dependent group is in principle doing so for the society of states. This is the theory of the mandate; and in our generalized statement it applies equally to colonies. Though our present international order has evidently not reached the point indicated by these propositions, it is beginning to experiment with some aspects of the general doctrine of international concern.

We now come to our final question: given our judges of the readiness for independence, what considerations other than the direct evidence of fitness have these judges to take into account? However important the fact of nationality may be in the outlining of independent states, it is evidently not the only consideration. It is frequently not the determining consideration. Guiding every effort to judge a claim to independence, there must be in mind a double question: How far shall the nation outline the state? How far may the state outline the nation? (1) Independence is undoubtedly the ultimate status and the only right status for the firmly marked nation; because no man can be a full-fledged human being until he can regard the deeds of his government as his own deeds. Wherever this normal rapport between individual and group is well established, there the principle is, Make the political body to fit the political mind. (2) But, since nationhood is not an unalterable fact, especially in its vaguer and feebler degrees, judges of the right must be endowed with the power of prophecy. They must be able to look beyond even painful periods of transition to the nation that may be made. The first problem for our judges, then, is always this: When is nationhood so stable a fact that it must take precedence over all other interests? On this point,

(1) The most available evidence is the evidence of *time*.

Nationhood being a matter of degree, the question is, How strong, how enduring, is this mental reality? The lastingness of the national spirit, particularly if it persists under difficulties, is as clear a measure as can be had of its deserving to rank as one of the objective data of world politics.

It is not wholly a disadvantage when a nation is obliged to contend for its liberty. Freedom which is won has a different flavor and meaning from the freedom of nature: it has become an *understood* liberty, a conquest of deliberate choice and sacrifice. It is for this reason that Tagore has said freedom should not come to any people as a gift. Hence the best cases for independence will always be those which show long persistence against odds, as with Ireland, Poland, Jewry. The sorrows of Ireland constitute no case; but seven hundred years of unremitting national will indicate a conviction founded on something more vital than national conceit or argument. It is not proposed that aspiring nations should be subjected to this test of endurance when the course of history has not supplied it! But it is a concrete principle of human affairs, never negligible when such intangibles as desire are to be weighed, that sincerity is evidenced by the will to incur sacrifice. When Turkey and Russia accept national poverty rather than the insidious bondage of the foreign loan, they do something to measure the force of national feeling. With statehood as with the fine arts, desire for it is the best index of the capacity for it; only, the desire must be genuine and deep, which qualities are best attested by endurance and sacrifice.

But, wholly apart from national suffering, age itself establishes the national habit, a habit far more difficult to break than the habits of individual minds. Hence, when in drawing boundaries the ancient outlines of sharply marked

nations are disregarded, as in 1870 the outlines of Italy, Poland, Schleswig, Alsace-Lorraine, Croatia, were disregarded, disaster is invited: the Great War is in some measure the consequence of that folly. And in the settlement of the Great War, in spite of that lesson, it has been found essential to punish the vanquished by creating, though on a lesser scale, new evils of the same stripe.

(2) *Size and the cultural center.*

What is the principle on which common sense so promptly rejects the splotchy racial-lingual map of the world as a possible basis for political boundaries?

It is not a matter of physical contempt of large for small: we well know that the cultural riches of the race have commonly been products of the pettier states. Witness Palestine, Athens, the communes of Renaissance Italy and Netherlands, the German states of Goethe's time. Fertility requires domesticity, perhaps a note of provincialism.

It is partly, though not merely, a matter of the high costs of separate statehood in the modern world, both for the state itself and for the rest of the world. It becomes clear that every boundary brings new economic waste and military danger. The enormous overhead costs of sovereignty weigh heaviest on the smallest states. As the arts of administration advance, all the economies that attend union press toward larger groupings. And, as every new state adds to the burdens of representation and deference of every other state, there is a strict limit to the manageable numbers of the world-family: it is at least conceivable, simply from the point of view of world-business, that the present modest society of, say, sixty members is too numerous.

But purely from the standpoint of cultural fertility, the burden of proof against the political separateness of a

small outline grows heavier with the passage of time. For, so far as we know the conditions favoring mental vigor, we must place high among them variety of human type and the contagion of genius. On the cultural plane as well as on the economic, the community which is both industrial and agricultural is more viable than either alone. Japan's industries, established by seventy-five years of effort and government aid, add less to the wealth and security of the nation than to its mental life. They stir into the national thinking a ferment which both enables it to achieve a quick rapport with western thought and vastly stimulates its own activity. The division of labor has its needed mental counterpart.

Now the mental ingredients of the state meet in its capital or cultural center; and *its* liveliness gives vicarious mental movement to the whole mass. Hence the necessity that all parts of the nation should have access to at least one great hearth of this sort. The results of the dismemberment of Austria are more than economic: a region benefited by political disunion from the old régime may be vitally harmed by cultural separation from Vienna. The new Baltic states may yet discover that their own capitals are poor substitutes for the greater centers from which independence has estranged them. Speaking of the prospects for Ireland in 1917, Bernard Shaw remarked that complete separation from England would be a disaster: London was too important as a place for the careers of gifted young Irishmen,—“Look at me,”—and besides, “What would London do without the young Irishmen?” The principle is universal. Political lines do not set final limits to cultural community, but they impede free motion and belonging. Hence one standard for the drawing of state boundaries must be, The greatest career open to the greatest number. A Canadian writer says, somewhat bitterly,

"The irony is that the United States is full of Canadian artists, writers, and actors of talent, who might have stayed home if they could have made a decent living, but who are forced by our very narrow market and smaller financial returns to seek a wider market. Sometimes their work comes back to us—as American!"²

A real grievance, it must be granted. There is no way in which nations peripheral to the greater centers can retain all of their own cultural strength. These centers themselves, to be sure, are in slow secular flux; no powerful culture now revolves about Baghdad; Peking and Petersburg lose their sure ascendancy and their names; Vienna and Athens cannot flourish with the loss of their territories or their wealth. An inwardly great nation may always hope to create a great capital in spite of the initial disadvantages: Prague looks up as Vienna declines. The world interest favors a cultural decentralization. In spite of all this, the cultural capitals of the world have shown greater persistence than the nations themselves; and the outlines of new nations would do well to take them as relatively fixed data.

A similar consideration arises from the distribution of mental talent. One man of genius leavens the whole lump of *his* people: the level of life in Czechoslovakia is set by a Masaryk or a Beneš; Gandhi is the property of every Hindu. There is no known statistical law for the arrival of such men in the world; but, other things equal, in ten million people we have a probability of finding a greater number of them than in one million. And since all of them by this peculiar trait of mental possession belong to all of their political community, there is a distinct motive toward enlarging the immediate resonance chamber of such talent as the world possesses.

² William York in *The New Republic*, Dec. 4, 1929.

All of these things favor the large state, when new formations are in question: only age, the long habit of political distinctness, can hold out against the tendency to the larger mergers of mankind. It must immediately be added that this would not be true unless it were also true that the arts of local autonomy are advancing *pari passu*, so that provincialism within the whole becomes the normal order. Regional genius-breeding is best secured today by a wider order which can include and protect a variety of shifting local nests.

(3) To the same effect is the kindred consideration of *geographical unity and economy*, which is sometimes confused with the dogma of the "natural boundary."

We have spoken of the great influence of habitat in forming national character. For this reason, as well as for commercial reasons, each independent state will desire its "share" in the commoner natural advantages, such as water power, requiring a share of both mountain and plain, forests, rainfall, essential resources, access to sea, open harbors. In a Europe of five states, each could have all of these; in a Europe of five hundred states, built on racial-linguistic lines, all but perhaps a dozen would be wholly inland and otherwise handicapped.

With present means of motion, the old "national boundaries" are gone, except for those greater mountain barriers which still govern the lines of trade and other human intercourse. The Rhine is no longer a national boundary for any people.

Allowing too that the "balance of power" must now be set aside as a factor in world politics—in spite of the present effort to resuscitate it—there is still ground for holding the ideal of *comparable terrains* in the outlining of states; and this ideal makes for the larger political units.

(4) The *available alternatives* to independence.

When it was a case either of being completely independent or else of being completely under the yoke, a weak case for independence was often worth fighting for. But contemporary statecraft is full of inventions: there are innumerable shades of part-sovereignty. From the colony to the protectorate and the dominion, and thence to independence with "reserved points" more or less sweeping, the ascent is well stepped. Degrees of local autonomy and minority treaties may make tolerable the lot of many a region which would otherwise be justified in seeking separation. But especially, the limitation of the sole-sovereignty of the single empire-state by a touch of international control, whether in the form of a mandate or of some as yet uninvented way of bringing the universal mind into the particular situation, promises to change the face of dependency everywhere.

We are not including in these newer alternatives the common diplomatic fiction whereby a nominal independence, offered to appease a public demand, is rigged for a hidden control. Then we have premiers whose speeches are written for them, kings whose decrees are supervised before issuance, elections whose returns are secured beforehand, and all the rest of the sorry dehumanizing buffoonery. The first fictions of this sort were supposed to deceive the people ruled; but those of the present deceive none but those who continue to practise them. Their days are over.

They leave behind them the question whether there can be in the world today an honest and capable "protection" or "tutelage," whether any people or group of peoples is fit to guide a backward nation, and whether, if these conditions were met, such nations would willingly defer independence. We are about to examine the *mandate* as an experiment in this direction.

Meantime let us sum up our results by asking how, in general, these criteria would apply to the present world of nations.

It is always an open question how many independent experiments in living can profitably be driven abreast. In my own judgment, the common life running in the world has so far reanimated somnolent old cultures that, where racial and geographical clefts are wide, the presumptions favor political separateness, "self-determination." They also favor a degree of merging of neighboring groups where the racial clefts are small. There are visible tendencies to simplify the larger contours of our world-map by federations which carry with them a degree of national fusion.³ Independence is a heavy price to pay for escaping a state of friction which may be temporary and curable, however outrageous the deeds it mothers while it lasts. In the verdant nationalism of today there are doubtless too many merely promissory notes, too many wills to believe in a future cultural fertility, too many forced drafts of minor cultural separatism.

The great justification for many of these demands for independence is simply the unfitness of any available régime of earthly guardianship. Given the ideal tutor, it would be desirable for all nations, advanced as well as backward, to take a turn at school! Given the inferior grade of tutelage we have, it is likely we must have many more nations in the world before we are fit to have fewer.

It is hard to make politicians believe that coercion of the national spirit has now no profit in it. Repression of differences of language and of custom is as futile as the

³ Dr. Hans Kohn has called attention to certain wide realignments of political sympathy in what he calls the "fellowship of a common destiny." *History of Nationalism in the East*, pp. 2f. Where these fellowships coincide with an economic area capable of developing a definite home-market, we may expect a gradual political unification to occur.

older repressions of religious observances. Violent uniformization such as has recently been practised by Italy in the Tyrol, by Poland in the Ukraine, by Greece and Jugoslavia in the Bulgarian provinces; or the equally violent segregation as of Jews in Eastern Europe or of negroes in parts of the United States—these are so far the opposites of fit means to bring national unity to pass as to raise a question of the fitness of the states which practise them to enjoy their own independence.

With such instances in view, it is almost as hard to make liberal-minded citizens believe that there is any such thing as a normal and decent nation-welding action. Nevertheless, to ignore it would be to lose sight of one of the pervasive processes of history. Belgium, in 1815, as an ambiguous mid-nation between France, Holland and Germany, might have become part of any one of them: it might easily have fused with the Dutch nation had Holland at that time not shown itself an intolerant and therefore intolerable comrade. No political outline has varied more than that of Germany: it was not intellect but common action which established its national self. The Frankfort assembly of light and learning was as little able to give birth to a united Germany as a prior assembly of philosophers to give birth to the Absolute. Bismarck brought about the requisite unity in action, and, since his imagination saw no other united deed than war, it was in blood and iron that Germany found itself. The essence of the operation is not war; it is common action, any vigorous common action which enforces the sense of reciprocal need, "I need you and you need me." Nations are formed around discoveries no more recondite than that, when these mutualities run through any considerable part of the business of living. In such cases, neither of the groups taking part in the fusion imposes its type on the other: there is a two-

sided assimilation to a national type different from either. Not in a thousand years could imperial Austria absorb the soul of Bohemia, or kill it; yet Austria and Bohemia might have become one nation as Czechoslovakia becomes one nation, and such miracles are to be frequent in the near future.

^{*}In the Orient, the spirit of the nation has a large work to do, that of leading men to co-operate for public ends across the ancient religious boundaries. It is introducing into politics the "rational" element of citizenship. Self-determination here presents itself, if not as an ultimate right, yet as a necessary and beneficent phase of history.

Not far ahead, we see another ideal emerging. The shades of national difference and kinship are many; so also are the shades of independence. The ideal is not "self-determination" blank and uniform: it is that the *degrees of political independence shall correspond with the degrees of national distinctness*. When this is achieved the great states of the world will be few, the self-governing regions many.

But in politics, the scope and worth of generalities of this sort is limited. Let us leave them, and address ourselves once more to particulars.

PART IV

MANDATES: THE BURDEN OF SYRIA

CHAPTER XVI

THE MANDATE IDEA

THE mandate is a natural device whenever many heads are responsible for a task which can best be done by one. When the responsible heads are a number of states and the task to be done is administering a territory, they may either try doing it together or give a mandate to some one Power. The former plan, international administration, carried out by a commission having delegates from each of the Powers, has had its successes, also its notable failures: its difficulties are internal friction and diffused authority, —too many cooks. The latter plan, the mandate, avoids this trouble: its patent disadvantage, if it is such, is that some one Power has to be trusted. But where there are several mandates to be passed out, this objection is mutualized and to that extent overcome.

The term is not a new one in international affairs,¹ though it is with the Treaty of Versailles that it first acquired a special character and repute. It has now become almost identified with the institution defined in Article XXII of the Covenant of the League, which was heralded as a reform of the old colonial relationship, recognizing certain rights of backward peoples and giving systematic protection to those rights.

¹ In 1815, the Treaty of Paris between Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, defined "The United States of the Ionian Islands" as "one sole free and independent state," and placed it under a British High Commissioner, who ruled by a dummy constitution. Again, in 1882, Great Britain's position in Egypt was at first substantially that of mandatory for European interests, and Italy at the Constantinople Conference had proposed the term.

What is novel in this institution of 1919 is that the conception of trusteeship is deliberately substituted for the conception of colonial "possessions," and substituted by a group of victors. At the end of the War there might have been a carving up of "liberated" regions, German colonies and Turkish possessions going to the Allies as so much legitimate booty, by "right of conquest." But such carving, in view of war-time professions and the terms of the Armistice, would have been indecorous. "As surely as Christ lives," Mr. Lloyd-George had said, "I assure you that we do not covet a foot of territory!" It is rumored, to be sure, that the House shook with laughter at this solemn assurance; also that troops of the Empire were operating in German East Africa without obvious necessity. But this profession and others like it nevertheless committed the Allies. And there were the Fourteen Points. Overt colony-grabbing was impossible. There was room for the entrance of a new idea. We need not too closely examine the sincerity of Mr. Lloyd-George—his moral weight was perhaps sufficiently assessed by his auditors—nor of the other parleyers at Paris; for the situation made its own demands on the diplomats. It was foredoomed that these territories would be occupied by various Allies; it was equally foredoomed that they could not be occupied as the sole property of the administrator, nor governed primarily for his benefit. In the spoils of *this* war, the victors had to be content with *less*, or forfeit every shred of moral covering.

I say the hands of the diplomats were forced by their own professions, with the steady pressure of President Wilson in behalf of those professions. There was another weighty argument. Had they seized colonial possessions at Germany's cost, the bill for reparations would have been diminished by the value of these colonies. No doubt

the mandate idea had this hollow advantage, highly esteemed in diplomatic chicanery, of permitting the presentation of an impossible bill under the pretence of having no acquisitions! In spite of all this, the event was, I think, without precedent. The victors performed a deed of ostensible self-limitation which bids fair to make itself valid. No doubt, the Covenant had to fight for its life, and even to pay for it: no matter. The Covenant was accepted. Something had been written into the constitution of the new world by the scribes of public opinion because public opinion had come to the conviction that it ought to exist, and for no other reason of comparable importance.

Whether the mandate in practice is what it professes to be, or whether it merely covers the ancient imperialism with a halo of undeserved sanctity, that is our concern, as it is the concern of every man who requires his ideals to be of the non-futile variety. But first, we have to examine more carefully the logic of this remarkable institution.

The notion of a mandate contains four elements. There are: (1) a task to be done; (2) a number of parties responsible for doing it; (3) an agent, the mandatory (originally mandatary) to whom the task is assigned; (4) securities for the performance, giving formal shape to his responsibility to them.

In the present case, the *task to be done* is indicated in Article XXII by the phrases, "peoples not yet able to stand by themselves . . . their well-being and development . . . tutelage." The detail of this general task differs in the three types of mandate outlined. In the A-mandates, "existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatary, until such

time. . . .” In the B-mandates there is no further mention of the obligation to bring the peoples eventually to the point of self-government. The duty is to administer, under conditions carefully laid down,—freedom of conscience or religion; prohibitions of slavery, arms-importing, liquor-importing, of establishing military bases, of training natives for outside military service; requirement of equal opportunity for trade and commerce among signatories. In some of these stipulations we hear the voice of experience in running respectable colonies, in others the voice of anxious rivals trying to keep down too much private advantage to the mandatory. As for the C-mandates, it is held to be sufficient if the mandatory administers them as part of his own territory. Here, except for the fixed relation of trusteeship and the admonition contained in the general task of tutelage, the mandate idea merges imperceptibly with that of the colony.

As to the *responsible parties*, Article XXII does not cite the Allied and Associated Powers: it speaks of a “sacred trust of Civilization,” which term seems to sweep into account much of mankind neither victorious nor belligerent; it also uses the phrase “on behalf of the League,”—a body somewhat narrower, one suspects, than Civilization. We are thus left in some doubt as to the precise identity of the parties supposed to be conferring the mandate, a grammatical suspense of which the victorious Allied and Associated Powers will later relieve us.

As to the *mandatory*: this charge is to be “entrusted to advanced nations”—that we may take for granted—“who by reason of their resources”—suggesting that the task will call for capital expense—“experience, or geographical position”—raising the question whether an inexperienced nation (possibly Japan?) might make up for this lack by being near at hand—“can best undertake”—open-

ing a somewhat illusory prospect, we fear, of free candidacy among all advanced nations—"and are willing to accept"—a very reasonable hint that the business of being a mandatory may not be all roses. We shall not go far astray if we assume that the composer or composers of this picture of the well-qualified mandatory had some inkling who the willing candidates might be; but no one can doubt the justice of the demands laid down, as far as they go.

As for the *securities*, the real bite of the institution, we shall consider them later by themselves.

Clearly, the whole point of the mandate-idea, as contrasted with the colonial idea, is that the mandatory Power, which does the administering, cannot do as it pleases with the domain, but is *responsible* to an outside authority and for a defined performance. The colonial Power is sovereign, legally speaking, in the colony; the mandatory Power is not sovereign in the mandate. The colonial Power owns the colony: the mandatory Power has no property ownership in the mandate. The colonial Power is traditionally assumed to use the colony for its own benefit; the mandatory Power must act for the benefit of the mandated region. And because the Power is sovereign and owner, its hold on the colony is presumably permanent; the mandatory Power has a defined and finishable task, and in the A-mandates, at least, the termination of that task, and the withdrawal of the mandatory Power, are expressly foreseen. In these four ways, the mandate-idea radically departs from the idea of the colony.

But, if the mandatory Power is not sovereign in the mandate, who is? This is a nice legal point, not without actual importance, for which the authors of the mandate idea, not being too definite on the point, have left us a choice among several answers.

Sovereignty is indicated by the capacity to choose the mandatory Power, or rather to confer the mandate upon the mandatory. This function has been exercised by "The Principal Allied and Associated Powers," the same military group that would have assigned these territories as colonies. For to this group is transferred by Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles such sovereignty as Germany had in its overseas possessions.

Sovereignty is indicated by the capacity to set limits to the authority of an agent. The mandatory Power receives the charter of its authority from the Council of the League of Nations, which is called upon by Article XXII to prescribe in each case "the degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory." It is the Council also which communicates the title and authorization to the Power chosen by the Allies, indicating that its consent is essential to the fiat.

Sovereignty is indicated as the entity on whose behalf the mandatory conceives itself to be ruling. This entity, we saw, as nominated in the bond, is none other than "Civilization,"—a ghostly party, to be sure, unable to appear personally in the conduct of business, requiring therefore to be embodied for legal purposes in some tangible shape. The victorious Powers seem to have thought that the Council of the League would serve as the legal representative of Civilization. If sovereignty, which is neither transferable nor conferrable is nevertheless *acknowledgeable*, the victorious Powers have undoubtedly disclaimed sovereignty for themselves and acknowledged it in the Council, to which body, further, the mandatory makes its report of trust. It is fit that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should thus clearly assert that it is not they, in their capacity as Victors, who can adequately body forth the essence of Civilization, there being some essen-

tial elements of Civilization also with the Non-victors and with the Neutral Powers.

If we look for other signs of sovereignty, as in the capacity to change the mandatory Power or to declare a mandate terminated, it must be admitted that the documents afford no answer. They assume a termination: they provide no how nor when nor by-whom. From this strange omission some have hastily inferred that no such power to change or terminate exists; and that the mandatory itself, being once ensconced in the mandate, and having to make the best of it for good and all, must act sovereignly, taking all means necessary to establish a working finality in the premises, and minimizing the intrusions of this theoretical League-oversight. Such would be one underground route back to good old colonial actuality. But this route is barred. First, by the logical point that whoever effectively confers the mandate in the first instance assumes thereby the capacity to change or terminate. Second, by the visible and constant limitations on the authority of the mandatory constituted by those securities for the performance of trust which we are to consider in detail.

(On the technical question of sovereignty, which furnishes plenty of fodder for legal talent,² my own conclusion would be that Article XXII designates for the mandates the moral sovereignty of Civilization as a whole and the legal sovereignty of the Council of the League; and that for the sovereignty of the mandatory Power there is no case at all, even in the C-mandates, much less the others.) But let us turn to the deferred question of those securities which make the links of the working arrangement and moor the mandate clearly off from the colony.

² Quincy Wright, "Sovereignty of the Mandates," *American Journal of International Law*, 1923, pp. 691ff. League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, *Minutes of the Eleventh Session*, pp. 36ff., in re French Togoland.

First, there are certain *antecedent securities*, to be looked to before the mandatory Power begins its work. The written charter or mandate document is such a security: it furnishes the constitution which prescribes both the limits of the mandatory's doings and the positive works which it is to carry out, thus establishing one of the standards by which its performances are judged. In the case of the A-mandates, there was written another antecedent security: the requirement that "the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of a mandatory,"—an ingredient of self-determination mixed into the original brew.

Then, there are the *working securities*, operative once the mandate is launched. They are first the annual report which each mandatory must make to the Council. Second, a certain organ of Civilization applied to this report, namely, a "permanent commission" instructed to "receive and examine the reports, and to advise the Council."

(This is all. Of higher government to dictate or to interfere in administration there is none. The Council, having provided the constitution, stands by like a quiescent deity; it makes no statute-laws, holds no courts, inflicts no penalties on the mandatory Power for malfeasance of trust, hears no appeals from the decisions of that Power, conducts no investigations, maintains no representatives in the mandated region other than the mandatory government itself. All told, the effective securities—if they are effective—reduce to these: a paper constitution, a paper report, and a commission, which, twice a year for two or three weeks, privately sits.

Surely, on the face of it, a flimsy and ramshackle institution! Devoid of every agency of control which could impress a realistic statesman. Innocent of all sanctions fit to oblige a misguided or wilful mandatory Power to

change its policy.) Unable to dismiss it if it fails, or to tell it when it has succeeded and ought to go. Proposing to represent Civilization to the backward regions through an emblem of Civilization which remains fixedly in Geneva; while its several emanations,—the mandatory Power (in London, Brussels or Tokyo), the high commissioner (not too visible nor accessible), the numerous and sufficiently visible minor officials, soldiers, and police of this mandatory Power,—may leave us, the mandated peoples, unreminded that the Being who has us in hand is truly Civilization itself. One of the main securities goes bodily by the board, since in no case was the choice of mandatory Power by the people concerned as provided in the Covenant “a principal consideration,” or any kind of consideration, in the assignment. And as a crowning mockery (so it is often said) the reports of this mandatory Power—Britain, France, Belgium, Japan,—are made to whom? To the Council of the League. And who compose the Council? Representatives of these same Powers, with a minor mixture of others. Hence to the even mildly world-wise eye it might appear that these advanced nations, making a brave show of responsibility, are in reality reporting their trustee-doings to themselves, well-assured in advance, therefore, of immunity from censure.

But this charge, and all the preceding picture of futility in mandate-physiology, omits one item. The proceedings of the Permanent Mandates Commission, which has asserted the brave right to ask questions *ad libitum*, though held in camera, are afterward *published*. The Assembly of the League gets them and debates them. They come to the knowledge of the wider world, so far as that wider world takes an interest.) The mandatory, then, does not report to itself alone; it reports to the world in general, beginning with an Assembly which contains a vigilant and

outspoken part of the world. Thus to the security of Paper adds itself the security of Publicity. Paper and Publicity, with a thinking Commission sitting between: this is the kernel of the working-guarantee that the mandate shall be a mandate. Is this sufficient?

We shall examine the actual goings of the institution in two mandates, Syria and Palestine, with some regard also to their neighbors in the Near East, and to the wider patch of mandated earth.

CHAPTER XVII

SYRIA: THE BEGINNING

To the Syrians, the word Syria means an ample stretch of coast, inner valley, and desert between Egypt and Turkey, including Palestine and the Lebanon. As the mandates have been apportioned, Palestine falls apart from Syria; and the mandate, styled the "Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon," still further limits the scope of the word by setting off its coast. In our discussion of the mandate, we shall use the word Syria for the whole territory under French mandate. And let me point out at once that the United States, as an Associated Power, being a party to the assignment of the mandates, and having separate treaties with the mandatory Powers in Syria and Palestine, recognizes the mandate, and receives the annual report submitted to the League. It is "we," then, the West in general, who are present in Syria as agents of Civilization, with France as our representative.

The mandate in Syria is built on a basis which is morally difficult. In this much-divided country, one division runs deeper than the rest,—that between the Lebanon coast, which is dominantly Christian by profession, and the interior, which is Moslem. This Moslem interior, not welcoming with open arms either the mandate-idea or the mandatory Power, has been compelled to accept both by military force. The mandate-idea, promising a consideration of wishes and implying consent, is contradicted by conquest. For the weal of Syria, the primary question

is whether this original contradiction can be lived down.

The clash of arms between France and inner Syria was the forefated result of a clash of expectations. Inner Syria, represented for the moment at Damascus by Feisal and his Arab forces, was bent on independence, an independence bargained for, fought for, and won. The campaign against the Turks, which finally broke a stiff Turkish-German resistance in Palestine, and then easily rode through Syria to the Taurus Mountains, was no doubt primarily a British enterprise under Allenby, leaning heavily on Egyptian resources, with small contingents of French and of Jews. But the work of Feisal and his Arabs in holding the right of the line to the east of Jordan, and carrying that flank forward with the rest of the army, was indispensable.¹ This work was done on the strength of an understanding with the British that success would mean the establishment of an independent Arab kingdom or group of kingdoms under the headship of the Sherifian family of Hussein of Mecca, father of Feisal, whose bounds would include with Arabia most of Syria and (as Hussein seems to have understood the matter) Palestine.

France, whose mental set toward Syria was of long standing, conceived ambitions there before mandates were heard of. Her interests, more concentrated on the coast, overshadowed the land to the Persian border. France could see a use for the whole of Syria, also including Palestine,

¹ An Arab source states these services as follows: "The Red Sea was taken from the Turks; all communication between the Turks and the Yemen was broken; 38 Turkish battalions in the Yemen and later 20 more battalions from Mecca to Damascus—in all 200,000 soldiers—were reduced to impotence; 20,000 soldiers prisoners at Medina, another 20,000 consigned to the Allies, in all about 90,000 men, were put *hors de combat*. Feisal advanced to the north of Maan, traveling a distance of 400 miles in the desert, occupied by Djebel El Druze Hauran and broke the connections of the Turks around Deraa." From a statement for submission to the League of Nations, entitled *Mémoire pour la Syrie et Faïsal roi de Syrie*. For further portions of the text of this mémoire, cf. Appendix I.

and prospective Arab kingdoms in that part must from the beginning be less than welcome to her mind. These two ambitions, each growing heady with the successful conclusion of the war, were plainly incompatible. And each had its psychological sense of justification, whose grounds we must examine.

The French interests, which readily transmuted themselves into French claims, were partly of ancient date. There had been Frankish Crusaders in those parts whose remains, immense ruined strongholds, and churches often built (like that at Byblus) of stones stolen from older ruins, still serve to remind Islam of a former mortal feud. There had been French missions, schools, and charities since the days of Père Joseph, Capuchin counsellor of Richelieu. Since the seventeenth century, France had been throughout the Near East the pioneer of western civilization, the bringer of general ideas, the interpreter of modern life, and, through her language, literature and art, the shaper of such minds as read and traveled westward. French is still the second native language of these parts; and, in the common love of beauty and grace of life, one can fancy a trace of Latinity in the spirit of the Orient. More recently, in 1860, France had appeared as military defender of Syrian Christianity when threatened with massacre from the quarter of the Druzes.

So far as such relations establish peculiar ties, it is evident that this cultural permeation without conquest might have made France welcome in some capacity as friend or ally, especially to the Christian coast. It is also evident that every reason which might have made France peculiarly welcome to Lebanese Christianity would tend to make her unwelcome to the Moslems of the interior. In Algeria, the coming of France was merely the coming of Europe: in Syria, the coming of France was taken,

rightly or wrongly, as the coming of Christian Europe, the reversal of the long-lasting ascendancy of the Moslem, and possibly the renewal of the ancient Crusader's animus.

Considerations of this sort had suggested the wisdom of confining French claims to the coastal strip. But what is a coast without an interior, either economically—for Syria is a place of trade—or politically, or strategically? And France had all these interests besides her cultural interest.

If one were making out cases of claim, because of the activities of western nations in the East, one could cover maps of Syria with pock-marks for all of the greater nations, America included. France could show steamship services, port improvements from Jaffa to Tripoli, shares in the Ottoman Bank and in Syrian-Palestine railways, and numerous mercantile enterprises sending rootlets through the land. French intelligence had been busy with Syria, thinking out schemes for irrigation, road-systems, new crops, new fields for capital; all these possibilities touched with imagination and the lure of the unpossessed.

Economic dreams require no great substance to create a strong drive for exploration and experiment. The known aspect of Syria was not too encouraging: a relatively arid land with barely three million people including the half million of Christians on the coast. No great wealth in Beirut's 100,000 nor in the 200,000 of Damascus. Irrigation possible,—but also necessary for any large growth; a costly and difficult enterprise. No known wealth in minerals. Mulberry trees on the coasts and a silk-growing tradition; much of it ruined in the campaigns. On the whole, not a productive land, but a land living on shrewd trading and on gifts from its emigrated sons.

Nevertheless, Lyons and Marseilles cherish warm fancies about the silk business. With France in Syria, raw

silk could be got on favorable terms, and French goods would find markets. M. Victor Bérard said in the Senate, July, 1922, "Notre installation en Syrie avait surtout été recommandée par les Chambres de Commerce de Lyon et de Marseille, qui voyaient là un débouché pour leurs produits." No doubt, even in a mandate where all League members must stand on the same economic footing, something may still be managed. There are unknown, therefore irresistible, possibilities.

Economics is an item, but after all incidental. The great interest is *position on the planet*.

Great Britain has hypnotized the world into thinking the Suez Canal her exclusive interest. But has not France also colonies beyond Suez,—Madagascar, Indo-China? Why should the British flag float over so many nicely graded stages between Gibraltar and the Indies, while France has Djibouti and nothing more?

A military base in Syria would give France an effective voice in Canal business. Great Britain would become more respectful in this quarter. The Mediterranean would be more French (*ergo*, proportionately less Italian and Spanish). And while the remote colonies would be drawn nearer, the Pacific Ocean, scene of supposable future great-Power play, is also nearer. And the criss-cross of French lines in the Mediterranean becomes infinitely more satisfactory to naval men! ²

Interests like these are not satisfied by coastal footholds without security for a friendly interior. A French Syria is what is needed, and Syria for such purposes should reasonably include Palestine.

² "Avec la Syrie, d'abord protégée, puis alliée fidèle, la France acquiert la sécurité de son empire lointain; un point d'appui sur la côte syrienne, au voisinage du canal de Suez lui assure des ménagements et des égards que la République n'obtiendrait peut-être pas autrement." Georges Samné, *La Syrie*, p. 595.

But, if France extends inland, it will not do to emphasize too much her Christian background. It must be made clear that, while a protector of Christians, France herself is not too Christian; is, in fact, if not a great Moslem Power, at least a great power over Moslems!

Algeria, and all subsequent extensions of African empire, have confirmed this relation; and France has not been too Christian in Africa to take an interest in the spread of Islam there, nor too Christian in Paris to erect a grand mosque for Moslem subjects.

In fact, this character as *puissance musulmane* becomes the ground for a new claim on inner Syria. It can be pointed out that of seventeen centers of Islamic life, France at present possesses but two, while England owns or controls nine! Plain equity requires that the Allies acknowledge on France's part a certain right to Damascus and Jerusalem! ³

At a glance, it may appear diverting, or outrageous,—this fancy of two great *puissances musulmanes*, distributing the centers of Moslem culture among themselves on a basis of "strict equity," neither of them having a spark of Moslem conviction, nor consulting a Moslem soul. But the excessive fragility of this claim of right may serve to indicate the strength of the drive of the French national will to dominate Syria, a will more political than economic, and well fortified by a sense of cultural mission given a romantic appeal by the pens of gifted writers.

³ "La France est donc loin de posséder la part d'influence islamique qui lui est nécessaire. Une saine compréhension de ses intérêts ne lui fait-elle pas un devoir de revendiquer Damas et Jérusalem? La stricte équité n'impose-t-elle pas à ses alliés de satisfaire à cette légitime revendication?" Georges Samné, *La Syrie*, p. 596.

At the same time, appropriateness and strict equity alike give France a claim in Palestine:—note the grounds. Great Britain "doit reconnaître notre prédominance aux Lieux Saints, avec tout ce que cette prédominance comporte; puisqu'elle protège les Juifs, elle peut laisser à la France le soin de prendre la défense des intérêts chrétiens." Charles Burckhard, *Le Mandat français en Syrie et au Liban*, p. 196.

"Our prestige in the Orient," "our historic right," "the penetration of the East by French intelligence, with the French language for its vehicle,"—such are the phrases by which an imperial disposition foreshortens its objectives.⁴ It is these intangibles that become the "realities" of diplomacy.

About this will of France there is nothing more remarkable than the absence of original suspicion that Syria, and especially Moslem Syria, might have an effective *will of its own*.

(This state of innocence in the mind of France is shared by other Allied Powers. Britain, Italy, and Russia enter the War as allies of France, all clear that Asia Minor and the Turkish provinces are parts of the great issue: there is much to be lost here, and also much conceivable gain. Fixing our eyes on this eventual gain, we decide as a matter of plain prudence to apportion it beforehand. Hence that series of secret treaties, no longer secret, the burden of which is simply, *Who, of us four, is to have What?* Are we not dealing with supine populations, in whom we can assume *a priori* a burst of joy at being delivered from the Turk? If we place this liberation in the foreground, the subsequent replacement of Turkey by fragments of Europe, on distinctly easier terms, will hardly be challenged.) We shall, of course, observe a certain appropriateness in the division. France, as a great Protector of Christians, with many *droits historiques*,

⁴ "Le Comité France-Orient . . . représente notre établissement en Méditerranée orientale comme un précieux élément d'influence; ou pour mieux dire, comme l'unique moyen de maintenir en Orient notre prestige et nos droits historiques, dans la mesure où le Traité de Lausanne, qui nous a dépouillés de nos privilèges séculaires en Turquie, nous en laisse la possibilité" . . . and, quoting from René Pinon, "Telle est aussi la grande pensée de Maurice Barrès, si éloquemment formulée dans son *Enquête aux Pays du Levant* . . . L'avenir lui apparaissait dans la pénétration de l'intelligence française, avec la langue pour véhicule, parmi les peuples de l'Orient. Et il voyait en la Syrie le laboratoire classique pour de telles expériences." Paul Pic, *Syrie et Palestine*, p. 133.

should certainly receive the Lebanon and whatever geography has to go with it. And then this Protector of Christians on the coast is to become a Grande Puissance Musulmane in the interior! But is there a special reason why these Moslems of the interior should wish to become as the other twenty million Moslem subjects of France? And if it is morally indifferent to France whether she appear as Protector of Christians or as Great Moslem Power, may not that fact render her suspect by genuine believers of whatever stripe? If the truth which this moral indifference betrays is recognized, namely that France like various other western lands has become politically religionless, and that its own peculiar emancipation from faiths is sure to be part of its political export, how can this pretence of concern for Christianity in Christian spots and for Islam in Moslem spots be other than wormwood in the belly of any honest faith?

There had, indeed, been a time when the Moslem interior showed no definable will of its own, except that negative will which continues through centuries to resent the exactions of a foreign ruler. But with the turn of the century, a positive national spirit had also begun to show itself in Syria and the Arabian peninsula.

It may have been the leaven of the West at work in the East in a new and more congenial fashion; for Syria had recently shown more disposition to travel,—many had emigrated, keeping in correspondence with Syria, a half million living in America. It may have been in part a growing aversion to the Turkish relationship. It may have been an inner ripeness for new self-expression. At any rate, there were writers, patriots, poets, thinking about Arabs and Arab rights, and taking active part in the Turkish Revolution of 1908, some of them hoping much for

the Arab world from the Young Turks of that day. There was La Fraternité Arabe which in 1908 became Fraternité Ottomane, sounding the note of "equal rights for all" familiar to western ears, meaning thereby *inter alia* Arab representation at Constantinople and guarantees that Arabian Turkey might be free to develop its local genius. There were also groups less trustful of possibility under Turkish overdom, societies necessarily secret: La Société el-Ahd, the society of the oath, and La Ligue de la Patrie Arabe (founded in Paris, 1904), publishing programs under the caption, "*Les Pays arabes aux Arabes*," with ambitious announcements such as this:

"Voici notre programme: Nous voulons nous détacher complètement de la Turquie, et fonder un Empire Arabe comprenant tous les pays arabes asiatiques, s'étendant dans les limites de ses frontières naturelles, depuis la vallée du Tigre et de l'Euphrate jusqu'à l'isthme de Suez, et depuis la Méditerranée jusqu'à la Mer d'Oman . . ."

The Turkish Constitution of 1908 did in fact contain concessions to the national spirit in Syria and Arabia, providing for the desired representation of these regions at Constantinople. In the main, however, conditions became worse as well as better for the Arabs. For while indolent old Turkey had its tolerances of difference in language and religious form, Young Turkey, anything but indolent and feeling its own national oats, began vigorously to Turkify Syria. Thus the Turk continued until the outbreak of the War, and thereafter with increased determination, his indirect service to the national sense of the Arab world, that of providing the régime against which the national mind contrasted its own ego.

This ego took the War as its opportunity, not from love of the Allies, but from distaste of Turkish rule; and leaders

at Damascus began to enquire of Great Britain what they might hope from co-operation against the common foe, for "les Alliés avaient déclaré qu'ils combattaient pour l'émancipation des peuples."⁵ The noted Turkish military Governor Djemal Pasha had only to break into a French consulate, discover this correspondence (which M. Picot, late consul, had neglected in leaving to destroy),⁶ and hang a few of the implicated citizens, to supply the movement with a group of martyrs, whose day of death is now annually celebrated.

As compared with Egypt, the national movement of the Arabs in Asia lacked definite centrality, as well as that age which makes widespread co-operation natural and easy. There was no doubt about the location of Egypt's political focus. But Syria-Arabia, a ring of verdure about a central waste, had various cultural foci, no one securely dominant. The prophet of a new order might arise in Damascus, in Baghdad, in Mecca,—possibly in the Nejd itself. In this vast region, there was a noteworthy community of feeling and understanding, running across the manifold sectarian Moslem divisions,—carefully omitting the Christians of the coast. But there was no one leader, there had been no outstanding hero, no unique slogan,—instead, a swarm of committees, orators, news-sheets, proposals, fits and starts. The War had come upon an unripe national movement, fervid enough, and definite in its rejections, but without authoritative leadership, requiring to get into action if at all by way of correspondence with interested outsiders. Great Britain was such an outsider, willing to meet a promising correspondent at

⁵ From a statement for submission to the League of Nations, entitled *Mémoire pour la Syrie et Faïssal roi de Syrie*.

⁶ M. Picot, whose name (on account of this fatal negligence) is anathema in Syria, has been tactfully honored by France with having his name given to a street in Beirut.

least half way. The Damascus correspondence having been rudely interrupted, Mecca might do better: it was more safely out of Constantinople's now hampered reach. It is true, not every Arab of the Hedjaz could hope to win respect outside the Bedouin districts; but the Hashimite family was present and honored in various portions of the Arabic-speaking world. The old Sherif of Mecca, al-Hussein ibn Ali, could without presumption sound the call to arms for an Arab state, and expect to be listened to. To Great Britain it was a move worth playing, and as the world knows, it was played—through Emir Feisal and Colonel Lawrence—with skill, and with success. Feisal won the good-will of Damascus as well as of Arabia, and became for a time the focus and hope of the Syrian-Arab nation.

The will of Syria was thus concentrated, during Feisal's time, in the aims for which he and his army conceived themselves to be fighting. On the specific definition of these aims, the correspondence between Great Britain (in the person of Sir Henry M'Mahon) and Arabia (in the person of Sherif Hussein) would be enlightening if we were permitted to read it. Precisely what Great Britain promised we are not yet allowed by Great Britain to know in full.⁷ But we know in part; and we know what

⁷ Fragmentary versions have appeared in England, France and America. (Requests in Parliament for the full publication have been refused.) See *Parliamentary Debates*, July 19 to Aug. 6, 1919; *Le Temps*, Sept. 18, 1919. According to these versions, there were important issues unsettled when Hussein overtly broke with Turkey in May, 1916, Hussein having renounced his claim to Mersina and Alexandretta, but refusing to relinquish Beirut. Hussein himself published in *Al Qibla* (Mecca) what purported to be a definitive agreement, July 29, 1920; Feisal, shortly before, had published substantially the same document in *Al Mufid* (Damascus). See also *Al Manar* (Cairo), May 1, 1924, Vol. xxv, No. 1. These Arabic versions give the following boundaries of the independent Arab kingdom-to-be: "In the East, from the Persian Gulf; in the West, the Red Sea, the Egyptian frontier, and the Mediterranean Sea; in the North, the northern limit of the Vilayets of Aleppo and Mosul to the Euphrates and the Tigris; whereupon the boundary follows the length of the Tigris to its mouth in the Persian Gulf,—excepting the colony of Aden." Within these

is still more important, as the reality with which France had to deal, the expectation of the Syrian interior.

Feisal and Syria expected an independent Arab state. And as to the promises, there is no doubt about Great Britain's subscription to that aim, at least to the extent which Lawrence describes as making "their freedom one more tool to help England win."⁸ The only doubt is about the boundaries; and here, again, the doubt does not touch inner Syria. Hussein had made it quite clear in his letter of September 9, 1915, that "The occupation by France of the purely Arab districts of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus will be met by armed Arab resistance." To which M'Mahon had replied, on October 24, "The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the West of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo,⁹ cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries." Then, mentioning certain existing treaties with Arab chiefs, and the (undetailed) interests of the ally France, the letter proceeds, "Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and

boundaries, according to these versions, Great Britain pledged herself to help in establishing an Arab state which should be independent "in every sense of the word," in respect to inner and to outer relations. Also to protect this state against all intervention, whether from outer enemies or "from the envy of any Emir whatsoever." Which latter clause, at least, we suspect of being the product of Hussein's prudential imagination. A complete translation of this document into English is now available in Ameen Rihani's *Around the Coasts of Arabia*, pp. 111f.

⁸ *Revolt in the Desert*, p. 247.

⁹ It is not unimportant to note that the region here referred to is not the *cities* of Damascus, etc., but the *districts*. To the Arab mind, this would mean the corresponding vilayet, or Turkish administrative province. A line drawn to the west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo might come uncomfortably close to these cities; a line drawn to the west of the districts would give reasonable room. The Bekaa itself, the great central valley of Syria, a later bone of contention, is involved in this item of wording. On this point, H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, is occasionally inaccurate (as p. 14, Vol. vi); and his map of the Sykes-Picot Agreement is misleading.

support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits or boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.”¹⁰

This letter-exchange was presumably not the last word between the two high contractors; and what the last word was, must remain for the present moment of history well-shrouded secrecy,—for our purposes not of the first importance. For we have most tangible evidence of the substance both of Arab will and of British consent. On October 3, 1918, Feisal was permitted by General Allenby to enter Damascus with shout and flourish and hoist his flag on government buildings. Also, to issue, on October 7, a proclamation to the Syrian people announcing an independent government for the whole of Syria. In pursuance of Hussein's declared purpose, Feisal further hoisted the Arab flag by proxy in Beirut (October 7); and General Allenby, in pursuance of England's equally declared obligation to France, required him to take it down (October 10); and, after protest, “*le drapeau arabe fut ôté pendant la nuit*” (October 12). Thereby lending sufficient emphasis to the fact that the Damascus flag was *not* ordered down! Nor those at Homs, Hama and Aleppo.

For the Arab forces lost no time in setting up governmental business and high official régimes in the four central cities of Syria, realizing that momentum counts for

¹⁰ A close reading of this intricately worded letter reveals that Great Britain could allege that she had made no promise regarding Syria. For the promise is made only “in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France.” And Great Britain, bound by agreements with France (though the Sykes-Picot negotiations were not begun until Nov., 1915, nor concluded till May, 1916), was not free thus to act in central Syria, any more than in coastal Syria. But the Arabs, while aware of French wishes, did not know of Britain's prior commitments to France until the close of 1917. They had reason to assume that Britain's objections related to Christian or pseudo-Christian coastal regions. They had made their own position clear. They acted on an assumed understanding which Britain made no effort to correct.

something in politics, and that the French will was still to be reckoned with.

France and Feisal were clear that their aims were inconsistent, France having been kept well-informed by Britain of the negotiations with Hussein, and Arabia sensing the spirit of French policy. Britain, ally of both, is caught in the desperate business of reconciling the irreconcilable, during a running fight; and thinks to do this by means of clever formulæ on papers, which on the whole would better be kept secret from everybody except the four great Powers who have some getting to do in Asia.

The contents of this noted series of secret treaties—the Constantinople Agreement of March, 1915, the Treaty of London, of April, 1915, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May, 1916, providing prudently for European hopes and fears, are now generally known, in our unobservant way. The last-named and best-detailed of all was especially designed to reassure France that the Sherifian-Arab enterprise then definitely determined upon would not block her plans in Syria. The substance of these various pacts, so far as they affect Syria, is sufficiently defined in the Sazonov-Paleologue memorandum of March, 1917, which declares succinctly Who is to obtain What!

France is to obtain the coastal strip of Syria, the vilayet of Adana, and certain northerly districts in the Syria-Asia Minor borders; Great Britain is to obtain southern Mesopotamia, with Baghdad, also the Syrian ports of Haifá and Akka. Palestine is set apart for a "special régime" to be later determined. And in the interior, envisaged as an Arab state or confederation of Arab states, two "zones of influence," one each for France and Britain, constitute an important part of the obtaining, carrying with them priority rights in local enterprises and loans, and the curiously coveted privilege of supplying official

advice to the budding Arab states. The four cities of inner Syria fall within the French zone of influence. And the line between "French and British territory"—unhappy phrase—indubitably cuts Feisal's hoped-for kingdom in two.

If France was reassured by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Arabs, when they learned of it, failed to realize its reconciling power.

Rather serious business; for in mid-campaign, that is, toward the end of 1917, this French will had got into public print, not at all to the pleasure of the secret treaters; revolutionary Russia having conceived that a warring world ought to know what imperial Russia and her democratic friends had been fighting for! The Syrians learn from the Russians *via* the Turks what friendly arrangements the United Democracies have been reaching in their behalf. Colonel Lawrence learns it from the Arabs; and resolved (1) to accept no honors for his share in the campaign, and (2) to make the enterprise so unequivocal a success that the Arabs could not "in honor or common sense" be robbed of it.

That which reassures France somehow un-assures the Arabs; and it now becomes important to reassure *them*. To this end, a Declaration, widespread in Syria and Palestine in early November, 1918, undertakes to define the nature of the agreed aims of British and French governments, and invokes the then potent name of the President of the United States.

Under the circumstances, the Declaration is a masterly work of art. It does, indeed, ominously refer to "native governments" instead of to that single Arab state of the Syrian dream. But it defines "the aim" as "the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by the Turks." And there is nothing in it about

"obtaining"! In place of that word there appear "encourage and assist . . . recognize . . . assure normal workings by support and practical aid." And to keep this somewhat detailed assistance in its psychological place, it is reiterated that the "national governments and administrations shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the peoples themselves . . . such governments and administrations as the peoples shall themselves have adopted . . . liberated . . . liberation . . . liberated." ¹²

The composition of this admirable Declaration we surmise was British. The Arab mind, making reservations of its own about the degree and duration of the "encouragement and assistance" it would require, could effect a fusion between the hopes of the Declaration and the hopes of Feisal, and prepare itself for a liberation in deed and truth, from the Turks first and also from the Europeans.

But the Arabs being now fairly re-assured, the French, strange to say, are now once more un-assured! And by

¹² Text of Declaration agreed to between the British and French governments and communicated to the President of the United States of America:

"The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in waging in the East the war let loose on the world by German ambition is to ensure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and to establish national governments and administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the peoples themselves.

"To realize this, France and Great Britain are in agreement to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, as also in those territories for whose liberation they are striving, and to recognize those governments immediately they are effectively established.

"Far from wishing to impose on the peoples of these regions this or that institution, they have no other care than to assure, by their support and practical aid, the normal workings of such governments and administrations as the peoples shall themselves have adopted; to guarantee impartial and even justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by arousing and encouraging local initiative, to foster the spread of education, to put an end to those factions too long exploited by Turkish policy—such is the part which the two Allied governments have set themselves to play in liberated territories."

their own "joint" Declaration! When, after its issue, they read it (President Wilson not seeing it until well along in the following year) they realize that the Arab mind will be ill-prepared by it for the obtaining they distinctly intend to do. The Sykes-Picot Agreement is not logically contained in that document. Further, has not the voice of Lloyd-George been heard in London (January, 1918), where labor groups and Liberals had been making their own inferences about the brand of self-determination that will be served up when the secret treaties are stirred into the brew, broadly hinting his own disavowal of those treaties and his thorough conversion to Wilson's program? It becomes necessary to seek from Mr. Lloyd-George a re-affirmation of that obtaining lest it all slip away in this flurry about ideals, somehow necessary to keep up English and Indian recruiting. To which re-affirmation Lloyd-George now brings himself with difficulty,—whether through dawning conscience, or through a sense of the slightness of French military effort in Syria, or through a new vision of British interests. Probably not conscience, for in the end Lloyd-George re-affirms; only extracting therefor the price of Mosul! Whatever the implicit contradiction between French aims in Syria and the aims of the Arab state, it is thus left without relief.

Meanwhile, the mandate-idea is being evolved; General Smuts labors on sketches between Armistice and Peace Conference. May not the mandate-idea work the miracle of reconciliation which neither Sykes-Picot nor joint Declaration could effect? In the mandate-idea, there is near-independence for Class-A peoples; and zones of influence turn neatly into "encouragement and assistance" under mandatories in whose selection the wishes of the peoples concerned are to count,—not indeed for everything, but for something.

In February, 1919, the Peace Conference is ready to consider the case of Syria. Feisal is at hand, with the Hedjaz delegation. It is late March before the Supreme Council evolves its result,—a Commission of Enquiry. On the 20th of March, in secret session, the great Powers speak plainly to each other. Lloyd-George is clear that a mandate is contrary to the Arab agreement; the Arabs had “helped most materially”; the French troops had “made no difference”; the “League of Nations cannot be used for setting aside the British bargain with King Hussein.”

As for America, “the only question from its point of view was whether France would be agreeable to the Syrians.” His name having been invoked without authorization in that hope-raising Declaration, President Wilson feels his honor peculiarly involved in seeing that this element of the mandate-idea, or the self-determination-idea, shall be here effective. A Commission should be sent to ascertain the desires of Syria, including Palestine.

France now stands at the parting of the ways: to consult “the wishes of these communities,” which wishes are to be “a principal consideration in the selection of a Mandatory,”—or not to consult them. Does she not already know what they are? The Council approves the Commission; but France cannot submit her interests to such an accidental arbitrament. If arrangements of the Sykes-Picot order, binding between the Allies, have already settled Who is to obtain What, consultations of this sort are bootless. France therefore declines to take part; and if France refrains Great Britain cannot proceed, thus appearing to wean affections to itself at the expense of its partner in obtaining. Either the enquiry must be abandoned, or the United States must act alone. Wilson decides for the latter alternative: the Interallied Commission on Mandates in Turkey, American Section, proceeds to Palestine, Syria,

and beyond, and labors in the heat of an early Syrian summer, amidst votings, petitionings, resolvings, representations and propagandizings of all sorts,—reaching nevertheless a perfectly definite result which, in Washington, comes to precisely nothing, as it was foredoomed to do.

But in Syria, the effect was not nil. Such an enquiry has a logic which works in spite of itself. If men are offered a choice of supervisors, it becomes evident that they are to have supervisors. They may express their preference for independence; and do so in dominant numbers. But they are prepared for something less. But again, if they are offered a choice of supervisors, it is certainly implied that they have a choice, that the possibilities set before them are not mythical. If it is already determined that France is to govern here, and Britain there, it is misleading to ask people to choose between them, or between them and others. If it is not certain that the United States will accept a mandate in those regions, it is misleading to present the United States as one of the possible advisers. Unless there is some possibility that those choices shall count, the work of such an enquiry as that of the King-Crane Commission can hardly be other than mischievous.

In the event, the work of the Commission, not discovering that France was the spontaneous choice of inner Syria, added materially to the difficulties of France in Syria. It was, so far, mischievous.

Whether the blame must rest on Wilson for sending the bootless Commission, or on France for insisting on the obtaining which her professions had discountenanced, may remain open.

The number of French troops engaged in the Syrian campaign was, as we have said, very small. This is not the fault of France. It was France that was invaded, and

French man-power was engrossed in the western trenches. The campaign in Asia was, in fact, Allenby's campaign; and Allenby was more aided by Arabs and Egyptians than by Frenchmen. This was well understood between France and Britain.

But, when the fighting was over, it became important that the Syrian mind should be prepared for its destiny, and to this end that British troops should withdraw from "French territory," as French troops could take their places, and thus allow the agreed obtaining to stand in relief. The French were, indeed, somewhat insistent on the British withdrawal. It proved to be a misfortune.

The British were holding the line of the Taurus Mountains, keeping the rich plain of Cilicia, richest of all that region, keeping it for France. They were also serving as mediators between Feisal, now once more at Damascus (April, 1919), and the French. Feisal and the French had not learned to understand one another; Feisal's Arabs could not adjust the French obtaining-disposition to their hopes. The withdrawal of the British, therefore, meant two misfortunes for the French: a direct contact with the Turk, for which they were militarily unprepared; and a direct contact with the Arab, for which they were diplomatically unprepared. General Gouraud arrives in Beirut (November 21) convinced that he has two enemies to face; the one avowed, the Turk; the other, unavowed, "*le gouvernement chérifien de Damas*." A conviction decidedly inauspicious for the future of Arab-French relations.

To the Sherifian government, the withdrawal of British troops had an inevitable color of abandonment by friends to somewhat less than friends, and the uncovering of that unwelcome split in their kingdom between the French and the British zones. They must now come to terms with the

French for themselves; such is the parting insistence of their British allies.

Feisal in Paris endeavors to reach such an understanding with Clémenceau; makes and receives various promises; agrees to the hardest item,—that of accepting at Damascus French help and encouragement, and the representation abroad of Syria by French agents(perhaps); admits the French mandate in the Lebanon; and establishes a *neutral zone* between the Arab and the French state, that neutral zone running through the fertile intermediate valley, the Bekaa, and protecting the railroad from Rayak to Homs, Hama, and Aleppo,—Arab-Syrian cities.

The initial clash was to occur in this neutral zone.

Clémenceau in Paris has accepted a neutral zone and admitted Arab control of the Bekaa. But Clémenceau does not know Syria, nor the exigencies of the now pressing campaign against the Turks.

General Gouraud is on the spot and can see several things not clear to Clémenceau. (1) The Bekaa is an integral part of the Lebanon, owned largely by landowners in Beirut and the mountain; (2) it is the granary of the Lebanon, which has nowhere fields enough to support its own people; (3) we need the railroad to supply our troops fighting the Turks; and (4) have we not to relieve the British, some of whose posts are in this neutral zone? If these reasons are not sufficient for disregarding a plain agreement, which may not have been written on a scrap of paper, it may be further alleged that “il ne devait pas tarder à se commettre des meurtres dans cet espace neutre.”¹³ It is enough. “Le général Gouraud fut amené à l’occuper, précisément à l’époque du retour de Fayçal en Syrie.”

¹³ Georges Samné, *La Syrie*, p. 579.

General Gouraud was apparently not seeking with might and main to avoid overt hostilities. What he provoked however was simply a decided protest from Feisal to Paris; and a return telegram from Clémenceau requiring the withdrawal of French troops out of the neutral zone! To this incomprehensible act of Clémenceau more than one French historian, including the official recorder,¹⁴ attributes the subsequent difficulties. What can the Arabs infer from such weakness, except that it is good policy to hold out for the execution of promises! It is evident that peace conferences leave something to be desired.

Feisal in Damascus has now a double task; to consolidate the administration, creating an unmistakable live and working Arab state; and to bring the minds of his associates—chiefly Syrian leaders, not Sherifian—to accepting that French advice which he perceives inevitable. It is easier to do the first than the second.

To give the state form and fame, the needful and timely step would seem to be to follow up that flag-raising with a head-choosing. Were the Arabs not promised an independent kingdom? Then there is every reason to have and declare the king. Feisal is offered the crown, and accepts it.

But it is the “crown of Syria *and Palestine!*” Did not Feisal understand that Palestine was reserved for a “special régime”? Great Britain must now come forward with France and remind the Emir that the future of the Arab regions is still in the hands of the Peace Conference; that not even the British signature is valid for a kingdom unless the Conference confirms; that his action is premature and cannot be sanctioned; and that he is invited to the coming

¹⁴ Who somehow fails to mention the agreement for a neutral region.

session at San Remo, where it is hoped the fortunes of ex-Turkish territories may be finally determined.

At San Remo, it is decided to apply the mandate-idea to the ex-Turkish territories; and the Syrian mandate is assigned to France (April 24, 1920).

France accepts the solution as satisfactory. It is nominally less than the pure obtaining she had expected on the coast; but the coastal Christians will be friendly to French rule. It is more than the zone of influence expected in the interior; for it means responsibility and authority over the four cities of Feisal's premature kingdom, and much more besides.

Feisal protests: no part of Arab-Syrian territory shall be under a foreign government. This is not Feisal's personal protest, nor that of a garrison of southern Arabs: it is the protest of the Damascus Government, chiefly Syrian; in May, this Government rejects the French mandate as unacceptable to the majority. It is now inner Syria which, in the name of Feisal (and I believe against Feisal's judgment), is in overt rebellion against the Peace Conference. It is Feisal's duty to limit this rebellion to peaceful expressions of rejection, in the name of legitimate expectations. Feisal, strong in the field, able as no other Arab leader to keep animosities under (with the aid of plenty to do) for the sake of a common hope, is no longer able, with a quiescent army full of anger, to keep perfect order on the border, to meet French railroad requirements, to make dominant in Syria a mind Islamically resigned to necessity, heartily co-operative with French and European will. To keep his own power, he must prepare to resist. He strengthens his forces, conscripting local additions to his army.

All this reluctance, trouble-making, resistance or show of resistance to the will of France and of Europe, is, of

course, futile and foolish. Except, indeed, for what it makes manifest to the world, namely, that if France is to come into the exercise of this sphere of mandatory encouragement and assistance, it will be in spite of "the wishes of these communities." It was impossible for France to accept the mandate for Syria, or for the Supreme Council to confer it, or for the United States to become a party to it, without a mental reservation which excluded the operation of that essential clause.

On the 24th of July, 1920, General Gouraud's troops occupied Damascus. And, within a few days, the other cities of inner Syria. "L'éclatante victoire du 24 juillet nous a rendu notre prestige, et l'application du mandat va pouvoir enfin se réaliser."¹⁵ The circumstances of this brilliant victory deserve the careful attention of history.

One must note in advance how much, to the French mind, the whole matter turns on the psychology of prestige.

In her own sense of prestige France had suffered, from the beginning of the Asian campaign, through circumstances beyond her control. Her part in the fighting was, as we have noted, necessarily a small part, but the Arab-Syrian allies were not making the due allowances. After the Armistice, France must replace the British in Syria; but it is an exhausted France, war-weary and mal-equipped which alone can take over this too-great task. The battles in Cilicia, losing to the Turks whom Allenby had recently defeated, but emphasized this condition. The minds reached by the American Commission were minds which could see France only in this circumstantially and temporarily so unfavorable light; and the choices, be it recorded, were governed not wholly by considerations of relative

¹⁵ *La Syrie et le Liban en 1921*, Paris, 1922 (official).

idealism or disinterested politics, but also by relative wealth, and the probabilities of eventual withdrawal. Add to this the recent diplomatic defeat in the Bekaa, and one can appreciate to what extent the suffering pride of France felt that by some event her prestige must be *rendu*.

Only: the most dangerous man in the world to entrust a nation's prestige to, generally speaking, is a military man turned governor. His theory is almost certainly this, that "en Orient plus que partout ailleurs, tout est une question de prestige, et que le prestige n'y repose que sur la puissance,"¹⁶ a principle which I dare say is false in every part of the world, but particularly in the Orient.

Toward the middle of July, there was a lull in Turkish troubles, and no perceptible lull in Syrian annoyance and troop-raising. The moment was favorable for putting an end to this nonsense at Damascus. The French Government authorized Gouraud to present Feisal with an ultimatum. On the 14th of July, Feisal was given until the 18th, midnight, to accept the following terms:

1. Absolute disposition of the railway, Rayak to Aleppo, assured by control of traffic, guard of lines, and occupation of Aleppo in French hands;
2. Abolition of conscription and reduction of the Sherifian army to its effectives of December, 1919;
3. Acceptance of the French mandate;
4. Acceptance of the Syrian money on a parity with the franc;
5. Punishment of certain guilty persons.

Feisal, having promptly indicated his acceptance of these terms in principle, asked to delay the definitive acceptance until he could promulgate the necessary orders. Two delays of 24 hours each were accorded him, Feisal meanwhile laboring with sweat and blood to bring his

¹⁶ "Testis," *"L'œuvre de la France en Syrie."*—I, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 février, 1921.

Council and his people to realize the *force majeure* that hung over them.

On the last day of grace, at 5:50 in the afternoon, Feisal handed the French representative in Damascus his detailed acceptance. This momentous message was immediately sent by telegram to General Gouraud. On the next morning, the 21st, to the consternation of Feisal and of the French representative at Damascus, word came that *the French army had begun its march* upon the city. A telegram of protest was dispatched, to which an answer came, stating that Feisal's acceptance had not been received! What had happened? This is, in substance, the official account:

"No response having been received at the hour fixed, 20th July midnight, our troops went forward on the 21st, crossed the Bekaa, occupied Rayak, and mounted the slopes of the Anti-Lebanon, pushing before them the Sherifian troops, who were under the order of the Syrian minister of war, Youssef Bey Azme. In the course of the morning, General Gouraud received a telegram from the Emir, accepting in principle the conditions imposed. This telegram, sent from Damascus on the 20th, could not arrive in time on account of the interruption of the line, cut by the bands which the Emir had sustained against us."

(Query: If the lines were severed, must not the Damascus operator have known the fact before long? And, given the knowledge in his head, is it conceivable that this momentous delay could have remained out of the two other heads, if not more, so fatefully concerned in that transmission?) ¹⁷

Let this mystery be solved as it may, General Gouraud receives Feisal's definitive acceptance on the morning of

¹⁷ Another version of the incident is: "Le télégramme qui la [l'acceptation] notifiât était destiné à parvenir la veille, mais il avait été arrêté à un relai par un de ces désordres locaux que Feyçal s'était tellement plu à fomenter contre nous." "Testis," *L'œuvre de la France en Syrie*.—I, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 février, 1921. These two versions cast doubt on each other.

the 21st, and with it the knowledge that it had been dispatched within the time of grace. He halts his column: he can do no less. Might not the situation require more, namely, a cessation of hostilities; since the will of France, embodied in the ultimatum, has now been peacefully attained?

This is not the military view of the matter. A military movement has its own momentum, needs something like a *victoire éclatante* to satisfy it; and the military mind has a preference for cleaning up a situation, leaving authority unambiguously in one place. There is accordingly a new note to the Emir, with new demands: immediate disarmament of demobilized soldiers; progressive disarmament of population; recall to Damascus of detachments still in Bekaa; maintenance of our column at a good watering spot some little way ahead. In effect, complete French military control of inner Syria.

Feisal's response, arriving the evening of the 23rd, is not satisfactory; whatever its contents, it "*constituait un refus*." Why this obstinacy? Having accepted the mandate and having got his colleagues to accept it, why does he refuse to render himself helpless before the French military command? Does he perhaps fear that mandate-terms, dictated under such conditions, would be too closely like colony or protectorate; too little acceptable to men who had been led to expect an independent kingdom? Whatever his reasons, Feisal, having already agreed to more than he considered right, can no longer agree, nor get others to agree, when they, former allies, are required to treat as conquered and disarmed foes. Hopeless as the battle is, there must be a battle.

On the 24th at daybreak, the French forces receive the order to move forward on Damascus. Senegalese, Moroccans, Parisians, Algerians, fall in, and continue the march.

At 5:30 in the morning the crest of Khan Meisseloun appeared, towering above the gorge through which passes the western road to Damascus. Here was established a small Syrian force,—a few of Feisal's men, but chiefly the Syrians, regulars and townsmen whom Feisal could not restrain. The position was strong, but these few, mostly irregular troops,—led not by Feisal but by their local minister of war,—could hardly have deluded themselves by any hope of preventing the French advance. They were there to record their denunciation of a wrong.

The engagement has been described by a gifted writer:

"Position redoutable, aux teintes brutales, d'une aube de juillet, . . . quand, à 8 h. 30, les bataillons s'élancent à l'assaut du redan. De l'ouest accourent les Africains, grands diables de Sénégalais qui poussent des cris de triomphe; du nord, aux accents de la nouba, des Algériens prêts à danser une sarabande; du centre, des Parisiens qui entonnent la *Madelon*; et, au sud, galopant sur leurs chevaux, des spahis du Maroc, qui hurlent le chant de guerre des bleddards. Incroyable mêlée que celle de toutes ces races unies sous un même drapeau, le nôtre, le 24 juillet 1920, sur le chemin de Damas."¹⁸

Thus, in a riot of savages, we advance to the work of civilization.

Youssef Bey Azme, minister of war, steps out ahead of his men, and receives the French bullets into his body. He and his men have their burial monument there on the road to Damascus.

Feisal abandons his now worthless hopes in Syria to the will of Europe and the Peace Conference. He retires to Palestine. The French victory is complete, if not to our eyes such as to deserve a tablet on the Dog River, with the deeds of Sennacherib and Caesar. France enters upon her mandate as a conqueror enters the territory of the conquered.

¹⁸ Pierre Lyautey, *Le Drame Oriental*, p. 169.

CHAPTER XVIII

SYRIA: THE SEQUEL

THE men who conceived the mandate-idea were dreamers, but not mere dreamers. They insisted on the element of benevolence in the work of the mandatory Power; but they knew that not even advanced nations with "resources" would accept the "sacred trust of Civilization" at a great, continuing, and uncompensated expense. Article XXII of the Covenant must be read in the light of this reflection.

To anyone whose sole idea of the mandate is derived from the letter of that article, it would appear that the mandate is a disinterested work: for this article mentions no interests as being considered except those of the mandated regions. This can only mean that, after the manner of statesmen, the devisers of the mandate left unmentioned another important set of interests of whose existence they were well aware. While referring dubiously to the "willingness" of advanced nations to accept a mandate, they knew that the Allies were displaying as much eagerness in getting mandates as if they had been getting colonies; they were not ignorant of the bargains that had already taken place, nor that Italy was cherishing a deep grievance at getting no new sea-coast in the Mediterranean. They realized that for the B- and C-mandates the political distinction from a colony was regarded as not of the vastest importance: fiscal and administrative unions with adjacent colonies were already in contemplation. Also that

for the A-mandates, the only full-fledged examples of the mandate-idea, allocation would be governed largely by political and strategic interests of the Allies, then by economic schemes more or less far-reaching, such as those which already planned the use of the oil-wealth of Mosul. It was well understood that the mandate burden, necessarily difficult and thankless, even when not imposed on an unwilling people, would somehow be paid for.

It is not to be taken as a sign of bad faith on the part of the mandate devisers that these *quids pro quo* were passed over in silence in Article XXII. It was the business of that document to state and fasten in unignorable terms what was primary and novel in the purpose of the mandate. Any number of other interests might be present, *provided only they were compatible* with that one purpose, the well-being, development, ultimate liberty of the mandated nation. The mandate takers could be trusted to look out for their own. It would have been fatal from the start to require pure and costly altruism; it would have been foolish to insert a clause urging mandatories to cover their costs. The institution presupposed a merging of national interests profitable to both sides.

Meantime, the first prospect for the mandatory must be that of capital expenditure on a large scale. This necessity would be the same whether the ultimate purpose were benevolent or selfish. Here would be the most material advantage of the transfer from Turkish to European control, for, assuming the will-to-obtain of Turk and Christian to be the same, the Christian is accustomed to the logic of spending in order to get,—the most physical form of losing his life in order to save it. The Christian *invests*. The Turk of classic tradition sees no way to get but to take; Turkish getting (old style) leaves a land limp and dead. Frankish getting gives it a lift, and makes it a part-

ner in the added yield. It is the genius of western economic magic that everyone, giver and getter, may have more.

Just on this account the conclusion of a devastating war was a moment little opportune for entering upon a great project of mandate-development. This was true of every European nation: it was especially true of France, who had suffered most cruelly both in means and in men. In the speculations inspired by the King-Crane Commission, preferences for the United States, as we have noted,¹ were not wholly guided by belief in its moral liberality. The Syrian commercial instinct was not blind to the fact that the Americans possessed capital. They had thrown billions into the war: they would have been far richer had they remained neutral; but they had billions left. One of my Syrian hotel-hosts lamented, with heartfelt pathos: "If America had taken the mandate, millions would have been poured into Syria: by now, the Lebanon would have become a summer resort for the world!" If one must have an uncle, let it be a rich uncle!

Impoverished France thus undertakes mandate-work at a severe handicap. Nevertheless, France is one of those nations of resource. She has credit; she accepts the logic of spending. Of her poverty she puts millions into Syria. Men also must be spent: thousands of them, Frenchmen as well as Armenians and colonials, wasted in the losing conflict with Turkish resurgence, whereby Cilicia, fertile Cilicia, was cut off from Syria.

The French budgets from 1919 to 1928 show a total of 3,500 millions of francs as invested in Syria: 3,000 millions for military establishment; 500 millions for administration and public works. Of these millions, few have yet returned to France directly or indirectly. In terms of

¹ Cf. pp. 260f. above.

financial balances, France is still on the giving side, and in all likelihood must remain there for many years. Note in passing the disparity between military costs and other costs. This disparity is the financial mirror of that moral difficulty which we have already dwelt upon. But there is something to show for these 500 millions of civil investments.

There are roads, of military and civil importance, connecting the great cities of Syria. A modern road is for automobiles; and they, with their services, multiply and transform all human movements. Arabs drive them with rash speed, skill, and all possible noise. The great land route to Mesopotamia and Persia is opened; and the use of all roads is now reasonably secure from Bedouin brigandage.

There are beginnings of schools, and plans for schools, which must move slowly while normal schools build up a corps of teachers. The university at Damascus, with its schools of law and medicine, is being aided to produce physicians and civil servants after European standards. There is an archeological mission, and a museum, "*Institut archéologique et d'art musulman*," established in a wing of the Palais Azem.²

There is book-keeping for provincial governments, and there are budgets that show a favorable balance. There is a working system of customs, and adequate warehouse-room at Beirut. Also an improved harbor, and transshipping facilities hitherto unknown.

There are surveys and maps, statistical knowledge of the land, the beginnings of intelligence in material self-knowledge of the national domain. Syria begins to consider itself as a physical totality for the engineering Rea-

² Apparently in unnecessary competition with the excellent archeological museum of the Arab Academy, founded by Feisal.

son. The possibilities of irrigation and cultivation under present techniques will duly be known. Also a thorough reorganization of the cadaster, with settlement of boundaries and titles, an immense labor ably carried on.

There is sanitation; effective measures to prevent spread of cholera from Iraq into Syria; less effective measures against malaria—but still measures, indefinitely better than the ancient mosquito-net measure. Inspections of meat continue much as under the Turks. There are beginnings of drainage system.

There is enquiry into the economic systems of the place, with questions of cause and effect in mind: The poverty of the land,—how much is it due to conditions of ownership? If there are no permanent improvements being made, no trees being planted, no enrichments of the soil, is this perhaps because those who work the soil have had no incentive to make improvements in whose fruit they can have no share? Or because titles are insecure? The discovery of these causes is the beginning of remedy.

The time has been short for much more than enquiries; and yet there is more than enquiry. There are actual beginnings of afforestation, actual developments of dry cotton-farming. The destroyed silk-industry is being revived: mulberry trees planted, cocoons multiplied, and with this a reopening of local silk-reeling mills, and silk-weaving shops disused during war. Syria feels the stimulating touch of capacity and intelligent energy. In the Lebanon the summer hotel and *tourisme* lift their heads, and there are those who will count these curses also as progress. The planning and regularizing instinct touches the ancient cities. Beirut is cleaned, straightened, in part uprooted and rebuilt,—Europeanized. Residents are encouraged to take part in this real-estate development. As an old Levantine seaport, mixed and undistinguished in architecture,

Beirut finds itself much improved. (But let us here record the dread with which we contemplate the same type of "development" applied to Damascus, Hama, Aleppo.)

And there is a change in the morale of the Christian population. They are not under the Moslem; not obliged to triple obeisance, to dismounting and, if required, surrendering one's mount to the political superior; not refused the right of ceremonial processions, of public funerals and weddings.³ The Christian of the Lebanon and elsewhere now knows himself to be in the welcome station of an equal to his Moslem compatriot. Such equality, if the new-fledged equals can be kept from making it a reverse inequality, is a benefit to Christian and Moslem alike.

All these are great and unquestionable benefits of the advent of European mind into Syrian business. They constitute a liberation from a blight of five centuries: in ten years the life courses of the land have been quickened. Under the combined disadvantages of political unrest and the severe poverty of a depleted France such an accomplishment is notable.

Nevertheless, such benefits as these do not by themselves constitute the happiness of a country. They represent the hope of France that the contradictory foundation will be lived down. They do not directly meet the question which that foundation still daily puts to the French administration: *is this in good faith a mandate, having as its primary aim the benefit of Syria*, and contemplating an eventual withdrawal of the French hand, with a firm-built state recognizing its debt to a benefactor?

It is possible that even benefits conferred by force could be a source of ultimate friendship, if the elements

³ "By 1914," says a correspondent, "these discriminatory practices had become decidedly attenuated."

of an understanding good-will were equally prevalent and unmistakable. What is necessary is that Syria,—especially inner Moslem Syria, shall be convinced that under French-European tutelage it can come to itself, and live its own life, rather than be absorbed in the dominant life of a civilization other than its own. What is the progress of this conviction?

No such conviction can exist in the absence of three assurances: (1) that the national will of France can be genuinely subordinated in Syria to an international purpose; (2) that the wounds left by military operations can be healed; (3) that the two peoples, French and Syrian, are fitted by temperament to appreciate and aid one another.

(1) On the first point, it is plainly difficult to subordinate the national ego of France, at this moment of the world's history. Haunted by anxieties for the future, France has been full of a sense of the weakness of a too-costly victory, and of the comparative retreat of her influence in the Orient. Believing in the best-ness of the French mind and the French language, she is little disposed to leave their destinies to the natural course of events. She has no intention of losing the opportunity which her political position now affords her for stamping on Syria and its people by positive action an indelible impress of French culture.

It is surely unfortunate that with the legitimate means to promote this end, there are mingled other means, so tactless and irritating as not alone to defeat it but to leave rankling surfaces of repulsion.

The French language. The language of the mandatory Power must naturally be one of the official languages in any mandate. It will become one of the obligatory languages in the national schools. It will live side by side with

the native language, not trying to displace it; developing a bilingual population,—no hardship in a region of language-adepts. The officers of the mandatory Power for their part will endeavor to become bilingual also,—a condition which France is meeting with difficulty, and which any other mandatory Power would meet with perhaps greater difficulty, the number of Arabic-speaking candidates for such foreign service in Europe or America not being great.

But why should the names of streets in Beirut be changed from Arabic to French? And why must these French names be reminiscent, not alone of ideals which France may be supposed to embody in a special degree, *Liberté, Égalité, Paix, Littérature*, but also of men and events of the western war,—*rue Picot, rue Maréchal Foch, rue de la Victoire*, and of the military spirit in general,—*rue de l'Armée, rue de l'Amirauté*?

The emphasis on France in history and geography. There would seem to be a useful distinction between monuments commemorating deeds in whose admiration the local population could join, and monuments whose "tendency" is both obvious to them and unwelcome. It was hardly astute—to apply no higher standard—to set up on the shore at Beirut a monument "*Aux libérateurs de la Syrie et du Liban*" without mentioning, shall we say, the aid which the British rendered to the French in that work of liberation! The inscription continues: "*à la gloire de l'armée française du Levant et de la division navale de Syrie.*" Allenby's plain plaque at Dog River is at once more generous and more truthful as history.⁴ Important as it is for the coming world-order, a teaching of history and of geography free from national bias has not been at-

⁴ "The xxi British Army Corps with Le Détachement Français de Palestine et de Syrie occupied Syria and Palestine October, 1918."

tained in any land. Yet one suspects that the new memorial tablets of Syria, and to some extent the Franco-centric maps and school books of the new Syrian schools, were conceived rather by the soldiers than by the scholars of France.

The tying of Syrian currency to the French franc, with its disastrous results for Syrian creditors, had an aim other than cultural. As "Testis" explains the matter, "Tying the Syrian money to parity with the franc, thus permitting drafts on Paris to be written at par, will be of very appreciable advantage for commerce with France."⁵ But, aside from having involved Syrian money thereby in the fall of the franc, whereby it has lost seven-eighths of its purchasing power abroad, the intellect which devised this plan was not engrossed with the interests of a future independent Syrian state, dealing with a coinage and credit of its own.⁶

It is natural that a mandatory Power finding the costs of trusteeship formidable should endeavor to recoup, and should, to this end, be pleased to announce that "the French market will be able to interest itself in the development of Syria if peace and order reign." But again, it is not the international spirit which makes the postal tariff from Syria to France and vice versa the same as between parts of Syria, or which favors French imports, at the expense of those of other Allies, to Syria by lower-

⁵ "De plus, la parité avec le franc de la monnaie syrienne, émise avec la garantie de l'Etat français, et qui permet d'user du chèque au pair sur Paris, est également très appréciable pour le commerce avec la France." "Testis," *L'œuvre de la France en Syrie*.—II, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1 mars, 1921.

⁶ Upon this point the Permanent Mandates Commission has seen fit to comment as follows:

"It may be asked whether the mandatory Power, by closely relating the Syrian pound with a currency foreign to the country, does not run the risk of impeding the development of its own policy, which aims at preparing the mandated territories for the full exercise of their independence, a result which would be inconceivable without autonomy in financial and monetary matters." P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 205.

ing the French values in the *ad valorem* lists,⁷ or which extracts from a Syrian province, suffering from the devastations of bombardment and the destruction of many villages too poor to make more than a feeble beginning in its popular schools, a gift of 100,000 francs for the Mosque in Paris, and another of 50,000 francs for a *Maison de la Chimie* in Paris.⁸

To the Syrian, the cumulative effect of these indications, many of them matters of detail, almost trivial by themselves, is that the national ego of France is dominant,—a colonizing will which seeks to appropriate, perhaps to digest. To us, it may indicate a France struggling away from a war-psychology toward an international outlook, having to overcome an initial skepticism or possibly cynicism which could only take the League of Nations as a diplomatic joke,⁹ and the mandate-idea as a sop for the sillier oriental enthusiasts.

(2) Can the wounds left by the military operations be healed?

It would be absurd to ask, while the guns of the Syrian bombardments of 1925 and 1926 have hardly died away, whether these wounds have healed. It is not absurd to ask whether there is a prospect of their healing.

The rebellion in Syria is crushed. Calm reigns. Travel is safe. No one is plotting another uprising. The leaders know, and the people know, that the League of Nations

⁷ The Permanent Mandates Commission calls attention to the following examples: Flour: French, 180-190; foreign, 200-205. Rice: French, 170-185; other, 190-265; Vermouths: French, 65; Italian, 110-130. In the report to the Council, it contents itself with asking for the principles followed "in drawing up the official lists of prices (*mercuriales*) used for assessing values for *ad valorem* duties." P. M. C., *Thirteenth Session*, p. 227.

⁸ P. M. C., *Thirteenth Session*, p. 182.

⁹ "Or, nos militaires, qui venaient de gagner la guerre en France et en Orient étaient un peu grisés par leurs victoires. Ils avaient fait de l'occupation en Allemagne, en Macédoine, en Thrace, en Turquie. Ils ne croyaient qu'à la force. La Société des Nations leur paraissait une institution assez risible." Pierre La Mazière, *Partant pour la Syrie*, p. 187.

will not open the question of the existence of the mandate nor of the choice of mandatory; that Europe, and the United States, stand solidly behind the French mandate; and that it is useless for Syria to oppose by arms the will of the West. There is no conviction that the situation is right; but some kind of co-operation with the mandatory Power is necessary; and the best heads of Syria set themselves to come to terms on some kind of hopeful organic law for the inner district. Political unrest will continue until the form of this agreement is determined. But military force has done its work; and the army of occupation is reduced.

The traveler in Syria is still impressed by the omnipresence of the soldier, large garrisons in large towns, small garrisons in small towns,—everywhere French uniforms and inspections of passports: in 1928 there were between twenty and thirty thousand troops still in the country, some few of them local recruits.¹⁰

He is impressed also with the necessity felt by the mandatory Power for exhibiting this military force. Joan of Arc's birthday was celebrated this year in Syria. In Aleppo, there was a military review. The tanks (which are kept well in sight in all cities) caterpillared through the streets, swinging gun-muzzles right and left, up and down; a squadron of airplanes roared low overhead; then the rest of the artillery, the cavalry, the infantry,—more than half of them black, and of the rest a few French officers over colonials of various shades. Perhaps two thousand

¹⁰ M. Daladier, speaker in the French Chamber, 1930, said that Great Britain had spent no more on defending a colonial empire of 400 millions than France on defending one with 60 millions; that in French East Africa there were three times as many troops as in British East Africa, which had more than double the population; that in Syria France had 18,000 soldiers, not including auxiliaries and Syrian legions, whereas in the territories for which Great Britain had a mandate where the population was twice as much, the number of British soldiers was 720.

soldiers all told, manifesting Force, discouraging Rebellion, maintaining Prestige! We recall that Joan of Arc, such a heroine as no other nation can boast, inspired a feeble state to resist the might of England. She was fighting for liberty. What had these tanks and savages to do with her?

In Damascus, batteries of tanks are parked near the railroad station. There is occasional artillery practice. One day in May it was announced that the batteries would be directed toward the village, "or what used to be the village," of X. The city is surrounded by a military boulevard, into which jut, here and there at strategic corners, pill-boxes with machine-gun slits; and accompanying the boulevard, a net of barbed-wire entanglements; so that in any future attempts on the city, the fighting may be kept *outside*.

Within the city, the great bombarded district, and lesser bombarded districts, unrebuilt.

We have mentioned the fact that, to the eye, more than half of the troops of the country are black. This impression is officially confirmed: "The troops of the army of occupation were composed principally of African sharpshooters, the French being reserved for special corps, such as the artillery, aviation and engineering corps."¹¹ This circumstance is of the first importance.

The presence of the Senegalese and other colonial troops is in part an incident of the deficiency of French man power as a result of the war. It is in part a result of the reluctance of the young men of France to accept foreign army posts: or to put it in terms of the subtly indirect discourse of M. de Caix, "it has been found that the climate of Syria is very similar to that of certain North

¹¹ M. Robert de Caix, French rapporteur, before the Permanent Mandates Commission, *Thirteenth Session*.

African colonies, and that the black troops do well there.”¹²

But in the main it is a sign of the necessities of existence of an imperial France. The population of France is not growing: it cannot find resources among its young manhood for its own future defence—if the world continues to be the warring world of French expectations—still less for the equipment of foreign services. It must perforce rely upon colonial recruiting, or abandon the imperial idea.¹³

In sum, France does not send black troops to Syria because it prefers black troops, nor because it wishes to impose a savage force as police upon a civilized community; but because it has no others to send; because it has become a matter of strict national policy to preserve from destruction that French young manhood which, through the war and through a certain absence of eugenic vigor in the French race, is beginning to have a scarcity value. Cost is a factor, for colonial troops cost less than Europeans. Climate is a factor: the Africans find Syria less trying than the French do. But the chief consideration is that Frenchmen cannot be spared, whereas colonial casualties, one may say, do not count! If France were fairly to face the fact that its imperial ends are now requiring it to use the essentially uncivilized means of patrolling the civilized by the savage, it would, I believe, in a burst of righteous shame rather renounce the imperial pretension. But the actual state of things is concealed from its people by its own interested discovery that the black soldier in his amiable moments is an amiable and harmless fellow, and by such comments as those of M. de Caix, that he

¹² *Idem.*

¹³ “Les conditions actuelles de notre indépendance nous obligent à donner place au foyer national à 22 millions de musulmans, à employer dans notre armée, et, en particulier, dans le poste de sacrifice de l’infanterie, des contingents musulmans importants.” Général Brémont, *L’Islam et les Questions musulmanes au Point de Vue français*, p. 19.

has "never heard the slightest complaint," that there is "very little contact between the Senegalese and the Syrian population," and that, in any case, these troops are "not entrusted with the moral and intellectual education of the Syrian population." It is one of the lamentable results of political necessity, so-called, that a man of M. de Caix's high character should permit himself such sophistry.¹⁴ The troops of a nation do most conspicuously represent that nation and its standards; especially to a people made daily to feel that, It is we, and such as we, who now have

¹⁴ The poisoning of judgment by political nationalism is nowhere more visible than in the discussions of this employment of savages. The following fragments are from the Minutes, P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, pp. 152ff. (condensed):

M. Rappard. As regarded the black troops, was it in conformity with the spirit of Article xxii of the Covenant, which had entrusted the guardianship of the populations under mandate to nations chosen because of their resources and experience, for the guardian to appeal, in order to bring his ward to reason, to soldiers of a lower level of civilization not only than the guardian but also than the ward?

M. de Caix. It was clear that the black troops of West Africa were less civilized than the Syrians, although from certain points of view they had great moral qualities. It was obvious that Senegalese soldiers had not been sent into Syria in order to contribute to the spread of civilization. As, however, they had nothing to do with the government of the country, they could not injure the work of education of the mandatory Power.

M. Roume. A certain number of his colleagues regarded the employment of black troops in Syria as an unfortunate and even painful measure. He could not disguise his astonishment at such a point of view. The black troops were regular troops of the Republic. They were well disciplined and well officered. He could not admit that the use of these troops could be regarded as involving any humiliation *for the Power which employed them*. He had had the honor of being for five years at the head of the general government of West Africa which furnished these troops. He knew them and appreciated and esteemed them. In France there were black troops in certain cities of the south, and they behaved very well. They had also behaved well in the Rhineland and in spite of the odious calumnies which were brought against them.

M. Rappard. He knew the qualities of these troops, their spirit of discipline and the high value attached by France to their loyalty. He was looking at the matter not from the point of view of the mandatory Power, *but from that of the inhabitants of the mandated territory*. It seemed to him easy to understand that for the Syrians, who aspired to independence and in whose eyes the presence of France was justified by the fact that they were not yet capable of directing their own affairs, the presence of troops coming from regions still less developed was profoundly irritating and humiliating. (*Italics mine.*)

the power to compel your obedience and your marks of respect. The Senegalese soldier is not slow to gather the import of this simple situation: We are the masters here, and these Arabs have got to give us the right of way. His manner shows it—that is one of the psychological attributes of savagery—and his contact with the Syrian population is ubiquitous and constant.

In the main the Senegalese soldier *is* amiable. He lounges jocosely through the souks, in his leisure hours, spending his money there, and in the wine shops and army brothels. If I describe him as a savage, that is not to paint him as constantly ferocious, but to indicate objectively his state of culture, his inability to appreciate the intellectual or moral qualities of the Arab world, his level of morals and manners, and especially his fighting methods. No one can honestly pretend that the gulf between these lusty Africans and the Syrians in point of civilization is not poignantly felt and resented by the Syrians.

The use of these troops in Syria, I must say plainly, is an uncivilized measure. Its only justification is that France has no other troops to use there. The logic of this argument is the ancient and familiar plea: "I cannot gain my ends by respectable means; hence I am driven to use foul ones." In the case of individuals, public opinion has never given credence to this alleged necessity, and in the case of nations, France was the first to cry out against the German resort to it, at the outbreak of the war. The entry of the United States into the war was directly occasioned by Germany's use of this same argument. If Syria cannot be controlled by civilized means, there remains the alternative *not to control it*: and we must insist that the employment of savages is especially inconsistent with the mandate principle.

The three stock palliations may be briefly noticed: (a)

that these troops are garrison troops, only used in military operations; (b) that no complaints have been made against them, Orientals being in general very liberal on the point of color; (c) that there is little or no contact with the people.

(a) It is astonishing that a European Power should extenuate the presence of these troops on the ground that they are only there *to fight*; that is, because their business is to be done under conditions where the difference between civilized and savage is most marked, where, under those irregular conditions, they escape the control of their officers and have none but the impulses of the primitive fighting man to replace it! ¹⁵

The mandatory authorities do not deny that during the rebellion in Syria outrages were committed by troops under French command; they only point out that the excesses in question are not to be attributed to Frenchmen, and that the auxiliary and irregular troops were hard to control!

"It was indisputable that persons arrested had been subject to more or less serious ill-treatment, and that the auxiliary troops had been guilty of theft in certain cases. Restitution of stolen property had been made wherever possible. . . . Pillaging was most regrettable, but it was impossible completely to avoid it in military operations, especially if the forces engaged included auxiliary troops. . . . The mandatory Power maintained that it had done everything to control its auxiliary troops. Though excesses had occurred, it had done its best to avoid them. . . . Cases of bad conduct on the part of irregular troops had undoubtedly occurred. . . . The French Government . . . denied most strictly the allegation that its troops had finished off the wounded at Nebek. . . . Perhaps the accusation would be better founded in the case of the auxiliary troops." ¹⁶

¹⁵ For the methods of the mercenaries there are various books available, some of them more restrained in tone than is the account given by John Harvey, *With the Foreign Legion in Syria*.

¹⁶ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, pp. 137, 140, 141.

Passing over without comment the fact that in the technical use of the term "auxiliary troops"—which applies only to Armenians, Circassians, and others recruited in Syria—these pleas constitute an unworthy attempt, in view of the obvious difficulties of identifying the authors of excesses, to attribute them all to soldiers of the locality (who, no doubt, did their share), we must remark that it is not clear, in any case, how a trustee acquits himself of responsibility for outrages by showing that he has employed agents "hard to control"! And all of these African troops, especially the Senegalese, come into the category of troops hard to control when in action, if only because of the language barrier between them and their officers. It must be remembered that few of the Senegalese speak French, and few of the officers speak Senegalese! In the passion of fighting and subsequent vengeance, there is thus no effective way to restrain these primitive fellows from following their instincts.

The argument that these savages are in Syria only for fighting purposes can only mean that, when people have to be put down by force, it is relatively immaterial what the engines of suffering are which are employed against them! And we have to remember that France is prepared to use these same troops in Europe.

(b) On the statement that Syrians "do not object." It is true that the Syrian Moslems are, like other Moslems, notably free from color prejudice. But they know the difference between civilization and savagery, in whatever color. And it is not true that they have made no complaints against the Senegalese as such.

The Permanent Mandates Commission during its Tenth Session considered petitions stating that the Meidan quarter of Damascus "had been attacked by a large number of troops composed principally of Senegalese, Armenians and

Circassians"; that a Dr. Combaz in Hama "had been killed by a Senegalese"; that Spahis and Senegalese had been ordered "to copulate with women and young girls" in the village of Derkutch.¹⁷ I am not prepared to say that these complaints are justified; I mention them merely to show that the Senegalese troops are singled out by the Syrians in their complaints as men felt by them to be capable of excesses.

(c) That there is little contact between the African soldiers and the population. This is false. If it were true, how could travelers be so impressed with their ubiquity? And this contact does not lack its moral reaction, even in its idlest forms.

Toward sunset on a summer day in Damascus, I strolled toward the mosque of Suleiman the Magnificent, to hear the muezzin's call to prayer. The evening was peculiarly still, and the delicately blended western light burnished the slender minarets, while the quavering wail of the muezzin seemed easily to pervade the waiting distances of the sky, and bind the ebbing business of the streets into momentary unison with Allah and the universe. At that moment three Senegalese soldiers, released from duty, turned the corner. One threw back his head and with a shriller cry *mocked the muezzin*, while his companions shouted with laughter at the rare fun,—and a few Arab faces registered a solemn helpless hate.

There is another aspect of the military situation which requires mention, namely, punishments and prisons as auxiliary instruments of repression.

Operations of restoring order in disturbed areas can be neither too gentle nor too discriminate: according to the felt seriousness of the situation, they are likely to be

¹⁷ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, pp. 140, 141, 146.

summary, even cruel. But when such operations are carried out among a population of another breed, felt to be inferior, their moral quality tends to fall to the level assumed to be that of the people, and thus to reveal in an exceptionally sharp light what that level is thought to be. They leave a corresponding sting.

Collective punishments, in which a village or a city or a quarter is held responsible for crimes committed within it, are sure to bring suffering to the innocent with the guilty. Such collective punishments have been so much the rule of French administration in Syria as to convey the impression of a great indifference about proof of guilt. The destruction of villages and houses, punitive raids, fines and requisitions of rifles, arrests and deportations of notables without trials (though doubtless on evidence furnished by the elaborate spy service), have left an unhappy impression, hard to eradicate.

Collective punishments are excused as a continuation of Turkish policy, "suited to the social condition of the country." "The French Administration, in applying the system of collective responsibility, had accordingly done nothing more than respect a social arrangement resulting from the condition of affairs under Turkish rule."¹⁸

The existing custom is also appealed to in explanation of the exposure of corpses of rebels, and of public executions. "A certain number of rebels were killed, and, in conformity with the procedure under the former régime, their bodies were exposed to public view. Twenty-six corpses had been brought back on camel and were exposed—not naked, as had been stated, but clothed,—in one of the public squares of the town."¹⁹ As usual, when a civilized Power undertakes to follow what it regards as a

¹⁸ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 136.

¹⁹ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 153.

barbarous local custom, it outdoes the barbarism. Damascus opinion was outraged not so much by the exposure itself, as by the preceding indignity of parading the flopping corpses on camel-back. (October 12, 1925.)²⁰

One can hardly appreciate the logic of this following of custom.²¹ It would seem to result rather in the degradation of the mandatory Power than in the elevation of the mandated people. An incident which came under my observation: at 7:30 in the morning of May 10, I noted in the Merji Square, the chief public square of Damascus, a small group gathered about what appeared a figure hung in effigy. On nearer approach I discovered that it was not an effigy. The culprit had recently been condemned for parricide, and his crime was described in Arabic on a paper tunic which enveloped his body. He had been simply strung up, early in the morning, to the middle hook of a scaffold which had room for three, by a thin rope, a mode of hanging long discontinued in most western countries. There was a small guard of soldiers, and a sober group of Arabs, old and young, considering the case. A Senegalese crossing one of the bridges of the Barada caught the sense of the scene from afar, and, breaking at once into a run and a broad grin, came in haste to enjoy; but found in that group no one to reflect his humor! When we consider that modes of punishment affect the punishers, as well as the punished and the witnesses, we perceive the risk, as well as the fallacy, of efforts to use "the arguments they understand."

²⁰ There was also a prevalent feeling in regard to this incident, which was one of the chief preliminaries of the bombardment of Damascus, October 18-21, that the men thus killed and exposed were in the main not rebels, but countrymen whom the raiding squad happened to find. One resident, on viewing the corpses, remarked: "I now know why my milk was not delivered today,—this was my milk man."

²¹ The primitive customs referred to are of course Turkish rather than Arab. Among the nomadic Arabs the sense of responsibility is still largely collective, but the urban population is well out of it.

Under the circumstances, is it desirable to draw a veil over what happens in prisons? Are we of the West to follow here also the customs of the Turk, as we conceive them, in order to be understood?

What happens in prisons, in times of public stress, is a matter of rumor rather than of knowledge. There are prisoners who emerge and tell tales, credible and incredible. And there are prisoners who do not emerge. The field is a fair field for legend, unless there is light; for what we know lends a certain anxiety in regard to what we do not know. Yet there is a natural darkness about the procedure of prisons, which the state is reluctant to lift; it was little more than a hundred years ago that we became aware of the inwardness of our own prisons,—it was more comfortable to live in vagueness, realizing that the wicked must suffer for their crimes. The prisons of Syria are still farther from our concern, and the culprits there are, after all, for the most part—Arabs! The Mandates Commission may look into the matter, but it also is distant; and must it not trust us, the mandatory Power? “The petitioners reproduced letters from prisoners who had been put to torture. The reply contained no reference to this.”²² It was alleged “that persons deported to the island of Rouad for political reasons lived under very bad conditions . . . fearful descriptions had been given, and it had been stated that the notables interned on the island were subjected to humiliating treatment.” In answer, our representative had to say that “he had not visited the prison of Rouad, but had the impression that there was nothing abnormal about it. . . . It had *never been proved* that there had been anything shocking in the treatment. . . . *Orders had never been given to humiliate* the political deportees.”²³ Is our representative mocking the Commis-

²² P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 142.

²³ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 100. Italics mine.

sion by these futile words? Must the deeds of prisons, once credibly complained of, be left to the unvisited darkness of general surmise, to the discretion of colonial jailers acting without orders to humiliate, and without orders not to humiliate, awaiting a proof that in the nature of the case cannot be given, *unless we go and get it?*

I suggest that the "sacred trust of Civilization" requires a special care for prisons and what goes on within them. If there are false legends afloat, there is one good way to destroy them. At present, the touch of our punishing machinery has not become reassuring to the Syrian spirit.

(3) There remains our third question, a psychological question, whose difficulty would warn us from its discussion if it were not so much the key of the whole situation: whether our mandatory Power and mandated people are well fitted, by temperament, to understand and aid one another. The marriage, as we have seen, was one of *convenience*, or perhaps of capture; not of inclination, and the *convenience* was that of one only of the two parties concerned. Nevertheless, it belongs to the French temper to believe not alone in its own worth but in its own inherent attractiveness; it does not entertain the possibility that it should not be both admired and loved.

Fortunately for the happiness of mankind, fitness for friendship is usually mutual: we are attracted to those who are attracted to us. It is not overt benefits which compel affection; nor do injuries necessarily cancel it. The qualities which command affection are, first, an inherent worth of being, and second, a capacity to perceive the positive worth of the other, in the midst of his limitations. The question, then, may reduce to this: whether the mandatory Power has a true and creative appreciation of the quality of the Syrian Arabs.

This question cannot be decided by the behavior of the first installments of French officials and soldiers. These men were exigency-levies, largely from the African colonies. Their unfitness we generally recognize:

"Careless of local customs, of susceptibilities, individual, or collective, not aware that Syria is a country of a very ancient and profound culture," they acted as toward barbarians, and referred to them contemptuously as *Bicots*, *tarbouchés*, *sales Syriens*, and the like.²⁴ From the subordinate officials in such a group, puffed with the sense of victory and authority, little could be expected but the deadliest petty arrogance. "One might see captains, lieutenants, subordinate employees exacting from notables external marks of respect such as generals or ambassadors would not have expected. One might see these same petty officers summon to their bureaus sheikhs, pashas, emirs, leave them standing while they themselves remained seated, and in an imperative tone give them orders often punctuated with blows of the fist on the table."²⁵

This is humiliating; but our leaders of policy will show a different spirit, will they not? Unfortunately, we shall have to look well beyond the first vintages to find it. We came into Syria with the idea that we must consolidate our position with the Lebanese Christians. The unfriendly interior hardly enjoyed a position of respect. General Gouraud, conqueror of Damascus, visits the tomb of Saladin; makes an address there, in the course of which he cries,

"Ma présence ici consacre la victoire de la Croix sur le Croissant!"

This was what the followers of the Crescent had been fearing: now, at least, they knew what to expect. The

²⁴ Pierre La Mazière, *Partant pour la Syrie*, p. 188.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

Grande Puissance Musulmane does not come with any intention of favoring the inner impulses of Moslem life. His first political care is to divide the country. The idea of district-making is a good one, provided the motive of *divide-et-impera* does not distort what is done in the name of local self-government. But who can explain the location of these lines of division? Why to the Christian sanjak of Lebanon of 1860 must there be annexed so many Moslem communities—Bekaa on the east, Tripoli on the north, Akka, Tyre and Sidon on the south? Damascus and Aleppo are cut off from the sea by this extended Greater Lebanon,—no harm so long as the mandatory Power preserves freedom of trade and passage,—but ominous for the position of the future when, this Power retiring, these states are left to reap the fruit of a victory of the Cross over the Crescent. Lebanon is enhanced by as many Moslem districts as it can safely dominate: and thus the consolidated region is given an illicit voting advantage in all Syrian affairs. This artificial, unsocial, uneconomic, indefensible political creation, added to such words and acts as those we have quoted, roused the reasonable apprehension of every Moslem of Syria; and, so long as it lasts, it will continue to work against confidence in the mandatory Power.

General Sarraïl was later sent, as a non-clerical, to undo some of this sense of *parti pris*. He succeeded in offending the Christians of the coast; but his legacy to the Moslem was, as fate had it, the bombardment of Damascus.²⁶ Gen-

²⁶ As a matter of history I am prepared to defend the statements that it was an unnecessary act of destruction, not due to any danger of a massacre of Christians; that it ruined a priceless quarter of the city, not a quarter poor in beauty and art; and that, as directed against an unfortified city, it was in violation of well-established rules of war. It is a deed which found little support in France. I refrain from discussing it further here merely because only a detailed account, for which there is no space, would be worth while.

eral Sarraïl was recalled by a justly aroused national apprehension. Perhaps Syria had had a sufficiency of the military idea. M. de Jouvenel, a civilian of suavity, may try his hand as High Commissioner. He is as politic as General Sarraïl is impolitic. But what are his principles, moral and political? Has he *any* principle *au fond*? He slips away from Syria, as by enchantment, without leaving an answer.

Is it possible for France now to come before Moslem Syria with a man and a *principle* such as to inspire first the respect, and then perhaps the affection, of its people?

If so, it will not be the principle of prestige, as we have so far interpreted it: that prestige over an oriental people is a consequence of power! We know that prestige in the West cannot be got that way: we assume that the Orient is different. Why? Is it because we think the Orient has not learned the paradox of non-assertion or that justice and righteousness are the qualities that exalt a nation? As long as we forget that it was precisely Syria that first gave these principles to the West, we shall convince ourselves of folly and show only that we still require to learn from that ancient school.

Dr. Samné does better in his theory of prestige. "Two qualities," he says, "are indispensable if one is to exercise a useful prestige upon Moslems: it is necessary to be strong and just. One must respect manners and customs, reward services rendered, repress with energy and promptness every least shade of insubordination. . . . But the best way for a European people to acquire a notable prestige among Moslems lies in a loyal and profitable collaboration at the sacred places frequented by pilgrims or possessing famous mosques and celebrated universities. . . ." ²⁷

²⁷ Georges Samné, *La Syrie*, pp. 596f.

Dr. Samné's psychology is better than the military psychology but it is vitiated by the same error. He supposes that there can be a "*collaboration loyale et profitable*" without the presence of respect or belief: he supposes that we can register an interest in Moslem culture for political purposes. He is, in this respect, only a shade less ungenue than General Brémond, who, desiring Moslems in plenty for the future armies of France, gives sage advice about beginning with the schools for young women, since they are to be the mothers and teachers of the coming generation of young Moslems, then bringing the secular consciousness forward so that political ties may speak louder than the old religious fraternity, and finally showing a resolute will. "Mais pour arriver à ce but il faut savoir vouloir. . . . O rois, disait Bossuet, gouvernez hardiment. Et Bugeaud: 'Avec les Arabes, qu'on ne s'y trompe pas, le *plus* est plus facile que le *moins*.'" ²⁸ Within all these pseudo-learned theories of prestige there runs the poison of the will-to-exploit, which is the essence of disrespect. And the Arabs, be it said, are so much subtler than any western people in their sensitivity to the adulteration of friendly professions, that there is only one recipe for prestige that we, at any rate, can safely follow: An honest and humble study of what is living and great in their cultural life and tradition, with the will to preserve and aid it.

M. Ponsot, the present High Commissioner, impressed me as having this auspicious trait, the *listening* administrator, with the capacity for genuine appreciation of native quality and for the first time, a principle in accord with the mandate. The fate of Syria will turn very largely on the question whether this man, whose appointment is a credit to the French state, can carry the Quai d'Orsay and his local staff with him. His load is superhuman.

²⁸ Général Brémond, *L'Islam et les Questions musulmanes au Point de Vue français*, pp. 74-76.

A part of the load is the universal fact that, when two different cultures meet, it is the vices of each which make the strongest psychological impression on the other.

The Moslem Arabs appear to the superficial western critic in terms of polygamy, slave-holding, sensuality, despotic temper, indolence, ignorance, inefficiency. This is the picture (add intrigue, treachery, palaver) to which the counsel, Govern hardily, is addressed. The spirit of severity, beauty, meditation, leisure, nobility, equality, wholly escapes this view. It wholly escapes such a critic, the solemn disgust with which the Arab views the vices of the western conqueror.

It is we who have brought into Syria, chiefly since 1919, the liquor shops, now prevalent in the cities.²⁹ It is we who have brought the painted women, establishing some eighty "*maisons militaires*" for the use of our troops.³⁰ It is we who, having passed these women from man to man and having worn them into poisoned hags, desert them to the mercies of the localities in which they were last used. It is our government in the Lebanon which has now licensed a gambling Casino at Beirut, of which half the profits are to come to that government. The Moslem religion contains an inherent resistance to corruption through alcohol or sexual promiscuity or gambling: in Moslem eyes the institutions we have mentioned are peculiarly Christian. Moslem eyes do not see them as merely one way a western government has of burning out the finer qualities of a certain number of its waste youth. There is a certain chance that, with the relaxing of old Islamic restraint, a modern-

²⁹ "Liquor and prostitution both existed to a much smaller extent before the war; they managed to keep a hold despite the opposition of the Syrians themselves, because they were largely owned and operated by Europeans protected by the Capitulations." Statement of a correspondent.

³⁰ Pierre La Mazière, *Partant pour la Syrie*, Intermezzo, pp. 147ff.

izing Syria will pick up *these* traits of Christendom as our most spontaneous contribution to its advancement under the mandate. But they are adding nothing to the bond of confidence between mandate and mandatory.

If there were anything in our contact with Syria which could represent to its people the faith which has made Europe great, I would have hope of it. But the element of enforcement takes the spirit out of co-operation and holds it to a plane of sordid exchange. If Syria is to see in us chiefly our own disillusionment, not alone with *les idées wilsoniennes* but also with *les idées françaises*, our national egoism with its attendant fears and cruelties, our sensuality and decay, then all our capital aid and our technical additions to the local arts of life will not save the mandate relationship from becoming a stench in the world's nostrils.

In my own judgment, the level of civilization in Syria is far too high to have imposed upon it, at this date in the world's history, an undesired European servitude. The unwillingness of inner Syria to accept a constitution into which this sort of mandate is written is wholly justified. M. Ponsot, having finally judged that no such constitution can be floated with the consent of a constituent assembly, has now decreed one, without that consent, as a unilateral act of mandatory authority. It is to be hoped that this instrument will operate until a more detached reflection can supervene upon the whole situation, such reflection as French opinion is peculiarly capable of, when it has the full truth of a set of circumstances to work on, as at present it has not.

The principles at stake are not new. Nothing more than this: an illicit national expansion is an ultimate source of national weakness, not of strength. On the other hand, a France contracted to the limit of sincere national control is

irresistible and immortal; for, wholly without Leagues or treaties or armies swollen by adulteration, the world will never abide the loss of that unique miracle, the creative French spirit.

CHAPTER XIX

INNER CONTRADICTIONS?

THE problems which have become acute in Syria are not peculiar to Syria. They are latent in the mandate undertaking everywhere. For at some point the two interests of trustee and ward are certain to clash; and while an individual trustee in such cases will commonly put the interest of his ward first it is much harder for an imperial state to do so. The case of Syria is conspicuous because this latent possibility of clash was driven to the surface at the outset by the resistance of inner Syria.

The Covenant-makers taking for granted a substantial agreement of the two sets of interests pictured nothing but mutual consent to the mandate relationship. Such mutual consent was essential to the plan, for "tutelage" under martial law is an absurdity. What was to be done if any people refused to be mandated, or rejected the mandatory, was a contingency unprovided for; perhaps not so much as entertained. Great Britain was fortunate enough to be received without contest of arms; she had been the visible ally in the campaign of liberation. France had to face the full brunt of the dilemma, to relinquish her mandate, or to enforce it upon an unwilling population. Her decision to fight for it implied that, where the two sets of interests diverged, the trustee's interest would govern, not the ward's, and the mandate principle would go by the board.

If this situation is inevitable, the mandate-idea is inherently fallacious. It is not a question whether the man-

datory is to look out for its own interests; we are clear that it is expected to do so, so far as these interests are compatible with the primary interest of the mandated region. The question is whether the two interests will necessarily diverge in any important respect, and what is to be done in that case.

The vast investments of labor, intelligence, money and men made by the mandatories in the Levant belong in the main to the class of common goods in which the two interests agree. On the surface, these works are for the benefit of the locality, but they serve the purposes of the mandatory as well. The great roads and harbors already supporting an increased commerce, mutually advantageous, are also ready to serve at need those "communications of empire" or any military requirement, including the control of the locality. The inhabitants use them gladly and continue to think of them as primarily military roads. The elaborate sanitary measures favor the lives of the residents and will be pointed to as among the most notable benefits conferred. One does not belittle this benefit if he points out that they are also necessary to make living safe for the foreign official and for the rest of the world. The reforms of administration, the new projects of irrigation, the new intelligence and confidence in the attack on poverty, ignorance, disorder;—all these substantial improvements done with the amiable bustle of a tenant moving into a new house do indeed advantage the owner and deserve his gratitude: but they also make way for the secure and fluent pursuit by that tenant of his own habits of life. The local life runs more or less freely into the grooves made for it: western life also, finding its own comfort and health and speed of travel assured, comes with its inquisitiveness, its business, its demands, and its roots!

Up to a certain point this agreement of interest tends to

conceal any latent discrepancy of ultimate aim, and to bring minds into a working accord. This is the great political value of "public improvements." Were the Arabs a less discerning race, they might well be appeased by the energy and wealth spent in their behalf.

But there are marginal activities which raise the question, Whose house is being built on these common foundations, ours or yours? For example, in education the kernel is common good, but the culture that surrounds it will be national,—either that of the locality or that of the mandatory. The spirit of the mandate requires encouraging the local culture: can a state bent on promoting its own language and culture in the Orient fairly execute such a mandate? Is it in pursuance of the mandate object that those Arabic street names in Beirut were replaced by French names? That those who would practise medicine or law in Syria are required not alone to understand French but to pass their examinations in that language? That, having destroyed by bombardment an important and beautiful quarter of Damascus, having ruined with other priceless things the Kowetly house, next to the Palais Azem the most beautiful of all Arab houses, whose mosaic and carvings are irreplaceable, the mandatory proposed to replace the ill-constructed and uncomfortable houses and the tangle of narrow streets by wide, straight streets and houses and shops suited to the commercial importance of the quarter?¹ To replace the shades and fountains, the

¹ From the Report of the French Foreign Ministry to the League of Nations on the administration of Syria for 1926: "On sait qu'à Damas une partie des souks situés au centre de la ville a été détruite, le 19 octobre, 1925. . . . La reconstruction de ce quartier où les propriétés sont très enchevêtrées n'est pas encore entreprise, car les autorités mandataires voudraient faire remplacer les maisons mal construites et inconfortables et le dédale de rues étroites qui le composaient par des rues larges et droites et des maisons et des magasins en rapport avec l'importance commerciale de cette partie de la ville. Le plan de cette restauration et de cette transformation est en préparation."

infinite architectural surprise, the inimitable domesticity of the Moslem ways, courtyards, souks, by the scorching dusty Tophet of a "wide, straight street" under the Syrian sun! To replace the heart of Damascus, the gem of Syria, second capital of Islam, with a segment of Lyons or Marseilles! Is this "tutelage"? Or is it the choking of one civilization in the name of another? When activities like education and reconstruction, whose first intentions are so clearly philanthropic, thus reveal an inner spirit of domination, what will be the interpretation of aims which are patently incompatible with the ward's advancement?

On the face of it, there is one striking inconsistency between the interests of mandate and mandatory, that between temporary and permanent control. It is of the essence of the A-mandate that it is temporary: in proportion to its success in enabling a mandated people to stand by itself will be the promptitude of the mandatory's retirement. But the very volume of the original effort and investment of the mandatory tends to cross this intention. The more thorough these preparations, the more distant the prospect of departure or, as some would read the case, the more chimerical the proposal of any departure at all: shall the mandatory plant unlimited capital and then abandon the fruitage?

Besides this economic puzzle, there are these political and strategic interests of the new residents,—they certainly do not have the temporary ring. As long as the British Empire holds together, the value of the new corridor to the East *via* Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, will presumably increase. If the wealth of Mosul and of the adjacent farther East is now to flow out through new openings to Haifa and Beirut, the makers of those channels will

want to stay to guard them. The protection afforded to the Suez Canal from the East becomes important as the British foothold in Egypt becomes insecure. Likewise with France: so long as she retains interests in Madagascar, Indo-China, Moslem Africa, the same political logic, be it good or bad, will continue to recommend her hold on Syria. And "historic rights," however ancient, never fade.

Could it be because our mandate devisers were unable to foresee the termination of these political interests that they left the ceremony of winding up a mandate wholly unprovided for? And is it possible that a certain hopelessness which settles down upon the leaders of the revival of Islamic culture throughout the Near East is due to the well-founded fear that the West has come, not to aid and depart, but to stay, displacing and uprooting the life of Arab Moslems, imposing its own tongues and ideas, promoting its machines and the machine-mind with them, insinuating its legal conceptions into their customary and religious law, drawing artificial boundaries across their trade-routes, dismembering the promised Arab state, strewing its chief cities—Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, Riyadh, Mecca, Jerusalem—as if by design among so many political fragments, thus banishing the wholly ghostly hobgoblin of a military Pan-Arabia, but ruining that wholly real incipient union of embers into a hearthfire of cultural life?

Of what advantage is it that we give lessons in administration, engineering, budget-balancing, if that Spirit of the Laws which Montesquieu perceived at the heart of all public life is to be robbed of its individuality? When the Near East as a whole is by our intrusions thoroughly mongrelized, blurred into the nondescript quality of a Levantine seaport, then there will be nothing to express through local law. No one will any longer care who governs the characterless mess; there will be no one to raise the ques-

tion of withdrawal; the West will hang on with sordid inertia to the corpse of a national being chiefly through the jealous fear of each that some other nation will occupy its place. If this is to be the result of our tutelage, our self-propagation in bodies that reject us, these petty instructions in economic and political arithmetic might far better never have been imposed.

Fortunately, Islam does not require Syria to be "re-signed" to that point. The Arab world is not disposed to permit the obliteration of its own type: it clings with entire logical clarity to our commitments for its eventual autonomy. It is useless to say that the question of the termination of the mandate is a bridge that need not be crossed until we get to it. The reality or illusoriness of his political hopes makes a part of the day-by-day consciousness of the Syrian. So long as this initial inconsistency between the two sets of aims is not cleared up, there remain complexes in his mind which the best devised benefit fails to overcome.

In general, the Syrian like the Egyptian insists that he is ready for independence at once. And this may be granted, on the same ground, the high level of capacity, and with similar reservations. It is fair to say that Syria has furnished far more than its share of the mental and artistic genius of the East. If the Syrian means that he is as ready for self-government as the Hedjazi, the Iraqi, the Persian, the Balkan, the Pole, he is doubtless right, and with a good margin. If he means that he has nothing to gain from a period of apprenticeship (and few are making this judgment), one may maintain a doubt.

The fact that he is not able to finance or to defend his own land at this moment is a difficulty, though not an insuperable one, at this stage of world-politics. But there are not enough young men accustomed to political respon-

sibility, trained, tolerant of differences of opinion, patient, superior to the personal frictions of political life, and withal having a wide and accurate knowledge of the needs of their own land. That something more which must be added to patriotism and intelligence might conceivably be brought about in various ways, one of them being a period of apprenticeship to an experienced and well-disposed tutor. But, granting this, the Syrian still rightly requires to know one thing: that there are definite conditions under which the apprenticeship will end and the nominal independence become actual.

France in the person of her rapporteur, M. de Caix, has re-affirmed her intention to withdraw. "As soon as the inhabitants of Syria and the Lebanon gave proof of their capacity to govern themselves, to exercise in actual fact the sovereignty which was theirs already in law, on that day the part played by the mandatory Power would be completed without even the necessity of confirming this fact by legal action."² This statement is important; but it leaves vague certain points equally important,—in what the proof of capacity consists, and to whom it is to be given. We have stated our own view of the mode in which these questions ought to be settled.³ The context of M. de Caix's remarks suggests that it is the mandatory Power which must be satisfied: it must discover that the local government is consistently reaching "reasonable decisions." Would M. de Caix mention some great Power which has ever found its most enlightened neighbor consistently reaching reasonable decisions? Or is there any party in France which will give a clean bill of rationality to the government of an opposing party? Let a satisfactory

² P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 61. The words quoted are M. Rappard's immediate restatement of M. de Caix's discussion.

³ Cf. pp. 211ff., above.

definition be given to the terms of withdrawal, and the reassuring effect will be profound.

Naturally, each of the A-mandates observes with careful scrutiny the fortunes of the others and seeks a treatment equal to that of the most favored mandate. In the matter of withdrawal, that exemplary neighbor is Iraq; for Great Britain and Iraq have now reached an agreement whereby Iraq is to attain autonomy and to be recommended in 1932 for membership in the League of Nations.

In interpreting this action by Great Britain it must be remembered that Iraq has never accepted mandate-status and that Great Britain has refrained from forcible measures to compel acceptance. Hence Iraq has muddled along as a non-mandate supervised by a Permanent Mandates Commission, which Commission has been uneasy in view of the anomaly, and also of the further anomaly of a mandate treating on equal terms with a mandatory Power, and finally treating itself out of mandate-status altogether. Realizing that Iraq's need of tutelage is at least as great as that of Syria, and that certain Iraqi minorities show distinct apprehensiveness of being left to stand alone,⁴ realizing, too, that the docility of Syria and Transjordan is unfavorably affected by the example of Iraq's brilliant promotion in the fine art of self-government, the Commission feels obliged to caution Great Britain against withdrawing too fast! ⁵ There is this further ground for hesitation. The treaty which sets Iraq free resembles in some ways the Egyptian Declaration of Independence, in that it provides reasonably and well for British protection of acquired British interests. Such continued oversight of Iraqi affairs is British, not international: and the League can only regard such a change as for the worse.

⁴ See Kurdish petitions, P. M. C., *Nineteenth Session*, pp. 184-194.

⁵ P. M. C., *Sixteenth Session*.

How can the Mandates Commission contemplate relinquishing a control it has never fully enjoyed in favor of a degree of actual control by a relatively private corporation? If Iraq in 1932 is to exchange mandate-status for membership in the League, that membership must be such as to keep the international interest in even justice an active factor in Iraq, dominant over any national interest there in evidence.

The deed of Great Britain does make up in some measure for the absence of prescribed methods of terminating a mandate. Precedent may serve as well as statute, so far as the analogies are usable. The case of Iraq has led to much discussion in the Council and in the Commission on the general theory of termination, from which something begins to emerge.⁶ But practical attempts to follow precedent have so far led to no great satisfaction, except the satisfaction of sentiment that a treaty with the mandatory Power is one stage better than the mandate itself.⁷ Such a treaty is said to be under discussion in Syria.⁸

⁶ M. Van Rees doubts the value of general theory, since each case must be considered on its own merits, where they are so diverse. The Commission tends to the view that without some highly general principle, no one case, not even that of Iraq, can be intelligently dealt with. P. M. C., *Nineteenth Session*, pp. 153, 173ff.

⁷ In Transjordan, Great Britain and the local government attempt an analogous treaty, February, 1928. This treaty is opposed by a large section of the population on the ground that "it flings away all prospect of securing real independence for the country." At the same time it is opposed by the Permanent Mandates Commission on the ground that it yields too much to the local authority. For it proposes (Article 2) that "The powers of legislation and administration entrusted to His Britannic Majesty as mandatory for Palestine shall be exercised in that part of the area under mandate known as Transjordan by His Highness the Amir. . . ." Is this a proper appointment of a High Commissioner by Great Britain, or is it an abdication of trust? Or is it, as the recalcitrant subjects think, the grant of a show of power to Abdullah, brother of Feisal, at a cost which binds the territory under permanent British influence?

⁸ "Il serait impossible à la longue de refuser aux Syriens, dont l'élite est nombreuse et éclairée, ce qu'on aura accordé aux Irakiens. M. Ponsot le comprend parfaitement. Déjà les autorités françaises négocient avec leurs administrés un traité destiné à remplacer le mandat. La fin de celui-ci n'est qu'une question de temps." W. Martin in *Journal de Genève*, 19 June, 1931.

The resources of diplomatic invention are not exhausted, and they will continue to seek a formula which will preserve both sets of interests in a well-secured alliance. But in the plain logic of the case there can be no formula to reconcile a temporary with a permanent directorship, and there can be no health in the A-mandates until we make evident to the Arab mind which it is to be, and, if we honestly intend withdrawal, *the avenue to be followed*. If we are now secretly minded not to take this step, it will be far better at once to re-define the A-mandates, pointing out our firm belief that Providence has here decreed another marriage or two. Otherwise the element of forced assent will continue to belie the mandate profession, poison co-operation, and drive the relationship down to the colonial basis, that is, to a definite defeat.

But is there, perhaps, an intrinsic contradiction in the very structure of the mandate? If so, then with the best will in the world, such a reversion is bound to occur.

In colonial administration, there is no pretence of satisfying the political aspirations of the subject-people. The initial hostility of the inhabitants creates no insuperable difficulty; for, when people clearly understand that they have to submit, they eventually strike out some workable *modus vivendi*, and a decent administration of their affairs counts for its full worth. From an administrator's point of view the virtues, or supposed virtues, of the mandate are so many sources of embarrassment. Experience raises the serious question whether the plan is not a clever impossibility.

The primary political virtue of the mandate lies in the fact that the mandatory Power is explicitly responsible to the League of Nations; is therefore, as we noted, not sovereign nor owner, but trustee. But how can one effec-

tively command without being sovereign? Especially in the Orient, where authority is understood with a certain absolute cast and aura, prestige is damaged when the subjects know that behind you is the overseer; and complaint encouraged by the situation runs over the head of the mandatory to the High Control sitting in Geneva. Here are all the evils of divided authority, with the added difficulty that the more powerful member of the condominium is the absent member.

Or how can one responsibly manage the material interests of a region without being in effect their owner? If the mandatory Power must in good faith speed its own withdrawal, how can it whole-heartedly invest its own resources, or fairly encourage the flow of capital to which it can give no long-time assurances? Quite apart from the numerous checks to the spirit of enterprise which are made part of the mandate structure, the favoring of native labor, the limitations upon land-grabbing by aliens, the enforced sharing of resources and markets,—a certain restlessness is built into the situation; and restlessness is hostile both to economic development and to the required tutelage.

Again, how can the trustee conserve the wealth of these poverty-stricken Asiatic lands while burdening them with a double set of governing agencies? In the interest of its tutelage, the mandatory must set up a complete native government: it must also maintain a sufficient staff of its own to supplement and guide their working. It cannot avoid creating high taxes and tariffs at a time when such costs are peculiarly irksome and destructive. The Palestinian Secretariat, with the remarkably intricate business of managing a difficult Jewish colonization-project and adjusting Jewish with Arab claims, is necessarily a heavy load upon a non-industrial population of less than a million in parched and rocky land.

Further, how can a people be brought on in the arts of self-government without being allowed to make their own mistakes? And yet how, if things are to be done by the inexperienced and incompetent, can the mandatory Power be held responsible for results? If there is to be a "good showing," this Power will find itself intervening, doing things for, and instead of, the local officials. "It was sometimes difficult," as M. de Caix explained,⁹ "for an engineer to see a road being repaired in such a way that it would most certainly be washed away with the first rains, and not to approach the local workmen over the head of the native authorities whom he ought in theory merely to advise." This dilemma is present throughout all branches of the government, in courts, assemblies, administrative departments. Thus the situation requires the mandatory to be at once efficient and inefficient!

It would be folly to judge the working of the mandates without recognizing these elements of paradox if not of downright contradiction which the administrator on the spot must feel to the full. Perhaps the economic paradox is the most formidable, since investment cannot regulate their duration upon the exigencies of a temporary régime; and without investments, no development.

The crux of this difficulty is the assumption that the régime following the mandate will be relatively irresponsible, an assumption which may be gratuitous in fact, but which may operate on the psychology of investors apart from a factual basis. What would be required to meet it is (1) that the economic responsibility of the mandated country will be one of the qualifications for independence, and (2) that the continuity of economic interests will be secured by treaty and guaranteed by an international body. These conditions offer no insuperable difficulty. But they

⁹ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 93.

require in turn *a prior international control of the amount, kind, and speed of debt-incurring* in which the mandatory engages a relatively poor land. It becomes an important special function of the Mandates Commission to examine all the aspects of economic development with the problem of eventual withdrawal in mind. This function should be assumed without delay.

If the economic problem is the most formidable, the most irksome is the political paradox, the absence of simple and final authority, while the functions of such authority must nevertheless be exercised. The administrator has to bear in mind his obligation to a supervising sovereign, impersonated by the Mandates Commission, who (he inclines to think) has certain major disqualifications: distance from the scene, a set of theoretical standards, and an inadequate knowledge of the local problem, if only because it is equally concerned with thirteen other mandates! The required annual report is (to the administrator) always untimely. Does not any policy require a period of years to show its worth? This chronic prematurity of inspection becomes peculiarly galling when, mistakes having been made which one knows to be mistakes, one must report them to the outsider and suffer the officious external admonition for what one is already on the way to remedy! The principle of self-correction so liberally accorded to the mandated people seems strangely withheld from the mandatory Power.

It is evident that to make a success of a mandate requires something more than a new scheme of organization: it requires a new mentality. The colonial mentality will not do, nor yet the military mentality. For to both of these undiluted authority is the breath of life, and "tutelage" an alien and mysterious process. Manned by the

average civil servant swathed in the atmosphere of his personal importance and secretly bound by an invincible nationalism the mandate is a predestined failure. From the standpoint of colonial logic its structure is indeed unworkable. And, when that logic is in control, instinctively reaching out by fair means or foul for that plenitude of power-to-compel which simplifies all political relations, the advanced nation instead of elevating its neighbor turns its worse side and tends to sink below the level of the backward state. For the power-to-compel must manifest itself in punishment; and colonial punishment adopts "the arguments they understand."

In the nature of the case, the mandate experiment had to begin with men of colonial or military experience, or else of none. The mandate mentality, able to command without being sovereign, to protect and keep order without military domination, to develop property without being or becoming its owner, to create a self-superseding régime without incurring instability, to encourage self-government without permitting maladministration,—this type of mind is rare anywhere on the planet. But *it exists*. It requires that the mind of the ruler shall be tempered with the mind of the educator. In contrast with the general principle of aristocratic politics according to which the state works best when it has more than enough power to compel, education works best when there is *less than enough* such power or none at all—its theory of prestige is the reverse of General Brémont's; and the mandate is professedly an enterprise in education. This union of tempers not infrequently makes its way into statecraft. "Chinese" Gordon had it in high degree.¹⁰ Marshal Lyautey brought to the colonial administration of French Morocco the qualities which would spontaneously have

¹⁰ For his philosophy of a mandate see footnote, p. 141.

resolved the paradoxes of the mandate. With such genius and good-will as his, "the adversaries of today are the collaborators of tomorrow," and the independent friends of the day following.

The essential difference between the mandate and the colony is psychological. The practical problem of its success—once the foundation is right—is therefore largely one of personnel, the personnel of the mandatory's staff. I do not ignore the importance of the personnel of the native government also:

" . . . The Commission should note how irritating it was to have to make not too competent governments carry out their duties, *when they knew well how to use the force of inertia*. Measures were proposed and the native administration for one reason or another did not adopt them. It sometimes happened that, after having refused to take some action the necessity of which they secretly recognized, they would ask the mandatory authority to take it in order that the latter might assume the responsibility with which the local authorities preferred not to burden themselves. If the official of the mandate had merely to deal with an educated and disciplined native staff desirous of carrying out its duties, the matter would be simple enough. . . . Chance . . . played a great part as regards the particular native official with whom the European had to co-operate. . . . There were as many forms of mandate as of contact, and there were as many individual temperaments."¹¹

These are persuasive words,—the words of veritable experience! Nevertheless, the burden *cannot be put on the native personnel*: that is just the psychological point on which the whole mandate practice rests. This native reluctance, incompetence, fear of responsibility, unreadiness to plunge into what to western eyes is an obvious necessity,—these qualities are precisely the business of the "tutelage" side of the mandate. It is just because they are personal

¹¹ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 95. Italics mine.

qualities that they must be met and transformed by the personal qualities of the representatives of the advanced nation.

When this is recognized we need have no further fear of inherent contradiction in the mandate structure; our fear is transferred to the question whether we are qualified to exercise a mandate.

CHAPTER XX

PROBLEMS OF SURVEILLANCE

As the effort to teach teaches the teacher, so the effort to run a mandate educates the mandatory. Mandates could not at the start be officered by mandate experts: they could not so much as be officered by believers. Among those who took the mandate as a diplomatic joke were not a few of their own original functionaries.¹ This disposition—let me say at once—has vanished: yet there is still plenty of muttering in the bureaus, with invocation of the points of dilemma we have been noting. Such an experiment must be guided firmly in its early stages by somebody that believes in it; this function falls on the changing personnel of the Council of the League, and the more stable personnel of the Permanent Mandates Commission. But can any control of the mandates by the League be effective?

There is widespread pessimism on this point: the prevalent view among mandate subjects in the Near East is, "The League does nothing for us." What they see is that mandates have not been brought up with a whip hand; they infer that the driver, if there is a driver, holds a loose rein. The nominal superior, sitting in Geneva, is presumably all-powerful; the subject who wants action sees no valid reason for inaction. He has no inkling of those remarkable self-limitations by which, as we saw, the controlling power restricts its weapons to Paper and Publicity.

¹ Cf. remarks and references of Marquis Theodoli as chairman of the Permanent Mandates Commission, *Eighth Session*, p. 92; Pierre La Mazière, *Partant pour la Syrie*, p. 187.

It turns out, however, that a very notable amount of control is exercised. The mandate devisers saw that it would not do to tie the hands of administrators too strictly. Sovereign states accustomed to having free hand in their over-seas provinces would adjust themselves with difficulty to surveillance of any kind. An absentee reviewing body could not attempt the part of a co-ordinate in administration, much less that of an active superior. These devisers therefore wisely left the function of control weak in legal instruments and made it strong instead in moral leverage.

This leverage is exercised by a pair of forces working together, the Permanent Mandates Commission and public opinion. Public opinion has always worked on the behavior of states. It puttered away at the old colonial management, and compelled slow changes in the interest of human decency. It blew along, like a great, fitful, limbless wind, consistent in its direction, but dull of eye and devoid of hand and fist. In a hundred years it accomplished a general recognition that colonies contained human beings. An important discovery; lineal ancestor of the "sacred-trust-of-Civilization" element of the mandate. Important; but without speed or precision in its application. The mandate institution has provided the directing eye, if not the hand and fist.

The Permanent Mandates Commission, a vigilant, independent, powerful body, made up of men experienced in administration and knowing its problems, the majority of whom must be nationals of non-mandatory Powers, free from the obligations of political office and having permanent tenure,—this Commission makes it its business to know, to judge, and to publish its findings. In reporting to the Council, therefore, the mandatory does *not* report solely to itself; for it reports first to this highly competent

Commission, and through its published agenda to the opinion of mankind. A rude, ill-formed, sporadic public opinion may be cozened or ignored; an opinion whose moral and mental level is given by such a Commission must be taken seriously. And the effect is real. The whole course of events in mandated regions is different because of the consistent, courageous canalizing of public judgment by the Mandates Commission.

Testimony to this fact, all the more eloquent because inadvertent, is afforded by an outburst of Sir Austen Chamberlain in the Council of the League, September 3, 1926. He accused the Mandates Commission of a serious offence: it was asking too many questions! And thereby it was taking the very government of the mandates into its own hands! His words, as reported, are memorable:

"The Commission had prepared an immense questionnaire, the answers to which it desired to see embodied in the annual reports of all the mandatory Powers. It was a questionnaire infinitely more detailed, infinitely more inquisitorial, than the questionnaire which had hitherto been in force with the sanction of the Council. He thought it raised the question of the true relative position of the mandatory Governments, the Mandates Commission, and the Council. It seemed to him—and he knew this feeling was shared—that there was a tendency on the part of the Commission to extend its authority to a point *where the government would no longer be vested in the mandatory Power but in the Mandates Commission*. He was sure this was not the intention of the Covenant. It was not, according to his reading of that document, intended that the governing authority should be any other than the Government which had received the Mandate."

Never, I suppose, has the mere power to ask questions, and to record the answers, been so highly rated. As a member of the Council supervising the mandates, Sir Austen forgot that it was impossible he should have too much

knowledge. He spoke for the moment as representing a mandatory Power, and as if desiring to shield the deeds of that Power from an excess of the Council's own inquisitorial light! Had the mandatories been reporting direct to the Council, an attitude like Sir Austen's would indeed have been sufficient to nullify any effort at control. But the Mandates Commission realizes that knowledge is, in its business, the very substance of control; and is powerful enough to insist on having it. I must add, within the conventions which have been established for its procedure.

I say that the work of the Mandates Commission, armed with nothing but Paper and Publicity, makes an important difference. I raise the question whether, under its limitations, it makes *enough difference*. How much truth gets told at Geneva?

It is evident that the whole effect of the Commission depends on the completeness with which truth gets through to it from the mandated regions. Particularly, it must know the mistakes made by the mandatory; not for the sake of pedantic animadversion on the current errors of human officials, but for the sake of perceiving and correcting in time any tendency of policy to deviate from the general aim of the mandate. Its review of the mandatory's work must be either a perfunctory rubber-stamping or else intelligently critical. And, if it is critical, there is always the possibility that its comment will be a rebuke,—a public rebuke. The success of the Geneva-end of the mandate depends on whether such rebukes can be given and received, as normal elements in a common constructive effort.

The Commission realizes the difficulty of its function. A public rebuke may be, not alone a blow to the pride of a great state, but a grave addition to its difficulties in the mandate. It cannot assume to sit as a superior court before

which the mandatory is on trial; it sits rather as a consultative board, co-operating with the mandatory. Hence it is that the rules under which knowledge gets to the Commission have consistently favored the presentation of the mandatory's case. Complaints of mandate-residents in order to reach the Commission must pass through the hands of the mandatory's officials. No complaints are heard in person. The Commission institutes no enquiries, though it has at times requested mandatories to make enquiries for its further information. In the study of the Syrian revolt of 1925, the French Government entrusted the enquiry to three Frenchmen, a circumstance which, as M. Rappard observed, might conceivably lead public opinion "to doubt the absolute moral independence" of the enquiry! ²

These rules necessarily operate in such wise as often to compel the Commission to judge on insufficient evidence, and under the painful consciousness of having heard but one side of the case. (I shall take most of my illustrations from the French mandate in Syria, because here I have studied most carefully the relation between the events as they appear on the ground, and the same events as they appear in Geneva.) On the causes of the revolt in Syria, M. Van Rees

"found himself faced with a great difficulty, because in his view the evidence furnished was not sufficient to allow him to weigh the pros and cons of the various complaints. He regretted this fact profoundly." ³

Complaints commonly deal with particular events in the form of unproved assertions, which the representative of the mandatory, the rapporteur, easily brings into question. Of conditions in the prison at Rouad, "It had never been

² P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 133.

³ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 48.

proved that there was anything shocking";⁴ of the conduct of the Senegalese troops, "It had not been proved that" they "had committed any atrocities";⁵ of finishing off the wounded after a battle at Nebek, "Petitioners advanced no proof," and the French Government denied most strictly that this took place.⁶ In the nature of the case, the Commission often finds itself dealing with unproved assertions on both sides,—an extremely unsatisfactory situation for conscientious judges. What principles can they use for resolving such a conflict of statement?

If a decision must be reached, it is necessary to give superior credence to the mandatory:

"When petitions contained statements of a general nature, the mandatory Power denied them, and the Commission could do no more than accept the denial."⁷

Or internal evidence may be resorted to, which operates in such wise as to throw out the worst allegations as exaggerated:

"Among those incidents as reported there were some which because of their evident exaggeration were of no value."⁸

or to produce a certain anesthesia when complaints become numerous:

"The offices of the High Commissioner were so overwhelmed with denunciations that the Administration might be discouraged from taking them quite seriously."⁹

or to encourage the dangerous sentiment that men and nations of high civilization are incapable of the acts alleged:

⁴ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 100.

⁶ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 141.

⁵ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 153.

⁷ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 89.

⁸ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 146.

⁹ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 90. It is here the High Commissioner who is in the difficulty; but the Commission is invited to share with him the principle, the greater the number of complaints, the less their credibility.

"With regard to the assertion that 'pillagers carried out depredations under the protection of tanks,' M. Freire d'Andrade 'was entirely convinced that no French officer would be capable of protecting thieves and pillagers'; with regard to reported atrocities at Wadi-Tame, he 'could only repeat what he himself said . . . to the effect that the Commission should believe the word of such a man as Colonel Raynal whose character and courage were beyond doubt, and who was incapable of not stating the whole truth'; as for finishing off the wounded at Nebek, he 'was convinced that French soldiers were incapable of such an act.'"¹⁰

When it becomes impossible for us, or our excited representatives, because of our high civilization, to do outrageous things, then Mandates Commissions will find their occupations gone on *a priori* grounds.

Apart from the insufficiency of evidence, the Commission labors under the consciousness of hearing *only one side of the case*. It is true, it cannot assume that it is sitting as a court before which the mandatory is on trial. Nevertheless, when questions of fact are being considered, the principles of evidence common to law and to science must be invoked. Thus, in the special enquiry into the Syrian revolt,

"M. Rappard . . . regretted that the Commission had not been put in a position to form a judgment of the local Administration except by statements coming from that Administration, which was at the same time judge and party."¹¹

And the Chairman of the Commission observed:

"The accredited representative had asked that the facts quoted to him should have been verified; but it must be remembered how difficult it was for a native in a village to find witnesses, to establish a fact, and subsequently to forward his complaints to the officer, who might be the very person against whom he was

¹⁰ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, pp. 140f.

¹¹ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 49.

complaining, and who would himself probably be called upon to make the necessary enquiry.”¹²

The presence of the accredited representatives, or rapporteurs, of the mandatories at the sessions of the Commission, as giving a personal supplement to the printed report, is a great aid in reaching a just judgment of circumstances. They have usually been, like M. de Caix for the French Government in Syria, gentlemen of probity and distinction, capable, adroit, and desirous of co-operating with the Commission. That they are unable to cure the essential one-sidedness of the situation, none would be more ready to acknowledge than they. For, in the first place, the position of the rapporteur would be diplomatically described as “delicate.” If there have been condemnable traits in the administration of the mandate by his own nation, he cannot take the initiative in revealing them, or in tracing out their story. He is necessarily an advocate. If there is an admission to be made, he finds himself driven to make it guardedly, and for the most part in the potential mood:

Were collective punishments resorted to frequently, or only in extreme cases? “It was possible that in the Jebel the houses of the rebel chiefs had been blown up. . . .”¹³

Was the legislative power exercised in effect by the High Commissioner? “It was possible that the High Commissioner had issued certain decrees when it would have been better to have caused a law originating with the local authorities to be enacted.”¹⁴

Is there still any censorship in Syria? “Censorship might exist in regions still subject to martial law.”¹⁵

Was there pillaging by the soldiers? “Pillaging was most regrettable . . . certain cases of it might have occurred.”¹⁶

¹² P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 92.

¹³ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 152.

¹⁴ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 81.

¹⁵ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 151.

¹⁶ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 137.

Were there atrocities in Damascus? "It would be dangerous to say that any excesses had occurred."¹⁷

But, in the second place, the *knowledge* of the accredited representative, often amazingly full, is seldom adequate at the critical juncture. Even if he were giving his whole time to the task of preparing to inform the Commission—as he is not—his knowledge would suffer the human limitation, and would reveal a necessary, if not a discreet, ignorance of many facts:

Was it true, as a telegram alleged, that prisoners on the Isle of Rouad were subjected to torture? M. de Caix "could only deal with this point by analogy. He wondered how it would be possible to introduce at this moment in Rouad the practice of torture, which had never existed there. This seemed to him to be improbable. . . ."¹⁸

Was it true that a Damascus landlord was punished for making complaint against his tenant, a French officer, merely on the ground of that officer's denial of guilt? Rapporteur "doubted whether the landlord in question had been unable to obtain justice."¹⁹

Recognizing the necessity of having a working tribunal before which complaints against officers and officials could be freely brought by residents, M. Freire d'Andrade at the Eighth Session asked for a table showing the number of officials judged as having exceeded their powers. At the Tenth Session, the desired table not being forthcoming, rapporteur said that "the organisation of a system of appeal against abuses committed by officials was of fairly recent date. The table which had been asked for would probably only contain, therefore, a very small number of cases."²⁰

Was the village of Han Arine obliged to pay 100 gold Turkish pounds for having neglected to notify the passage of the bandits? "Perhaps, in certain cases, the infliction of a fine had been the result of a mistake: it was necessary to examine the position of each village . . . [Rapporteur] had no detailed information on this matter."²¹

¹⁷ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 154.

²⁰ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 123.

¹⁸ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 165.

²¹ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 136.

¹⁹ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 90.

An element of humor sometimes enters the proceedings of the Commission as a buffer against the direct impact of the indefensible. On being reminded that the Government of Syria, in 1927, with large areas in ruins and in need of every piastre, had decided to subscribe 50,000 francs toward the *Maison de la Chimie* in Paris, the rapporteur explained that "the President of the Syrian State had doubtless wished to give evidence of the interest taken by his Government in science"! ²² Or again, in the preparation of the organic statute for Syria which was approached by individual discussion with amenable notables, when M. Rappard desired to know whether the agreement of the local authorities on the principal points of the draft statute was now assured, he was told that "their agreement would be achieved from the very fact that they would be called upon to express an opinion." ²³

It is difficult to know whether to characterize as pleasantry some of the answers given by our rapporteur. On one occasion the administration of the Moslem Wakfs (or pious foundations) in Syria was under discussion. Complaint had been made that these religious charities and other bequests had been subjected to a searching control by the mandatory, intruding western principles into a peculiarly private and central Moslem interest, and incidentally assuming entire charge of the Hedjaz railway in Syria, built by contributions from the Moslem world for the use of pilgrims to Mecca, and dealing with the tangible properties of the Wakfs as its own. The Chairman of the Commission enquired "the reasons for appointing a Frenchman as director of the administration of the Wakfs, which were religious in character, and clearly a Moslem institution." ²⁴ To this question it was easy for the rap-

²² P. M. C., *Thirteenth session*, p. 182.

²³ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 123.

²⁴ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, pp. 103f.

porteur to reply that the "Controller-General was a Moslem," a quite literal truth, and that "the Frenchman was not at the head of the administration of the Wakfs, he was there simply as adviser." He could point out that Article 6 of the charter of this mandate required the mandatory to see that "the control and administration of the Wakfs shall be exercised in complete accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders," and thus not only justified but obliged its supervision. What he did not explain was that this clause (quite conceivably drawn up with the purpose of sanctioning the intrusion) had become the text for an elaborate system of centralized control quite alien to the local character of these foundations; that instead of one "director" there were four highly responsible positions in this system, the *Directeur*, or *Chef de service* of the *Commission Général*, the *Président*, or head of the *Conseil Supérieur*, the *Contrôleur-Général*, or executive head of the whole affair, necessarily a Moslem, and the *Délégué*, or *Conseiller*, representing the High Commissioner, the Frenchman in question; that the *Contrôleur-Général*, the nominal Moslem head, who was also member ex-officio of the *Conseil Supérieur*, was appointed by the High Commissioner and dismissible by him; and that the High Commissioner's *Délégué* who must sanction the proposals of the *Contrôleur-Général* thus held this Moslem's official life in his hand, and through him governed the whole machinery. He did not mention the fact that one of these Moslem heads was M. Jinardi, a Frenchman who had become a Moslem, marrying a Moslem wife, thus adventitiously qualifying to serve as adviser.

Some of the material results of this virtual capture of the Wakf administration have been excellent. Much private graft and negligence has been ended. The amounts yearly devoted to the purposes of the testators have regu-

larly increased, and by large percentages. Systematic auditing and the recapture of property wrongly alienated have augmented the capital. The income has been devoted to better devised ends, to hospitals and clinics, to sanitation, to schools and a museum. The yearly reports of the mandatory ring with the enthusiastic accounts of results accomplished. The western mind penetrates the crannies of the shaky old Wakf hulk! Whether these results are in "complete accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders,"—would it be invidious to enquire? The Commission does not enquire. It notes merely that the cost of administration is high, approaching twenty per cent of the entire budget, and lets it go with that remark. To my mind, there is no better example of the ruthless overriding by the mandatory of the cultural susceptibilities of the mandated people, and of the way in which, because of its imperfect knowledge, the Mandates Commission may at times—I regret to use the word—be played with! What is gained in this administration is worth gaining; it need not be gained at this cynical cost.

Owing to its distance from the scene, many an accurate statement by the rapporteur becomes misleading to the Commission; and, for the same reason, the element of irony may frequently be missed, and a thoroughly false impression be given.

During the rebellion, there was much pillaging by the French troops. When the Commission enquired into this, it was assured that "restitution of the stolen property had been made wherever possible."²⁵ This answer is taken in all seriousness: "It should be recalled, however, that as far as possible the objects stolen had been restored."²⁶ But, when one faces the factual situation of destroyed villages or ruined mosques with scattered dead or terrified

²⁵ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 137.

²⁶ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 140.

owners and custodians, one realizes that the limit of possible restoration is soon reached.

Complainants had urged the appalling extent of the destruction of villages during this conflict. Rapporteur was asked whether this and other measures were exceptional. The reply gave no data, but merely argued that, "as the columns had operated throughout the whole rebel country, had the villages been systematically destroyed, none would continue to exist"! ²⁷

To one on the ground, none of these answers would have been taken on its face, as meeting the legitimate question. Still less such statements as these: that "contact between the Senegalese and the inhabitants did not . . . exist in normal times"; ²⁸ that the fixing of boundaries for the Greater Lebanon had been due to "various reasons almost entirely geographical"; ²⁹ that "the bombardment ordered by General Sarraïl before his departure had only resulted in the sending of projectiles into the gardens: not a single shell had fallen that evening on the houses," ³⁰—in other official statements it was alleged that only blank shells were fired on the evening of October 18, 1925,—yet at six on that evening the living room of the Irish Presbyterian mission was wrecked by an explosive shell.

It must be evident that the Mandates Commission is doing its work under the heavy handicap of obscure and partial light, a handicap which does not, on the face of it, appear to be necessary. This imperfect knowledge reacts to the disadvantage of the mandatory Power, as well as to the disadvantage of the mandated people; and has been made, strangely enough, a matter of reproach by the rapporteur:

On the effort of the Commission to decide—as it ought

²⁷ P. M. C., *Tenth Session*, p. 152.

²⁹ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 83.

²⁸ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 154.

³⁰ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 153.

—whether the mandatory had been excessively severe in its destruction of villages:

“A village which did not refuse hospitality was in many cases a village which willingly accorded it. It seemed to him unwise for the Commission round the table to decide whether a particular village had more or less consented to the presence and feeding of a band of insurgents.”⁸¹

On the effort of the Commission to decide—as it ought—whether the mandatory had intervened in the administration more than the idea of a mandate would admit:

The administrators “continually found themselves compelled to choose between accepting technical errors or nothing at all, and taking some action which might go beyond the limits of the mandate, which were not always so easy to respect as was imagined by people outside the country, whose only duty it was to formulate principles.”⁸²

With these rather ungracious reminders of a disability which the mandatory Power might materially help, it is not surprising that the Commission is often forced to a suspension of judgment when judgment is its duty. It is also at times misled into a judgment widely recognized in the regions affected as false or inept.

Let me illustrate this statement:

The mandatory Power is bound to keep order, by forcible and energetic action if necessary; and in doing so, there is likely to be incidental suffering on the part of the innocent neighbors of the guilty. The formula, “inevitable incidental suffering,” is a valid generality: it covers many complaints arising from the operations repressing the Syrian rebellion. The final judgment of the Commission declares that

⁸¹ P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 152.

⁸² P. M. C., *Eighth Session*, p. 93.

"If there have been acts of harshness, distressing incidents, innocent victims, these events are unfortunately such as usually occur in the course of all forcible measures of this kind."³³

This judgment was probably not intended to cover the bombardment of Damascus, an error promptly rebuked by the French Government, and fortunately not among the events such as usually occur. But there were "distressing incidents" in the campaign, which the Commission, had it known of them, would have been loath to cover, as by a general indulgence, with that condoning generality. This is one:

There is a guard stationed on the new boulevard north of Damascus leading into the Baghdad road. There are rebel snipers in the district beyond. A shot strikes one of the guard in the shoulder. A detachment is sent out to scour the neighborhood for the distance of perhaps a mile. It returns with a dozen or more men roped together. Not all of these can be guilty of having fired that shot; are any of them guilty? They look rather like villagers, shepherds. The question is emphasized as one sees groups of animals driven to market by soldiers of the scouting party. But why dispose of the flocks so soon, before the men are tried? There is to be no trial. The men are stood up against a wall, still roped together; machine guns are turned on, and their muzzles waved back and forth a few times. That is the end of the incident.

Was it among the "events such as usually occur"? Not unless one adds the phrase, when a nation deals with another which it regards as far inferior. It is the equivalent of a composite American lynching party. But it was not the intention of the Commission to lend its good name to the palliation of such deeds. It had no knowledge, and

³³ P. M. C., *Eighth Session* (Extraordinary) held at Rome . . . including the Report . . . to the Council.

of course, no proof, of this minor incident. There were witnesses in Damascus, not in Geneva. But, when those who know of such things read the verdict I have quoted, the name of the League tends to fall into the discredit it now suffers throughout the Near East. I say this as one solicitous for the League, and greatly admiring the work of the Commission.

One understands why, under such circumstances, the Commission reaches out for more adequate means of knowledge, and proposes the enlargement of its questionnaire, to the annoyance of Sir Austen Chamberlain. That annoyance, while manifesting in part the Old Adam of all administrators, the wish for full control with little or no responsibility, was also due in part to a defect in the method proposed by the Commission. The defect lies in the fact that a standard set of questions can cover only *classes* of events, such as are likely to recur from time to time; whereas the whole character of an administrative action may be, and usually is, determined by its particular circumstances.

There are certain broad topics—legislation, finance, public health, etc.—which will be dealt with in any report of conditions. But apart from these, only a few situations will become critical in any given year. What these will be, and how they will deviate from the normal, cannot be foreseen. To attempt to foresee them by a comprehensive set of categories is to run the danger of burying the significant matters under a mass of dull and indifferent detail. It is a case of the ancient fallacy of trying to catch the particular in the net of the general. Again, let me illustrate the point by an example.

In its report for 1926 on Syria, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs deals with its attempt to hold elections in

Syria, except in Damascus, which was still under martial law. This attempt was generally successful except in Homs and Hama, where a boycott of the election accompanied by intimidation prevailed. The ministerial report continues:

"N'ayant pu obtenir le même résultat à Alep, quelques agitateurs essayèrent de provoquer une émeute qui fut immédiatement et facilement réprimée" (p. 15).

One gathers from this sentence that there was a threatening disturbance in Aleppo on the day of election, which was properly nipped in the bud by prompt and vigilant action. This appears to have been the impression gained by the Mandates Commission, if indeed the sentence attracted any attention; for no questions appear (in the proceedings of the Eleventh Session) to have been elicited by the event. Now let me give a prevalent Arab version of the event:

On January 8, 1926, the day set for the election, there was no notable disorder in Aleppo; but there was an attempt to boycott the election. Many of the notables refrained from voting. On the following day, sixty-two of these men were arrested, and were held without trial in the Serail, or general prison. What was to be their fate? On the third day, no explanation and no promise of trial being forthcoming, public concern began to organize itself. It was decided that a peaceful protest should be made in the form of a petition, presented by an assembly of citizens to the governor of the prison, asking him to respect the rights of citizens to the extent of bringing the arrested men to trial on a formal accusation, or else setting them free.

Accordingly, a large concourse of citizens, unarmed and without disorder, brought the petition to the governor of the Serail. He received it and announced that he would forward it to the local representative of the High Commissioner, and return an answer within fifteen minutes. The crowd waited. There was no disturbance, and no threat upon the prison. Within the ap-

pointed time, the answer appeared in the form of two tanks, twenty cavalry and thirty black soldiers, who proceeded to drive the crowd out of the enclosure of the prison.

As they dispersed through the gate and into the open space before the prison, a mitrailleuse mounted in the Citadel above them opened fire into their midst. Thirteen were killed and eighty were wounded. If this was the riot referred to in the report, "*l'émeute fut immédiatement et facilement réprimée.*"

Now this is merely an administrative detail, such as one can dispose of in a single sentence. It is just the peculiar circumstances of the story which indicate whether the citizens of Aleppo are being helped along in self-government or confirmed in a habit of cowed submission. It is the spirit of the event which concerns the Mandates Commission; and the spirit lurks in the detail, easily slipping through the meshes of a set of questions.

The reader may doubt the accuracy of the version of this event here recorded. If so, he is in a favorable state of mind for asking himself what facilities the Mandates Commission ought to have for receiving such reports and for testing their truth. Note that the event occurred more than five years ago. The dead are buried; the wounded may show their wounds and the witnesses tell their tales. But whose story are you prepared to believe? What is Aleppine testimony worth in Geneva? There is nothing here and now available which in a European sense would be called evidence. Shall we then dismiss it, as so many similar tales have been dismissed, as "unproved"? An honest enquirer may be forced to this impasse; but he will remain restless under a system which repeatedly leaves him there with the rankling reflection, "It may be false; but also, it may be true."

The Mandates Commission has had before it at various times proposals aiming to remedy its chief weaknesses

as an organ of control: the insufficiency of the evidence submitted to it, its biased sources of knowledge, its distance in space and time from the particular event, its inevitable yet fatal reliance on generalities.

It has been proposed that petitioners should be able to appear in person. This obvious measure of good sense, so far as the theory of evidence is concerned, would threaten in practice to swamp the procedure of the Mandates Commission with an unmanageable volume of judicial business.

It has been proposed that the members should visit in person the mandated territories (during the Fourteenth Session, the return of M. Orts from an extended journey in Africa was the occasion for a shower of invitations to members of the Commission to make such visits), or that occasional sub-commissions of enquiry should be sent out from the League, or that there should be a visiting delegate or delegation making the rounds of the mandates. All these suggestions are quite sound, in so far as they recognize the imperative necessity of supplementing the distant and general-principle mode of judgment by the vision of particular fact. But they also are defective in principle. They contemplate merely occasional visitations. Any such visitation will be heralded, the house put in order, the damaging particulars scuttled out of the way. Further, the evidence is frequently transitory, and, since the momentum of such a delegation is great, it never arrives on time. Finally, such conspicuous visits invite complaints, and find their work, hasty as it is at best, beclouded by a mass of hopeful beggars and liars whose pleas and myths discount every honest tale, while the whole occasion tends to humiliate and disturb the mandatory in the exercise of its rightful functions.

There is another suggestion, which has been put forward

in various forms,³⁴ at first sight more audacious than any of the preceding. But it has the merit of being the natural procedure; and its original vigor would be followed by a simple *modus vivendi* in which the sense of encroachment on the functions of the mandatory would disappear. It is, that there must be in each mandate a *resident representative of the League*, who, by his constant presence, with his constant and visible respect for the mandatory Power, reciprocated by that Power, becomes a symbol of the primary relation of co-operation between them.

Like any minister or consul, such a representative must be *persona grata* to the mandatory. His presence would have the effect at first of concentrating upon himself the attention of the disaffected. He would be taken as an offi-

³⁴ As by Professor E. M. Earle and Professor Harold Laski. When the idea occurred to me during a visit to the Near East and to Geneva in 1928, I was not aware of these earlier writings; but I assumed that it would have been among the alternatives already well-considered by the Commission in establishing its procedure. In discussing the matter with members of the Commission I did not learn that they had entertained it. There had been a suggestion, in the difficulties connected with the Mosul boundary, that a resident representative of the League should be assigned temporarily for the sake of easing frictions with minority groups in the border districts. This officer, who was to report to the League through the High Commissioner of Iraq, had a slight analogy to the resident consul I had in mind; but the suggestion failed to materialize. Professor Harold Laski, in *A Grammar of Politics*, p. 597, judges that "there should be accredited to each mandated territory of the League a commissioner who will act as its ambassador upon the spot," and adds the important note that this commissioner should not be a national of the mandatory state. In 1925, the British Labour Party resolved that "it is essential in all tropical and sub-tropical dependencies to invite the League of Nations to appoint an 'Observer' to the governing body of each Dependency and Mandated Territory" as an aid to impartial supervision. Professor E. M. Earle, in an article published in *The Nation*, Jan. 13, 1926, offers a similar proposal: The League "should maintain a resident commissioner in each of the 'Class A' mandated areas, including Syria, to receive complaints and petitions and to inform the Permanent Mandates Commission concerning observance of the letter and spirit of the Covenant."

And indeed, in the original discussion of the mandate theory by General Smuts, the notion of such a resident consul is foreshadowed.

Though the plan seemed in 1928 to be outside the scope of practical politics, on account of the tendency of the mandatory Powers to limit rather than expand the supervisory functions of the League, this convergence of independent judgments seems to me to lend much force to the conviction that such an officer is a necessary part of any effective oversight.

cial sympathizer with their views and a court of appeal from decisions of the mandatory Power. This is the state of things which mandatory Powers apprehend, and which they agree would "never do"! But note what will follow this first stage.

It will be a distinct advantage to the mandatory and to the League to have a local clearing house for complaints. Let the League's representative give them a sympathetic audience; but he will also know what to do with them. He will know the local courts which are competent to handle three-fourths of the specific complaints which now make their toilsome and unsatisfactory journey to Geneva, and consume the energy of the Mandates Commission. The presence of this representative would be a distinct stimulus to these courts to give fair and prompt hearing to deserving plaintiffs, enhancing the prestige of these courts. And it would be a strong influence in training the people in the principles of evidence, and the effective modes of presenting their cases.

As time passes, it will become evident to the people that the representative is not there to uproot the mandatory régime, nor to join in conspiracies against its success. But he is there to know what passes, and to give authoritative unbiased witness to the actual event. The League of Nations thereby ceases to be a distant symbol for inaction, ignorance and ineptitude. It has a personal and present mentality. It can bring the vividness and detail of the concrete occurrence, and therewith its spirit, into the data which the Mandates Commission has before it.

Rendering unnecessary the objectionable lists of minute questions, and the cumbersome business of bringing hordes of petitioners before the Commission at Geneva, and avoiding the disturbance of routine and the shock to the normal currents of authority involved in inspectorial visitations,

the presence of the representative would simplify the whole scheme of relations between the populace, the mandatory and the Mandates Commission, and give it a normal, effective working-status.

To my mind nothing less than this will make the Geneva end of the mandate-working a success. But whether this or some other plan be devised, it is certain that the present crippled provisioning of the Mandates Commission is intolerable; and the good faith of the mandatory Powers will best be shown by their initiative in putting an end to it. And while the increasing access of the Commission to knowledge does carry with it the increased possibility of adverse comment, it is a truth abundantly demonstrated in history which the leaders of national policy can surely accept (though it may be hidden from the petty officials) that authority and prestige may be the greater for the frank acceptance of an honest criticism, when the ultimate aims of critic and criticized are in accord.

PART V

MANDATES: THE BURDEN OF PALESTINE

CHAPTER XXI

PALESTINE: AN IMPASSE?

FROM Jerusalem to Bethlehem is a pleasant five-mile walk. If one starts an hour before sunrise he can reach the old monastery at the top of the hill looking down on both cities in time to see day break over the mountains of Moab and the Dead Sea. At this hour the contours of the tumbled wilderness which wastes away from the stubble of the near-by fields to the denuded rocks of the lower valley are sharply visible in the contrast of light and shadow. Motor traffic has not yet begun on the highroad. Only the rural Arabs are abroad, bringing their market-truck to town on donkeys or camels. Here at the Crusaders' Rampart, or farther on at the Tomb of Rachel, one can still summon the illusion of antiquity, and find the landscape a fit setting for those occasional authentic spots whereon the historical sense dwells with that peculiar satisfaction which for many millions of souls, Jewish, Christian and Moslem, constitutes the primary meaning of Palestine.

But even now there are disturbing notes. A cluster of red-tiled roofs belonging to a group of bungalows whose wide windows reply sharply to the first glance of the sun betokens a new settlement, European in architecture and surroundings. The Arab villages, poor as they are, belong to the hillsides out of which they grow. These new colonies, clean and well-appointed, strike one as exotic: involuntarily one asks, "Why are they here?" There is a pride about them, a challenge, a stir, as if some gong of

modernity were sounding from them; and the spirit of Palestine, stirring also but trying to listen to other sounds, seems to respond reluctantly, "Must I, too, go this way, and become altogether one with these?" Here speaks the temperamental antithesis between the new Zionist and the Arab; and in such undefined contrasts lie the germs of political conflict.

Nowhere else in the world is an overt political clash so clearly the surface-play of forces before which politics is helpless. Diplomacy would like to wash its hands of the matter. We see Great Britain the mandatory, passing a critical decision to the League, and the League hesitating to accept responsibility! There are no precedents in the case; and therein lies its persistent hold on our interest. Some long-drawn struggles make us weary,—the endless cross-pulling of patent self-interests. Some enlist our chivalry, as cases of right against might. Some command a deeper concern,—the conflict of two rights, two equally justifiable ideals, which the facts somehow have made incompatible: these contain the essence of tragedy, for without sacrifice on one side, or on both, there is no solution. This is the case in Palestine: for here are two corporate streams of hope which we rudely describe as "national," each with a valid claim on our sympathy, while it is impossible that both should be realized. And no political power dares deny either the right to life.)

(It is futile to try the case on the basis of the promises and declarations of Great Britain. Her fumbling efforts to give shape and limit to conflicting hopes are pertinent but secondary. The aspirations of Jew and Arab have not been created by any Balfour Declaration nor by any Hussein M'Mahon correspondence. They spring out of the new life running in two great peoples, encouraged by all that has been said and thought since war-time about the

rights of national movements. It is not Great Britain alone, it is the entire western half of the world which is involved in the dilemma. Britain, to be sure, is in the further plight of having committed herself to both sides,—first of all to the Arab,—and of having as an Allied Power received from both sides a substantial *quid pro quo*. But this unhappy position becomes a crucial one only because the pressure of demand comes from populations who know little and care less about the letter of written agreements. Britain has to deal not with what she has promised, but with what masses of Jews and Arabs think she ought to have promised. The Arab populations in Palestine and behind Palestine are thinking in terms of their desired kingdom with its western verge on the Mediterranean Sea. The Zion-minded Jews the world over, knowing Palestine only through the mirage of tradition, dream, and hortatory eloquence, can only think of their rights in that land in terms of their ideal Jewish community united and free. These masses are the drive and heft of two immense animated wedges whose sharp ends meet and contend in Jerusalem. Let us then disregard for the moment the political entanglement and go at once to the center of the matter, the logic of the opposing ideals.)

Zionism is no ordinary national movement. For many Jews it embodies in one concrete program the entire social and religious idealism of the race. Zion, the ultimate symbol of Jewish vision, concentrates into itself the intense longing of the intensest of human races. The Jews are not now a nation so much as a people pregnant with nationality. Zionism is to be the birth of this latent nation, and every Jew is to know the reanimating influence of what a part of Jewry thus realizes.

Why should Jews, international in fact and spirit, wish

to add one more to the number of national boundaries and rivalries in the world? The answer is, They do not. They wish only to incorporate a distinction which exists, and to give it a regular status in which it can work for human understanding rather than for prejudice and dislike. No one who is not a Jew could venture to say how strong to-day is that conviction of separate historic mission implied in the Biblical idea of the chosen people. But wholly apart from this, the international Jew knows, as few know, the value of a "national home." It is no mere place of refuge; it is not merely a satisfaction for an obscure homing instinct on the part of a homeless people. It is not alone the promise of an answering and protecting nationhood, now more than ever needed when all the nations are strengthening their national consciousness. It is all these, but it is also, and first of all, a religious goal and a profound psychological promise. For it means that through well-rounded occupational activity the Jew will find himself and will show himself to the world, a complete personality. It is Jewish self-consciousness that speaks through Zionism: "At present we are not, as a people, farmers, mechanics, soldiers, engineers, statesmen, sportsmen. We have been obliged by our anomalous situation as permanent strangers to specialize in a few directions. Henceforth we shall be everything, develop every human aptitude and power in our own measure, and so meet the calumny that we are in our souls part-men, cunning and parasitic. On the soil of our fathers we shall become what we are, renew our cultural fertility, and repay mankind blessing for persecution." This is a program whose conception compels admiration. Further, its significance is unique: there are no near-parallels in law or in history.)

(What is necessary to realize this idea?

(For the religious side of it, Palestine. Palestine, re-

stored as a center of Jewish culture and worship. If Zion is to be a geographical fact, and not merely an ideal condition, no other place on earth will serve. Sophisticated religion tends to turn its primitive concepts into allegories: and Zion might be thought of as a Jewish counterpart of the Kingdom of Heaven, a poetic symbol for the final state of social evolution without specific locus. But orthodoxy is concrete in its imagination, and gives Zion a body as well as a soul. Medieval Jewish mystics, renewing the ancient splendor of rabbinical learning, tried to transplant their schools to Tiberias and Safed. And to this day that element of realism is faithfully continued. (In a current textbook of Jewish religion one reads:

By the Messianic time or "the Days of the Anointed," the chief of our national hopes, we mean (1) the days of the restoration of Israel to the Holy Land, the rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem, the resumption of the Divine service therein, and the return of the Divine Glory to Zion; (2) the days of the universal cessation of warfare and the highest development of all human virtues and happiness.

The universal human hope is there: but the distinctive hope of Israel is there also, requiring the physical and historic Jerusalem.)

For the material and social sides of the program, various conditions are necessary, some of which unhappily do not exist in Palestine: good soil in plenty, abundant water, varied natural resources, an immigration unified in spirit though drawn from all parts of the world, an opportunity to exercise genuine political control. What shall we say? That the program faces difficulties? Or that it faces impossibilities? We have to reckon with an inexhaustible moral enthusiasm; we have also to reckon with very stubborn facts.

A great community must have its economic rootage. Nothing qualifies Palestine for this rôle except the courage with which Zionists have faced the up-hill struggle with a meager and thirsty land. Palestinian soil will support a close settlement having European standards of living only with the application of a maximum of capital, a maximum of labor and the science of the twentieth century, added to agricultural talent, skill and experience. Zionism is resolutely prepared to supply the capital, the labor and the science and to acquire the rest. Its spirit is magnificent, many of its results remarkable; it is not for any outside observer to cry impossible. But it is necessary to consider the costs of success. Some of these we can discern with the aid of figures now available.¹

The Jews in Palestine are now about one sixth of the entire population; in round numbers 160,000 in a total of perhaps 950,000. Their holdings of land, individual and corporate, amount to a quarter of a million acres more or less,—not a vast estate among so many. What fraction is this of the entire area of Palestine? In literal truth, less than a twentieth; for Palestine west of Jordan has some six million acres all told, and one might unwarily conclude that the Jews in Palestine have far less than their proportionate share of the land. Figures could hardly tell a more misleading tale.

About half of the total area of Palestine is reckoned as cultivable. And of this half, barely more than a third, i.e. one sixth of the whole area, with irrigation and drain-

¹ Palestine has not yet been adequately surveyed. The official survey now going forward may require eight years to complete. The hasty once-over of 1919, made under Lloyd-George's Government, is no longer of value except for the purposes of a shifty politician. In what follows I shall rely chiefly on a Jewish source, the report (1928) of the Joint Palestine Survey Commission, using round numbers and making my own inferences from its careful data, supplemented by such data as later commissions have presented.

age, can be considered fairly good valley land, including both light and heavy soils. The Joint Palestine Survey Commission estimates a million acres (4,144,800 dunams) in this class of good valley land, including in the category the coastal plains. Noting that the major Jewish land holdings are of the best valley and coastal land,² it appears that they now hold let us say one fifth of that scanty fraction of the soil of Palestine which can be considered as fairly good for agriculture.

But we must again consider: it is not 160,000 Jews who are engaged in agriculture, but only some 33,000: the rest are urban. It is one thirtieth of the population that are holding that fifth of the best land, and it is not enough for them,—by far not enough.

For the average farm of 100 dunams (say 23 acres) in the Emek, or Plain of Esdraelon—probably as good land as Palestine can show—is proving insufficient for a Jewish family, with its relatively high standard of living. The Joint Survey Commission proposes 60 acres for a minimum dry farm. This would more than double the demand on land for the present group of farmers. But again, that group is obviously too small a proportion of the total Jewish community, especially in a land which sustains no important industries. If the present community were divided evenly between farm and town, we should need again to double our land-requirement. And thus, without any further immigration into Palestine, nearly all of the best land would be requisitioned!

² Many of the colonies, especially the early ones, have taken poor soils, or marsh lands, partly abandoned and malarial, potentially rich, and by heroic efforts have brought them to a good yield. But any map of the Jewish holdings will substantiate the statement of the text. Dr. Hans Kohn writes, "Sehr grosse Strecken Landes wurden nach dem Kriege erworben, vor allem in den fruchtbaren Ebenen des Landes, entlang der Meeresküste und in der Senke zwischen Haifa und dem Jordan." *Nationalismus und Imperialismus im Vorderen Orient*, p. 206.

This is a rude estimate. All figures will be revised as the slow business of survey goes to completion. But no correction can alter the essential truth it intends to convey,—the extraordinary pressure for more land which Zionism even now creates; the disproportionate draft on the best soil. How can this draft be met?

Article 6 of the mandate was written, without adequate survey, in a spirit of hopeful vagueness. This article speaks of “state lands and waste lands” which may be made available for settlement. This sanguine phrase has become a current myth. State lands there are, and waste lands in plenty; but by far the greater part of the waste is unreclaimable, and the state lands are not, as a rule, vacant. They are, generally speaking, fields or pastures whose use was paid for as a tax to the Ottoman Treasury rather than as a rental to private landlords. The occupants hold them, under the shiftless methods of Turkish registry (“chiftlik” happens to be their word for it) without recorded title, but with a customary tenure which cannot be disregarded. No doubt many shaky claims have been trumped up by unsettled Arabs making capital of British scruple for precise justice. The Beisan area might have been differently apportioned. But, when all this is discounted, the amount of usable vacancy in Palestine is but a crumb for a hungry man. Zionist land at present grows chiefly as it has grown,—by purchase from private owners. Picture the situation, in one or two actual cases:

“The most important single irrigable area in the Jordan Valley is to be found in and around the marshes of Lake Huleh. This land is of exceptional fertility. . . . Two obstacles stand in the way of this reclamation. One is the heavy cost (of engineering the drainage) . . . the other is the acquiring of title to the land.” Estimate suggests that \$468 per acre will overcome both obstacles.

Or again: “The coastal plain from Haifa to Gaza is probably

the finest citrus growing area in the world. . . . This area is comparatively densely populated." In other words, the Arabs are here and have been raising fine oranges on this soil for years. But further irrigation is possible; and note: "The only perennial stream of any importance is the Audja . . . the right of irrigating from which has been conceded to the Palestine Electric Corporation."

Under such circumstances it must be excessively hard for the Zionist to refrain from coveting his neighbor's land. Collectively speaking, he has the money. The Arab on the land is commonly poor: either he is a tenant cultivator whose livelihood may be sold over his head by his landlord (a process now legally guarded), or he is an owner to whom a mounting price may become an irresistible temptation. At first it could be assumed that at some figure or other land could be bought. But now the corporate apprehension of the Arabs crosses private transactions: Arab authorities denounce land-sales to Jews; campaigns are occasionally started in the Arab press against the would-be seller.³ And, apart from this, the process has an evident limit.

For while in twelve years the Jewish population has increased through immigration and natural growth by one hundred thousand, the non-Jewish population has increased through natural growth alone by roughly one hundred twenty thousand. The Arabs are not melting away before the Jewish influx: they are merely moving from the

³ Maurice Samuel, *On the Rim of the Wilderness*, Chap. iii, gives data (rather *tendancieux*) of the holdings of certain leading families,—as that the Husseini family owns 50,000 dunams (say 12,000 acres),—without noting how many members and sub-families, often running into the hundreds, these family-clans contain. He points out also that many of these, while inveighing publicly against sales to Jews, seek indirect ways to dispose of their own holdings for high prices. It remains true that the land grows tighter; and that the sentiment against transfer to Jews drives such sales underground.

better land to the poorer. They see thirty thousand Jews, one thirtieth of the population, holding one fifth of the fertile land and requiring much more. They see a large share of the wealth of the world, backed by British power, abetting this growing acquisition. They reasonably foresee and fear that it would not be too much for a successful Zion if all the exploitable land of Palestine were to become Jewish property, leaving to the growing Arab majority the two million acres of rocky waste.

Let us suppose this economic difficulty surmounted. Note simply that to accomplish this, the settlements must have every advantage, including the intensive application of modern methods, the spread of electric power and motor roads. Industry must be developed wherever possible, with a sprinkling of small shops and factories. The landscape of Palestine, already marred, must take the further consequences.

Let us leave out of account also the dismaying fact that many of the newer immigrants from Eastern Europe have little evident unity of purpose or spirit with the older Jewish residents, the fifty-five thousand Jews of the pre-war period and the devoted Zionist pioneers. One must speak here from impressions, since there are no statistics of the hearts of men, and there is no way in which an organization can control the *motives* of those who apply for entry. To me it appeared that the new arrivals were commonly devoid of *Judaism* in the religious sense, or of any religion except the social gospels of the oppressed; that they hope much from the future, but are free from sentimental attachment to the past, including the Jewish past. In that ill-omened march to the Wailing Wall in 1929, they carried not the means of worship but the Zionist flag! In the words of one interpreter, their nationalism is "a secular

nationalism psychologically religious,"⁴—i.e., devoid of dogmatic sincerity. If the soil has any sacredness to the piety of Moslem, Jew, or Christian, they show but a sub-conscious awareness of it, and are ready to disfigure Palestine unconcernedly with the marks of a western experimental civilization. Their hope is to enrich the world by demonstrating some advantageous novelty in social order, education, literature, drama. Zionism will be justified, they think, in proportion as it hastens to "contribute." It is no light task to make these emancipated spirits into a moral unity with those who see that Zionism is justified *in Palestine* only for those to whom Palestine is a holy land.

But let us suppose this task of moral unity also accomplished. There remains the social-political side of a truly national home. This side is essential,—perhaps from the psychological point of view the chief essential: for of all the human functions it is just this one of running his own nation, making his own laws, dispensing his own justice, providing his own statecraft and defence, of which the Jew, whose genius is the Law, in his dispersion has most keenly felt himself deprived. And it is just this side which in Palestine is most demonstrably impossible of achievement.

⁴ Maurice Samuel, *On the Rim of the Wilderness*, p. 134. The center of Mr. Samuel's interest is in the labor movement, "which represents a synthesis of traditional Jewish culture and new . . . social ethics" . . . "unique among world labor movements in its cultural consciousness" . . . not that it contains all the creative elements, but that it is, as represented by the Jewish Federation of Labor, "the most significant force in the country." When Mr. Samuel says that the "Zionist movement which threw, in the last decade, 100,000 Jews into Palestine, drew these from the most enterprising elements in Jewry" (p. 140), he characterizes very accurately the dominant spirit of the newer group. We are all in favor of enterprise. But, if one thinks of the grounds on which Israel for a thousand years has reiterated its longing for Palestine, it is not primarily as a place on which to wreak its repressed enterprise.

For how can the social and political spirit of any people express itself without a connected community; and without that community under its own control?

Physically speaking, Zion in Palestine is a dappling of separate settlements, interspersed with far greater numbers and areas of alien elements. Further land purchases on a large scale might mend to some extent this physical brokenness. But when will a Jew be able to stand on any hill in Palestine and say of the land in sight, "This is ours"? Not until the 680,000 Moslems and 80,000 Christians are required to cede the ground. With four Moslems to one Jew, and the Moslems not inclined to go, what can happen? Double the number of Jews: the Moslems are still two to one. Give the Jews all the good land: the Moslems are still all about, on the hillsides and in the rocky pastures. The Jews remain a physically scattered minority.

But what of that? This group of detached patches on the map has already a unified political life of its own. There is an official Jewish Community, with powers of taxing and making rules for its own voluntary membership; there are Jewish representative bodies, organs of Jewish-national thought and will. Can we not imagine this complex but lively organization a budding political entity, and the present Government of Palestine a temporary protecting mantle to be withdrawn as the new state-within-a-state gains in numbers, consistency, and strength, becomes able to stand alone as a Jewish commonwealth, perhaps as a "Seventh Dominion,"—a fully responsible political entity?

One would prefer to believe that there are no longer any well-informed Zionists who cherish this expectation. It remains the elementary truth of the situation that until the inconceivable happens,—that Moslems and Christians accept the right of the Jews to make laws for all,—the

Zionist Community must remain under a major law which it does not make and accept a military protection which it does not itself provide. The leaders of Zionism, recognizing this crucial discord between the logic of the facts and the logic of their ideal, have renounced, and for the most part also resigned, at any rate the near prospect of political control, preferring that the ominous words of Weizmann before the Peace Conference about "making Palestine as Jewish as England is English" should be forgotten, and proposing some intermediate objective.

Some would aim at parity of numbers with the Moslems, reasonably assuming that this would mean a preponderance of political influence. Others, probably the greater number, continue to hope for an ultimate Jewish majority. "The Balfour Declaration appeared meaningless to by far the greater part of the Zionists if it should not lead to the attainment of a Jewish majority in Palestine; for there was no difference in principle between a Jewish minority in Palestine and the conditions in other lands of the Dispersion."⁵ Since, however, this ideal has become the center of Arab fears, public announcements of Zionist aim avoid the statement: the demand of the Revisionists that the Zionist Conference at Basle in 1931 declare for a Jewish majority *on both sides of the Jordan* was rejected.

There are some who would cantonize Palestine, making (say) six Jewish, seven Moslem and three Christian cantons, in a country two-thirds the area of Switzerland. Jewish cantons would naturally be drawn about existing Jewish centers in the best land—the Northern and Southern Plain of Sharon, the Valley of Jezreel, Upper Galilee—and by the subtle coercion of bringing contiguous Arab

⁵ Hans Kohn, *Nationalismus und Imperialismus im Vordenen Orient*, p. 190. Cf. also p. 220: "Obwohl die bisherige Erfahrung dagegen spricht, dass eine jüdische Mehrheit in Palästina erzielt werden könne, erhoffen sie die Zionisten, fürchten sie die Araber."

land under Jewish rule would tend to complete Jewish ownership within the canton boundaries. On the other hand, the all-or-none spirit of the canton would lead to the presumption of unwelcome for Jews in the non-Jewish cantons; and Jerusalem itself could not be cantonized.

All these half-way objectives lack the essential political virtue of national control. Their proposers do not too closely ask themselves the question of Solomon, whether such a half of the political infant has half the value of the whole child. They continue to interest themselves in these partial goals, I believe, because the logic of the Zionist conception insistently carries beyond them. This logic shows itself in the arguments by which Zionists support their *right* in Palestine. For any argument based on historic possession or on a divine mission is logically a right to the whole land. Religious orthodoxy is explicit enough: "The sins of Israel have brought about the loss of their independence as a nation, of their land and Temple. But the divine decree that ordered the exile of our nation has also promised the restoration of Israel." On the case may be put on philosophic grounds, as in *The New Palestine*:

"The Jews are entering Palestine because they have a right to. They are building a homeland in Palestine because there is an organic indissoluble connection between the identity of the Jewish people and the country from which it was ejected long ago.")

An organic connection is exclusive: heart, lungs and liver cannot be shared. Once Zion is conceived as a political entity on earth, the consistent Zionist is driven, consciously or subconsciously, to claim not a right in Palestine (which the Balfour Declaration assures) but the right to Palestine (which the Zionists of 1917 desired it to assure).

This claim of right, based on a mission which it is felt a religious disloyalty to compromise, cannot be shaken in

the Jewish mind by analogies from history or international law. To urge that the same reasoning which leads the Jew to claim Palestine would give the Arab a right to Spain is quite sound so far as it appeals to the ordinary flux of historic conquest and possession; but it wholly misses the sense of this "organic and indissoluble connection," this right of destiny. Such a right has the force of a religious conviction for those who have it; it has the weakness of subjectivism for those who do not share that vision.

Sensible of this forensic weakness, Zionism has sometimes sought to strengthen its claim by emphasizing the cultural contrast between Jews and the rural Arabs of Palestine. These Arabs are represented as a rude and unlettered population, backward in all the arts of life. It is argued that they ought to yield to the cultural drive of the great Jewish wedge, from which in the end they will profit in every tangible way. It is not the few Jews who can find place in Palestine, it is the Jewry of the world whose interests are at stake. Should half a million ignorant fellahin, only languidly concerned in the matter except when excited by demagogues, block the united aspiration of fifteen million members of a highly gifted and advanced race?

The answer is not quite simple, even if the picture were a true one: but it becomes important to correct the error—unhappily widespread—of this picture. Palestine has its rural Arabs and also its urban Arabs; its Moslem Arabs and its Christian Arabs; its peasantry, its Bedawi, and its cultivated men of affairs; its fanatics, its grasping, disingenuous effendiat, and its leaders with liberal minds and a sense of humor. Amin el Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, is one of these leaders, about whom rumor is always busy. Without generalizing, I may relate one incident I happened to observe. During the spring of 1928, an International Missionary Conference had brought to

Jerusalem a group of positively-charged Christians whose intentions were an occasion of much misgiving among the Moslem masses. Lord Plumer opened the Conference; perhaps the military subjugation of Islam was to be followed by an ecclesiastical aggression! The thousands of pious celebrants in the Nebi Musa pilgrimage of that year might be heard singing with high fervor, "Down with the Missionary Conference!" During this disturbed time the Grand Mufti used his position to show to this suspected Conference an exceptional courtesy: he threw open the chief Moslem shrine, the Mosque of Omar, at an unusual hour, to the supposed conspirators against Islam, and supplied them group by group with guides to its several sacred spots. He acted then, at least, as a man of courage and understanding, to temper prejudice not to rouse it. In thinking of Palestinian Arabs we must remember their notables, their scholars, their tradesmen and their artisans with innate deftness and sense of beauty, as well as their farmers, shepherds, nomads.

Of these peasants, it is true that they, like many peasant peoples, are for the most part ignorant and backward. They are not idle nor inept in agriculture:⁶ they are no doubt unenterprising in the modern sense, and commonly accustomed to wretched living conditions. But they know

⁶ Sir John Hope Simpson has to say of the fellah: "He is a competent and capable agriculturist, and there is little doubt that were he to be given the chance of learning better methods, and the capital, which is a necessary preliminary to their employment, he would rapidly improve his position." *Palestine. Report on Immigration, Land Settlement, and Development*, by Sir John Hope Simpson, C. I. E., Cmd. 3686, October, 1930, p. 66. With regard to the fellah's plow, the Report notes that "a good deal of ridicule has been and is poured upon the nail-plough which he uses. In the stony country of the hills no other plough would be able to do the work at all. With regard to the use of that plough, Dr. Wilkansky writes: 'It performs very slowly, it is true, but thoroughly, all the functions for which a combination of modern machines is required—a plough, a roller and a harrow. . . . The ploughing of the fellah is above reproach. His field, prepared for sowing, is never inferior to that prepared by the most perfect implements, and sometimes it even surpasses all others. The defect lies only in the slowness.'"

their plight and are making their way out of it: their direction is more important than their present place.

Jerusalem as a world-city hears all the rumors of modernity, and a certain sophistication runs from the town throughout the land. There is hardly a nomad now wholly untouched by the technical side of modern life; the spreading radius of that occasional education carried by autobus, victrola, movie, the electric miracle, reaches the fellah, makes him a marginal member of the world-mind, and without dragging his anchor evokes with these strange stirrings much shrewd reflection of his own. He remains a traditionalist, but he is no longer the inert traditionalist of yesterday. He enters the currents of nationalism, rather dazedly, not wholly sure whether his nation is Palestine, Syria, or the new Arabia; over-dependent at present upon what his effendiat instil into him of anti-Jewish, anti-British sentiment; not yet strong enough to demand of that leadership what it is little used to,—definite and vigorous social effort on his behalf. The democratic element of every genuine nationalism comes slowly in Palestine; but he is blind who cannot perceive its presence.⁷ In its vaguest form, every Arab feels himself a part of the great Arab background, participating in its disappointments and its hopes: and a man plus a national movement is a man enlarged and ennobled. Further, these people have a high native capacity mental and artistic. It is a matter of justice, not to say of generosity, if we refer to their actual backwardness in terms of *our* arts, to remember that ~~they~~ they and their leaders have suffered for centuries under the exactions of an unprogressive tyranny. What they are is not to be seen on the present surface of their culture.

⁷ The masses in Palestine will learn a great deal from the vigorously democratic nationalism of the Jews, with its powerful labor group. It learns something by participation in labor unions; but it will not be weaned away from its own cultural sources by these common interests.

But my plea is not for generosity; it is for realism. If we in America, Jews and Gentiles, could see things as they are in Palestine, we should recognize as axiomatic three things: (1) that nothing like the full plan of Zionism can be realized without political pressure backed by military force; (2) that such pressure and force imply an injustice which is inconsistent with the ethical sense of Zionism, undermining its sincerity and its claim; (3) that every increase of pressure now meets with increasingly determined Arab resistance, within and beyond Palestine. Hence the question which political Zionism must answer is whether it proposes today, as in ancient times, to assert its place in Palestine by aid of the sword.

To many Arabs, the Balfour Declaration, in spite of its careful safeguarding of all existing civil and religious rights, is understood as obliging Great Britain to "do something" for the Jews. Most Zionists have the same conception. And the Arab mind enquires: What can Great Britain now specifically do for Zionism which is not at the cost of the Arabs? What favor can it show which is not favoritism? And what is favoritism if not a negative injustice, a veiled warfare under the cover of an enforced peace? If the question is capable of an answer, it needs to be a clear answer, plainly spoken. Great Britain *is* serving Zionism. It is doing so, not only by maintaining security and order in the land (with some lapses), but by furnishing the administrative staff without which no such settlement would have been possible, and by creating new opportunities. Under the older Ottoman régime foreign Jews were at a disadvantage: they (like other foreigners) could acquire land only in the name of Ottoman subjects. These disabilities are now removed: as is often said, Jews are now in Palestine by right, not on sufferance. *Why press for more than this equitable opening*, when more means a reversed

injustice? The rural and industrial centers already founded need no more than an equal legal status for their peaceful development. The Arabs are not wholly wrong in their apprehension that an equal legal opportunity, given Jewish energy, power and strategy, will of itself ensure a steady proportionate advance. Perceiving the economic future, Zionism has already taken the commanding positions.

"In the short time of a decade, all the economic situations decisively controlling the future,—great parts of the lands in the orange region and in the fruitful plains, the land about the bay of Haifa which with the building of the harbor is gaining extraordinary importance, the monopolistic-concession for the utilizing of Palestinian streams for power and for irrigation, the concession of the Dead Sea development,—all these have gone over into Zionist hands."⁸

Why, I ask, is this not enough?

The great Hebrew University on Mount Scopus needs no more than equal legal opportunity to realize its destiny. And this University, be it said, under the prophetic leadership of Dr. J. L. Magnes, is the symbol of all that is best in Zionism. For the true and attainable Zion is the Zion of culture and faith, exemplified in a quietly developing community living and working with other communities,—not the Zion of political nationalism.

(I am not saying that Great Britain can fulfil its mandate by mere passivity, while Jewish Agencies develop the land. The pronouncements of the Mandates Commission⁹ and the British Commissions of 1930, and subsequent declarations of policy by the British Government, agree that a more positive program is called for. But this program cannot be one of adding to the direction of Zionist effort the Government's resources. It must be one of controlling

⁸ Hans Kohn, *Nationalismus und Imperialismus im Vorderen Orient*, p. 220.

⁹ P. M. C., *Seventeenth Session*, p. 143.

the whole economy, and especially the land economy, of Palestine, in order that existing inequalities of equipment and standard between Jew and Arab shall not be indefinitely increased.

It is indeed a bitter thing to the sincere Zionist that his ideal community cannot have in that unique spot of earth its perfect body as well as its perfect soul. It is a bitter thing to me to have to assert this. For I went to Palestine a Zionist in faith, warmed by the ardor of Jewish friends to whom this vision is the breath of life, prepared to believe all things possible. And I came away sorrowful on this score, seeing that to strive for the perfect body, as things now are, can only mean the loss of soul and body alike. To pursue any campaign for a more vigorous fulfilment of "the British promise," to force cantonization on Palestine, repeating the standing grievance of divided Syria, to press for any further favor of the state, is to work blindly toward another bloody struggle involving first the new settlements, then Great Britain, then no one knows what wider area.

In this we have been assuming that on the issue of Jewish dominance the Arab mind is irreconcilable. That those Zionists are mistaken who expect to win him over through the marked improvement of his living conditions which the influx of capital and the broad social upturn must bring him. Is this true?

That answer lies partly in the fact that for the Arab, whose local attachments are peculiarly strong, Palestine, besides being his home, is also a holy land.

It lies partly in the fact that to his mind Palestine is not a separate province: it is an integral part of Syria, with Damascus as its natural trading and cultural capital, while Syria is an integral part of greater Arabia. In his

dream of a free Arab empire, Damascus may have served as capital for the whole; or Syria, with Palestine and Transjordan, may have constituted an autonomous province. In any case, the new Arabia through Palestine reached the western sea; while Palestine as a part of Syria became a partner in that new and proud political enterprise. The expulsion of Feisal from Damascus by the French was a cruel mutilation of this dream. The mandate for Palestine excludes it from the imagined kingdom and shuts that kingdom from the Mediterranean. Even so, political arrangements may be unmade. But village settlements are a more final obstacle: they build a human barrier and put an end to hope. The progress of the Zionist colonization thus becomes for the Arab national outlook a culminating stroke in a prolonged series of breaches of faith.)

A letter from King Feisal to Mr. Felix Frankfurter is often quoted to show that there is no inherent incompatibility between the Zionist program and the Arab interest. It may be surmised that Feisal when he wrote that letter (which he no longer endorses) spoke for few besides himself, inasmuch as the American Commission of Enquiry found but one per cent of its petitioners in favor of the National Home. During the brief time when Feisal attended the Peace Conference he was recognized as a member of the Hedjaz Delegation, and as plenipotentiary for his father, Hussein of Mecca, though his credentials have been disputed. But, had he been speaking for Hussein, he would have summarily rejected the Zionist program; and further, there was nothing which qualified him to dispose of the rights of Palestine's Arabs. His voice at that moment was presumably the voice of the British Government upon which he was then utterly dependent, and which had the strongest motives for persuading itself of the alleged

harmony of Arab and Jewish interests. But the chief point in interpreting the letter is the circumstance that, when Feisal signed its Arabic equivalent (for at that time he understood English imperfectly if at all),¹⁰ he had every expectation of ruling in Damascus with Palestine as a part of the Syrian state. A Zionist colony within an Arab state is worlds apart from an Arab colony within a Jewish state. The former might be considered by an Arab prince, the latter never.

No: Arabia will not be reconciled to Jewish dominance in Palestine. For 1300 years Moslem Arabs have lived here, tilling the soil, caring for their herds, raising their fruits and olives, practising their trades and crafts. Between them and this habitat there is a genuine adjustment: technique and custom, dress and architecture, they transmit from antiquity with an unconscious faithfulness: they *belong*. The rights which go with long occupation and use cannot be brushed aside, even though no letter of a British agreement could be cited to confirm them in their place. The changes which are coming and should come in their habits and interests must be worked out by themselves in their own terms, at their own rate, on their own soil, not imposed by an abrupt, unrelated invasion from Europe.

On the basis of existing theories of right, then, there is

¹⁰ The letter was framed by Colonel Lawrence and signed by Feisal. A valuable account of the origin of this letter is given by Professor Frankfurter in *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1930, Contributors' Column. Cf. Appendix II.

In an interview at Amman, printed in the *Palestine Bulletin* of October 2, 1930, Feisal is reported as saying,

"During the Peace Conference I represented my father and due to this position came into contact with the delegates of all nations, meeting also several Zionist leaders. At that time I had several interviews with Dr. Chaim Weizmann and exchanged letters with him which were of a purely personal nature. At that time I wanted to find means of arriving at a rapprochement, but events prevented a continuance of these efforts. Since then, as I understand, Zionist policy has undergone a change." Asked about the letter which he wrote to Professor Frankfurter, he said, "I exchanged letters with many people, but I cannot recall such a letter."

no way to reconcile nor to arbitrate the conflicting claims. Perhaps it is time to seek a new principle.

Zionism has challenged all prevailing theories of territorial right, in view of a unique religious and cultural mission. Regarded as an article of Jewish faith, the claim is, as we said, subjective. It ceases to be subjective when that mission or some part of it becomes an article of faith to the wider world, as when France, the United States, Arabia, can say with Great Britain, We believe in the mission of the Jewish people. A claim of "right" can substantiate itself just so far as this wider persuasion is forthcoming. Suppose, then, that we should attempt to adjudge rights in Palestine, apart from all Balfour documents or M'Mahon scrip, with the sole question in mind, how can that soil best be used—the total interest of mankind being considered? What guidance could we get from this view?

First, Palestine is a land of interest to three great living faiths. Each one of these may regard itself as able to make the best use of the land; no one of the three is qualified to act as sole judge in its own case. But, since the use in question is primarily religious, any one of the three is clearly disqualified which aims to exclude or dominate the others. Result: no one of the three may be in exclusive control; Christian, Moslem and Jew must recognize the separate status of Palestine and accept whatever consequences this fact may have for their national aspirations.

Second, Palestine is indivisible. Each faith is interested in all of it and in free movement to all parts. Cantonization is offensive from every point of view; and those who propose it thereby show themselves spurious guardians.

Third, rights in Palestine have nothing to do with the results of war. Neither the Allies nor the League nor any

other grouping of mankind is competent to dispose of it on military or political grounds. The idea of settling the status of Palestine by consulting the written promises given by Great Britain or by all the Allies to one group and to another is the height of solemn impertinence. As conqueror, the Allies have the power to do what they will; if they consult right, they will regard Palestine as belonging primarily to the religious interests of humanity.

If these interests remain disunited, the Powers will consider them politically, that is, in proportion to the aggressive pressure they exert. I should like to join a group to assert these interests collectively, a group of Jews, Moslems and Christians, resolved to prevent as far as possible that secularizing and industrializing of the country to which the imperial interests of Great Britain and the economic drive of political Zionism are alike committed. I can imagine such a group addressing the political Zionists in this vein:

"We desire the revival of Palestine, in the line of its own genius. Carry there the best you know of the arts of life; but conduct your social laboratories elsewhere, where they are favored by natural conditions and where they do not disfigure and secularize. To have meaning for the modern world, these social experiments must be in the heart of it, not artificially fostered in a remote place. Your Einsteins cannot go to Palestine; they must live in the atmosphere of scientific concentration, amongst colleagues. Your Bergsons cannot go there: they must live where they can sense by intuition the *élan vital* of contemporary life. Your great artists cannot live in Palestine, if they have something to say to this age. Industry and finance on the modern scale cannot find a center there, a land without fuel, without ores, and with meager power. To our minds, the poverty of Palestine is its preservation. We do not want Palestine spoiled, and your attempt, if you persist, will merely spoil it and not satisfy yourselves. Bethink yourselves in time and save yourselves and humanity that distress and loss. Spiritualize your

conception of the National Home, and for the earthly Zion accept the achievable symbol in place of the inachievable completion. Build your communities there, but let them not be closed groups, —let them be communities that mingle actually with their neighbors, as befits those who would understand and interpret. Strengthen that magnificent university, with its broad conception of its mission, with its scientific ministrations to the needs of the people and to the historical interests of the Moslem and the Christian as well as of the Jew. Through that university and its affiliated institutions, let the Jewish wisdom show itself a comprehensive wisdom in which all creeds and races may find sustenance. ‘And *all nations* shall flow into it. And many people shall go and say, Come ye and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of His ways, and we will walk in His paths.’ ”

And to the Arabs of Palestine and beyond, it might say:

“With you, we record our rejection of Jewish domination in Palestine. We reject also the political domination of any faith, Christian or Moslem, in that land. We wish to assure the Moslem inhabitants of Palestine of the security of their possessions and of their ways of life: they shall not be placed at a disadvantage by any act of any western Power. We request your aid in maintaining the spirit of reverence in this ancient land. To achieve this, we call upon you to lay aside the spirit of exclusiveness proper to the older era of Islamic life, and adopt the spirit of co-operation proper to the newer stage. Recognize the religious element in other religions, the common bond among mankind constituted by the worship of God, and the peculiar bond between the three religions whose common tradition centers in this place. Welcome the situation which has brought the piety of Jew and Moslem to agree in honoring the site of the Temple: make it easy instead of difficult for your Jewish brethren to worship at the Wailing Wall. Cease to annoy them there, without profit to yourselves. Allow Palestine to be set apart among the regions of the earth, not for the imperial aims of any nation, and not to the disadvantage of the new Arabia, but as a shrine and place of pilgrimage in perpetuity, a meeting place for the spirits of East and West.”

As to the administration of Palestine, there must be a political order there; and this order must be either national or international. Theoretically an international administration as contemplated by the Sykes-Picot program would show the needed hospitality of interest. On the other hand, it would suffer the curse of neutrality, which might bring with it a fatal indifference to any religious interest as outside the political province. These deeper concerns are better secured by a Power which unites a positive appreciation of faith with a wide toleration of temper. No Power, to my mind, fulfils these conditions so well as Great Britain,—on one of the two sides which she shows in Palestine.

On one side, Great Britain is acting as a faithful custodian of the wider human interest. She is conserving the monuments, clearing the walls of the city, preventing alterations within the walls without official approval, encouraging historical research, establishing a museum of antiquities, co-operating with the Hebrew University. But this side of Great Britain must be summoned to keep with us a watchful eye upon that other, the imperialistic side, which has no mandate, whether from the League of Nations or from mankind, for enterprises on this soil which serve the Empire alone, the guarding of the Canal, the opening of communications to the East, the piping of Mosul oil to port. These enterprises, neither commanded nor forbidden by the mandate, may be taken as the understood consideration on which the mandate is accepted. We have no quarrel with that view so long as it is consistent with the character of Palestine and the welfare of its people. Let Great Britain, we say, serve herself as she may within the greater interest; but let her act first as an honest mandator. Let her put off her weak acquiescence in the trend to industrialization. Let her *retard* the inevitable changes

of an intrusive modernity, adjusting their pace to the awakening needs of the people, so that Palestine may retain the harmony of its customary life and of its aspect as it grows into new forms. And let her recognize the interest of the Arab states by securing to them free access from the interior to the sea, and freedom of trade and also of political intercourse across the obnoxious boundaries.

The two enemies of peace in the Holy Land are fanaticism and fear. The movement of the modern spirit within all creeds is having for one of its beneficent effects the gradual melting of fanaticism without argument. Fixed and antagonistic dogmas are transforming themselves into alternative sets of symbols which can dwell together. But fanaticism is kept alive and sharpened by fear: clashes at the Wailing Wall are symptoms of political rather than religious apprehension. These fears of displacement, of national thwarting, must be put at rest; and they can only be quieted by unequivocal public commitments, renouncing the intention to dominate and to exclude. Such public commitments tie leaders and masses together, and prevent the local heads from being rushed into excess by an extravagant momentum of demand which they themselves have encouraged. If there is to be peace within the gates of Jerusalem, the first condition, as I see it, is that Zionism publicly disavow its unholy alliance with western military power, and the attempt to interpret the mandate as an obligation pivoted solely on Zionist aims. Then, that Great Britain restate, not alone her policy toward Jew and Arab,¹¹ but her general conception of the mandate, in terms which clearly subordinate the interests of the Empire to the general human good. Then, as under such a mandate they might reasonably do, that Moslem authori-

¹¹ Written in June, 1930.

ties publicly accept the administrative separateness of the Palestinian area. With this degree of mutual sacrifice, interests now mutually repellent will be found to enlarge because they can interpenetrate.

CHAPTER XXII

POLITICAL ZIONISM

IN October, 1930, the British Government took the awaited and necessary step: it issued a statement of policy in Palestine. The White Paper of Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb) arrives to supplement the Churchill statement of 1922. Definition being wanted, Lord Passfield defines in black and white; states not only what His Majesty's Government will do and cannot be prevented from doing, but also what they will not do, and cannot be browbeaten into doing. A remarkable White Paper,¹ remarkably received.

For the first time since the launching of the mandate, a measure of Arab approval. The annual Arab celebration of the Balfour Declaration, namely, by a general *strike*, is called off by the Arab Executive. The Arab press growls more gently, gives signs of a relenting humor. *La Nation Arabe* heads its leading article, "*Faillite du Sionisme: à propos du Livre Blanc,—vers le triomphe du droit.*" There is good reason for this lifting of Arab heads: this White Paper, for the first time, proposes positive action in behalf of Arab population. It is time. The Mandates Commission has taken courage and offered plain criticism to the British Government for passivity toward Arab needs:

The Arab element might have found its interests safeguarded by a Government agricultural policy including, not only public works to develop the cultivable area, but also the organisation

¹ For the official name of this White Paper, cf. Footnote 6, p. 366 below.

of agricultural credit . . . together with an educational campaign which would have initiated them into the working of these institutions. . . . Such action could only be taken by the Government, for it could not be expected that the Arabs would take it themselves. Though undertaken for the direct benefit of the Arabs, it would have indirectly helped towards the establishment of the Jewish National Home.²

And Great Britain's own investigator, Sir John Hope Simpson, brings in a notable report carrying the same proposal.³ The White Paper promises action. These reasonable projects at once promote a reasonable state of mind in Arab Palestine: the opportunity exists for healing a sore spot in the world. And the White Paper, no doubt hoping for this effect, expressly invites Zionists to recognize "the necessity for making some concessions on their side," repeating the axiom that "it is only in a peaceful and prosperous Palestine that the ideals of the Jewish National Home can be realized."

What is the Zionist response? An emphatic and general repudiation of any such White Paper, punctuated by resignations of leading officials, among them Dr. Weizmann, chief spokesman of political Zionism since the war. Of the need for coming to terms with Arab feeling, of seeing the rare chance of the moment,—not a trace. These protests demonstrate the power, extent and determination of the Zionist Organization. They raise the serious question whether that power is among the forces making for peace in the world or for strife. Dr. Weizmann in resigning made it clear that he has little faith in getting on in Palestine by an understanding with Arab leaders: "If it is

² P. M. C., *Seventeenth Session*, p. 142.

³ *Palestine. Report on Immigration, Land Settlement, and Development*, by Sir John Hope Simpson, C. I. E., Cmd. 3686, October, 1930, p. 143. "A methodical scheme of agricultural development should be thought out and undertaken, which will ensure the use of the land of the country to better purpose than has been the case hitherto."

demanding of us that we should build our National Home absolutely without friction, we are being asked to do the impossible." Certainly, no important work is ever done on this planet without friction. But the time comes—and it concerns the public—when peace must be made. If this occasion for the meeting of minds is to be intemperately rejected, it must be on grave grounds, such as these: that Arab favor is being purchased by the sacrifice of Jewish rights, and thus of British honor. This is the accusation: the word "betrayal" is freely used. What are the grounds for this charge?

They reduce to two points, change of emphasis and the demand for delay.⁴

Of the change of emphasis there can be no doubt. In Mr. Churchill's view, this is the main difficulty.⁵ One feature of this change is the positive interest in the Arab case, above adverted to,—which change we cannot regard as a defect. With this goes an insistence on the equal weight of the two obligations of the mandate, toward the Jewish National Home and toward the non-Jewish population. If objection is made here, it must be because Zionism wishes to make the obligation to the National Home primary: Zionists often speak, indeed, as if the National Home were the whole object of the mandate, and the sole reason for the British appointment, forgetting that the mandate must in the nature of things have a wider purview than the Balfour Declaration. The White Paper ad-

⁴ Dr. Weizmann has expressed his view in a letter of October 29, replying to Lord Passfield's message of regret for his resignation. This letter, widely published in the press, may be found in *The Manchester Guardian Weekly*, November 7, 1930.

⁵ "The question which has to be judged is whether the new declaration of the Socialist Government departs from the position established in 1922. . . . Here it should be said that the difference is largely one of emphasis. . . . The alteration of the emphasis of a few passages and phrases might easily have brought the balance of the statement into harmony with the balance achieved in 1922." Press Dispatch, November 1, 1930.

verts to this view "that the principal feature of the mandate is the passages regarding the Jewish National Home, and that the passages designed to safeguard the rights of the non-Jewish community are merely secondary considerations. . . . This is a conception which His Majesty's Government have always regarded as totally erroneous." ⁶ But an equal regard to the two obligations, besides being the only decently just attitude of the mandatory, has already received the express sanction of the Mandates Commission ⁷ and is no longer a matter of debate.

There is, however, another phase of the change of emphasis, and that is a marked plainness of speech in criticizing the deeds and attitudes of both Zionists and Arabs. Thus, "His Majesty's Government feel bound to remark that they have received little assistance from either side in healing the breach" (p. 4). There has been "a press campaign in which the true facts of the situation have become obscured and distorted" (p. 4). There have been "sustained tension and agitation on both sides," also "pressure or threats," by which H. M. G. will not allow themselves to be moved! Here and there the Jewish Agency is mentioned as over-reaching its place. "Claims have been made on its behalf to a position in regard to the general administration of the country which H.M.G. cannot but regard as going far beyond the clear intention of the mandate" (p. 10). The co-operation between the Palestine Administration and the Jewish Agency is to be continued and improved; but this "special position of the Agency . . . cannot entitle the Agency as such to share in the government of the country" (p. 8). According to the mandate, the Government may arrange with the Agency for the construction or operation of public works, services, and utili-

⁶ *Palestine. Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government*, Cmd. 3692, October, 1930, p. 11.

⁷ P. M. C., *Seventeenth Session*, p. 145.

ties; but this provision is "permissive and not obligatory" (p. 10). These negations, taken together, amount to a re-proof of that zeal which, interpreting the undefined elements of the mandate in its own favor, had taken the risk of meeting just such rebuff. It had taken this risk for the second time. For Churchill's White Paper of 1922 had twice declared that the special position of the Zionist Executive "does not entitle it to share in any degree in the Government"; and the Shaw Report of March, 1930, noting that Zionist authorities had not kept within the agreed limits, had called for a more explicit statement,—not so much to restrain the Jews as to dispel the disturbing Arab belief "that the Zionist Organization, through pressure at home, can influence the acts of H.M.G." ⁸ To comply with this requirement, and to be at the same time ingratiating, was beyond the power of Lord Passfield's diplomacy. It did not occur to him to say as politely as did Mr. Churchill that the Zionist Executive "*has not desired to possess* and does not possess any share in the general administration." He had to meet an eager momentum, and he leaned bluntly against it. His "emphases" were depressive; and Dr. Weizmann could find in them "no basis for continuing that close co-operation with H.M.G. for which I have stood during so many years." Still, a dour emphasis is no ground for a charge of betrayal. The specific criticisms are not denied. To resign because of them carries a strong implication that one holds for just these policies of unbalance in favor of the National Home which that Paper points out as subversive.

The second point in the charge against the White Paper is the delay which it requires in Jewish colonization.

⁸ *Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929*, Cmd. 3530, March, 1930, p. 141.

Here again, this White Paper only carries out what the commissions of enquiry had demanded. Immigration policy and land policy being among the causes of trouble, facts were required and were forthcoming. The Simpson Report, claiming no finality, offers the best data available, and shows quite enough to make evident that immigration *must* pause. It differs from previous estimates in two ways: the cultivable land is less extensive (1,600,000 acres instead of 2,750,000 acres); and there is a showing of the number of landless rural Arab families,—a startling showing of nearly 30 per cent, say 25,000 families out of 87,000. There is also a rough estimate of unemployment, Arab and Jewish. The problem of Arab economy is of a magnitude not hitherto appreciated by anybody. The British Government has little choice. With the limited land available, every land transfer becomes “affected by a public interest,” and will now come under governmental control. There will be those measures for agricultural development called for by the Mandates Commission, and by all the other commissions. And until these measures begin to make way for increased population, there will be a checkage of the immigration of labor. The principle is announced that the preparation of the Labour Schedule for immigration must depend on the ascertainment of the total of unemployed in Palestine,⁹—Arab and Jewish considered together. It is nowhere proposed to stop immigration. It is not proposed to check it except under the head of labor, which is one of nine heads,—no doubt the most important.

Is this a scandalous proposal? Is it novel? Mr. Churchill had said in his acceptable White Paper of 1922: “It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that

⁹ *Simpson Report*, Cmd. 3686, October, 1930, p. 137.

they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment." But Mr. Churchill said nothing about unemployed Arabs; he did not propose that, if there were such Arabs, Jewish immigration should stop until they found work. The present White Paper seems to argue from Arab unemployment to no-immigration; forgetting that, if Jewish capital and Jewish labor come in together, the labor employed by that new capital, an existing state of unemployment is made no worse, and may even be relieved. Further (the political cynic observes), such a principle offers an easy handle to any one who might desire to stop Jewish immigration; for, if idle Arabs will have this effect, idle Arabs can be produced at will.

Have we rightly read the White Paper? It is not if Arab unemployment exists, it is *only if the immigration of Jews adds to that unemployment*, that immigration is to be restricted (p. 21). As the Simpson Report points out, "The principle of 'derived demand' would justify the immigration of Jewish labour even when there are Arab unemployed in the country, if the newly-imported Jewish labour is assured of work of a permanent nature through the introduction of Jewish capital" (p. 136). It would be hard to be more explicit.

When, therefore, Dr. Weizmann says in his protest that "Jewish immigration is to be restricted, not when it might cause unemployment, but whenever there is unemployment among the Arabs," he precisely misreads the careful statement of the White Paper.¹⁰ He objects to a sweeping restriction which it does not propose; he implicitly approves the reasonable restriction which it does propose.

¹⁰ Dr. Weizmann further misreads the White Paper when he says that according to it "every landless Arab cultivator, even though he never possessed land or never lost land as the result of Jewish settlement, has a right to be settled on the land as a farmer before Jews may acquire land for close settlement" (Letter to Lord Passfield, October 29, 1930). When the leaders misread, the followers are widely misled.

But *why this haste* on the part of Zionism? Why should the proposal of delay be denounced as betrayal? The answer lies partly in the continued sufferings of Jews in the "zone of incurable anti-Semitism" in Eastern Europe, immigration from which has been stopped or checked by various lands formerly open to them. But it lies chiefly in a race for security through numbers, a desire to reach a position of equivalence with the other elements of Palestine, so that the representative institutions which are certain to come will find the Jews ready to hold at least their own. This desire is masked under a professed fear of "crystallization." The idea of crystallization, and the word also, was provided by the Mandates Commission. In indicating that the mandate placed no obligation on Great Britain to realize the National Home within a fixed time-limit, it said:

"The policy of the Mandatory would not be fairly open to criticism unless it aimed at crystallizing the Jewish National Home at its present stage of development."¹¹

Crystallization, then, is the bad thing; for it is evidently hard to get out of a crystalline into a fluid state again. The Mandates Commission defines the evil only to say of the British policy that it "deserves no such reproach." But to those who like Mr. Sacher and Mr. Jabotinski desire to move on without pause or political settlement to achieve a Jewish majority, "so that under a democratic rule the Jewish point of view should always prevail,"¹² or who propose to bring in 30,000 Jews per annum for sixty years, to relieve Eastern Europe, any slackening from the present relatively modest rate would seem a standstill. To such

¹¹ P. M. C., *Seventeenth Session*, p. 145.

¹² *Shaw Report*, Cmd. 3530, March, 1930, p. 109.

Zionists (of whom the extreme party are called Revisionists) mass colonization will alone realize the National Home; and "a large scale of colonization . . . is a Government enterprise by nature and can only be completed if the Government by legislative and administrative action supports the colonization." One is at a loss where to look for examples of such governmentally managed mass-transfers, unless in the forced exchanges of peoples between Turkey and Greece; and we will not impute to the Revisionists this ambition. But it is clear that the plight of the Palestinian Arabs has become of little moment to them in the preoccupation with their own objectives. The "betrayal" of the White Paper consists in its allowing so minor and usual a matter as Arab distress to prescribe a temporary pause in the main objective. "There are always landless and idle Arabs."

These being the charges, the implication is that Zionism has a rightful claim upon the British Government for a different emphasis and a different rate of speed. What is the basis of these claims,—claims so assured that they go to the extent of threat? These claims are appeals to the letter of a certain bond, the Balfour Declaration. A vague bond, to be sure; worded in generalities, like all foundation-laying state-papers, and requiring to be interpreted. There is nothing in these few words which can be held against British policy. Transmitted to Lord Rothschild as a "declaration of sympathy," the Declaration contains no promise to establish a National Home—that establishing being necessarily the work of the Zionists themselves—but to "use their best endeavours to facilitate" this object, while holding intact the interests of the other groups in Palestine. Certainly there is nothing in the Declaration to prescribe either the emphasis or the rate of speed of the

development.¹³ The Churchill White Paper and the denounced Passfield White Paper being authoritative interpretations, an appeal from the interpretation to the original would seem to find little foothold, unless a more authoritative interpreter can be found.

But the Balfour Declaration itself, which had one thing to do, namely to announce favor for a National Home: is that a satisfactory ground of right?

On the purely legal side, the Declaration is a mere flourish unless Great Britain has some right and competence to dispose of Palestine, a question to which I shall return. But, assuming this, the Declaration is still legally precarious. It is subject to the Treaty of Versailles, and especially to the Covenant of the League, whose Article XX expressly cancels any other obligation or agreement which may be inconsistent with the Covenant.¹⁴ Now the Balfour Declaration is inconsistent with Article XXII of the Covenant. For this Article would bring Palestine under a typical A-mandate, with a "provisional independence" and a prospect of complete independence. But

¹³ The Balfour Declaration.

Foreign Office,
November 2nd, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur James Balfour.

¹⁴ "The Members of this League severally agree that the Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof. . . ."

the Declaration makes such a mandate impossible. There can be no provisional independence in a land subject to a protected immigration. The A-mandate considers the welfare of the residents; whereas the Declaration considers also the welfare of a nation of non-residents, making the Jewish people of the world as a whole virtual or potential citizens of the state to be. Accordingly, Article 1 of the mandate, instead of announcing a régime of "aid and advice," provides a régime of direct administration: "The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate." As for the ultimate withdrawal of the mandatory, while Article 28 considers a time when the "Administration of Palestine" will merge in a "Government of Palestine," the constitution of this Government is left undetermined. Self-determination is thus at a minimum in Palestine. And such straw-vote as the King-Crane Commission¹⁵ took, found an overwhelming sentiment against the National Home. The legal logic of the Arab case against the present validity of the Balfour Declaration would seem unanswerable.

However, the endorsers of the Balfour Declaration were also framers and signers of the Covenant,—the same people, a year and a half later. It is clear that in signing the Covenant they had no intention of repudiating the Declaration. A well-developed program of Zionist development came before the Peace Conference and was considered with favor. This can only mean that it was understood among them, and lay in the nature of things, that the case of Palestine is an exception to all general rules, including the general principles of Article XXII. This exceptional nature had been recognized in all save one of the inter-Allied secret treaties, long before any Balfour Declara-

¹⁵ Cf. pp. 254f., above.

tion was thought of: it failed to come to light only in the negotiations with Hussein, where it was most needed. For by this failure, the Arabs, who alone also among the Allies concerned were not consulted in framing the Declaration, are justified in appealing from it, not only to the Hussein agreement but also to Article XXII.¹⁶

The force of the Zionist claim, then, cannot rest on the Balfour Declaration, but rests on the considerations moral and other which gave rise to it. The Declaration itself is a mere announcement of obligation; a public commitment based on a prior unwritten duty. By Lord Balfour himself it was regarded as an act of delayed justice. When Lord Islington moved in the House of Lords that Great Britain, on account of the National Home, should not accept the mandate for Palestine, Lord Balfour put the case, quoted in abbreviated form, as follows:

“Their [the Jews’] position and their history, their connection with world religion and with world politics, is absolutely unique. There is no parallel to it, there is nothing approaching a parallel to it. Here you have a small race originally inhabiting a small country, I think of about the size of Wales or Belgium . . . at no time wielding material power, sometimes crushed in between great Oriental monarchies, its inhabitants deported, then scattered, then driven out of the country altogether into every part of the world, and yet maintaining a continuity of religious and racial tradition of which we have no parallel elsewhere.

“Consider whether the whole culture of Europe, the whole religious organisation of Europe, has not from time to time proved itself guilty of great crimes against this race. . . . Nobody will deny that they have at least rowed all their weight in the boat of scientific, intellectual and artistic progress, and they are doing so to this day. And yet, is there anyone here who feels content with the position of the Jews?

¹⁶ For their statement of the case, cf. *Correspondence with the Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization*, Cmd. 1700, June, 1922, pp. 11f.

"Do not your Lordships think that if Christendom, not oblivious of all the wrong it has done, can give a chance, without injury to others, to this race of showing whether it can organise a culture in a Home where it will be secured from oppression that it is not well to say, if we can do it, that we will do it. We should then have given them what every other nation has, some place, some local habitation, where they can develop the culture and the traditions which are peculiarly their own."¹⁷

There is here no mention of the claim based on ancient possession, which claim has no standing in law or right. Frequently as it is appealed to, it vanishes before the 1300 years of Arab possession. If one seeks to accent this historic claim by the statement that the Jews were "driven out" of their homeland, the assumption is that *conquest gives no rights*; and in that case the British have no right to dispose of the land from which they have driven out the Turks. This plea is in any case less cogent in the case of the Jews than in most other cases; for they were not driven out of Palestine, though this is a common myth into which even Lord Balfour falls. They were temporarily driven out of Jerusalem. Under the emperors following Hadrian they had for the most part full liberty to return even to that city. But, once Jerusalem had been destroyed with its temple and priesthood, and a Roman city built in its place, a temple of Jupiter on the site of the temple of Jahweh, there was a voluntary exodus of Jews from Palestine, focusing their lives in other centers to which Jews had already migrated, notably Babylonia and Alexandria. Many never left Palestine, continuing in Safed and Tiberias, and setting up in Jamnia on the coast a notable school of rabbinical learning: there was no attempt to drive them out. There is extraordinarily little in the history of the first and second centuries of our era to warrant

¹⁷ Earl Balfour, *Speeches on Zionism*, pp. 59-63.

a Jewish claim in Palestine in analogy to the claim of an individual to stolen property. Not until Heraclius (628-635) was there a determined fit of general expulsion; and after his brief rage the tide flowed back.

The substantial basis of this claim, I repeat, is moral. It arises (1) from the religious attachments of the Jews and (2) from that instinct of cultural pregnancy which craves not only some physical basis of national life, but a special soil and sky. No one has expressed this need more poignantly than Dr. J. L. Magnes:

"The Jewish People has and can have no other historical center than the Land of Israel. . . . Palestine can help this people to understand itself, to give an account of itself, to an intensification of its culture, a deepening of its philosophy, a renewal of its religion. . . . It is holy for us in a practical and a mystic sense. Its holiness attracts our old and our young, the religious and the non-religious from far away places, and they want to work its soil, and build up an ethical community, and thereby make the land still more sacred. Its very landscape and colour help every child and simple man among us to understand our classic literature and our history. It helps us as through no other means to lay bare our very soul, to get down into the sources of our being. . . . Does history really mean so much? The individual does without it, but the community is a Beduin camp without it."¹⁸

The only Zionism which has a right in Palestine is the Zionism which feels the force of these essentially ethical demands; and the rights which that Zionism has can by no Declaration exceed the rights which these considerations require.

In Zionist programs we may distinguish two policies:

"The one maintains that we can establish a Jewish Home here through the suppression of the political aspirations of the Arabs,

¹⁸ J. L. Magnes, *Like All the Nations*, pp. 19, 22-23, 25-26.

and therefore a Home necessarily established on bayonets over a long period—a policy which I think bound to fail because of the violence against us it would occasion, and because good opinion in Britain and the conscience of the Jewish People itself would revolt against it. The other policy holds that we can establish a Home here only if we are true to ourselves as democrats and internationalists, thus being just and helpful to others, and that we ask for the protection of life and property the while we are eagerly and intelligently and sincerely at work to find a *modus vivendi et operandi* with our neighbours.”¹⁹

This latter policy Dr. Magnes resumes in three demands: immigration, settlement on the land, Hebrew life and culture. “If you can guarantee these for me I should be willing to yield the Jewish ‘state’ and the Jewish ‘majority.’ ” There is here no prescription of emphasis, nor of rate of speed.²⁰

The Zionism, then, which clashes with the White Paper on grounds of emphasis and speed is not the whole of Zionism, but a party: altogether the most vocal party, because, committed to the use of the political weapon, it is itself politically organized. This political Zionism is of recent date.

Its birthplace was Austria, and its early strongholds the Germanic countries of Europe; its official organ, *Die Welt*, was published in Berlin, and its early colonies were Yiddish-speaking colonies. It was a response to a new variety of anti-Semitism, systematic and theory-led, lively in those lands toward the end of the past century, stinging the pride and national feeling of Jewry, and especially of Theodor Herzl, journalist and playwright of Vienna, out of the belief that their destiny was to be “assimilated” in the nations of their residence. The alternative was to in-

¹⁹ J. L. Magnes, *Like All the Nations*, p. 30.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

sist once more on the separate Jewish nationality and to strike out for a Jewish land.

It was in 1896 that Herzl's pamphlet, "The Jewish State," roused hope and fervor by marking out a promising course of action. Palestine being in Turkish hands, a charter must be obtained from the Sultan to settle Palestine as a whole,—the same Sultan who four years earlier had forbidden Jews to enter Palestine or to own land there. Still, the Sultan might be won over. Jewish Palestine would pay a handsome tribute to the Porte as suzerain and protector. The state would be organized in such a way that all other religions would be tolerated, and their holy places set apart under extra-territorial jurisdiction: Moslem interests and Christian interests would thus be met, as guest-interests in a Jewish community.

Evidently, if Zionism is to make *début* as a factor in the politics of Europe and Asia, it must organize its resources and its sentiments, becoming subject at the same time to mass-feeling and mass-will. There must be conferences, resolutions, programs. The first conference, at Basle, 1897, brings Herzl's plan to clear definition of end and means. The end, a home in Palestine, but specifically "a publicly and legally assured home." The means, four in number. First, promoting the settlement in Palestine, not of rabbis, artists, literati, but of farmers, artisans, industrials,—the body-material for Plato's Republic and for all republics. Then, second and third, the world-wide federation of local Jewish groups, with a deliberate strengthening of Jewish feeling, personal dignity, national consciousness,—reversing the note of assimilation. Finally, the specifically political method,—“preparatory steps for the attainment of governmental grants,” or, as the French version has it, “*des démarches préparatoires pour obtenir le consentement des gouvernements.*”

The one *démarche* first evidently indicated was the formidable one in the direction of the Porte: Herzl did not hesitate before the task. And, had he been able to secure at that time fifty million francs, less than a fifth of what Zionism has since spent in Palestine, the Sultan might have been gained. Underneath his persistently hostile front there was at least one moment when he was secretly amenable. For, sensible that Europe had been roused almost to the fighting point by his massacres of Armenians, he thought he saw an opportunity to buy back a degree of favor. He went so far as to send a secret messenger to treat with English Jews, offering them the coveted charter if they would use their influence to explain and support his Armenian policies. It is to the lasting honor of these English Zionists that, with the goal so nearly within reach, they declined to consider the bribe: they could not attain Jewish release from persecution by becoming parties to the persecution of another race. Zionism was at this moment strong in its native idealism.

At the outbreak of the War, Herzl was gone and the political *démarches*, many in number, reaching even to the Holy See, had so far come to nothing. A group of "practical" Zionists, impatient of waiting for governmental favors, had made beginnings of colonization, difficulties or no difficulties. When it became evident that the War would involve the Ottoman Empire and perhaps end it, Zionist counsels were divided: if political advances were to continue, it would be necessary to treat with the victor,—which would it be? Zionism, we say, had been centered in Germanic countries. Already in 1915 many Zionists began to sense the perils of the military-political entanglements in which the more zealous were likely to involve them. Mr. David Alexander and Mr. Claude G. Montefiore pub-

lished a manifesto pointing out these dangers.²¹ Dr. J. L. Magnes resigned from the American Zionist Executive Committee, writing these words:

"I want equal rights for the Jews, no more and no less, in all parts of the world, including Palestine. I do not want it said as it has been said that the Jews of Russia, for example, should be denied equal rights in that country in view of the more than equal rights they are supposed to receive in Palestine at the end of the war at the expense of the Ottoman State. . . . The war cannot give Palestine to the Jews; the Turkish Government cannot give Palestine to the Jews. All that the war can give to the Jews, all that the Turkish Government can give to the Jews, is free ingress into Palestine and equal rights as I have described them."²²

Dr. Magnes' resignation was accepted on the ground that the views thus stated were "no longer in agreement with the Basle program."

During 1917, the cause of the Allies was in grave danger. "It was the time," said Mr. Churchill, "when many hitherto unswerving despaired of victory. It was the moment when most resolute elements of the British Government sought to enlist every influence that could hold Allied and Associated nations to their task." In February of that year—note the date—Sir Mark Sykes (he of the Sykes-Picot Agreement) began discussions with Zionist leaders. It will be remembered that the United States did not enter the war until April, and that Russia, though not yet down, was staggering toward revolution: it was widely felt that the turn of the tide depended on keeping Russia in the war and on bringing the United States into it. It is also to be recalled that of the 14 million Jews then in the world, *7 millions were in Russia and 3 millions in the United States*. Note Mr. Churchill's further words:

²¹ *London Times*, May 24, 1917.

²² *Like All the Nations*, pp. 48f.

"The Zionist movement throughout the world was actively pro-Ally and in a special sense pro-British. Nowhere was this movement more noticeable than in the United States, and upon the active share of the United States in the bloody struggle which was impending rested a large proportion of our hopes. The able leaders of the Zionist movement and their widespread branches exercised an appreciable influence upon American opinion. . . .

"The Balfour Declaration, therefore, must not be regarded as a promise given from sentimental motives: it was a practical measure taken in the interests of a common cause, at a moment when that cause could afford to neglect no factor of material or moral assistance."²³

This remarkable statement implies that the motive for the Balfour Declaration was not mere desire to do an act of belated justice: that Zionist Jewry had something of great weight to give, something which merely as citizens of Allied countries they might not give, and that the Declaration was designed to secure this something. What was this *quid pro quo*? Mr. Churchill's statement is enough to show that there was one; but it does not stand alone. Mr. Lloyd-George (likewise in attacking the Passfield paper), said,

"At a most critical moment in the War we were anxious to secure the good-will of the Jewish community throughout the world on the side of the Allies. The Balfour Declaration about Palestine was a gesture not merely on our part but on the part of the Allies to secure that valuable support."²⁴

²³ Interview of Nov. 1, 1930, published by Jewish Telegraphic Agency, distributed by Universal Service, Inc., and appearing in various British and American papers.

²⁴ *New York Times*, October 25, 1930. To the same effect, the Marquess of Reading in the House of Lords, October 25, 1930: "No ground should be left for the complaint that this country in time of war promised the Allied nations to certain things, and that after the dangers were passed had taken a different view and ignored those promises." The passing of dangers has no bearing on the promise unless the promise in some way secured relief from those dangers. General Smuts's remarks in this connection have the same implication.

This chorus of statesmen's voices seems inspired by a common desire

Did the British statesmen at that moment suppose that the promise of Palestine would wean away Jewish minds in Germany, Austria and German Palestine from the cause of the Central Powers to that of the Allies? Did they suppose that Russian Zionists would nerve the Russian armies to keep the field? Did they suppose that the Zionists of America would be led, beyond the point of their own convictions, to urge us into the War or to hold us, once in, to the task beyond the point of *our* convictions? Or was there financial aid to be secured which, without that promise, would not have been forthcoming? ²⁵ Whatever correspondence may have preceded the Declaration itself has not been published. But we do know (again in Lloyd-George's words) that the Declaration "was issued for reasons which were regarded by the Allies as paramount to the great conflict then going on," reasons, then, belonging to the realm of temporal exigency rather than to the realm of eternal justice. There were pro-Zionist members of the Cabinet, like Lord Balfour, to whom that justice which Mr. Churchill would classify among the "sentimental motives" was doubtless dominant. The Declaration itself, given in a public act, and able to justify itself in the public mind, rises high above the level of the secret treaties. But it had another aspect, not yet revealed to the public eye,—to men like Churchill and Lloyd-George its most significant aspect,—which classifies it with the other war-bargains.

to come to the defence of the Balfour Declaration by showing that it was no mere deed of justice, but an act which had been paid for by some very substantial price of great importance at the time; and therefore of exceptional obligation!

²⁵ Comte R. de Goutaut-Biron makes much of the fact that in 1916-1917 the Allies were trying to negotiate loans in the United States, and ventures to say, "The great American Jewish bankers made their coöperation depend on explicit engagements on this point (*i.e.*, on favoring the National Home)." *Comment la France s'est installée en Syrie*, p. 153. He gives no evidence for this statement, which seems to require a privileged knowledge of the secrets of high finance, and may, I believe, be treated by us as imaginary.

Various glimpses of the diplomatic process make their way to light here and there. We know that Zionists were active in devising the formula for the Declaration. Also that they preferred to the formula finally adopted this one: that Great Britain will facilitate "the reconstitution of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people,"²⁶ —which would have obliged Great Britain to seek to make the whole of Palestine the Jewish State of Herzl's dream.

There is a dramatic appeal in this swift realization in 1917 of hopes that had been cherished for centuries, the fruition of the sternly objective imagination of that Austrian-Jewish mind in which the fancy of the playwright was wedded to the realism of the journalist become statesman for his race. At the outbreak of the War, Zion was reckoned by the hardheads of Europe among the negligible utopias. At the close it was a reality.

In this finally successful, or partly successful, *démarche* of political Zionism with the warring Allies, the movement became consciously committed to the "method of Joshua." Planning to share in the fruits of victory, Jewish detachments fought with Allenby in Palestine. The moral right was to be supplemented by the right of conquest. What need then to consider too tenderly the alleged rights of present inhabitants, whose ancestors had usurped our places? Those who pressed for "the reconstitution of Palestine as the National Home" were not troubled by this scruple: they were willing to commit the whole movement to a policy which would have brought the Arab world to arms. But even the milder policy carries the same willing invocation of force. "It might be asked why the Moslems should now be more uncompromising toward the Jews than they had been under the Turkish régime. The answer to

²⁶ Asher Ginzberg (Ahad Ha'am) in preface to a new printing of "At the Crossways," translated by J. L. Magnes and printed in *Like All the Nations*, p. 70.

that was obvious: under the Turkish régime there had been no Balfour Declaration.”²⁷ Becoming political, Zionism adopts the political methods in vogue and accepts the reaction of those methods upon the spirit of the movement itself.²⁸

Zionism is under peculiar temptation to use the political methods, and in peculiar danger from doing so. It is under peculiar temptation because these appear to be in a practical world the methods that “get us somewhere.” It is in a peculiar danger, because the religious animus is mortally sensitive to the means it employs. The tendency of politics is to develop partisan feeling, fear and suspicion across borders, exclusiveness, sharpening of boundaries and deepening of gulfs, propaganda and misrepresentation, disparity between profession and practice, an ultimate reliance on *force majeure*. Has Zionism escaped these dangers? We have in Palestine a possibility of comparing the spirit of the new political element with that of the non-political pre-war settlers. Sir John Hope Simpson presents this picture:

“In so far as the past policy of the P.I.C.A. [Palestine Jewish Colonization Association, pre-War] is concerned, there can be no doubt that the Arab has profited largely by the installation of the colonies. Relations between the colonists and their Arab neighbors were excellent. In many cases, when land was bought by the P.I.C.A. for settlement, they combined with the development of the land for their own settlers similar development for the Arabs who previously occupied the land. All the cases which are now quoted by the Jewish authorities to establish the advantageous effect of Jewish colonisation on the Arabs . . . are cases relating to colonies established by the P.I.C.A., before the Keren-Hayesod

²⁷ Mr. H. C. Luke, Acting High Commissioner at the time of the disturbances in August, 1929, before the Permanent Mandates Commission, *Seventeenth Session*.

²⁸ When the Declaration is announced as part of the Turkish Treaty, the Shofar, Joshua's trumpet of ram's horn, is sounded in Jerusalem.

[the chief Zionist Agency] came into existence. In fact, the policy of the P.I.C.A. was one of great friendship for the Arab. . . . They employed the Arab to tend their plantations, cultivate their fields, to pluck their grapes and their oranges. . . . It is also very noticeable, in travelling through the P.I.C.A. villages, to see the friendliness of the relations which exist between Jew and Arab. It is quite a common sight to see an Arab sitting in the verandah of a Jewish house. The position is entirely different in the Zionist colonies.”²⁹

In colonies of the Zionist Organization it is made a matter of principle to employ only Jewish labor. There are two motives for this: to avoid founding the social life of the colonies on cheap labor, with a lower standard of living than Jewish labor; to keep for Zionism all the advantage of Jewish spending. It is reiterated that Jewish funds will not be given if they are to be spent in providing support for Arabs. The fact that such spending is a second use of the money, the Zionist settler who spends it receiving full benefit in terms of the labor he buys, is not considered. One needs only extend this principle to see its tendency, viz., that no matter how many times the money is turned over, it should be turned always into Jewish hands, thus helping to support an indefinite number of settlers, and to solidify the Jewish community,—also to insulate it. Sir John quotes a lease of the Jewish National Fund as follows:

“ . . . The lessee undertakes to execute all works connected with the cultivation of the holding only with Jewish labour. Failure to comply with this duty by the employment of non-Jewish labour shall render the lessee liable to the payment of a compensation of ten Palestinian pounds for each default. The fact of the employment of non-Jewish labour shall constitute adequate proof as to the damages . . . and it shall not be necessary to serve on the lessee any notarial or other notice. Where the

²⁹ *Simpson Report*, Cmd. 3686, October, 1930, pp. 50f.

lessee has contravened the provisions of this Article three times the Fund may apply the right of restitution of the holding, without paying any compensation whatever."

The working of this policy must be considered in connection with the policy of land ownership. According to the Constitution of the Jewish Agency (Zurich, 1929), "Land is to be acquired as Jewish property . . . title to be taken in the name of the Jewish National Fund, to the end that the same shall be held as the inalienable property of the Jewish people."³⁰ The aim of this policy is the natural one, No slipping back, and (in conjunction with other measures) the prevention of the growth of large individual holdings: but among its effects is the practical removal of the land forever from the resources of Arab Palestine, and the creation of a closed community within a population which has its natural lines of interdependence among all members, and whose ordinary exchange is the best guarantee of mutual knowledge. One might consider that such group enclosure needs no artificial encouragement. There is always the disposition of the national sense and its loyalties to promote the patronizing of Jews by Jews, as of Irish by Irish, or of Swiss by Swiss: and this deal-with-your-own-kind spirit is emphasized in the Jew by inheritance and history. It would seem that the influence of new institutions should be rather toward breaking down the separate impulse than toward accentuating it by penalties. One may give full weight to the laudable elements in the aims of these measures and yet see in their

³⁰ "Actually the result of the purchase of land . . . by the Jewish National Fund has been that land has been extra-territorialised. It ceases to be land from which the Arab can gain any advantage either now or at any time in the future. Not only can he never hope to lease or to cultivate it, but, by the stringent provisions of the lease of the Jewish National Fund, he is deprived for ever from employment on that land. Nor can any one help him by purchasing the land and restoring it to common use. The land is in mort-main and inalienable." (*Simpson Report*, Cmd. 3686, October, 1930, p. 54.)

total impact "a constant and increasing source of danger to the country";³¹ one can understand that for such reasons as these the "Arabs discount the professions of friendship and good will on the part of the Zionists."³²

And, in truth, one is compelled to observe, as another incident of the political spirit, a psychological and practical tendency to disregard Arab interests, while repeatedly professing great concern for them. The benefits which are widely advertised as reaching the Arabs are for the most part incidental to the Jewish development.³³ Let the Government propose to devote any part of its resources to the fellah, and there are protests because a degree of taxation may fall on Jews for measures which benefit the Arabs first. To use any of the state lands mentioned in Article 6 of the mandate for landless Arabs is counted a flagrant breach of faith. Mr. Harold Loeb, writing in *The New Republic* under the caption "Zion for Arabs," is full of scorn because Great Britain shows a concern for them which it has not shown to their equally depressed relatives in Iraq: "There are always unemployed and landless Arabs in Palestine." When Dr. Weizmann shows irritation because the British Government appears to assume an obligation toward "every landless Arab and his family," he illustrates the unhappy influence of the political obsession upon a profoundly humane spirit. The same insensitivity is shown in the suggestion that the Arabs of Palestine

³¹ *Simpson Report*, Cmd. 3686, October, 1930, p. 55.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 54. One of the Arab leaders expresses himself as follows, "It is paradoxical that while the Zionists repeatedly state that it is their desire to live in peace and co-operation with us, since the beginning of their work here after the war they have hardly recognized our existence. Not in a single one of their enterprises were we asked to participate. We were ostracised as if we were their enemies."

³³ With Mr. Maurice Samuel, this is quite definitely avowed. "In this point . . . the Jews do not pretend to act as philanthropists. They are compelled to develop the rights of the Arab people, because they cannot securely otherwise treat for their own *vis-à-vis* the Arabs." *On the Rim of the Wilderness*, p. 232.

might well be transferred to other places, as Trans-jordan.

Sir Mark Sykes was a better adviser when he said:

"It is the destiny of the Jews to be closely connected with the Arab revival, and co-operation and goodwill are necessary from the first. . . . Jerusalem is a terrain throbbing with history: it is inflammable ground, and a careless word or gesture may set half a continent aflame. Jewish policy will not be realized by diplomacy, tact, delicacy, or the virtues of the drawing-room politician. Jerusalem calls for more than that. It does not call for toleration, but for sympathy, understanding, compassion, sacrifice: sympathy with the Moslem, to whom the Mosque of Omar is the most sacred spot on earth; understanding the Christian who feels that in helping Zionism he is doing something to make a great amend. Sacrifice all sense of triumph, or old memories of ancient wrong. Approach it not in a spirit of toleration, but of brotherhood and affection."³⁴

These words, applauded to the echo and endorsed by Zionist leaders at a time when the enterprise was still but a fair hope, may show by contrast how the political connection has denatured the moral attitude of the Zionist movement, until it fails to recognize and use the moment when an understanding with the Arabs is possible.

When Professor Albert Einstein was leaving America in the spring of 1931, he addressed in New York a great gathering of Zionists, who were inaugurating a drive for funds. He spoke briefly, and his address was immediately translated from German into English. Two of his statements were especially noteworthy,—I translate from my own memory of his words,—

"To bring about an understanding between Jews and Arabs is not the responsibility of Great Britain: it is the responsibility of the Jews.

³⁴ Speech in Hippodrome at Manchester, December 9, 1917.

“And to reach such an understanding is not less important than the building of new institutions in Palestine.”

In the English translation as read to the audience, the second of these two statements was omitted. Both statements are profoundly true; the second in particular seems to mark a spiritual position which political Zionism can no longer attain.

But why is it the especial responsibility of the Jews to effect this understanding with the Arabs? Is this simply what each side of a dispute is bound to say to itself,—“I must make the first advance”? It is more than this. Those very advantages in terms of western culture wherein the Zionists are prone to contrast themselves favorably with the Arabs, those advantages impose the obligation. If they are truly moral and spiritual advantages, they will show themselves in the capacity to include and to reach agreement.

One would like to believe it the destiny of the Jews to demonstrate, in a world which reluctantly believes in anything beyond physical energy, the reality of a purely moral force. If this is the case, it will be well for them to reconsider the cost of the political aspect of Zionism; recalling how the zealots of the time of Titus, by appealing to arms, brought down on Jewish heads the destruction of the Temple.

Already there are manifestations of this type of reaction in the world outside of Palestine. The last clause of the Balfour Declaration contains an appeal to this wider world: “it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice . . . the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” It was foreseen that making a National Home would tend to emphasize the national separateness of the Jews in every land,

diminishing whatever firm inherence they had in the nation of their residence, and thus tending to undo the long work of winning equal status which in some spots of the earth was achieved. The Balfour Declaration, having no power over the laws, still less over the moods, of "any other country," could only utter the pious wish that no such prejudice should occur. It begins to occur. The existence of the Hebrew University in Palestine is taken as an excuse for making Jewish matriculation more difficult in various Continental universities, even though the Hebrew University confers no degrees. This reaction, which may be noted as typical, has no reference to the University, but is, I judge, a vague response of the world's feeling to the attitude of Zionist leaders in Palestine. The unvocal Judaism of the world is not well represented by its political comrades.

Let me resume by recurring to my thesis: the only Zionism that can show a claim of right in Palestine is a truly ethical Zionism. And to this Zionism the Balfour Declaration is a doubtful aid.

"There is no use at this stage," said Mr. Churchill, "in examining whether the obligations which Great Britain has contracted by the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate were wise or unwise. The sole question is whether they are being fulfilled." But, if we are not to examine the wisdom of these obligations now, when shall we examine it? It is perhaps *the* actual question in the case, not whether Great Britain was wise, but whether she was within her right either legally or morally in contracting the obligation, or the Zionist movement in accepting it. In no case is it more essential than in this case to break through the terminus of mental vistas created by a legal document, and find the bases of that agreement.

On the legal and ethical right of Great Britain, I have given my judgment that the pressure of war led her and her Allies into a deed of gift of property not their own. Consider a moment. You and I are among the millions having an interest in Palestine: who empowered these combatants to dispose of our interests there? Are these interests pure intangibles? Not quite. Imagine that in the fortunes of the campaign strong military motives had arisen for bombarding Jerusalem, or for blowing the old city to bits as an age-long source of trouble in the world, would not the warriors or the conquerors have hesitated, on account of some rightful indignation which they would realize as due them from people like ourselves? Our right is made of the same stuff as that right of religious sentiment appealed to by Mr. Balfour in his plea for the National Home. We have joint rights there with Jews, Arabs and Christians of all stripes: and I repeat that the "right of conquest" is incompetent at this age of the world to gather these rights into any military fist.

Nor had the political Zionists a better right to accept this illegitimate gift, with the tinge of war-bargain quality which cannot be washed out of it. Was something of the Jewish influence of the world purchasable in 1917? Did the cause of the Allies become better and that of the Central Powers worse to many Jews because Palestine was thrown into the scales? Had this part of Jewry so little stake in the War that it could hold in reserve until then what others were giving without compensation? And, if so, was it then ready to abandon this state of poised indifference and fight—against its principle of neutrality—for the sake of the Promised Land? There is no escape from the moral dilemma established by the element of war-bargain, however subtle. And one presses the question, By what authority could any group of Zionist leaders tie up the

fortunes of Zionism with such a bargain? If there has been any "betrayal of Zionism" it is here: the betrayal of true Zionism by its political left hand.

In one of the early years of the war, Rabbi Mosensohn of Jaffa addressed in Yiddish a large gathering of Zionists in Faneuil Hall in Boston. He lifted his audience to enthusiasm by an eloquent picture of the future mission of the Jews as interpreters between East and West. For the Jews know the heart of western civilization; and they know the Orient, whose blood flows in their veins. Just such interpretation is a function of growing importance in the years of increasing tension between the two great streams of civilized life. Placed in Palestine, in contact with both traditions, the Jew of Rabbi Mosensohn's picture might conceivably be the savior of the world from the horrors of a suicidal conflict of cultures. No one of his hearers but was moved by the nobility and sweep of his conception of the Jewish national mission in the coming generations. Let that conception prevail. But an interpreter must be freely chosen—not self-imposed; and must be trusted by both groups whose minds he would bring together.

PART VI

B- AND C-MANDATES AND COLONIES

CHAPTER XXIII

MANDATES AND COLONIES

EVERY A-mandate, we say, is an exception to the rule. Loose as the mandate plan was, each of these Arab regions, strong in individual character, has cracked the original outline of the type. Nevertheless, the mandate principle of trusteeship, non-sovereignty, international oversight, much-filtered admission of public opinion, begins to commend itself. What its place in the new world is to be we can better judge if we now widen our view for a moment to include mandates of the B and C classes.

In these groups there is a necessary rapprochement between mandates and colonies. As the mandate experiment fumbles or fails, mandates tend to become colonies; as it succeeds, colonies tend to become mandates. Any degree of success will overflow its defined banks. The mandate-idea cannot be localized in those regions which the accidents of war threw open to it; if it is applicable at all, it applies wherever advanced peoples are in charge of backward peoples.

For in point of history the mandate is little more than a codification of what colonial experience had already marked out as the required standard. Conventions about slavery, liquor traffic, military conscription, had not waited for the arrival of the mandate. Colonies were already on the way up. The war-talk reason for taking German colonies from Germany was not that they failed of being mandates, but that they failed of being tolerable colonies.

That the colony itself is a "sacred trust of Civilization" was a doctrine already here and there professed. Official definitions of the status of the Philippines approximate closely to the mandate-idea.¹ The mandate was simply the colony with its international conscience brought to blossom.

This rapprochement was no doubt a part of the original design. Mandate and colony under the same Power lay side by side in Africa: unified administration was bound to come. It is a part of the formula for the B-mandates that

"The mandatory shall be authorized to constitute the territory into a customs, fiscal and administrative union or federation with the adjacent territories under his own sovereignty or control, provided always that the measures adopted to this end do not infringe the provisions of this mandate."

The British mandated areas of the Cameroons and Togoland were early incorporated with the colonies of Nigeria and the Gold Coast; and the principle of this incorporation is accepted by the Permanent Mandates Commission.² French Togoland and Cameroons are similarly administered as parts of French Equatorial Africa. Ruanda Urundi became united with Belgian Congo under a law of August, 1925. At this moment the British Government has before it an elaborate report on "Closer Union of the

¹ In the words of McKinley's declaration, "The Philippines are ours, not to exploit them, but to develop them, to civilize them, to educate them, and to exercise them in the science of independent government"; which last phrase indicates that the word "ours" means less than ownership and contemplates an eventual withdrawal. Congress had laid down the condition of self-government, that of being able to maintain a stable government; and President Wilson in 1920 gave it as his judgment that this condition had been fulfilled. So far, the mandate-idea runs true to form, except for the international surveillance of administration. Unfortunately, a later declaration in Congress to the effect that for reasons of a military order the United States is not disposed to abandon its position in the Philippines, gives a rude shock to the conception. A Syrian-French writer comments, "C'est sans doute là un premier pas vers l'enterrement du généreux idéalisme des principes wilsoniens." Benoit Aboussouan, *Le Problème politique syrien*, p. 212, n.

² P. M. C., *Fifth Session*, p. 190.

Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa" involving the Tanganyika mandate, Kenya colony, and the protectorate of Uganda. Mergings of this sort are looked on with suspicion by Germany, who naturally sees in them an aim to complete the act of appropriating her former colonies, which the mandate holds in suspense. The Permanent Mandates Commission likewise has qualms of its own: there are obvious slopes down which, with the loss of a clean separate accounting, the mandated-half of such unions might slip from its grasp.³ Objections of this sort hold good only so long as it is supposed that in these unions the mandate moves toward the colony; in so far as the colony succeeds in moving toward the mandate, they vanish.

In general, since the War, colony practices have been moving toward mandate practices,—as was required by the situation, the great colonial Powers having set up as radical critics of the German ways of running a colony. They have been moving rapidly in all that pertains to internal administration and at least nominal interest in the well-being of natives. They have been moving with great difficulty toward the point of accepting responsibility to an international authority. The British colony of Kenya in East Africa may illustrate both tendencies. In 1918, one could still see gangs of laborers roped together and driven off to work on private plantations. In 1930, it can be said that "forced labor for private employers is now a thing of the past." This change has been brought about chiefly by the vigorous action of public opinion in England since 1921; and the *colons* of Kenya have no wish to see this interference with their private business increased by the offices of the League. On the contrary, being sturdily re-

³ P. M. C., *Nineteenth Session*, pp. 147-150: history of the discussion to November, 1930.

solved to carry the white man's burden in the white man's own way, they desire to have Tanganyika freed from this influence. "In the Crown Colony of Kenya there is a continuous agitation against the mandatory status of the neighboring territory of Tanganyika. And indeed it is difficult to imagine that the system at work in Kenya can remain permanently side by side with that in Tanganyika. One or other will give way: the principle of responsibility will be generally adopted, or arbitrary government will be extended." Kenya at present, like the Philippines, approaches mandate behavior, but rejects mandate oversight.

In the progress of the colonies, public opinion quite apart from the League has had a large share. It could hardly be otherwise: general attention in that quarter having been enlivened since the War and the agencies of knowledge and criticism vastly increased. Thus labor groups and Crown Commissions in Belgium calling attention to conditions of forced labor for private employers in the Congo ⁴ were able to limit if not to stop the practice in that region. The Portuguese Government was stirred by public criticism to enjoin (1926) similar doings in Portuguese Africa. The Liberian Government, finding itself advertised abroad as enjoying income from fees paid by employers for impressed labor, asked for an investigation and was investigated with effect. When French Equatorial Africa builds a railroad by forced labor from Brazzaville, its capital, to the ocean, and, when the death rate in the labor gangs becomes dimly known,—the highest ever recorded for such enterprise,⁵ criticism comes first not from the League but from within France. M. Robert Poulaine, contributor to *Le Temps*, Professor Henri

⁴ Rapport de la Commission pour l'étude du problème de la main d'œuvre au Congo Belge, 1925.

⁵ Reaching upward of three hundred per thousand in a single year.

Labouret, and others raise expostulatory voices; and the government undertakes reforms. There is a general stirring of conscience in France; there are conferences, pamphlets, societies for the study of colonial problems, much writing on the theme "*Comment se comporter à l'égard des indigènes des colonies.*" There is apprehension, too, a *malaise des administrateurs* as they become aware of a widespread "*malaise colonial*" and of an appalling depopulation. Thus colonial manners improve by a sound self-criticism, aided by an occasional and noteworthy *sursaut moral*; all this apparently independent change not unaffected by the fact that the mandate standard is in the world, and that modern governments cannot remain far behind it, once knowledge makes its way through to their own peoples.

But change in colonial practice is hastened by the fact that the League has a direct hold on the colonies of its members, as well as upon the mandates. The Covenant of the League binds these members (Article XXIII) "to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control," a phrase which might pass as perfunctory were there not an Assembly to put it into action. Through the initiative of the Assembly, a Temporary Slavery Commission is set up which does work, reaches out into the world and gets facts, takes forced labor into its province—where indeed it belongs, and stirs the world's conscience as well as the conscience of nations, leaving a demand for a Permanent Slavery Commission to help colonies and mandates out of these bogs. But further, by dint of the Treaty of Versailles, League members have made themselves into an International Labour Organization, having a mightily equipped Bureau or Office in Geneva, a formidable fact-finding and convention-proposing body, with annual Labour conferences to air and

actuate its work. League members have agreed (Article 421) to apply to their colonies, protectorates, and possessions such conventions as they have worked out in these conferences and have ratified. In this Labour Office there are men who know labor in their own persons (as one suspects the members of the Mandates Commission do not) and a penetrating intelligence goes out from them to make brethren of the workers of the world in all lands. It is the Labour Office that implements the Slavery Commission and works with the Mandates Commission on this phase of its interest. Thus the member states find their colonial policies in respect to labor at least as effectively studied as their mandate policies.

Having gone so far in recognizing an international responsibility for colonial administration, the Powers proceed with difficulty. France in particular finds it painful to be harried into colonial liberalism by outside monitors. There may be in this reluctance a certain suspicion of the sentimental view, and an unwillingness to be driven out of profitable arrangements by an overweighted humanitarianism. The *Association des Sciences Coloniales* and also the *Conseil Economique des Colonies* dwell on the importance of labor in upbuilding character and desire the governments to encourage this phase of education, while helping private enterprise! ⁶ Chambers of Commerce pass resolutions condemning the proposals of the Labour Office. *Le Temps* stirs the sleeping dog of "sovereignty." Others see in the proposed measures the work of envious rivals in the colonial field, desirous of limiting French prosperity. But perhaps M. Varenne strikes best the psychology of the matter when he says that "it is not necessary for the League of Nations or anyone else to call the attention of France

⁶ R. L. Buell, *Forced Labor*, Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Vol. V, No. 22, p. 414.

to these principles: France was the first to apply them.”⁷ And on the ground that self-correction, if it comes, is always better than other-correction, one may agree that the international censorship has something of the character of a nuisance. So we find France in 1930, acting with Belgium, Portugal, Abyssinia and Liberia—on the whole, not the best colonial company—to defeat any effort to increase the influence of the League in this direction, notably wrecking the British motion for a Permanent Slavery Commission.⁸

This attitude, reverting to the relative simplicity of the “sovereign” colonial government, natural enough as a reaction, loses the thread of the future. Self-correction is not hostile to the admonition of others. The pride, as well as the sincerity, of a great state is today measured by the wideness of its net for gathering information, criticism, judgment. There is only one ground on which it could be necessary to withdraw from the play of idea-forces in the international arena,—namely, if there were premises in play which could not be discussed between men of sense and good will.

So much for the general principle of the situation. But it remains a question of particular fact whether the existing international supervision is of the helpful or of the nuisanceful sort. To judge this, there is no better test than the issue of forced labor which we have spoken of in the large, and which on its own account now deserves a closer look.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 425f.

⁸ The grounds put forward were (1) that the terms of the Anti-Slavery Convention, which requested governments to submit information, did not require them to give account of their actions to any outside organ; (2) that sovereign rights are invaded by such requirement; (3) that a Permanent Slavery Commission might promote a Permanent Minorities Commission and who knows what other dangerous progeny! Behind such flimsy veils can modern governments fancy they conceal their corrupter motives?

CHAPTER XXIV

FORCED LABOR

NATIVE Africa is not a Garden of Eden. There is labor there, hard and long labor, as when the Chagas walk their fifteen to twenty miles a day carrying grass for their cattle. But this labor is what one might call natural labor, growing out of the obvious demands on one's own purpose: it is not labor for wages, nor for strangers, nor for objects one does not understand. What keeps up the will and the muscular strain is the clear mental link between the end and the means. One knows when the job will be finished. Continuous, clock-timed, overseered, gun-picketed labor on the roads, railroads, plantations, mines, settlements of foreigners, in return for pay-money, pay-checks, or possibly for tax-receipts which will buy nothing, need not be more laborious than this natural work; but it is mentally in another world, and as yet beyond the average native power of enjoyment.

However, the obligation to work is one of the primary lessons in civilization. Africa must somehow come to realize not alone the universal moral law of working for one's-bread, but also the law of working harder for more and better bread. As General Smuts puts it, "The gospel of labour is the most salutary gospel for him," the native African. No doubt. It is not quite obvious that this ancient rule carries with it a duty to become a glad grinder in the stranger's mills; but let this pass for the moment. The good roads needed for our business will ultimately help the native: they will some time relieve the heavy burdens

of portage and dissect the jungle. Meantime, to build them we must have more and faster portage, fiercer breaking of the jungle. It is a premise of the situation, is it not, that these roads and other public works must be built?

From our point of view, the opening of Africa is one of those enterprises for which we choose to use the term necessary. Africa, let us say, is of imperative value as a source of materials: there is a vast and impersonal something which we may call "world-demand," or even "world-need," which lights on African crops and minerals—gold, copper, diamonds, sisal, cotton, rubber—and sanctifies Extraction, and therefore all the agents and agencies of Extraction. If our money-system is to be based on gold, gold must be produced fast enough to keep prices from falling: we depend chiefly on Africa for that service, and wonder at present whether Africa is working hard enough. All this means plenty of labor, men and animals broken to regular habits of application, in a continent which, unlike Asia, is on the whole underpopulated. Our men can live there, in spots, but not as a rule at hard physical toil. Most of these livable spots (fused by General Smuts's sanguine imagination into a white vertebral column running from the Cape toward Cairo) are at a high altitude. The conclusion is clear: the native must work for us. The necessity affects not a few men, but whole populations.

Now, slavery is in bad odor, and we have engaged to get rid of it. There are some five million slaves left on the planet, we are told, and that means other millions of owners and dealers who have no scruples on the subject: but no one now offers a theoretical defence. However, we have no need of owning the men outright. Instead of having all the labor of a thousand men, one tenth of the labor of ten thousand men will do as well. Only, with regard to this

tenth we have to answer the same question as in slavery: shall it be at the native's desultory free will, or at our command?

In industrialized lands, supply and demand take care of the labor requirement. If not enough men appear at the wages offered, offer more. But in Africa this principle fails; for, first, there is a strict limit to the wage we are willing to give,¹ and, second, the wage-figure strikes no spark in the native eye. Certainly, there are volunteers, even converts to the idea of labor among the Africans: employment has an attractive force, especially when tribal supplies run low, and migrations of labor are now among the great African facts. But the total voluntary supply is not enough. The Rhodesian copper mines may sap the labor supply of the sisal and coffee growers of Tanganyika. Forced labor is the alternative; and forced labor means labor at our will, at our price, at our time, place and speed, and under penalties for slacking, evasion or escape.

What penalties? To be fined? Clearly, fining here means nothing. Flogging or imprisonment is more eloquent. Even imprisonment sits lightly, if it is nothing more: "The native did not seem to understand that there was any stigma in being sent to prison. Penal sanctions, unless of a very drastic nature were almost useless." So speaks M. Merlin from much African experience.² If we are to punish, we must "use the arguments they understand," which—as Lucifer instructed the Lord in Job's case—are ultimately physical. There is no need to specify. Fear of

¹ It is taken as an axiom that a proper distance must be maintained between native wage and white wage and so between the two standards of living.

² P. M. C., *Ninth Session*, p. 39. M. Merlin continued by saying that while he was in no way in favor of forced labor, "it was necessary to encourage the native to work in order to civilise him. . . . For a native idleness did not mean starvation; [he] could live indefinitely on the resources of the primitive country in which his home lay. [Yet] the native could not be allowed to vegetate in his own home."

being shot may be a useful aid to keep restless labor in line.

Our general policy is well stated by the Conference of Governors of the East African Dependencies meeting at Nairobi early in 1926, which reaches certain explicit principles, the first of which announces the ideal, namely, "to enable land to be put to the best economical use,"—not the first time in history that the plain crying usability of matter has appeared to govern human conduct. In this land-using, the principle states, the progress and welfare of the natives are to be provided for, and serfdom strictly excluded from the picture. However,

"Steady progress cannot be secured in some areas unless every able-bodied individual who shows no tendency to work is given to understand that the Government expects him to do a reasonable amount of work, either in production in his own reserve or in labor for wages outside of it. ["To vegetate in his own home" is no longer to be allowed in Africa, if we have our way.]

"In areas where the first alternative is not within his reach [why should there be any such areas?] the native should be definitely encouraged to go out to labour. . . ."

In pursuance of these principles District Officers were for a time instructed to use "moral suasion" to get labor from the reserves to the estates, and local chiefs were stimulated to use methods suitable in their own eyes to "advise and encourage" young men to take service on the plantations.

How much hardship is involved in any such system of encouragement will depend, as always when individuals are helpless, on the personal quality and perceptions of the nearest recruiter or overseer. In any British dependency there is a strict limit to what is tolerated or left for long unknown. In Portuguese Angola "Natives are forced to work on roads, public works, or distant private cacao and

coffee plantations. A contract is secured for a definite period of months, but it is renewable at the option of the employer, and usually the native is not released. Officials claim that only natives are taken who have not paid the annual hut-tax, but actually men are taken and homes broken up at will in order to get the strongest men. Many are sent to the equatorial islands of São Thomé and Príncipe, where the average life on the torrid cacao plantations is four years. In the month of August, 1929, 1,179 natives were shipped to these two islands from Angola. Women with babies on their backs are forced to work on the roads.”³

Yet let us not suppose that incidental human suffering finally condemns a system. It is necessary to “weigh values,”—a modern way of getting our ends to justify our means. On this score, consider that the great end of reclaiming the Dark Continent cannot come in any other way, at least, not nearly so soon. The natives cannot be expected to realize what these roads and railroads will mean to their descendants,—the end of the great forest, of the great game, of the free, roaming, barbarous, lethargic-passionate life,—the beginning of scientific uses, large-scale tapping of nature, capital applied to land, lighting up the general darkness, interpenetration, access everywhere to the riders of rapid motion,—commerce and added wealth here and abroad, ideas, books, clothes, politeness, world unity,—one more great *difference* wiped out forever! If they could foresee all this, would they not gladly sacrifice themselves for it (or would they)? And, since they cannot, shall we not sacrifice them for that good? Remember, too, that at worst we only substitute one kind of suffering for another. Let not our sentimental liberals forget that the black man is used to despotism,

³ From private correspondence.

and that the slavery we still have to abolish in the world is largely his own enslavement of his own kind. We bring him into a dreary mill, but we do not bring him from Paradise; and we enlighten his darkness, an unsought benefit for which he owes some return.

Such, I think, is the philosophy which underlies the resentment of southwest Europe toward intrusions of the League mind and of the public mind into the private business of colonies with their own labor supply. It is a plausible philosophy, unanswerable from the value-weighting point of view, since no one has yet shown how to weigh unlike values against one another. It might be defended that an added fillip to the wealth, happiness, and so the cerebral efficiency, of a highly endowed Frenchman, Belgian, American, would outweigh in any sensible scale the lives and happiness of a hundred anonymous black fellows. Not many profess this belief; but there are many who act on it. If you happen to hold it, it is one of those undebatable premises that lie athwart all rational understanding with those who reject them. For of the relative weight of these values, I say, it is still the case that God only knows.

Two things, however, we can say with certainty. There is no difference between this principle and that of slavery. Forced labor is slavery by piecemeal, slavery in the modern manner: its motives are identical and in practice it leads to the same types of abuse. In many ways, it may lead to a far worse case, as Professor E. A. Ross pointed out in 1924. His report of village conditions in Angola carried this remark: "The government makes them work but gives them nothing. They return to find their fields neglected, no crops growing. They would rather be slaves than what they are now. As slaves they have value and are not underfed, but now nobody cares whether they live or

die. This government serfdom is more heartless than the old domestic slavery, which was cruel only when the master was of cruel character." Conventions on slavery will amount to nothing unless they are followed, and with the same resolution, by conventions about forced labor.

And further, as in the case of slavery, "the system deprives of human sensitiveness those who elect to work it." Though you and I, a thousand miles away from the creaking and groaning of the system, think we are shielded by our ignorance from such effect, this voluntary ignorance of ours is none the less corrupting our fiber and making a sham of the civilization we pretend to bring to Africa. Remember the time, hardly more than a generation ago, when the accidental presence of a single traveler through the Congo was the sole link between cultivated Europe and what H. W. Nevinson called "the most appalling revelation of human abomination known to me." If Roger Casement had not brought back the story of those infernal punishments and butcheries, if he had not reported the atrocities of Putumayo, in South America, we might longer have remained contented beneficiaries of a hidden hell. We have to fear our own distance and our own middle men who step down the long grade between sensitivity and callousness. The will-not-to-know is now impossible to us except as that "viciously acquired naïveté" which is the essence of guilt. We say the African is used to despotism, and that is true; but his chiefs wield their royal clubs, assegais, axes, within the sphere of the *mores* and the spirits of the tribe: those joys and miseries are placed within an ethos which, being his own, can bring him an inner medicine. The force we set around him has for his mind no super-physical meaning: it is to him in the literal sense brute force. Instead of educating the native by our

labor-discipline, we are removing his spark of a soul from its hearth-fire and letting it go out.

I am speaking now not of everything that can go under the title of forced labor, but of the typical thing: there are discriminations to make, and I shall make them. It is necessary to be clear at the outset what the essence of forced labor is. But what then? Shall the great African opportunities be lost? The alternative is definite: change African habits or lose the materials, the wealth, the trade of a continent. Perhaps it is also: change African habits and lose Africans. Belgium becomes alarmed at the human shrinkage in the Congo region. In French Equatorial Africa the four millions of twenty years ago are now a bare million and a half. We can make the African work but we cannot prevent him from dying. A frightened self-interest foresees the extinction of its game. What a prospect for those magnificent roads! A noble railway to nowhere! A firm colonial rule over nobody! There must be better ways to manage than we have at first struck out.

What is it, then, that the international eye, looking out from Geneva, proposes to do with forced labor?

The B-mandates define their standards in the following terms: "The Mandatory shall prohibit all forms of forced or compulsory labour, except for essential public works and services, and then only in return for adequate compensation." The C-mandate formula is substantially the same. This cuts away at once the greatest abuse, herding of labor by political power for the private concessionnaires.

But after all, it is the private enterprises that chiefly want the labor. The public works are in the main but common carriers for private business. If government is not to act for private interests, how shall they get labor? We have said that the ordinary wage-inducement operating on

the free native is too weak; and, if he surrenders his freedom to the extent of signing a contract, he has still to be instructed in the infinite solemnity of that act!

“To punish natives for breach of contract was extremely difficult. They had no discipline and no idea of the meaning of a contract. . . . If they were arraigned before a police court and punished for breach of contract, then the employer who did so might find himself boycotted by the natives and could consequently obtain no labour.”⁴

One might, indeed, try a combination of fair treatment and a little extra attention to the food! “Employers who followed such methods,” said Mr. Smit, “usually experienced few difficulties”; but still there were difficulties, and Major Orde Browne reporting from Tanganyika (1925) sustains the premise of the whole forced-labor program, namely, that reducing compulsion means undermining the labor supply. The situation calls for ingenuity; and ingenuity readily finds ways, without using direct compulsion, to bring a necessity to bear on the natives which will drive them to seek work.

We may trim down their lands until their older ways of livelihood no longer suffice and they must earn wages or go hungry. This is the situation in South Africa, where one-fourth of the population own 85 per cent of the land, leaving 15 per cent for the native three-fourths, who need relatively more room! This clever principle has been found useful elsewhere. Or we may tax them, as governments do, for services about to be rendered, so that they must earn their tax money by labor. This is the most popular resort, for it arrives in the form of a well-justified public demand. We saw it operating in the Angola hut-tax; Sir Harry Johnston used it and defended it in

⁴ Mr. Smit, High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa, reporting for South West Africa, P. M. C., *Ninth Session*, p. 36.

Uganda; Kenya has found it efficient. Or we may make laws requiring men to be occupied at something,—which is surely reasonable,—and, if we surprise anybody in a do-nothing frame of mind, or without a new-stamped labor contract on his person, we may arrest him for vagrancy and put him to hard labor. Or we may go to him with paternal and impressive governmental advice. Perhaps the finest invention in this way has been struck out in South West Africa, the region from which Mr. Smit was reporting “few difficulties.” Here three religious missions desire to do their work in Ovamboland,—Ovamboland being our chief reliance in supplying labor for our mines and railroads. If missions desire to teach religion, why not make it a condition of their permission to do so that they give a written engagement “to encourage all natives under their influence to seek employment in South West Africa proper”?⁵ The missions comply, and natives go to work!

The Mandates Commission is not blind to these subterfuges. Its members make their own dignified and reservedly caustic comments. “To require missionaries to co-operate in the recruiting of labor does not appear to M. Orts justified by the desire to ‘maintain public order and public morals’ ”; and in M. Rappard’s mind, the plan seemed to make the missionaries “instruments of government.”⁶ But the Commission takes no official action, and reaches no further definitions of standard. In this field it shows either a strange timidity of action, or a strange mental distance from the human meaning of the problem. Less familiar with the facts of labor than the International Labour Office, it has been inclined to defer to that Office’s judgment and to wait for its findings.

It is Labour that knows what questions to ask, Labour

⁵ P. M. C., *Ninth Session*, p. 39.

⁶ *Ibid.*

that has the motive, the energy and the skill (as in the person of the lamented Harold Grimshaw) to amass the facts of the indictment. It is Labour that realizes what further standards need to be proposed. Thus it is that under the spur of the Labour Office, of the Temporary Slavery Commission implemented by that Office, and of the Labour conferences, colonial practice promises in these matters to pull ahead of the practice of the mandates.⁷ It is due to the vigilance of the Labour Office that we learn to ask of our administrators such questions as these that follow, none of them settled by the mandate rule. As you examine these questions, think first what depth of human misery lies behind the slow emergence into European consciousness that these questions demand to be asked of our work in Africa; and then think of the state of mind of any administrator who resists the pressing of these questions by whatever agency.

Are women and children to be subject to forced labor, or only adult men? Are the aged or the invalid to be exempt?

How many days of the year may laborers be held? How many hours of the day?

Shall it be considered whether they are taken during sowing time or harvest when all hands are needed at home?

What proportion of the men of a village may be taken at any one time?

May they be taken long distances from their homes, and separated from their families and from customary restraints for long periods?

⁷ "Unless the commission takes more definite action soon, it is possible that, as a result of the work of the International Labour Conferences, some colonies will have accepted more far-reaching international limitations upon compulsory labor than exist in the mandated territories." R. L. Buell, *Forced Labor*, Foreign Policy Association Information Service, Vol. V, No. 22, pp. 419f.

Shall the people at home be obliged to raise food for the workers and to bring it?

Shall the employer be responsible for returning the workers to their homes?

Shall there be any other judge of "adequate remuneration" than the employer?

Is health to be a charge of the employer? Shall infectious or contagious diseases contracted in camp be returned to the villages?

Shall the moral condition of the labor force be a charge of the employer?

Shall labor desertion be punishable as a crime, or by death?

Shall there be taxes payable only in labor, and shall there be a limit in the use of such taxes?

I must guard against the impression that these are set down as rhetorical questions which answer themselves. I realize that one must not hasten, without local knowledge, to build a set of rules on the basis of such questions alone.

Nevertheless, to have unearthed the questions which require to be asked, white human nature being still what it is, marks the first important step toward the establishment of a code for dealing with native labor. And the international mind, having done the first great service, that of noting these questions, has already proceeded to the second. The International Labour Conference at Geneva adopted in June, 1930, a Convention on Forced Labour, which member states are invited to ratify and enforce.

Now, any such code tends to become as complex as the devices of human greed for profiting by the weakness of the native. On the other hand, it might conceivably be a simple statement of the criterion which distinguishes decent from indecent practice. The task of all such codes is

twofold: they have to check specific abuses by defining them; and they have to bring about, if possible, a new state of mind in the abusers, by making salient the central ethical issue. The first task requires the elaborate statement, and a continued vigilance of revision, as the ingenuity of the abusers advances into new ground. The latter task is the only thoroughgoing work: for as long as there are whole classes or nations of whites unscrupled or underscrupled about forced labor;—i.e., unconvinced,—the old abuses will continue. If there is a point of principle, it has a chance of becoming persuasive in proportion as it is accurately expressed. The Mandates Commission may well be following a true instinct in refraining from much specific rule-making; but in that case it is all the more imperative for it to supplement the great work of the Labour Office by finding and stating the central principle of its judgment.

Certainly, the standard implied in the mandate documents is inadequate. Forced labor is not necessarily tolerable when it is “for essential public works and for adequate remuneration.” It is clearly necessary to add, as do the advisers of the Labour Office, that the work must be “of important direct interest for the community,” that it must be “of present or imminent necessity,” that the effort to obtain voluntary labor on reasonable terms must first have been made, and that the work must not “lay too heavy a burden on the present population.” These added requirements successively whittle down the sphere of legitimate forced labor. But why not go at once to the root of the matter and say, as some of these advisers do say, that all forced labor is evil; and that the object of colonial and mandate policy must be to get rid of it as soon as possible? Can we accept this principle,—which has the advantage of radical simplicity—No forced labor?

On this point our diplomatic educators are on strong ground. Labor is a habit, and it is seldom acquired by the free evolution of inner impulse. Our own young, as a rule, have to be initiated into their "chores" by external sanctions. Nature herself prescribes effort as the cost of good: muscles exist for the service of instinct. But how much and how steady effort may be required for the current goods of life at any stage of culture, nature never teaches: that is the business of social education. Human nature is capable of evolution largely because of the immense extensibleness of this means-to-end sort of effort: there is no assignable limit to this extension so long as the human being cares enough for the end and can see the way from the means to the end. Now Spinoza is probably only half right in saying that all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare: indeed one might say that the most excellent things are the most universally accessible, and cannot be earned or won by any amount of industry or violence. The value of life is never in direct proportion to the amount of effort that goes into it; poetic idleness has an eternal rôle in civilization. Still, every advance brings a new complexity in the system of goods to be enjoyed and requires a new level of reason and character. And to reach a new stage, effort must in general precede appreciation: a period of painful tugging, directed from without, must come before the period of autonomy at a higher level of culture. It is merely silly to assume that men in any large numbers will work much harder than they have to for objects which are just beyond the horizon of their interest—unless they have somehow acquired a strong faith that they are going to want what they get when they get it! If "No forced labor" means "No discipline," then no honest educator could possibly accept the principle.

But let us be honest educators. If we are going to

educate by way of labor, let us pay some regard to the conditions of education. There is nothing educative about effort required by an alien toward an end which one neither cares for nor understands. Nor can we educate in this way men who are already fixed in their own folkways. Begin with the boys. Set them about tasks within their own understanding. Begin gradually, not at full speed. Let them see an advantage to themselves, not only in getting through with the present task, but in acquiring skill for further activities of the same kind. But, you say, all this means impossible slowness of operation. I answer, certainly it will be slow: education is slow, more particularly education which alters the level of culture. And it must begin by enlisting the will on the side of the goods which you are proposing to introduce,—securing a moral interest in the change. Unless you are willing to accept these educational conditions, then do no more skulking behind the alleged educational value of your forced labor!

It may be taken as a general truth that what we call “forced labor” has no genuine interest in education.⁸ It

⁸ A friend in South Africa writes as follows:

“You are trying, it seems to me, to find a philosophical basis for the ‘sacred-trust-of-Civilization’ principle underlying the theory of mandated territories. Excellent in itself, just as the concept of the ‘guidance’ of the backward by the more highly developed is excellent in itself. But in the light of my South African experience, I am convinced that you get this ideal of guidance only where the contact between white and black is restricted to that of missionary and administrator giving their best to the black man without thought of permanent residence or settlement in his midst. This is the important point: missionary and administrator, say in Tanganyika or in West Africa, are temporary sojourners, looking forward when their work is done to well-earned retirement in Europe. Hence their attitude towards the blacks is purely professional and in that sense unselfish: they are there to do the best they know for the blacks, and then retire. The trouble begins when you get the white settler, who comes to stay, to make his home, to leave his progeny. Then you begin to hear of making the land a ‘white man’s country,’ which—as the blacks cannot be exterminated and replaced by whites, and are moreover wanted for the sake of their cheap labor—means ‘a country fit for the white man to live in,’ which in turn means a country in which the white man is permanently

is not concerned that Africans work harder for better goods: its lever is their necessity—they must go through the work-mill to gain *the same goods*, as animals will go long journeys if they have to for water or salt. It has an interest in speed. It is dictated by the peculiar western haste for possession which in Africa works almost pure evil. A speed which means dislocation to native life and consequent discontent, despair or revolt-stirring, will bring no civilization to Africa; for civilizing responds to no whip-cracking. Nor will it bring profit to Europe. The call sent out by Brussels (March, 1928) for “slowing up industrial development in view of the drain on native labor” indicates that the time-factor will prove fundamental in economy as well as in education, and that self-interest will, from its own side, tend to eliminate forced labor as uneconomic and dangerous.

But let us not delude ourselves with the sophism that the issue is at bottom economic and will work itself out on economic lines; that a holy corporate something called “world-demand” will, after a painful period of fumbling, find some fair way to satisfy itself, without too much strain on the natives. What the economist finds is that the issue is inescapably and untransformably ethical. It is ethical first and economic afterward. The two issues are united because we are trying to do our economy by the use of creatures having wills of their own, and a degree of moral sense which is capable, when offended, of interfering

and exclusively boss, not merely because he is at present the more civilized, but simply because he is white. The talk is of maintaining ‘white civilization,’ and undeniably at present the white man is the repository of that civilization. But the actual aim is not to maintain that civilization by communicating it as fully and rapidly as possible to the blacks: the aim is to maintain the social, economic, political predominance of the white people, by erecting every sort of barrier, legal, economic, social, to their advancement, *i.e.*, to their becoming civilized to the point where they might claim those fundamental rights due to all civilized men, which rights are part of the definition of being civilized.”

mightily with their efficiency! There lies the line between man and animal; everything on the human side is capable of fraternity in seeing a moral point, and requires to be dealt with accordingly. There will be no economic solution in Africa until there is first an ethical solution. What then is our principle?

Separate out from "forced labor" all those legitimate requirements under whose cover it creeps in. Leave out the labor imposed on criminals for their punishment or their health. Then: (1) minors may be required to work as a part of their education by their immediate guardians; (2) adults may be required to work by way of a reasonable common service to the community, military or civil. This means in effect a tax payable in labor, without disrupting the course of community life, for objects of patent general advantage, given to a government accepted as one's own. Thus, a village might be called out to clean its own paths, to provide its own sanitation, to extend its own clearings, to destroy the bush that harbors the tsetse fly, to meet emergencies as of fire or flood. Old tribal Uganda required each year a month of labor for communal work: there can be no valid objection in principle to such a public demand.

Forced labor, properly so called, lies outside these classes. Its mark is, simply, absence of consent. Absence of consent on the side of the worker, whether present consent or eventual consent: absence of *reference* to the worker's consent on the part of the employer. The consent we are looking for is not evidenced by a wage-labor contract signed by the worker,—such contracts may be the alternatives to starvation: the consent we mean is consent to the system that surrounds him as well as to the particular job. *Forced labor is labor to which men are driven*

by a system which has nothing to do with their own social history or their wills. With this understanding our principle is, No forced labor.

This does not necessarily mean shutting off the labor supply from the public works; nor from the plantations and the mines of the white man. It means an absolute and primary obligation to enlist the will of the worker—if not in the total enterprise, which may be beyond his grasp, yet in his own new mode of life. Unless we are “on the square” with the native mind, as far as it can follow our designs, we have broken off the moral relation, have reduced the creature to a means to our ends, and are making a mockery in advance of all further deeds of “education” or of religion. The usual assumption is that the more primitive the tribe the less important are our moral scruples; the reverse is true. In proportion as culture is primitive the ethical basis of dealing becomes momentous. To say that tribes are “superstitious” is to say that they are governed radically by their world-views and reverences such as they are. Savage iconoclasm on our part toward these beliefs and feelings will only leave us in another generation with a continentful of such moral problems as no government can deal with. An element of honor at this point, given the high degree of adaptableness of many African peoples, will not leave us devoid of labor, but it will require a radical slowing of the rate of change.

The Convention on Forced Labour above referred to adopts the standard of eventually eliminating forced labor, though with a different definition. Article 1 of this Convention reads:

Each Member of the International Labour Organization which ratifies this Convention undertakes to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period.⁹

⁹ For text of this Convention and Recommendations, cf. Appendix III.

The forced labor thus to be suppressed includes "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty, and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily"—excepting such normal obligations as we have listed. These marks do not include all labor that is really forced, but they are tangible marks, available for public evidence, reaching the main body of the disease. This Convention requires to be ratified by each member state and is to come into force for its ratifiers twelve months after two members have ratified and registered their ratifications. This necessary minimum of two ratifications has been met: in April, 1931, Great Britain determined to apply throughout the Empire and "without any modification" both the aforesaid Convention and the recommendations concerning indirect compulsion to labor adopted by this same conference.¹⁰ It is now the question whether the remaining great colonial Powers will give effect to this instrument, which provides, among other things, for an annual report to the International Labour Office.

Its fate will hang upon the clearness of the case for an international organ of judgment, in addition to the national organs which are now arising. That is precisely the question now at our door. Why should this work of dealing with forced labor be an international business?

¹⁰ The League is notified of the following ratifications: Irish Free State, March 2, 1931, Liberia, May 1, 1931, Great Britain, June 3, 1931. The convention will accordingly come into force May 1, 1932.

CHAPTER XXV

PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

I

A GLANCE at the facts regarding slavery and forced labor leaves no doubt that there are questions here which must be pressed, and with competent means for getting the facts. But by whom?

There are strong motives within each modern state for keeping this work in its own hands. The British Government declares its policy in Kenya Colony as follows:

"In the administration of Kenya His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population [up to which point we seem to recognize the language of the mandate], and they are *unable to delegate or share this trust*, the object of which may be defined as the protection and advancement of the native races. . . ." ¹

The Hilton Young Commission (1929) for East and Central Africa recommended an Advisory Council of officials and non-officials to work with the Native Affairs Department, and also recommended that the annual report of each territory should give data "similar to those required by the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations" to the Government in London.² Within each of the colonial

¹ *Memorandum relating to Indians in Kenya*, Cmd. 1922, 1923. [Italics mine.]

² J. H. Oldham has advocated an extension of the existing colonial agencies in London for the purpose of giving more adequate attention to native interests. *White and Black in Africa*, Chap. vi. Cf. also Julian Huxley, *Africa View*, p. 433. The French Government will not allow a

Powers are lively groups concerned for the treatment of natives in the dependencies: in the end it must be *their* judgments which lift the level of practice. By appropriate advisory boards within each government, this self-corrective energy can find its most immediate effect.

There is no question of the advantages of these direct, home-grown agencies of control: they are necessary in any scheme. But are they sufficient?

Most obviously, they act under handicap. Regulations that are to limit anything so determined as the pace and scope of economic interest must bind the rival Powers simultaneously, or else any move toward greater humanity is likely to place the mover at a disadvantage.

Again, when we pit conscience directly against national interest, we put rather too heavy a strain on conscience, and give the issue a false setting. If conscience is proposing a costly form of national self-restraint, it needs the eyesight of companions, and of disinterested companions. There are eight Powers directly interested in African forced labor. Before the meeting of the 1930 Labour Conference, these Powers, not wanting to be victimized by the non-interested and therefore non-informed other members of that conference, held a meeting of their own in Paris in order to determine a common attitude and if possible a common text for the impending Convention. Who else could be so competent to do this? Nevertheless, accord was not reached in Paris; and it *was reached in Geneva*, these same delegates participating! The assumption of the preliminary conference, that there is something local in the concern about forced labor, was false. Whatever concerns conscience concerns mankind at large, and the time has

commission of its own Chamber of Deputies to enquire into the administration of its colonies in Indo-China and elsewhere in the Far East. Premier Tardieu demanded of the Chamber that it should be the Government's own commission of experts, and was sustained.

come when our organization of thought can take account of this fact.

One might almost rest the case for international management on the achievements we have noted. What but an international body could have reached this extraordinary Convention on Forced Labour, or have initiated the work of getting the Powers to accept it? And, as for the pursuit of the object, what is commonly and publicly accepted as standard practice will be commonly observed only if there is an active international intelligence at work: for there is no subject on which public profession is so fair and actual behavior so foul as this of slavery.³ Given such intelligence, the Powers may and do then watch one another narrowly. As associates in the League they are less prone to condone one another's guilt than to eliminate by mutual criticism all abuses which could result in differential privilege.

But further, the same common forum encourages rivalry of a more generous sort,—the rivalry to show positive results in public health, education, native political competence, public finance. The Belgian mandate in East Africa is said to have given 300,000 francs for extension of medical service on suggestion of the Mandates Commission. The payments in Nauru to native owners of phosphate lands have been more than doubled, presumably through observations from the same quarter.⁴

The mere consecutive focusing of attention on questions of native welfare by the Commission and by the Labour

³ There is as yet no evidence that the humiliations of Liberia, and the retirement of officials there, have been accompanied by a change of heart on the general subject. Slave running like rum running makes ready use of an unpatrollable coast. George F. Schuyler reports, *New York Evening Post*, July, 1931, that persons who gave information to the International Commission are now being punished in such wise that information will henceforth be almost impossible to get.

⁴ P. M. C., *Thirteenth Session*, p. 39.

Office has the effect of making these matters more prominent than they otherwise would be in the minds of administrators. The accumulation of knowledge and experience by the members of these bodies adds year by year to the value of the advice they are able to offer to all the Powers. Nothing short of a permanent international board can accomplish this work.

Such a body has a wider function: it becomes an organ of self-consciousness for the evolving world-brain. With it, we, the general public, have nerves reaching to those remote spots where sensitiveness is important, intelligence to interpret what the nerves report, volition to effect a significant reaction. Without it, we are dumb, semi-dormant, insufferably slow of response and irregular in action. It is hardly conceivable that once well awake we should willingly relapse into the former blundering lethargy. It is not merely that we can mitigate the transitional sufferings of backward groups of mankind: it is that we stand to learn much of our own business through widening our base of observation. Our local formulæ, eight-hour days, and the like, show their limitations. We deepen the philosophy of our social life and multiply our own alternatives.

This consideration becomes especially strong when we include the A-mandates in our view. Here the insistent problems of labor lie between those of the African territories and those of our own social order. Forced labor and the slave trade have no present standing in those countries.⁵ Lively questions are those of standards of living, of debts,

⁵ Forced labor in the Jebel Druze became a factor in the Syrian revolt, but it is now seldom called for in the mandates. Slavery still flourishes in lower Arabia, whither slaves still come in numbers from Abyssinia, *via* Tajura, a French protectorate on the Red Sea. (Ameen Rihani, *Around the Coasts of Arabia*, pp. 225ff.) The Sharia law, hardly changed since the Koranic period, assumes slavery much as the New Testament assumes it, without condemnation or approval. But Ottoman law has ruled against it and ended it in the north.

taxes, and land tenures, of the varieties of holy days, of competition with western imports and the vanishing of native arts. Running through all these is the issue between individualistic and communistic systems of economy. In the Near East, the western systems come into the closest comparison with the group-systems of the Orient and of Russia. There is room for experiment and invention, such as certain Zionist colonies have undertaken. The economy of the entire Orient is in evolution, and two things are certain: it will not remain what it has been, and it will not be identical with that of the West. It will either blunder through into its own new order, or else it will be intelligently guided into lines which suit its mentality and talent. The availability, during this time, of international experience and counsel, provided it is welcome, will be invaluable both to the Near East and to the western lands, interested witnesses of the transition.

These grounds seem to me conclusive. International oversight of a particular administrative interest, especially where some standard of humanity is involved, has reached the point of paying its way. Irksome, meddlesome, humiliating,—all of this it commonly is: but such defects are points of manner, not of substance; they are curable, or, if need be, ignorable in view of the indispensable function.

Can we say as much for the mandate idea as a whole?

II

This is far less easy to answer. In the mandate, the business of internal administration is mixed with and hampered by political malaise, especially in the A-mandates we have been reviewing. The international hand has to work through the national arm. If one asks whether the

mandates, generally speaking, are a success, it is necessary to divide the question. Does the element of international control in the mandate make it better than it would be without that control? Is the relation of dependency imposed by the mandate a reasonable and successful relation? It is conceivable that in some cases the answer would be "Yes" to the first question and "No" to the second.

As a middle thing between colonial status and independence, the mandate may be better than one and worse than the other. How can one judge the value of an improvement on the colonial system in places where the colonial system has no business to exist? If it excuses something like conquest, where conquest is flagrantly out of order, its merits are obscured by its original maladjustment to the situation. Except in Palestine, this is the case in the Near East. The continuing political troubles in the A-mandates are not due to any inherent vice of the plan of international supervision: they are due to a duplicity of motive on the part of the Allies, an original disingenuousness in the presentation of the new status, and, behind this, a failure of political intelligence in meeting the actual problems of a transitional situation in this region. And, since the present form of international control refrains from examining the prior and basic question of status, it cannot avoid appearing as an accomplice in the national egoisms of the Allies.

If in spite of this confusion of the question we fix attention solely on the element of international supervision of the work of the mandatory, we can give a clear affirmative to its value. Its effect has been real, even if it has been mild,—expressed well enough, in the main, by the word "ameliorate." Some honest tutelage has come out of it. For the general welfare of a people, and for their political hope, the mandate thus supervised is a large improvement

on the same arrangement apart from the international mind and eye.

It has hastened in some cases the arrival of local constitutions and liberties; it has deferred that arrival in others. The international control has limited certain excesses of national self-interest on the part of the governing state. But it has in effect winked at others, by refraining from critical judgments proportionate to the gravity of the offence. It gave no effective rebuke to the gerrymandering division of Syria. It smothered the severity which the bombardment of Damascus called for. Its failure to announce a decisive judgment on the whole French action in Syria is largely responsible for the rooted distrust of the League in the Near East. Of late, the Mandates Commission has shown greater courage. In the unequivocal judgment of the British administration in Palestine (June, 1930), it required a fundamental accounting of stewardship. In my opinion, this criticism was partly misdirected,⁶ but its spirit was refreshing; and, had the Labour Government perceived the advantage of welcoming that spirit, instead of complaining of errors of detail, it might have added much to the moral weight of the Commission's future work. In any case, that work has gained steadily in general respect; and the strength of the Commission's utterance will grow with its prestige, with its experience, and with the extension of its organs of knowledge.

It is true that the vocal liberalism and the democratic fervor of the world are hardly satisfied with the results. The Inter-Parliamentary Union, committed to the interests of populations, frames resolutions calling for a drastic

⁶ In criticizing an economy of military control, it failed to note the admirable sides of the British restraint in the use of force,—not wholly a matter of economy. And, though the Commission offered no literal encouragement to that haste to colonize which is the peculiar vice of political Zionism, its demand for a positive policy of development has played into the hand of the tendency to speed.

increase of the League's powers of review: the Mandates Commission ought to be authorized to make its own investigations; residents ought to be permitted to present complaints directly to the Assembly; the Assembly should have the right "to withdraw a mandate from a Power which shows itself incapable." . . . The Second International, as one might expect, resolves even more vigorously in this vein. All such resolutions record an element of disillusion and impatience on the part of the idealists.

But League control, let us remember, was set up by a coalition of idealists and cynics. The idealists in a burst of international enthusiasm saw the beginning of a new era, in which national egoism could now definitely be kept under. The cynics, in a burst of faith that the new words would prove as futile as the old, saw the new era as a new cloak for the old political game. The peculiarity of the present moment is not that the idealists are disillusioned,—they are used to it. The peculiarity is that the cynics are disillusioned also!

This is perhaps the best evidence of the reality of international control. In building the League and the Commissions, there were many who builded not only better than they knew, but far better than they desired. The League is anything but negligible. Publicity, formerly a manageable thing, is now a many-headed and formidable power: it is no longer easy to fall away unnoticed from a diplomatic promise. There is a new barometer of moral prestige in the world-community: ratings fall and rise instantly with the doings of the Powers at Geneva. All now perceive that the step taken in establishing the League was one of the few momentous steps in the political progress of the race. To Great Britain the deed was perhaps of the most serious omen: in submitting the autonomy of her colonial Empire to a determined, penetrating public scrutiny, she ran the

gravest risk of mischief in pursuit of a possibility of good, and that venture deserves the most unreserved acknowledgment of history. Had our own country entered the League at the outset, we should also have risked something, but nothing comparable with the risk accepted by Great Britain. It is less to be wondered at that her spokesmen occasionally hint of some Monroe Doctrine which reserves the rest from an intrusive outer judgment than that she still remains the stanchest supporter of the principle of international responsibility within the now-defined limits.

Reactions against this control, Sir-Austen-Chamberlain-outbursts in Council, withholdings of information, resentments against public rebuke,—all these are to be expected. But, if the conservatism of Europe shows sign of desiring quietly and without scandal to weaken the powers of international oversight, or to evade them, we cannot dismiss this attitude as pure reaction. There are reasons for it, and those who believe, as I believe, in these international agencies and in their promotion must take account of these reasons. The conservative element naturally tends to sympathize with the difficulties of administrators—and we have kept these difficulties in mind: the simplicity and swiftness of undivided authority must be aimed at in the mandate as elsewhere; the principle that governors must govern, and that public order is the first condition of other public good, has lost no force in the world. Besides this, there is a certain instinctive distrust in the conservative temperament of the value of public opinion in international affairs, a distrust which is not all astray.

For, on this point, we must acknowledge that the democratic principle in world government has far to go to reach its maturity. Invoking a world-opinion to take part in mandate and colony business may exaggerate all the defects of

domestic democracy. If ignorance of local matters is such that "on most questions there is no public opinion," how much more serious is this ignorance of the wide-scattered intricacies of world politics! If democracy at home is emotional, biased, subject to propaganda, fickle, how much more so the democracy of the wider world. If democracy at home is partisan, how can a world democracy escape the deeper partisanship of nationalism? What part of the British public is less than fixedly pro-British? Or of the German or of the French not fixedly for its own? No League can control what Arab tells Arab to incite hatred of the Jew, nor what Jew tells Jew to arouse those claims which inflame the Arab. If Zionist leaders in New York say to their hearers, "Palestine is ours; we have only to reach out and take it,—were it not for the British obstacle," they may build a momentum of demand before which a just internationalism is feebly armed because of the smallness of that public which knows and cares. One has only to imagine a world-wide referendum on any piece of the world's business to realize how far we are from a possible employment of the democratic principle full-fledged.

It is fair to say that what world-opinion there is, is better organized for thinking than any domestic democracy. It begins to act at a higher level of intelligence than most democracies ever reach, because it has non-political (and supposedly non-national) ways of getting the facts and opinions which are the grist for its judgments. The thinking-process constituted by the League, the League Commissions, and their restricted public is capable of giving lessons in quality to every democracy in the world. Even so, as a thinking-process it is far from adequate. It is good at applying obvious principles of right and fair-play,—and much of the world's work of reform consists in doing just that. It is not so good in getting hold of the less obvious

principles, and meeting the unsolved problems of thought. It does not know how to examine its own presuppositions. Hence it often fails to see the real nature of the issues it is dealing with.

The present deadlock in regard to international control is governed, in my judgment, by a number of these unsolved problems. Both liberals and conservatives are trying to operate on a too-simple philosophy of international order; and because of this the practical alternatives are never justly stated.

When the mandate is conceived as an adjustment of two sets of interests, those of mandated and mandatory, we are making an advance over the theory presented in Article XXII, which mentioned only one set of interests. But the two-interest theory is also and fatally abstract. For, besides the two impersonated interests, there is always a third set arising from the world situation as a whole.

This we found conspicuously true in Palestine: Palestine cannot be disposed of as if the Palestinians and the British with all Allies were the sole parties concerned. The same is true of Egypt, Syria, Iraq. If this world situation failed to come into evidence, it is partly because it was mentally identified by the victorious Powers with their own national interests, and hence became qualified by their bad consciences. But it has a legitimate case where the national interests have not.⁷

⁷ Hence the ineptitude of much of the discussion of the moment, about readiness for independence, "readiness to stand alone under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." If these strenuous conditions were equally present everywhere there might be some uniform tests for readiness. But the Hedjaz and the Yemen have no such conditions to meet as Syria and Iraq. They can stand alone, given their lighter strains, when far more highly qualified communities under heavier strains cannot stand. Readiness, then, is not an absolute condition: *readiness for independence is relative to the demands upon the region*. The whole question is falsely put when it is represented as a question of the ability of the given nation to govern itself, or of the comparative political advancement of (let us say)

Thus, French trade and French ideas are not a legitimate ground for French control of Syria. But world trade and the general spread of ideas are on a different footing; they give a legitimate case—I do not say for world control of Syria—but for some kind of international foothold, since the destiny of Syria is to be, not abstractly self-determining, but a world-member. Leave out entirely the interests of any nation's military strength in the Near East, and ask merely whether the crossroads of the world should be made safe, like other highways, for the traffic of goods and of thoughts. It is necessary to have there not merely well-meaning governments, but governments responsible in the wider sense,—able to assess the weight of the valuables entrusted to them.⁸ Of the Near East in general we may say that it is fated by its geography to live more than its own life, to become world-conscious, to add to its local genius a general sophistication. The proper price of its independence, then, is not the *non-obstat* of any particular western state. It is simply a sympathy with, and an understanding for, the interests which from all sides are penetrating its territory; and, as a pledge of this, a readiness to admit the presence of an authoritative representation of these world-interests.

Now maturity in public life means that the universal

Syria and the Hedjaz. The question is one of ability to do what the world situation requires at that point.

⁸ As Iraq moves toward independence, the United States shows a certain uneasiness, as well as the League. American Consul Randolph at Baghdad submit certain questions to the British High Commissioner: What will become of the American schools? Will they fall under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of Education? The situation is complicated by the parallel concern of the Persian schools, for half of Iraq's Arabs are Shiites, who look to Persia for guidance in religion, and possibly in politics. Likewise with the courts, Britain desires, in withdrawing, to ensure that there shall be mixed courts, but not such mixed courts as in Egypt: rather in these courts there shall be a majority of British judges with a British judge presiding! Iraq desires to entertain the international mind, but is embarrassed when the American mind, the Persian mind, the British mind, present themselves successively in this capacity.

interest is to some extent consciously present in the particular state: France, for example, does in many ways embody the science and culture of the modern world. France in Syria will represent the world-interest, but the trouble is that she will represent much more besides in interests peculiar to herself. It is not the presence of France that is important in Syria: it is the presence of the world, or let us say, of the League. The more readily France with other great Powers accepts the surveillance of the League—which registers this difference—the more readily can the same acceptance be expected of Syria. At present, in Syria, France speaks louder than the League. But, unless the League speaks louder than France, and the world-interest louder than the League itself, no particular state could become an acceptable mediator of the world-concern.

The meaning of international control is thus misconceived by both liberals and conservatives. When the liberals omit the peculiarities of the world-situation, and judge particular cases by abstract principles alone, the conservatives rightly distrust an over-simple analysis. When the conservatives take for granted that they may identify their own functions with those of the world and of civilization, the liberals are justified in remonstrance. But what both sides fail to see clearly is that the mandate system in the Near East is a transition system on false pretences: that in its legitimate character it is a transition to a special function in a world in which all functions are different; and that the particular form of "advice and assistance" now chiefly in order is what we might call coaching by an international body in this international rôle. Even now, the A-mandates ought to be in active relation with the League, preparatory to full membership, participating in League discussions (rather more than the United States does at present). Even now the wider world should be

directly present in these territories. Mixed Courts like those of Egypt, in which judges from many nations sit together with local judges, might with advantage be instituted in each of the A-mandates.

But the chief need is a more direct analysis of the world-interest itself as it bears on each several state. In that interest there are evidently economic strands; these are attracting wide and competent study, though the theory of ownership in raw materials irregularly spread through the world has received little thoroughgoing examination. There are also cultural strands—the incipient world-mind fusing or clashing with local civilizations in varied patterns and raising intensely poignant questions about the value and the fate of these local cultures. These questions are all but untouched. Then there are ethical-legal strands; and the whole formulation of an international law for the world of tomorrow halts on the problem of how far the ethical principles which govern individuals in the local community can be applied to the relations between states.

Let us venture to open the latter two of these unsolved problems, the evaluation of cultures and the basis of an interstate ethical code.

PART VII

STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD-ORDER

CHAPTER XXVI

THE FATE OF ISLAMIC CULTURE

I

THE visible unity of Moslem lands is gone. The political breach between Arab and Turk has been followed by the abolition of the Caliphate. This Turkish deed—which Europe could never have ventured—cut away the central knot of the loose legal-religious world of Islam. The loss of this headship, vague as it was, has given a natural impetus to the various national movements already in existence, but in all these movements there are two parties, the party which attempts to retain the Moslem element in the national life, and the party which aims to clear politics of all religious attachments. This clear separation of church and state is more difficult in Moslem communities than in the West. For Islam, like Judaism, is at once a religion and a social order; its Law is a part of its life. To compel the separation as Turkey has done is to enforce a radical alteration in Islam itself.

Across this divided and decapitated world run the further divisions we have been noting, divisions imposed by the Allies as if they were secretly governed by fear that some ghostly college of *ulema* might still call for a Holy War. While recognizing that “there is not enough technical skill in the entire Mohammedan world outside of Turkey either to build or to operate a single battleship,” a wise western geographer points out that the character of Mos-

lem lands is such that their invasion is too costly for Europeans. Italy, finding it too expensive to hold Libya against the Senussi, has come to terms with them. Even in Syria, which of all Arab lands is most like Europe, "the cost of the French military expedition to Damascus and the occupying force in Syria is adding an overburdening weight to the already terrible burden of France." He therefore approves of the British policy of marginal control, if there is to be control. "It would seem to be a sound policy to leave the Mohammedan world to itself so far as possible; but, above all, if force must be exercised, to exercise it only in strategic regions of high productivity or at strategic points, where special sustaining resources like oil, phosphates and tin may be developed."¹ The geographer is leaving his rôle as pure scientist, and is offering professional advice to an assumed western will to keep Mohammedan power within bounds, in the event of a new impulse of expansion. Writing in 1924, he thought it most important to control Constantinople. Since that is now impossible, perhaps the morcellation of the Arab regions may serve the same end.

How great a part this precautionary motive may have played in the *arrières pensées* of the Powers, or whether any, we need not try to guess. Our interest is in the effect of this policy of division upon the civilization of Moslem lands. Arab country, while vast in extent, is a narrow rind of fertility about an interior desert. Instead of having one cultural capital at its center,—Riyadh is there, but it does not dominate—it has a number of scattered nuclei in this rind,—Mecca and Medina, Jerusalem and Damascus, Mosul and Baghdad. Its mental vigor depends not on the freedom of some one or two of these, but on free inter-

¹ Isaiah Bowman, "The Mohammedan World," *The Geographic Review*, January, 1924.

course among them all. Original Islam was the inspiration of southern Arabia; developed Islam was the co-operation of this fiery vigor and conviction with the art and deflection of Syria, Persia and the River-land. Such co-operation is still more essential now, when the whole of Arabia tingles with the impact of myriad stray electrons from the west and north, and desires to re-order its life not according to the response of the Wahhabi alone, nor according to the response of the more advanced north alone, but by a common counsel, in which urban and rural and desert life combine. If the politics of Europe had been directed toward preventing this recovery, it could hardly have been more fitly devised than by this dismemberment under the guise of liberation.

The truth is, we have hardly become aware of the facts of civilization as having claims of their own. In thinking of the rights of nations, we have made a beginning of doing justice to the group life of mankind. But a man's life enters into all the groups in which he is a member. His physical existence does not directly depend on any of them; but there is a certain fullness of life which cannot exist without them, and which may become as important to him as life itself. If all his groups die, he may still survive; but something will have died within him which he alone cannot reanimate. There is tragedy in the death of an individual; there is tragedy also in the death of a culture, a partial death within many individuals. The world is readily moved by accounts of personal suffering and loss; these may become levers moving to political reform. When individual pain and death result from human malice or ineptitude, there is a ready fund of indignation to demand a remedy. But, when a mode of life passes away, customs vanish, languages are forgotten or thrust into disuse, literatures are lost, arts are neglected, systems of law

displaced, architecture ruined and not replaced, when the ambitions of whole societies of men to stand well in the eyes of their fellows have faded because customary standards have lost the supporting pride, fair fame, and hope proper to a freshly burgeoning society,—this type of decay though it carries with it the death of many individual souls may run a swift course without exciting the grief or even the attention of the world.

The Spanish Conquistadores in the new Americas are remembered as cruel to individuals; but they were still more merciless to the social life of those lands and to the material monuments around which that life grew. To them it was a simple situation: the extinguishing of a false religion and the planting of the true one. The religious wars of mankind have commonly been waged with a self-righteous fury against the heart of alien faiths. The Crusaders, great builders as they were, were even greater destroyers. The beautiful mosque of Cordova is ruined by the construction of a church in midarea. The Christians here were less considerate than the Turks at St. Sophia. The historical research which carefully reanimates broken and misplaced stones is but a surface eddy in the current of heedless cultural supersession. For it has been the habit of mankind to condemn, either actively or passively, the culture of others to death without a hearing, assuming that historical changes—the transformations of the *Zeitgeist*—are beyond human control. An age to which religious war has become impossible still looks with pious resignation on the passing of modes of life animated by creeds of different name. But there are germs at least of a different attitude. Having learned that religions can no longer be classified as the true and the false, having done lip-service to a “right of self-determination,” we are in principle ready to put a positive value on the existing inner

variety of the cultural life of the world. We have special reason to dwell upon the case of Arabic-Islamic culture; for it is not a dying but a reviving culture, and, if it passes, the passing will be an incident of our own political deeds.

The moment is a critical one. It is as if, after long somnolence, and a certain well-encased self-satisfaction, the conditions of cross-fertilization had arrived, and a sound development, not imitative of the West, and not anti-suggestible toward it, had begun. It takes political form, and is absorbed at the moment in its nationalisms; but it had begun before the era of nationalism, in a breath of new thought blowing over the Arab world. It began to be felt that the order of human life is in part a human product; and that the resignation of Islam does not counsel pure acquiescence in the state that happens to exist. As a matter of conscious principle, this is enough to mark an epoch: for, though no good Moslem has ever been a consistent do-nothing fatalist, the spirit of accepting as the will of Allah whatever required much effort to change was sufficiently prevalent to ensure general stagnation. It is not a question of religious doctrine, but of what one argues from it. It is presumably a late result of political subjugation rather than a purely theoretical declaration turned into a popular habit. To suppose that "there is no solitary event from conception to the final death spasm which has not been irrevocably fixed by divine decree" might be taken as only a highly emphatic way of stating a view of particular Providence widely held among Christians. It has not prevented Moslems in past or present from vigorous fighting or from other exertions in directions that allured them. All deductions of let-alone, let-go are purely fallacious. It is simply a matter of fact that this idea of the omnipresence of divine action, besides making the Moslem peculiarly inclined to refer events to God, has tended

to make him inert. If one has been lazy and negligent, it is always consoling to think that it was so ordained and could not be helped. One lets oneself off, and perhaps lets others off also; one curbs his anger in a way that would satisfy the counsels of a Spinoza. "Does a servant break your valuables? Why should you be angry? It was written. Does he leave your animals to die from lack of care? That too was written: he is not responsible."² He learns not to rebel against any fortune; he is patient. And he is indisposed to the appeals of "improvement" or "progress"; almost totally incurious in the direction of natural science. "I praise God that I seek not that which I require not. Thou art learned in the things I care not for; and, as for that which thou hast seen, I spit upon it."³ This is the traditional temper and mark: it is not pure indolence, it is also dignity and a sense of comparative value deserving much respect. But what there is in it of indolence is shaken. An interest in science stirs once more in the minds of the race that gave us much of our mathematics, our astronomy, medicine, philosophy. A lively literature has appeared, which, as is natural among a people of great conversational power, runs more easily to pamphlets and journals than to books,—a literature occupied much with politics no doubt, but equally occupied with its own present version of the problems of the relation of religion and science, and with the great issues of social reform. This literature is "even forging for itself a new mode of expression in the form of a simple classical Arabic, which is neither the Arabic of the Koran nor yet the Arabic of the common people."⁴ Lord Cromer thought it impossible

² T. Warren, *The Moral Paralysis of Islam*.

³ Letter of a Turkish *cadi* to an English traveler who asked him for statistical information; printed by Sir A. Layard at the end of *Nineveh and Babylon*, and by William James, *Psychology*, II. pp. 640f. n.

⁴ S. A. Morrison, "New Developments in Moslem Lands," *The Moslem World*, July, 1928.

for Islam to change; for "Islam reformed is Islam no longer." To which we must say, *Eppur si muove*. At least, the civilization penetrated by Islam does move; and either Islam will change with it, or Islam will be discarded. But is it to change into a distinctive new character? Or is it to change into a mere sophisticated modernism without a soul of its own? Is there a vitality here which holds the promise of a genuine renaissance of culture?

II

Superficial indications give opposite impressions. We say there is a vigorous life stirring; and this one positive fact may be sufficient to warn us that there is something afloat which we have no right to kill. But, if we are to try weighing the how much and how good of this cultural promise, we must look at the negative side of the picture as well.

"Culture!" said an old British resident of Jerusalem. "They have no culture left, only rags and shreds of what was once a culture." To the same effect a shrewd French critic: "The Arab culture has no life in it today. It was crystallized at Cordova; it has produced nothing for five hundred years. The intelligent Arabs have little interest in anything peculiarly their own. They want western goods and western ideas." The same critic goes on to warn us against the Arab mentality as a substantial building material for culture:

"The excellent manner of the Arab deceives the observer. Its charm is not based on illusion; for the Arab has great virtues and equally great graces. But the deception lies in what one promises oneself he can depend on. Try to *do* something with the gentleman who offers you coffee and puts his entire estate at your disposal! You will be maddened by his incapacity to resolve, to begin, to find means

to the end, to carry on, and to *finish*. He is full of competent words; but he *tackles* nothing. He is best at editorials. Enterprise and statesmanship are beyond his tenacity. The more imperative the task, the more, at the crisis, must you expect the breeze to die out of his sails, as if Allah must complete what man has shown enough good will to begin."

We need not pause to debate these opinions. There are traits of mind which are likely to turn up anywhere after generations of a type of government in which the ordinary rules of cause and effect are systematically obscured, where industry adds nothing to wealth, or integrity to high standing. Under other conditions, as in Egypt or America, the same mental stock gives a different ring. And there are qualities which have not been discouraged even by Ottoman control,—the skills which can still be called on to renew the ceramics of the Mosque of Omar, the connoisseurship which can build and guide the marvelous Museum of Archeology at Damascus.⁵

More serious than any disparaging fragments of symp-

⁵ There is also this to be remembered. No culture can be judged by what its carriers are not; but only by what they are. Every culture has its peculiar type or types of guilt; a culture might be described as an arrangement of social tensions which favors some sorts of man and tends to ruin the others. It is probably not necessary that any should be ruined to let the favored rise, but the careless world has yet to find the formula which will make life secure for all at once. Genius requires a union of freedom and discipline-from-within. Give this same freedom to those who lack the inner control and they blow themselves into a froth and vanish. Wealth in the form of private property is liberty of a sort to the possessor; and, in order that it should be that liberty, it must be superior wealth. Nine out of ten who achieve this distinction are grossened by it; one out of ten may be ennobled. It is a justification of our wealth system if it produces this one noble product, the magnanimous man; though no one is justified in accepting with resignation the vulgarization of the Babbitts. Communism, in attempting to resist this disaster, forgoes the positive product and will be justified, in turn, if it provides the conditions for some other. But it will not produce this other without cost, and precisely the same kind of human cost; for the yield of every form of civilization comes out of its field of liberty, and the field of liberty is always a field for the self-destruction of fools. Hence, to point out that in Arab lands, or elsewhere, there is a prevalent abuse of liberty is to point out nothing

tom-psychology are the widespread nervelessness and apathy in many fields—general acquiescence in decay of architecture, loss of sureness in new construction, absence of creative sparks in fine art, in reflective literature, in political philosophy. If one attempts to define the spirit of a typical Arab city,—let us say the glorious and unspoiled Hama,—one is seized with a double wonder. First, how these marvels of building, these arrangements of street and tunnel, house-wall and river, water-wheel and aqueduct, were conceived and continued to this day. Then, how remote from these minds is all that train of thought which, by penetrating the inner nature of molecular and atomic forces, first set just such water powers as these to lighting houses and moving electric trains through the Alps. All that indefatigable curiosity, analysis and inference which has bred modern science, that rigorous self-discipline in the interest of an unbriable, uncajoleable deity called Truth, seem alien to the pervading loveliness and romance of Hama, the grace and variety of imagination in its streets, the brooding sense of melancholy resting over the place and invading all things of time, the ceaseless sigh of human dependence on the eternal, mingled with the solemn, reluctant rune sounded incessantly by the great water-wheels as if their voice were the burdened breathing of time itself, lapsing forever and ever and ever. Over much of Arab land there lies this ineffable medieval spell which the harsh note of applied science would rudely disturb; and from many spots of this land I, for one, devoutly wish that applied science may long keep its distance. But one wants the machine age kept in its place by men who have the science and the mechanical skill, not by men who ignore its meaning.

distinctive: a culture is only then ready for destruction when its institutions bring general decay and cease to provide their saving remnant of sound human stuff.

And one further asks of every society promising to contribute to civilization, what is now being done with its overflow of mental power and its overflow of wealth. If such wealth and power, as they accumulate in private hands here and there, run to personal enjoyment, or to the dignifying of a purely private existence, without liberal thinking, without turning outward to do or to create or simply to imagine something of general interest, at least one of the normal sources of culture would appear to be dried up.

III

But what do we *know* of the qualities which beget a culture? No one could have foretold, at the time of the first bloom of Arabic civilization, that the given ingredients would yield the marvelous result; nor has the after-wisdom of our philosophers of history done much toward explaining it. That era from the eighth to the eleventh century, from the time when Charlemagne sent ambassadors to the court at Baghdad to the time when Moslem, Jew and Christian could be found discussing Arabic metaphysics and Arabic poetry in Cordova and Seville, remains one of the enigmas of the adventurous life of what we call western culture; for, if that link had been omitted, classical antiquity itself would have given us a much diminished inheritance.

The conquering tribesmen and townsmen of Mohammed were neither artists nor scientists. They had no architecture nor graphic art. Mohammed's great house in Medina, the first center of the new religion, was a square enclosure with mud brick walls about eleven feet high, with inner palm-and-mud-thatched huts and porches for wives, for followers, and for those engaged in worship. The first Moslem cities were army camps, at Basra and Kufa,—en-

campments where soldiers lived with their families, at first mere huts of reeds which were taken down and rolled up when they went on their raiding campaigns. Of culture these armies had poetry, song, hunger, and a religion, little else. They had further a habit not commonly reckoned a part of culture, a habit of fighting one another, a habit which the united faith had thwarted since believer must not kill believer, and which thereupon took an outward direction. The peoples on their periphery who first felt the force of their conquering arms were well advanced in the arts of which these *Ur-Arabs* were innocent. There, among the Persians and the Syrians, charged with remnants of Hellenistic and Roman culture, were craftsmen, architects, scholars, largely with Christian-Byzantine gloss, whom Arabs could wonder at and later use. But these craftsmen and scholars were drowsy and world-weary, at the ebb of productive force. What could come of such a mixture?

To this somnolent ebb-tide polite world, the fact of being subjugated by a horde of uncouth lance-armed horsemen and infantry who hardly knew the feel of a city street, plainly preferring the open spaces at the desert's edge with loose-blown tent-walls to well-made dwellings, who even shunned the gardens of Damascus as sources of fever,⁶ seemed an incredible nightmare. It might have been, as they expected, a story of such things as Genghis Khan afterward inflicted on the Arab world. What they least expected was that these conquerors, once they trusted themselves to the cities, should fall under the spell of beauty,

⁶ "In Syria they lived equally apart from the population, in camps such as *Jabiya*, and for at least two generations showed neither appreciation of architecture, nor any desire to rival the splendid buildings of the Syrian cities. They avoided these cities, in fact. Damascus merely reminded them, in the words of the poet *Akhtal*, of the pallor and rigors of the fevers caught by them in the gardens of the *Ghuta*; and *Jahiz* expresses the same feeling when he says, 'Beware of the *rif* (cultivated land), it is death, and a quick death to approach it.'" From a letter of Mr. K. A. C. Creswell.

and, instead of tearing down the great Basilica of St. John at Damascus, as the center of an enemy-religion, insist rather on sharing it, worshiping Allah on one side, while the Christians worshiped their Trinity on the other!

It is but half the fact to say that the Arab mind of that day was backward, under necessity of borrowing the arts of the Syrians and Sassanians. The other half is the *will-to-borrow-and-to-learn*. This capacity and interest revealed something which removed the Arabs from the list of the world's destroyers; this same power enabled them to sting aging Byzantine provinces into new vigor, and to give back to eastern tradition a distinctive quality and coloring which has created the mosque, with its minaret and kibla, the arabesques of Moorish Spain, the courtyards and gardens of Moslem Persia. There was psychological stuff in the tribesmen of Mohammed and Khalid which enabled them to take the position of masters of arts, recognizing the greatness of a great heritage, and doing with it something better than faithful transmission.

This mental stuff had to live in the same heads with much folly and vice. The religious spirit of growing Islam had to fight for its life with greed and lust, and when Medina was destroyed in its civil wars this spirit all but succumbed. Baghdad was the scene of feud and murder as well as of luxury and revelry. It is always in spite of much that culture makes its way,—there are philosophers of history who would prescribe a certain grandeur of license as a sort of manure for the plant,—but never perhaps in spite of so much as at Baghdad. The flow of wealth was immense; but, with all the spending, some appreciable part went into the intelligent patronage of learning and art, into the making of books (and multiplying them by means of an improved paper), the development of mathematics, the creation of algebra, the transmission

from India of the decimal system with a character for zero, the pursuit of astronomy and chemistry, the editing of Aristotle.

Arabia, we say, at the time of its conquering march through the Orient to the Oxus, and through northern Africa to the gates of Tours, was *hungry*; hungry for the means of livelihood, hungry also for a certain greatness of life, which included the ample exercise of reason and connoisseurship. That fire which burned somewhere in the depths of the Arab soul under the name of religion, side by side with fierceness and crude passion, carried a dimension of mental being that made it level-eyed with the best minds of the Byzantine world. The Arabs were proud and shrewd conquerors, liberal first for the sake of tribute and then for the sake of ideas, merciless to those who could give neither. But what finally counted in history was the life they lived, making Arabic the *lingua franca* of the then learned world, creating an education for the people everywhere so that the Koran could be read, establishing a fraternity of thought in the midst of a fraternity of worship, and offering such service as hard livers could offer to faith in the unity of God and in the finality of his latest Prophet.

What, then, do we regard as the elements which made this Arabic civilization? First, I should put that hunger itself, that hot metaphysical concern to which all philosophy is germane. Then, an older culture to feed on, assimilate and transform. Third, a vast organization of the government and wealth of the world, ensuring a wide field from which to draw genius, ensuring also a degree of peace and of disturbance of peace. Finally, a fruitful co-operation of different types of mentality, the virile breadth of the southern Arab, the refinement of Syria, Persia, Egypt.

IV

Can these conditions ever return? Certainly not. There is no place in the world today for that far-flung Arab empire dominant with its language over other peoples, and concentrating into itself so large a share of the power, wealth and science of the world. But this is only to say that there is no place today for any world empire or for any monopoly of culture. That form of history is past which Hegel and Ranke saw, the incarnate Idea, or *Zeitgeist*, flitting from place to place, residing for a time with one people, and then, at the setting of the sun, moving farther West. The sun's circle has been completed; and there is no more night. All cultures of the present start from a diffused fund, the common property of mankind. For this universal heritage there is no *Untergang*: the rhythms of history can never henceforth dip below its level,—except by a vast physical catastrophe. In place of that old picture of a living culture, we have the new one: the free admission of ideas from all quarters, and a vigorous capacity to remold them. There must be a sufficient population, a sufficient wealth, a sufficient thirst for life on earth, a sufficient demand for heaven, an adequate capacity for joy, pain and compassion. There must be tough idiosyncrasy, racial genius and variety of life. And there must be that metaphysical sense, that desire to get back to the roots of things, and become the prophet of what one finds, which is fertilizer and shaper to all the rest.

Of these conditions, some are clearly present in the Moslem world; others will come, unless we prevent them from coming. The Arab world has now incorporated into itself much of that Syrian and Persian stock which was once outside. Its native force is evidenced by the fact that neither Greek nor Roman nor Byzantine culture sub-

merged its quality; in fact, it dominated throughout its domain. Except in Turkey, the ideas of Islam and the Arabic tongue achieved a fusion which neither the Roman nor the Greek civilization accomplished. And that chief factor in all growing culture, that cosmic hunger which I call the religious or metaphysical sense, is far stronger in the Arab-Moslem world today than in any land of Europe or America.

With the removal of the political blight which for centuries has kept numb the soul of Arab countries, other conditions should arrive,—wealth, population, initiative, intellectual courage, social experiment: it is these conditions which we have the power to promote or to thwart. Sir Mark Sykes, speaking in Manchester in 1917, on the occasion of the Balfour Declaration, emphasized to his Jewish audience his own certainty that they would be in presence of a powerful Arab civilization:

“When I speak of the Arabs, I enter into no nice distinctions: I refer to those in Asia who are one in language and blood. By environment they are called Syrians, Mesopotamians, Mosulis, Aleppines; by religion they are called Christians, Mussulmans, Druses, Mutawilehs, Ansariis; in blood, there is on the male side a little infusion in Syria of the Crusader, and in Mesopotamia of Turanian and Iranian, but scientists would call these only traces. Eighty-five per cent of the stock is Semitic. For 800 years the Arabs have been under the yoke of Turkish dynasties: their canals of Mesopotamia have been ruined, and when Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope, he cut them off from European commerce. They were bound, impoverished, divided by Turkish intrigue, and isolated by events. Are they dead? Never! You know, ‘The Semite sleeps, but never dies.’ Wherever there are men of Arab stock, whether in Nigeria or Chicago, Java or Manchester, there one finds progressive people who take an interest in art, in literature, in philosophy, and have a high place in commerce. The Arabs of today have the same vitality and capacity as the Arabs who under the Omayyads carried civiliza-

tion from Damascus to Cordova in Spain, and from Basra to the wild steppes of Austral Asia; as the Abbasids who spread literature and art from Baghdad to the whole civilized world.

"To-day the Arabs are pro-nationalist. They are one in blood and in tongue. There are seven or eight millions of them; and they are prolific. There is here a combination of man-power, virgin soil, petroleum and brains. What is that going to produce in 1950? The inevitable result is that the seven or eight millions will turn into twenty millions; the Mesopotamian canal-system will be reconstructed; Syria must become the granary of Europe; Baghdad, Damascus, and Aleppo will each be as big as Manchester; universities and a great press must arise.

"The Arab civilization is coming there; no Sultan or Kaiser can prevent it; and when it comes no imperialists and financiers will be able to control it."⁷

And although Sir Mark Sykes, he of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, had done what he could as agent of that secret treaty to cut the coming Arab state in two, his words at Manchester contain what, after thirteen years, we must still regard as a valid account of probabilities, some of them already realized. Feisal can now speak of 300,000 ex-nomads settled in newly irrigated lands on the Tigris, and of a new thirst for education among the Shiites who are half of his people.⁸ The passage from Damascus to

⁷ From a mimeographed report of the address made by the Zionist Organization in London. An accurate French translation will be found in Georges Samné, *La Syrie*, pp. 417f. Sir Mark continued with these words: "It is the destiny of the Jews to be closely connected with the Arab revival, and co-operation and good-will from the first are necessary, or ultimate disaster will overtake both Jew and Arab. I warn the Jews to look through Arab glasses." (Cries of "We will, we will!")

⁸ "Il a suffi d'une loi pour amener la population à multiplier les pompes à eau le long du Tigre, ce qui a permis à 300,000 personnes jadis nomades et qui ne savaient pas ce que c'était que la culture, de se vouer à la vie sédentaire.

"Pareillement dans le domaine de l'instruction publique les gens refusaient jadis d'envoyer leurs enfants à l'école. On peut dire que sous le régime turc, les Chiïtes, qui forment la moitié de la population, étaient pratiquement sans aucune instruction. Maintenant, les enfants se précipitent dans les écoles, et elles ne sont pas assez nombreuses ni assez vastes pour les contenir.

"Tout cela est la conséquence du sentiment de l'indépendance."

Journal de Genève, 1930.

Baghdad, which before the War was set down on the diplomatic maps as a matter of 29 days, can now be done in 26 hours by land, and in far shorter time by air: there is a revolution in this fact alone. The most backward part of Arabia, under the peace of Ibn Saud, definitely enters the modern world: transport is safe in the Nejd; means of livelihood begin to diversify; the wealth, power, and enlightenment formerly concentrated in a few hands spread themselves. Two large wireless stations, at Mecca and at Riyadh, with the aid of a dozen smaller ones, are making a mental unity of the dispersed spaces of the kingdom. This after barely five years. The initiative is there: we have chiefly to refrain from destroying.

To this extent the fate of Islamic culture depends on us. To as great an extent it depends on what it does with its generative principle, its religion. The metaphysical sense, without which there can be no significant culture, may be crippled in either of two ways,—by a rigid and defective religious type, or by a dismissal of all religion for a secularized social scheme; and the issue of the future lies in this question, whether the Near East, now hesitating between these two equally deadly alternatives, will be able to evolve for itself a third. Impatience with the slow movement and the positive abuses of a fixed religious institution always presents an incentive to abolition. Yet, if Islam vanishes from the Arab regions, without leaving any equivalent source of human dignity, horizon, and hope, the cultural result will hardly be other than a modernistic cross-breed, which might as well be hatched under European feathers as under any other.

It is not customary in works on political philosophy to engage in discussion of religious systems; but, in the case of Islam, to avoid such discussion is to neglect the center of the whole political and social problem.

V

Islam is no doubt the fixedest of fixed social religious systems. This fixity is said to be secured by a sacred book, delivered from heaven, after an eternal and uncreated prototype. Yet other religions have also their sacred books from heaven. But the Koran calls down terrible curses on those who venture to alter the book, or even to take a part and discard the rest. So also do other sacred books. It is true, the Islamic curses are more vehement and sulphuric than most others. Yet, after all, if one is cursed, is not any curse bad enough? If, on the other hand, one wins in his own conscience the liberty to choose among the contents of the Koran, or of any other book, one's first act of choice is to drop those curses; and then the fierce ones are as harmless as the rest. To Islam also the "higher criticism" is bound to come.

No, the superior fixity of Islam is due, not to its attachment to a sacred book, but rather to a striking character of that book, the definiteness of its rules of life. Many sacred scriptures run to general principles: when this is the case, applications may vary with time and place. Mohammed distrusted wide generalities; his genius lay in a union of thought and action; his kingdom was also of this world; he was seer and prophet, but he was also legislator and magistrate. As Mahmoud al Arafâti puts the case: "Where is the Christian who *inherits* from a co-religionist by virtue of such and such a verse of the gospel?"⁹ This concreteness brought large advantages to his movement in its time, decisive reform of old abuses, the abolition of child murder, restriction of the number of wives, an improved position of women and of slaves, a vast advance in

⁹ Mahmoud bey Salem al Arafâti. Quoted by Eugène Jung in *L'Islam sous le Joug*, p. 91.

the conception of God, the suppression of idolatry and of a hundred superstitious usages, an inter-tribal truce, an expanding fraternity, effectiveness in common action. But the reform of the seventh century might well be an atavism in the ninth. This very concreteness became a disadvantage after the second century of its existence.

Why has this same difficulty not halted Christendom? For we have our fundamentalists who date their theological and ethical sources six hundred years farther back than the Koran; yet they are able to live among their fellows without wishing the sun to stand still except in education. The answer lies chiefly in the fact that the simplicity and high generality of the principles of the Christian religion, the conscious contrast it set up between the spirit and the works of the law, and the consequent absence of any well-defined social doctrine, allowed, in western lands, the various arts of life to set up for themselves as independent of religious control. Religion could adopt for itself the realm of the purely spiritual, at least as a working hypothesis, and let all the sciences and their applications try an autonomous life. A religion identified with a full-wrought code faces a dilemma when our ideas of property, family, art, science, society, develop: either Islam relaxes its hold on these interests, or else it changes with them. In either case, it ceases to be Islam: such is the theory behind Lord Cromer's dictum that an Islam reformed is Islam no longer.

But this dictum assumes that our own secularization of the several arts has been successful. If Lord Cromer were speaking today he could not so readily make this assumption. Neither are these several secular interests so prosperous in their independence as we formerly thought; nor is it so possible to confine religion to the "purely spiritual." The ties between church and law-making are cut, I

trust, irrevocably: but religion has lent and continues to lend, through the minds of law-makers, biases to the laws of the family, education, personal and wage-relationships, international conduct. We are beginning to realize our folly in trying to set up a spiritually sterilized education; and to this extent we recognize an element of validity in the Islamic conception of the state. There are sufficient reasons for destroying every institutional control of the officers of religion over the work of the law; there are profound and inescapable reasons for retaining a vital bond between the spirit of a nation's religion and the spirit of its laws.

The institutional tie, as Turkey has well seen, brings with it the death of thought, and the corruption of both church and state. When Turkey renounces the Sharia law and substitutes the Swiss Civil Code, as a code that will apply to Moslem, Christian and Jew alike, it takes a necessary step in the making of a modern nation; for the state today can prescribe no religion to its citizens and must still provide them all with a code of law. But, when Turkey decides to deprive the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople of his civil and administrative powers, thus compelling Greek Catholics in Turkey, together with Jews and Moslems, to bring all civil cases amongst themselves before a jurisdiction which is not in their eyes duly sanctioned, it not only assumes unnecessary trouble; it abandons a valuable element of oriental intuition. It is possible for a modern nation to allow the continuance of the religious courts, Patriarchal, Rabbinical and Wakilat, while offering its citizens the option of its own neutral jurisdiction. And for cases between members of different confessions, the principle of the Mixed Courts of Egypt offers a valuable recourse.¹⁰

¹⁰ Cf. Pierre Arminjon and Pierre Crabitès, "The Patriarchs of the Near East," *The Moslem World*, October, 1930. Jew, Moslem, and oriental Chris-

The way forward for Islamic countries is not, I conclude, by adopting that western artifice which pretends that religion has nothing to say about daily life, morals, law, institutions. The alternative is to find in religion a source of growth as well as of conservation. It is sometimes asked whether Islam can adjust itself to modern life. But this gives modern life too much authority. The question is rather whether Islam can beget new ideas of its own, passing independent judgment on the various proposals of "modern life," accepting some and rejecting others, according to its own living standards.

The answer to this question, in brief, is that Islam has every inner provision for growth that any religion has, or any legal system. It is, on the whole, rather better equipped for change than many such systems: the difficulty has lain, not in the absence of means of growth, but in the lack of disposition. This proposition is so far at variance from the general opinion that I must offer some detail.

VI

It is well known that the Koran is only one of several sources of Moslem law: besides this there are Mohammed's decisions as magistrate, the common law of Medina during his time, and a body of tradition about his personal opinions, habits, conversation,—a rich and varied corpus of original material. In the editing of this extra-Koranic traditional material, or *Hadith*, one might imagine two very different interests at work, one seeking scrupulous historians have much the same conception of the ultimate source of authority in law; the law which they most readily accept, especially in questions of family and personal status, is the law which they can recognize as the law of God. The idea is valid; we may regret but cannot combat the circumstance that for the present the same conviction tends to bring these religionists into three different tribunals. We cannot legally impose either an identity of religion or a neutrality of religion; the alternative is to admit variety of religion, while we wait for the inner evolution which will bring them together.

torical accuracy, the other seeking the sense of things, and arranging the materials according to their *ideas*. Islam has not had to choose between these two; for each of these interests has made editions of the sources. And the fact that the *Musannaf* of Bukhari, the best example of the classified collection, "enjoys a reverence only second to that of the Koran" shows that the Moslem mind from early times has found satisfaction in beginning to penetrate behind the authoritative word of religion in search of its principle.

But besides the editors of tradition, there are also the interpreters. And, wherever interpretation goes, there goes an element of flexibility; more particularly evident when there are numerous interpreters, differing among themselves about the meaning of ancient sayings, not wholly applicable to present cases. The remarkable thing about Islam is that, instead of providing for the faithful a single orthodoxy, an officially declared and final interpretation, it offers *four orthodoxies* among which believers may choose. One of these naturally corresponds to our fundamentalism, distrusting speculations of reason, seeking a literal faithfulness to primitive Islam, reviving ancient customs and punishments, striking off hands of thieves, refusing to eat new foods if the Koran contains no instructions how to eat them. This is Islam at its narrowest, interpretation reduced to the zero point, begetting, as religious narrowness does, certain strong-willed ascetic sects—the powerful Wahhabis are followers of this (Hanbalite) way. But it is also least in numbers of adherents. The other three ways have given to Islam a group of usable principles of interpretation, that is to say, principles of growth. They are:

The principle of *analogy*: similar case, similar rule. With a wide enough perception of similarities, this (Hani-

fite) principle does for the Moslem jurist what legal fictions have done for the jurists of the West.

The principle of *public advantage*: if a literal application of a Koranic rule works evident injustice or injury, it cannot be meant in that sense. For—and here appeal is made to one of the few great Islamic generalities—“in Islam there is no injury.” This (Malikite) principle would seem to allow room for a modern “sociological jurisprudence” of the type developed by Roscoe Pound, or for other forms of pragmatism. And, if legal logic is to be subordinated to an evident public good, the way is open for progress.

The principle of *agreement*: based on another generalization, “My people will never agree in error.” At first, this meant that what the surviving companions of the Prophet, or what the leaders at Medina, agreed upon as being good Islam, *is* good Islam. Allowing this (Shafiite) method to be used in other places gave a chance for local variation. It is capable of being extended to variation in time also, and, with ash-Shafii, agreement of all Moslem peoples is capable of superseding the Koran itself.

The principle of *discretion* or “preference of the judge.” It required a degree of audacity for Abu Hanifa to incorporate into his system this idea of judge-made law, allowing departures both from strict letter and from strict analogy, and tied to no standard of public advantage. It was intended to make necessary allowance for local conditions; and it has always been distrusted by the traditionalists. On its face it invites a dangerous degree of personal innovation into the law. But its spirit is simply the “appeal to reason” everywhere invoked by reformers. It is so far felt to incorporate the required liberty that its name, *Idjtihad*, becomes the name of an advanced Turkish party and of its influential journal.

Of these four principles, two are generally accepted by all sects, "analogy" and "agreement." These two keep an anchor in the tradition; while "public advantage" and "discretion" taken at full force might easily turn Islam loose to the tides of the times. For this reason, it is not likely that these latter two will ever gain the full confidence of Islamic leaders. They are not yet *the* desired principle of interpretation, which must unite liberty and continuity. What that principle is, however, is foreshadowed in a comment which ash-Shafii makes upon the principle of analogy: *if a reason is given* for any command, says this enlightened commentator, all analogies must be taken from that reason, and not from any external point of resemblance. We are here hot on the trail of the insight that *the reason for the rule is the essence of the rule itself*, evidently the valid principle for all continuous legal growth.

To illustrate: We have rules against theft. But why is theft forbidden? Suppose we say, because it is contrary to social welfare that property should be limited to what can always be protected by personal vigilance. Then this social welfare, the alleged reason for the rule against theft, is the essence of the rule. We may take "social welfare" rather than "no thieving" as our guide: the wider rule includes the more special rule, and much more besides. Or, suppose we find that the reason against theft is that one must love one's neighbor, and that he who loves his neighbor will not steal from him. This wider rule, Love your neighbor, is then the essence of the special rule against theft. The reason for a rule may always be taken as an equivalent and superior rule.

The business of interpretation, then, becomes a business of *discerning the reasons for the rules originally given*, whether those reasons were stated or not. The sum of such

reasons would be the living spirit of Islam, and would be capable of new forms in any time or circumstance.

I feel justified, therefore, in my assertion that Islam contains in abundance the necessary principles for its own growth. Indeed it may be said that until the middle of the 13th century Islam was the vehicle for whatever growth in civilization the western world could boast. And let me note that I am speaking here solely of Islamic canon law, its most conservative part. This canon law, or Sharia, is but a part of the actual law of Moslem lands. Islam has been peculiarly free to carry on its ordinary life on the basis of local custom and the decrees of local rulers. Its rigidity lies chiefly in those personal and family matters which come close to the ethical sense of a religion. Naturally, it is just these matters which, to foreign minds, make up the chief traits in the social picture of Islam:—polygamy, slavery, divorce, the seclusion and inferior position of women, etc., etc. Hence it is important to learn that in these respects Islam is free to change. Many Moslems in Russia have become monogamous, and Moslems are rapidly becoming so elsewhere. The seclusion of women was not a Koranic precept nor an original Arab practice: it was an acquisition from some Byzantine quarter. It is chiefly in respect to slavery and divorce, and to the ethics of sexual and social life, that the spirit of Islam must summon itself to revise Islamic practice.

VII

Principles of development have been present. The disposition to use them has been lacking. Lethargy and stagnation are not Islamic principles: they are political and economic consequences. What then of the present: does the disposition to re-think Islam exist at the present time?

Now re-thinking begins with *selection*. For, when one chooses from a body of tradition the parts he can use in his own mental housekeeping, he is discarding and interpreting, perhaps in spite of himself. During my travels in the Near East I took what occasion I could find to ask of pious Moslems what parts of the Koran they most cared for. Very frequently I received the cautious answer, "I have no choice; all words of the Book are equally inspired." But one could reply that selection of some sort is always present, if only in the frequency of use. Then evidences of selection would usually appear, and sometimes of active and systematic selection. The Mufti of Aleppo set out for me a classified series of passages covering the main points of theology and morals. Under such leadership as his, the whole mass of Islamic thinking must be reanimated. And my impression is that for thousands of sheikhs and imams the question of a living, contemporary Islam is constantly pressing. Re-thinking is not necessarily deliberate: it may be imposed by the times.¹¹

But the deliberate work is also necessary: an avowedly new interpretation, guided by some sort of philosophy. For in the conscious transition from one stage of belief to another, there must be some "light of reason." Evidences of this stage of philosophical reconstruction were fewer than I had hoped. In Egypt and Syria, the work of original scholarship appeared to be chiefly historical and scientific, with philosophical implications. In Turkey, however, the problem has been clearly faced and grappled with. Side by side with the Turkey which identifies all religion with the old ignorant and corrupt organization, its schools and monasteries, and which begins and ends with cleansing the Augean stables, there is another Turkey which recognizes

¹¹ Among the Koranic injunctions now frequently brought forward is the obligation to seek the light of knowledge; thus the Koran sanctions its own revision.

the social hollowness of a religionless state. The University of Stamboul has taken a leading part in formulating the task. It is Khalil Nimat, professor of logic, who writes:

"One of the institutions which form society is religion. An individual may live a social life only when he is linked to the religious life by some sacred ties. The lack of religious life causes a vacancy in the soul of the human being which cannot be filled by any other thing. In the same way the place of religion in the social structure can not be filled by other institutions.

[After criticizing the former interpreters of religion, the use of Arabic as a language not currently understood in Turkey, and the "unreasonable myths" which thwarted the religious life of the people, he continues to the effect that]

"Islam is the religion of the Turkish people. It satisfies the will-to-believe of the individual. It lifts him to a sense of communion with the eternal being. It has the character of true universality. And in its purity it has no official institution, but imparts its eternal and holy being and its holy injunctions to the consciences of men."

Nevertheless, it is with the public offices of religion that the Faculty of Theology concerns itself, under the stimulus of a commission constituted at the university. This commission brings in a report recommending certain reforms in the general practice:

To transform the religious monuments so as to render them accessible to visitors;

To permit people to come in without taking off shoes;

To use the Turkish language for liturgy, sermons, prayers;

To give attention to the musical qualities of the voices of the muezzins, and to introduce musical instruments into the services; for "*la musique religieuse moderne élève le cœur et purifie les sentiments. C'est un facteur moral considérable.*"

To prepare preachers of talent at the university, and have their sermons printed, thus preparing a literature and philos-

ophy of religion; also engaging lay thinkers who have given attention to religion.

In this we find a bending of practice to the drift of modern life, perhaps more noticeable in Turkey than elsewhere in the Near East. For, with the fixed demands of the business day and of new modes of clothing, the five periods of prayer each day and the ceremonial purification required before each prayer became impracticable and fell into disuse in the cities. The mosques of Constantinople are strikingly empty of the daily worshipers one sees in Moslem lands generally. But there is also the recognition that the primary need is for a new philosophical reflection on the content and function of religion.

At least two members of the University have made beginnings toward such a new interpretation of the Koran. Chekib Bey, professor of psychology, has proposed to carry out a topical classification of the verses of the Koran connecting with the principle of the *Musannaf*, so that a comparative study may bring out the common thought in each topic. Ismail Hakku Bey, professor of education, believes, however, that this will not effect the required adaptation; what is needed, he holds, is "a Bergsonian type of interpretation," which seeks the living spirit of the Koranic doctrine, its *élan religieux*, and restates that in the language of the present. To my mind, the two proposals might well supplement one another: the former would secure the historical continuity, by anchoring itself in the texts, thus limiting the subjective elements which might creep into the "Bergsonian method"; whereas the latter, with its demand that life speak to life, the old life to the new life, through the common medium of religious experience, would ensure the vitality of the result for the present life of the nation. And any result reached

by Turkish scholars in this field—though by its reaction against the Arabic elements of Islam, Turkey has created a momentary hostility toward its findings in the Arabic speaking lands—would be of immense value to the world of Islam generally.

But why do I speak of the reinterpretation of Islam rather than of a substitution for Islam of a better religion or a better philosophy? I am indeed convinced that men are moving rapidly toward a consensus in regard to religion, under the impact of a common front toward the naturalistic atheism fostered by a false view of science, so that party names in religion mean less today than for many centuries. But I am also convinced that we are not ready to cast loose from the historic aspects of religion, nor to take refuge in religion-in-general. It is not for nothing that the minds of the Near East have with such general consent found satisfaction in Islam. And it is too easy an explanation to say that they like it because it makes but slight demands on moral conduct, making concessions at every point, nay, appealing, to the animal passions of men as in its whole domestic program and in its pictures of Paradise. Without debating the matter in detail, it may be sufficient to point out that the great innovation of Islam at the time of its birth was not its compromise with warfare and lust, but its doctrine of the unity and sublimity of God, and at the same time of his omnipresence,—“God is nearer to you than the great vein in your neck”: this central religious dogma Mohammed’s religion has been more successful in making generally *felt* throughout the body of its adherents than has any other religion of my acquaintance. It is well to consider that the Moslem looks on the average Christian as prayerless or lazy in his prayers, as idolatrous in his imagery of worship, as addicted to wine, as lacking in brotherhood, and as mate-

rialistic in the dominating ambition of his life in spite of his spiritual professions.

It is sometimes said by Christian missionaries that leaders of Islam are tending to borrow ideas which are specifically Christian, such as that of the universal love and fatherhood of God, *without acknowledgment*, as if they were thereby guilty of a literary plagiarism! To my mind that borrowing would be the most natural and welcome result of a serious philosophical enterprise of reinterpretation. For elements of Christianity and of Judaism are part of the original stock of Islam, which in its pronounced anti-Trinitarianism was reacting against a corrupted or misunderstood version of Christianity. Convergence would be a necessary consequence of mutual enlightenment. As Dr. S. Khuda Baksh of Calcutta puts the matter:

“In the past, the fundamentals of Christian and Mohammedan culture were identical. Are they not moving to the same goal now? . . . True Islam is true Christianity, their goals being identical.”

Historically, Islam has been characterized by a proud self-sufficiency. Fanaticism is a state of will, not a state of reason. It is an attitude of final attachment to goods which one knows one has, joined with an equally final resistance to the suggestion that there may be better, reservation of the inward depths from fellowship with an outer infidel world, nameless reluctance to be dragged into the current of the general life, tough and unreasoning maintenance of one's chosen way and formula for salvation. Fanaticism is proper to the irrational elements of religious feeling: it is destined to melt, but it can never disappear through violence or fraud from outside. It is an instinctive protection of an unclear insight. It is a confession of weakness, of

unfinished power of expression, and a sign of participation in greatness. Its self-reservation is a cry for *time* in meeting an outer civilization on its own ground. At the heart of Islamic culture today there is a remnant of the old fanaticism, an unbreakable tenacity of idea, making its strongholds impenetrable to appeals to change labels, flags, religious names. This tenacity is a measure of its inner force and promise. What it demands from us is respect, friendship, readiness to exchange philosophical ideas, and above all the grant of the needed time for an inner evolution.

VIII

Of all things, what is not wanted, and what is intrinsically most futile, is the attempt to exploit Islamic faith for western ends.

It was an apparently sagacious application of psychology which inspired those publicists who in 1920 advised France in these terms:

“Occupons la Syrie, prenons Damas. La possession de cette ville, une des villes saintes de l’Islam, assurera notre influence définitive sur tous les musulmans.”

As with many another wise application of a foolish psychology, “C’est le contraire qui se produisit.”¹² No act has done so much to shake French influence in Moslem lands as the seizure of Damascus. Likewise with the deft idea of constructing a mosque in Paris, which to a diplomatic eye might well appear “la suprême habilité, afin de conquérir l’âme de nos protégés ou sujets musulmans.” Will the eye of a jealous Islam fail to detect the note of insincerity in this scheme? “Le fait de la faire inaugurer par le Sultan du Maroc détruit tout l’effet qu’on espérait, car il est

¹² Eugène Jung, *L’Islam sous le Joug*, p. 54.

considéré comme un prince ne jouissant pas de sa liberté." ¹³

Behind these moral ineptitudes lie the more material utilities. General Brémond has carefully studied the military future of Europe; he sees that "In 1940 there will be one French soldier in face of three Germans," and he conceives that "It will be our colonial troops who will make up the difference." With this premise, note our consequent attitude to the Mohammedan religion:

"The actual conditions of our independence oblige us to give place at our national *foyer* to 22 millions of Moslems, to employ in our army, and in particular in the post of sacrifice, the infantry, important Moslem contingents. Knowledge of Islam, therefore, constitutes an indispensable part of our baggage. . . ." ¹⁴

If these are our intentions it would be shrewder not to publish them. The stupidities of the West, born of its lingering willingness to exploit, are rapidly creating an irreconcilable Islam, including an immense colonial proletariat in Africa and an advanced community in Asia. These segments are bound together in that Islamic equality and fraternity which Christendom professes but finds with difficulty in its heart. They are becoming united also in concern and protest against these attitudes of the West: there is a Moslem press, little heard in the outer world, which carries instant response from Algiers to Delhi, to China, to the Straits Settlements and the Malay Islands. The Arabic language acquires a new universality in these regions: Koranic schools in China are speaking Arabic; there exists what Massignon calls an intellectual supra-territoriality. It is easily possible for us to render this great community hostile, and thus antipathetic even to

¹³ Eugène Jung, *L'Islam sous le Joug*, p. 56.

¹⁴ *L'Islam et les Questions musulmanes au Point de Vue français*, p. 19. Cf. p. 277, footnote 13, for a part of the French text of this passage.

those elements of our civilization which it could best use in its own housekeeping.

It is equally possible to be in honest alliance with its legitimate hopes, remembering that in proportion as the West makes it difficult for the Moslem world to come to an understanding with itself, it prevents itself from coming to an understanding with that world.

We do not know what culture is going to be born, nor where. We cannot make the new thing an object of definite public effort. What we do know is that nothing is furthered by the destruction or hamstringing of a vital forward movement having an individuality of its own. And that when in the end the birth appears, it will be well for us that we have not been its enemy.

It is well to remember the advice of the geographer: Islam cannot be controlled. One would desire to move our statesmen by the unmeasurable value of a new cultural birth. But, if they cannot be moved by that, will they not pause in time before the picture of their own peril? Let them in either case try something that has not yet been tried,—good faith, a reticent and respectful aid in the slow processes of the gods.

CHAPTER XXVII

IS THERE A MORAL CODE FOR STATES?

THE world of free states forms a small community, of some sixty members, let us say, in lively conversation. At one time, this conversation resembled the ordinary intercourse of neighbors,—there were long pauses in it; at present each state is in almost incessant communication and interaction with every other, affecting each the other for better or for worse. Are there ethical rules for this intercourse? And, if so, is the code the same as the code for individuals? On the face of it, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, seem applicable; Love your neighbor, Forgive your enemy, seem less so.

Statesmen hesitate to accept the identity, cite "reasons of state" for deeds which would be personally immoral; hence Cavour's famous remark, "If we did for ourselves what we do for our country, what rascals we should be!" The public, however, takes for granted that the codes are the same. This is one of the reasons why statesmen, as we saw, distrust public opinion in international affairs, and hold an attitude of reserve toward the League in so far as it is an organ of public opinion. International law hesitates on the same obstacle: Grotius was for applying personal ethics at once to the conduct of states; few of his successors found the case so clear. It is evident that we shall have no stable basis for international law or for international behavior, or for that international control which has been concerning us, until we know whether pub-

lic opinion is right or these conventionalized statesmen are right.

Public opinion operates by analogy: it simply transfers its "Keep faith, do justice, pay what you owe" from the realm of persons to the realm of groups. The analogy is inviting and in a sense irresistible. We personify nation-states; we think of their relations as personal relations; their transactions as personal deeds; their consequent reputations as indicative of personal character and moral quality. Do they not make engagements with one another, as debtors and creditors, as givers and receivers of promises? Have their conversations not the qualities of truthfulness or of deception? Are they not cruel or humane in their dealings with their dependents? Do their deeds not display at every point the mentality of the doers,—their sense or stupidity, their honor or dishonor, their generosity or tight-fistedness, their narrowness or liberality of judgment? These qualities in action call forth the same emotions, the same shades of praise and blame, as in persons: the great state which bullies a small one loses the sympathy of the neutral onlooker and risks the peril of a combination of Powers against it. There is the same logic of social and anti-social behavior: a great body of common interests makes for co-operation and the establishment of a community of states; this community requires for its stability confidence in promises given, and in the general preference for peaceable rather than pugnacious conduct. Have we not here a sufficient basis for political ethics?

There is perhaps no more celebrated analogy in the whole field of human thought than this between the state, as "the mind writ large," and the individual: we have lived through the excesses of the "organic theory" of the social body; and we have learned the limits of this peri-

lous similitude.¹ Some of us have reached the conclusion that no human group is, in a literal sense, either an organism or a person. In our study of the right of a nation to life, we encountered some of the respects in which the analogy fails.² It is probable that a transfer of thought so universal both in literature and in common usage is largely sound: it is also probable that we have reached that point in human history at which we need a more literal and accurate judgment. I propose that we first examine the notion of right, and then enquire whether the conditions of its use are present in the relations between states.

I shall undertake to defend these theses: that states may, in a figurative but wholly valid sense, be regarded as subjects of rights and so as ethical beings; that the first principle of their moral code cannot be different from the first principle of the code of persons; that there are, however, certain cases in the relations of states which have no parallel in the relations of persons; and that to this extent the code of state behavior will show differences from that for persons.

I

In order that there may be a question of right, there must be at least two conscious beings, one who claims the right and one who is called upon to respect the right: there must be a "subject" and an "addressee." On the part of the subject there must be some matter in interest,—let us say, his life: he must be capable of caring for that object, of taking pleasure in its preservation, of suffering pain in its deprivation or destruction. Whether at any moment he does so care for it does not alter the right: a man does not

¹ William Ernest Hocking, *Man and the State*, Chapter xxiii.

² Chapter xiv above.

lose his right to life—I have no right to kill him—merely because he may be momentarily disposed to suicide. The point is simply that a right is built on an assumable interest; and on this account an indifferent or insensitive being could not be a subject of right. A tree has no right to life unless it is capable of taking an interest in its own life. But the mere capacity for pleasure or pain is not enough to give a right: otherwise all animals, big and little, insects and protozoa, would have claims of right. No one can be a subject of right whose range of interests is limited to his own consciousness: a completely self-interested or selfish being—the ideal criminal—would have no rights. For the claim of right is a demand that the addressee limit his own self-interest or impulse in my behalf; it assumes a capacity for mutuality. In brief, right can exist only where there is moral capacity on both sides: that is, it can exist only between persons, disposed on each side to value the personality of the other or others. The claim of right implies a reciprocal desire to promote personal life through the mode in which material interests are used.

Are these conditions present, or may they be present, as between states?

Clearly not in any literal sense. States as such are not capable of pleasure and pain; nor are they persons except in the sense of juristic fiction. The personality attributed to them is of the order of a “group mind,”—that is to say, an identical strand in the will of all their members.³ The only subjectivity present is the subjectivity of these members. The only rights are their rights. But so far as these rights are identical, and are rights in the same object, it is convenient to refer to them as the rights of the group.

It follows that there is no ethical basis for a set of in-

³ *Man and the State*, Chapter xxiv.

ternational rights until it is generally true that citizens of any given state are capable of caring positively for the political existence of all those groups from whom rights are claimed. In a world of sovereign states, professionally polite to one another, but each at heart for itself alone, there are no rights and no basis for international law. It is a monstrosity of abstract legalism to suppose that rights are a concerted protection of the interests of individuals who may have no interest in one another: rights are *toto cælo* different from interests, and the difference lies in an element of disposition harder to realize between states than between members of the same state. Nevertheless, wherever there is a profession of politeness, there is a profession of regard; and where there is a profession of regard, the reality of regard is at least conceivable. It is possible that there should be a community of states, each of which finds the world better worth living in because of the presence of the other states, or of some of them: in such case the conditions are present in which we can speak of the rights of states.

The same considerations which make nationality important, make it possible for states to be subjects of right; for, where there is nationality, one state will cannot substitute for another. States, like individuals, are destined to reach their mental maturity through interaction with other individuals: hence the existence of these others becomes a constitutional concern for each one.

Thesis: States may be subjects of right.

It is worth noting that this kind of other-regard, or world-mindedness, comes about indirectly.

There is no such thing as a point-blank interest in the existence of another person: such interest always arises by way of a common concern in some third object, as by

seeing the way in which he deals with his work, or by noting what things attract him. States are in the same case. To this extent, all the marvelous development of world-interests and world-causes tends to thicken the ethical substance of mutual interest among states, and to confirm the basis of international right.

The cause of art against the neglecter or the destroyer of art has become a world-cause. The cause of health, the fight against infectious diseases, is a world-cause. The cause of education, the fight against ignorance and superstition, is no longer a private concern of this or that government. The cause of conversation in science, philosophy and religion is beginning to be recognized as a world-cause. The deepest cause of conflict in the modern world, economic competition, yields its own quota to the common concern in general prosperity and enlightenment, to safety and justice for travelers, and to the necessity of an understanding among men in the use and conservation of natural resources. Here you have a body of goods not national but universal; their international character is not chosen nor made; it lies in the nature of the case and we wake up to it as a fact,—the world-order has happened to us!

It is enough, one might consider, to compel us out of our state-egoisms into a world-community ready to work out a system of rights for states. The tendency is strongly that way. But note that, as with persons, everything depends on the primary abandonment of the egoistic principle. However profound the respect commanded by any state on the ground of its cultural or scientific contribution, the retention in its politics of that exclusive self-interest associated with traditional sovereignty deprives it of all right, and so far destroys the possibility of international law.

The political destruction of such a state—if its self-

interest were chronic—might become a necessity of the world-community.

II

We say the same basis for rights may exist between states as between individuals. Are the principles the same?

The answer is to some extent contained in the question. The fundamental moral law is simply: be moral; make the moral order a fact in the world; come out of your isolation; be a member of a community having rights; value the political existence of your neighbors. The whole point of the idea of right is that right does not exist by nature or by fate, but only by the free decision of the human will. The idea of "natural" rights is a misnomer: no man (and no state) has any inalienable right by virtue of his birth; all his rights are conditioned upon his good will. In an infant we are bound to assume this good will until he proves the contrary; we impute to him a group of rights which fit him to carry on his life and to realize whatever destiny he may have in him,—rights in this sense "natural." In the case of a state, there is no normal psychology to be assumed; the traditional temper of states is more unsocial than that of infants; the actual probability of the presence of rights in the state is therefore less. If and in so far as we can assume such good will, the general principles of right would be the same.

Look at the matter from another angle. Relations of states are relations of individuals; injuries and benefits of state to state are injuries and benefits to individuals by way of their political selves. Whoever touches a person raises an ethical question; and that question comes directly under the personal code of the aggressor. The general ethical principle, then, *must be identical* for states and for persons.

It is for this reason that the psychological reactions are the same as between states and between persons, with a certain tendency to intensify them in the case of the state. An injury to the community may be resented more than the corresponding injury to oneself; a slight to oneself may be less goading than a gibe at the place one comes from. Individuals commonly vaunt themselves by competitive boasting about their localities. It is as though in the state-life those personal qualities which constitute the higher dignity or vanity of persons were peculiarly in evidence. Having no specific biological life, states have none of the problems of animal hunger or lust; their qualities lie in the field of intelligence, integrity, justice, prowess, abundance,—all concentrated in the dignity and honor with which the state invests itself and which it calls on others to recognize. Preoccupied in its domestic activity with problems of right, a state finds it natural to assume that character with other states. It cares for its prestige in part on the ethical ground: it distinguishes between being feared and being respected.

There is no foothold, then, for the superstition current in our social philosophies, that the self-interest of the community is the source of the altruism and devotion of its members.

“No human society has ever prospered or ever can prosper by concentrating exclusive attention on its own welfare. . . . Society considered as having no function but to exploit the universe for its own advantage stands out in colours which can only be described as morally despicable.”⁴

We thus reach our second thesis:

The fundamental principle of right is the same for states as for individuals.

⁴ L. P. Jacks, *My Neighbour, the Universe*.

III

This would seem to imply that any maxim which would concentrate into itself the essence of the moral law for persons would be equally applicable to states. Let us try a few examples.

Could we, for instance, take it as an ideal for Italy to "Love thy neighbor, Yugoslavia, as thyself"? Perhaps the emotional element in such a rule should be omitted in the case of states, in favor of some more equable sentiment. Let Italy approve, or value the existence of, Yugoslavia! Even so, can Italy be summoned to value Yugoslavia as itself? Our principle seems to falter because that sympathy which takes the joys and sufferings of others as one's own extends but slowly from the center outward; this is certainly true of individuals. The sentiment of a nation toward its neighbor is not so much *like* the sentiment of the individual to his neighbor as *actually composed* of the sentiments of its citizens to those distant beings across the national boundary.

Let us try the Golden Rule, which at once appears more usable: Do unto other states what you would have them do to you, and refrain from the opposite kind of doing. One sees that the negative side of this precept is more practicable than the positive side: even in personal relations nobody makes it his primary business to plan a benevolent interference with other lives except at their request. Let us transform the rule in this way: So far as our actions affect other states (in the ordinary course of events), let the effect be of the sort we should welcome in our own case. The Golden Rule thus tends to reduce itself to Ulpian's triple rule: *honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere*. To this we should add at least this positive element, mutual aid, mutually devised.

This mutual aid, which has its place in state practice, may be nothing more than the old prudential reciprocity within a limited group of allies, benevolence with the expectation of equivalent return: it may rise to an actual *entente cordiale*, likewise among a limited group, and it is capable of becoming a general political attitude. To this extent the positive form of the Golden Rule may be held applicable.

It would be absurd to say that the moral principle of humanity or good will, with its implications of positive altruistic action, may be a rule for persons but not for states. It is a rule for states because it is a rule for persons.

But besides being just and friendly, shall states be forbearing, forgiving, non-resisting, self-sacrificing, in view of the malice or selfishness of other states? Are they always obliged to literal truthfulness and the keeping of promises even to their hostile and unscrupulous rivals? We become aware of a certain awkwardness as we carry out the scheme of personal ethics, at least of the Kantian-Christian variety of ethics. The analogy begins to halt. Without saying dogmatically that the scheme becomes impossible, we may set up something like a scale of increasing difficulty in applying it:

(a) Justice. Debt-paying and promise-keeping; remembering all other obligations in dealing with each one; using the same standards of judgment for great state and small state, ally and non-ally; being ready to rebuke illicit-favor-seeking "friendly states."

(b) Forbearance, patience, slowness to wrath; a disposition not so much to endure evil as to give due scope to the self-corrective processes of the other mind. This is entirely usual in diplomacy; resort to force generally follows, not a single slip or affront, but a cumulative series of abuses.

(c) Forgiveness. This is something more radical: it implies refraining from punishment when punishment is

clearly merited, and also overcoming the subjective ill-will, definitely resuming friendly and even cordial relations after a breach of loyalty on the part of another state; it is the willingness to treat a fault as if it had not been committed, not for the sake of inaccuracy (and certainly not from fear) but for the sake of a firmer alliance with a presumed better will of the offender. Forgiveness as a merely complaisant or *laissez faire* attitude is morally contemptible in persons and not less so in states; it has no place in the world unless it can actually bring about a more vigorous moral will on both sides.

In the form of a cancellation of debt, an economic simulacrum of forgiveness is not unknown in inter-state relations.

(d) Non-resistance, self-sacrifice. Like forgiveness, these attitudes are highly unethical unless they can be made to carry a creative significance; and this is usually impossible except in personal relations, where the language of feeling is direct. As between states, there is no virtue in offering oneself as a cannibalistic meal. The difficulties which attend all altruism between groups here reach their maximum.

There are other consequences of applying in detail the principles of personal ethics from which we reasonably shrink.

The morality of persons accepts the given community as a finality: it is not for any individual to wish out of existence any who are there, nor to judge the question whether this one or that one ought to be alive. No matter what scoundrel is ill he shall have a physician; and, if he is in danger, he shall be rescued. Thus our morality of universal good will tends to perpetuate the *status quo*, leaving to nature, and to some of the scoundrels who are kept alive, the task of eliminating surplus members. In

the world of states, each member claims immortality, and nature can do nothing to remove a decrepit state by death. Unless the *status quo* in this world is finally right, some other ethics than that of universal appreciation would seem required to change it.

Again, in the world of persons, each is in duty bound as a lover of peace and freedom to subordinate his private judgment of rights to a communal judgment and execution. If Kant is right, it is wrong not to require men to set over their heads a common government with its organs of compulsion. The same logic would press individual states to subordinate themselves to a world state, from which conclusion we definitely draw back for reasons already given.⁵

The reason for the difficulties seems to be this,—and we shall state it as our third thesis:

While the fundamental ethical principle cannot be different as between states and persons, *the situations to which this principle applies are radically different*. The same principle applied to different cases gives different results.

In the following chapter we shall examine several ways in which the cases of states and of persons diverge.

⁵ Chapter xiii.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE ETHICAL QUEERNESS OF STATES

LET us bring before our minds a picture of the difficulties of political ethics by simply enumerating the more important respects in which states, in their relations with other states, differ from individuals.

(1) *Uniqueness of each state.* Men constitute a natural species; they have the profound subconscious kinship derived from the common biological background. States have no such likeness among themselves; on the contrary they have a rooted diversity which begins with the geographical locus. Much of the quarrelsomeness of modern states arises from the futile effort to compensate for the hopelessly irregular geography of the planet.

Now comparison is at the basis of ethical logic, which assumes a fundamental equality: act as if others were to use the same principle; desire for yourself only what you desire for all; count yourself as one and only one. Yet comparisons of state with state become odious and to a degree criminal, as if one were to argue: Canada has so many square miles per person; Italy must have the same. The whole complex situation of each state is so utterly incomparable with that of any other that each must do and have many things which no other can do or have. Differences, of course, do not exclude likenesses: every free state is a state and free, and there are rights which derive from this status, belonging to all such entities alike. There is a minimum of equality carried with the fact of

statehood. But beyond this minimum, the general rule has less scope, gets a foothold with difficulty: the extreme and qualitative inequalities among states constitute the chief barrier to international law, and the difficulty begins with the ethical principle itself.¹

For example, ask what is "justice" in a distribution of goods or of costs among a group of states. Now justice always harks back to some sort of equality; one must treat equals equally, and unequals proportionately, that is, by equal measure. Suppose we have two communities, one of which has 160,000 people, the other 660,000 people: what is equity in the apportionment of political power? Shall we have equal representation or proportional representation? Here you have one side of the Palestinian dilemma. The Zionists will not accept less than "parity" of power with the Arabs, using the slogan, "We shall neither dominate nor be dominated." The Arabs regard the parity of unequals as a fundamental injustice. If the individual is an ultimate entity, the Arabs are doubtless right. If communities are to count as integral wholes, the Zionists have something on their side. In the absence of clear principle the political settlement tends to take the form either of trying to appease both groups by a bi-cameral legislature, or of striking a compromise.

(2) *The puzzles of identity.* When a person acts he expresses his character; when a state acts it expresses the character of a party, a fragment of the whole, perhaps a temporary administration whose whole spirit may be repu-

¹ The radical incomparableness of states carries the consequence that the first established and best established parts of international law are the two extremes, the most general principles and the most particular obligations due to special agreement. The intermediate body of duties and rights has more the character of conventions, more or less variable, than of principles. Precedent counts for less than in municipal law, because all likenesses of circumstance are dubious. Treaties have more temporary validity and yield less for principle. Philosophy should count for more, if it can extract what is universal from what is particular.

diated in another moon. The whole idea of moral judgment and responsibility depends on the notion that the same mind that issues an act receives its consequences: without conscious continuity, the "Thou ought" has nothing to take hold of.

Now, in one aspect, the state is more perfectly continuous than the individual, for it is more enduring; and the consequences of its behavior in the world more surely come back to it. If it were true that every administration is the momentary expression of the dominant moral judgment of the state, there would be no important difference between state and person in this respect. But the mental gap between the promiser and the fulfiller is commonly bridged only by a heave of political will: if Egypt assumes the debts of Ismail, it is not because *this* Egypt incurred them; if Russia repudiates the debts of the Czar, its policy is bad but its psychology is relatively accurate in so far as it says, "*We* did not incur them." On this borderland a statement may be scientifically correct and ethically disreputable. For the normal situation is that the state *wills to be* an organic whole, acting with the wholeness and identity of a person; that this unity is itself a moral feat, not a given fact,—it is a deed which requires to be continually renewed.²

In one respect, this defective and malleable personal identity of the state has auspicious consequences: it facilitates the mending of injury. To hold a grudge against a state is far less reasonable than against a person: after an election, the state that sinned may no longer exist. The political question always is, What is now the best arrange-

² It is true also of individuals that personal identity is to some extent a deed: by conscious and subconscious choice one determines from moment to moment how much of yesterday's self shall be kept as myself. The "selectiveness of memory" is largely the silent record of this activity. But this process is far more conspicuous in the life of a state.

ment? The moral element is conserved by the fact that "the best arrangement" is never the merely expedient arrangement, but the arrangement having in it the best promise of moral renovation.

This principle at once explains and gives a standard for the apparent fickleness of political action. If Turkey and Greece today come to agreement without liquidating the moral issues between them, this is entirely sound: it means, not that the moral judgment has become unimportant, but that it is referred to the objective labor of history and the self-conscious education of national character. If a treaty is torn up, the deed may or may not be legitimate. The state which breaks a treaty purely for its own present advantage loses repute: the state which denounces a treaty in view of a new outlook on the general good does right. If the new arrangement is the best arrangement in the sense we have defined, then it is not true that the end justifies any means whatever, nor that the success of a *coup* makes it right; but it may be right for a state to assume the responsibility for establishing the new status (as in the Revolution of 1776) in advance of the general approval of mankind, and with that ultimate approval definitely in view.

Fac et excusa has no case. When Frederick the Great said that he could always find a pedant to justify what he had done, it was the pedants who preserved the saying, and thereby showed the destiny of history to retain its ethical independence and objectivity. The state may abandon an old personality and assume a new one; but every crime implies a criminal, whether it be the whole state or a party or an individual officer, and must work out its consequences within the national being. Italy cherishes a complaint that in the Treaty of Versailles the faces of the Allies were set against her; if that is true to any

extent, it is a fair historical question whether it marks a response to the bargaining temper of Italy in the war-making.

(3) *"Property" of states means something quite different from "property" of individuals*: it means less in some ways and more in others.

It means less. For the territory of a state is largely "owned" by individuals. The boundary of a state may be altered without any tangible alteration in the property of the individuals transferred. The right of the state in the land which it claims as its own is not as a rule the right to plow or to dig or to build—but simply the right to govern there. "Power to use" then would not mean the same thing as with persons: the superior power of British individuals to use oil or cotton land would not imply the superior power of the British state to use that land as governor.

On the other hand, state property means more. A person distinguishes his property from his body; but the domain of a state is at the same time its property and its body. Deprived of all his property, the organic man would still live; deprived of its domain, the state ceases to exist.

The peculiarities of the domain become, as we have seen, the source of certain elements of the national character, and so of the state mentality. Hence property in domain is strongly affected by such considerations as these: the small number of states in the world community, and the wide differences in character in that small number, the world-village. The incomparableness we have dwelt on undermines all the reasoning which in a human community makes desirable a more equal distribution of wealth. The meaning of state-property is affected, too, by the absence of free mobility: a state's geography is its social as well as its material fate; its neighbors are permanent and cannot be escaped either by moving away or

by driving them away. And there is no unoccupied space between, nor yet beyond, the world being now full for states, if not for persons. No one can estimate how much the peace of human society is furthered by the ready mobility of individuals and the relatively large empty spaces between them: one can get away from an uncomfortable neighbor, so that there is an incessant displacement of unpleasant by pleasant social stimuli. But Mexico can neither abandon her northern neighbor nor induce that neighbor to depart nor place a comfortable distance between them: the United States cannot wish itself next to the Isthmus; nor can Ireland escape being a strategic bastion of the British Isles. And, while individuals are destined to grow, and do so without a thought of encroaching on others, there can be no physical growth of a state's domain without a diminution of some other. There is a tendency on the part of each state to conceive its domain on the plan of an organic body, and to desire its completion as if one needed a nose at this corner or a finger at that. But the world does not lend itself to division into a group of completed bodies on this plan. The state domain is the state body and a basis of the state mind, forever imperfect and forever wedged in with imperfect and unchanging companions.

It is clear, then, that to deal with state property under the simple analogy of private property is impertinent. The principles dealing with specific contracts, debt paying, and the like, can be literally taken over from private law, because here the subject-matter is definable, and execution of agreement becomes a causal factor in reaching new agreements. Also, the presumption against "theft," or any compulsory alteration of state-property without sufficient reason would be the same, since property in both cases is a positive interest. But the "sufficient reasons" would not

be identical; and the principles of distribution and transfer would have to be developed from the nature of the peculiar individual state-interest in its domain.

(4) *"Existence" for states means both more and less than "existence" for individuals.*

It means more. For the destruction of a state is an absolute destruction. Having no separate soul of its own, it has, in its mundane existence, its whole existence; having no mode of reproduction, it can leave no progeny to continue its character and program. Think of a state as a process rather than as a substance; then for the "identity" of a substantial thing we have the "continuity" of the process and its momentum,—to interrupt the process is to annihilate it, for whatever begins anew in that place is no longer the same process. It is for this reason that the persistence of their state appears so all-important to its citizens. Whatever is "going on" in the nation, whatever foundations have been laid for long-range enterprise in business, domestic or cultural life, moral and social experiment, concrete thinking which requires to be consecutive and cumulative,—all this is dependent on continuous political being: death of the state means wreckage and rebuilding all this in an altered sense. The sacrifice of the individual to the cause of the state's existence will always appear a reasonable sacrifice.

On the other hand, it means less. For the destruction of the state need involve no loss of life to a single member: its dissolution and replacement do signify a deeper dislocation of habit than that of any other association; yet it is conceivable that the surgery of old habit, with all its pain and waste, may make way for a better habit which in the course of time will mean more freedom and power for every injured interest.

In general, the killing of a state, like the killing of a

nation,³ means—what killing individuals never means—the birth of a new one on the spot. And it means—again without analogy in individual life—the birth of a state at the same stage of maturity as the one destroyed, able to conserve a good deal of the disturbed sequences of the community. The *karma* of the old deeds carries over into the new self.

Sometimes the being of one state may be simply absorbed into another. Men cannot swallow one another alive; snakes may try to; states can. The only near analogy to this situation is in the mental realm, as when one mind comprehends and to that extent includes another, or as when, in multiple personalities, one of them knows all the rest.

(5) *Every issue tends to become an issue of existence.* Among individuals, it is seldom that detriments to liberty or to property threaten life. Among states, so long as war is a possibility, every advantage must be studied with the question in mind, Would it count in war? Hence property, as a form of power, becomes a vital issue; thou shalt not steal becomes the same in effect as thou shalt not kill, when addressed to one's neighbor, whereas stealing for oneself may be considered a mode of preserving life! The imaginative forecasts of speculative campaigns lend momentousness to slight points of material advantage: and since the state, as Hegel said, "may put its honor into anything," anything may thus be made a *casus belli* in the desire to guard against war.

But even apart from war, states are necessarily occupied with the question of existence, their own and others', in a way which does not enter into personal ethics. The human community is accepted as a fact given by nature and changed by nature: the community of states, since the

³ Cf. p. 199, above.

state is a construction of human will, is subject to change by will. Besides these voluntary tamperings with life-and-death issues there are forces at work, beyond the reach of national policy, which alter the *status quo*. Pressure of population and changes of climate in one's own or neighboring states 'are nobody's merit and nobody's fault: yet, like changes in commercial routes and the sweeping effect of scientific discoveries, they are perpetually building and unbuilding the power of states. They are a part of the irrational element of history, and because as yet no principle of justice has been devised to deal with them, they remain among the residual causes of war.

At present the "vital interests" of a state constitute a premise refractory to discussion if not undiscussable: and changes of existence, being outside the realm of private morals, become the focus of the unethical, or shall we say a-moral, practices of statesmen.

Austria feels herself hungry, and thinks Bosnia would digest well. The statesman's duty is clear; trump up an excuse and swallow Bosnia, much as the United States swallowed Texas, or as Disraeli swallowed Cyprus for the Empire. These deeds cannot be brought under the ethics of theft or murder; they are performances in the workshop of existence, pre-natal tinkering with the future state. The particular means are wretched,—deception, crookedness, hypocrisy, aggressive war: they tar the whole notion and repute of statecraft with their pitch. They indicate in part, no doubt, the incidents of political egoism; but also the failure of reason to deal with the rights and wrongs of existence, growth, decline, on the part of states.

And clearly the greatest element of the difficulty is the moral obstacle to going backward or admitting decline. "I must decrease, but he must increase," may be a valid judgment; and individuals are sometimes found great enough

to make it: but it is almost inconceivable on the part of a state; and international judgment, bound by conventional courtesy and the habitual assumptions of personal intercourse, has no guiding principles to apply. It is more prone to conceive justice as moving toward equalization than as following the law, To him that hath shall be given; from him that hath not shall be taken away. Such reason as there is, while deploring the military motif of the balance of power, vainly flounders to undo the irregularities of an irrationally portioned world.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE WAY TO A POLITICAL ETHICS: RÔLE OF THE LEAGUE

BECAUSE of these several anomalies, the use of any moral rule whatever becomes hazardous. For all morality has in it the element of subordinating self-interest to principle; this means in effect some sort or degree of self-sacrifice; and self-sacrifice immediately touches this intolerant nerve of *existence*. Can we expect states to consider the paradox of personal ethics as their rule of action: Lose your life in order to save it?

The individual within his political community has already taken the great risk; he has abandoned his weapons of forcible self-assertion, trusting his welfare to the law, *i.e.*, to the justice of his compatriots. He makes his political bed with them, out of all the world, because they are like-minded and he can build up moral understandings with them. The meaning of making the first moral advances, committing yourself to a principle, is that the step tends to create a moral community, to elicit general respect for that principle: life is risked and possibly life is saved. Now, if the state risks its own being in the wider and more various community of the world, where no such like-mindedness exists, it risks the welfare of these personal risks within itself. It is asking, let us say, Greeks who have perhaps reached the natural limit of their moral faith in trusting other Greeks, to trust also Germans, French, British, Americans, Japanese, Albanians. The political commitment requires a certain natural sympathy among the co-jurors.

When the individual makes a moral advance, "I trust you, will you trust me?" he relies much on the immediate language of friendly feeling. There are men who carry immediate respect for their personal courage; others who create immediate confidence by their palpable good-will. The state cannot speak this language. It lacks the organic signals of emotion, and it lacks inner unanimity. An individual who risks, risks himself alone and may do so wholeheartedly. An officer of state who contemplates a deed of risk must consider that he alienates the goods of others, and that these others are not unanimous. A deed of moral creativeness (such as an important degree of disarmament would be) done in the name of individuals whose moral vitality fails to rise to it, becomes a gesture rather than a reality, and fails of effect.

But perhaps the chief consideration is that such a deed falls into a world of states which is surely, in part, *bad*, i.e., deliberately set to take malicious advantage of the moral advances of others; in part cynical; and in part morally obtuse. The bad world is a rightless world, and there are no crimes in dealing with it. The obtuse world, unless the state has some ethical creativity at command, requires accommodation to its habits. Bribery for the bribe-seekers, since the outside state cannot without interference replace them by honest men; bargains for the venal; deception for everybody, since deals must be kept secret; intimidation for the cowardly and unscrupulous; the regalia of sham authority for the vain and empty; always and everywhere, "the arguments they understand."

There would be no escape from this situation were it not for the fact that the moral hope is the most universal thing in human nature, and that it is a matter not of choice

but of necessity to build on it. Let me point out several ways in which this necessity is seen.

It is impossible to conserve domestic morality itself while the state practises the methods of the "state of nature" in its external relations. When Athens dealt as pure egoist with her allies, Athenians began to deal as pure egoists with each other, and the democracy was ruined. *Internal relations assimilate themselves to the morals of external relations.*

It is impossible, if states deal with each other at all, to abandon the outward show of morality: for whatever we converse with, that we set in the place of respect and moral equality; to converse is a mental abandonment of solipsism, and requires an outgoing interest. But a pretence or profession which cannot be given up shows what the sound relation *must be*. "Hypocrisy is an homage which vice pays"; but, we note, it pays by necessity.

It is impossible to evade the ultimate fact that the deeds of states are the deeds of the persons, citizens, and affect persons. They cannot escape their ethical quality, for whatever we may not kill and eat we are bound to respect; and where we are bound to respect we are bound to something more than accommodation and ethical passivity. The moral principle, then, is inescapable; but how is it possible for states to act on it?

The primary duty, Make right an institution, Make it a going concern in the world, is not removed by its difficulty or its risk. It is probably true that in a bad world a state which alone should practise justice and benevolence would make a meaningless sacrifice of its interest. But the very thing we have pointed out as a "puzzle of identity" in states shows that no state and no world are, as objective facts, either "good" or "bad." These are party characters,

aspirations, not characters of states. The ethical element is not, but *can be made*, the dominant quality. Likewise with the unethical element. But the calculated egoism of states is a consequence of disillusion, not a spontaneous impulse; and it is a trait which weakens as intelligence and public participation gain. Admiral Sims is quoted as saying, in reference to conferences for limiting arms:

“There was really no such thing as international good will. As everybody knows, ‘war’ exists at all times between all nations that trade with each other. It is an intensive struggle . . . in which each nation strives for its own trade advantage without any particular consideration for its influence upon other nations. . . . The ill-feeling that undoubtedly exists between nations on account of the economic war must be resolved before there can be any real hope of world peace. It is as if the world were a caldron of boiling oil around which the statesmen stand dropping in pieces of ice from time to time to keep the caldron from boiling over while at the same time new fuel is being heaped underneath the economic strife.”¹

This is a part of the truth which it would be inane to ignore; and, if the economic tail could wag the entire dog, then ethics and law are out; ill-will and covert war become the guide of state policy, modified solely by fear, the hatred of waste, and the grave doubt whether populations are any longer willing to go to war on issues which they see to be economic. In this doubt the realistic position shows its Heel of Achilles. For economic wars have been brought off hitherto only by masquerading as moral wars; and the world has grown shrewder than it was. There will be no general war hereafter which cannot show a genuine ethical motive to a highly skeptical public. No people is dominated by the economic motive: there is no nation but would prefer to believe itself living in a world where ideal

¹ Boston *Evening Transcript*, June 6, 1931.

elements could be counted on. The difficulty is simply that no nation feels capable of making such a world alone. But the venture of sincerity in public dealing can never be without a response in kind *in some party* of the foreign state: the time will come when this response is the integral response of the state. For I repeat, a moral hopefulness, i.e., a tendency to believe in the response-begetting character of the moral venture, is the most universal trait of mankind. Here Italy, France, Yugoslavia, Japan, America, speak the same tongue. And when, as is always possible, a group of states, on any particular issue, constitute the nucleus of a community of right, the balance of public power tends necessarily in their favor.

In the transition from a sporadically honest world to a world set squarely on a basis of law, there is likely to be a bad half-hour in which the entire society of states appears to hesitate between going forward into the new venture and slipping back into the comedy of prudential bargaining. This is the half-hour dominated by suspicion of each that the other is secretly playing for its own advantage; and hence by the demand that morality shall be made perfectly safe, through "security." The demand is impossible. Morality will always be less than safe, as living is less than safe. To recognize the critical and dangerous half-hour is to recognize the great opportunity of history, that of creating a permanent ethical fabric by a consistent attitude of intelligent risk-taking. My conviction is that this half-hour is now present.

For this conviction I offer two reasons. We have reached the point when the finally refractory questions, those of existence and of inequality, can at least be rationally approached. And we have reached the point when truth is more powerful than propaganda.

As to existence, we have come to see that *statutes* are

not mere facts: the question is always pertinent, "Are they right?" The Polish Corridor is not a mere fact, established by a Peace Conference, and to be accepted as sacred: it is a fact which presents the question, Is it a reasonable arrangement? With the admission of this question, the ethical consideration enters, and no ultimata of powerful states can banish it. Boundaries are not mere facts; populations are not mere facts: these are results of decisions and policies, wise or unwise, fair or unfair. The unique thing about the Treaty of Versailles is not that it established a new status in Europe, and protected it against change by violence: the unique thing is that it left in the world an organ competent to revise its own findings.

The problems of inequality might be insoluble if it were a matter of direct comparisons: what does Poland deserve in the world as against Russia? But the eye of status-making has now a different point of regard: the wide and vague phrase, world-welfare, begins to take form and substance, and the several states have their parts in promoting *that*. Nobody knows what the ideal of world-welfare is; perhaps there is no such thing: but there is some consensus on the next steps of betterment. And these steps supply an objective measure of the present worth of nations and of cultures; a judgment non-invidious, because it is the judgment of facts, not of private and biased opinion.

Let the League be supplemented by an organ, non-political, non-national,—scientific, or at least objective, and without power, devoted to the problem of conceiving the world of the next generation, bringing an untrammelled reason into the problems of status, of population, of race, of religion in its political bearings, of the universal elements in culture. Let this body acquire what influence it deserves; only let it be free and equipped for responsible

utterance. Señor de Madariaga conceives such a body as rectifying the tendency of the League to echo political and national faction; it would do this, I believe, and also hold the League truer to its own ultra-national purpose, encouraging it to deal politically, in time, with the most sensitive problems of boundaries, inequalities, statuses, declines, mergings of states.

As to the value of truth, the policy that can be publicly professed is even now the strongest policy. The weight of public opinion has brought world politics around its critical turn. As in building an arch, the point has now been passed when the structure is in danger of falling: *weight can be rested on the line!*

The difference is made by the fact that no nation can now do crookedness in a corner. There are still many hiding places in the world, and much concealment; but none of them is safe! Italy imprisons its editors and historians; but it becomes known that she imprisons them. Russia exiles its scholars, or fines them, or does away with them; these deeds become known. There is propaganda; but the theory of propaganda is known, and in a world suspicious of propaganda, learning the peculiar sound of the "inspired" utterance, insisting on knowledge, propaganda totters, stammers, sees the beginning of its end. Poland holds an election; Marshal Pilsudski sees to it that anti-Pilsudskiites and Germans do not vote: he does not do this himself; he hands it over to subordinates and forgets to enquire how they managed it. Polite Poland, Pilsudski, and the French public do not know; but the world knows, and knows why the others remain ignorant. The Philippines hold a procession for independence, and a part of the American press represents it as a procession promoted by penalties in the schools: but the denial comes through, and the American public knows both of the procession

and of the bias of its press. Lying becomes a losing game.

Imagine the League as an organ of publicity becoming obnoxious to statesmen who prefer the cover of privacy; imagine their doing away with it. What we cannot imagine is that the public would then remain in ignorance of this deed and of its motives. They are in the position of the ancient Chinese Imperial Recorder. On one occasion the Emperor, it is said, commanded this officer not to record the deed he was about to perform: "Then, Luminous Majesty, I must record the fact that Luminous Majesty has directed me not to record it." The old obscurity no longer covers—there are trails leading into it. It is true, history forgets much, and always must: the time may come when a new generation will read and believe the French military tablets in Syria. But history makes meantime its subconscious notes, carries the cumulative sum of these acts of concealment, and gives its place to the character which conceals. There is and will always remain a vast amount of the devious and false in the negotiations among states; but the grumble of these dark waters sinks deeper into the underground caverns of the world.

The future lies with the policies which can be publicly avowed, and with the union of those who commit themselves to these avowable policies. To remain out of the League at this juncture, is to forfeit one's share in the critical half-hour of world politics.

"Hang yourself, brave Crillon! We fought at Arques, and you were not there."

CHAPTER XXX

THE ETHICS OF INEQUALITY

WE have tried in the last few chapters to clear the ground for an ethical code for states in dealing with other states, presumably their equals. We have left in the background the problem of dealing with unequals, which is our peculiar interest. Inequalities among men and nations are not what we choose but what we find,—inequalities always “in respect to” something, say power, size, wealth, years of schooling, brevity of the law books, index of crime. These inequalities are not inconsistent with the deeper lying equalities: our codes must begin with the equalities, and then go on, as we do in actual living, to deal with the differences.

I

Our current adjustments to inequality are not as a rule either difficult or invidious. The superior age of the elder is accepted without heartburning, together with whatever deference is due. Leaders and led arrange themselves commonly by mutual consent. It is when stratification is *imposed* that we encounter resentment.

The aggressive way of dealing with inequalities or alleged inequalities is an aspect of what we call imperialism. Forget its ethical quality for the moment and regard it on its factual side. It is a phenomenon of expansion, an overflow of will: “Since I am able to take care of more

than myself, let me do your willing for you, make laws for you, bear the brunt of your impact on the world outside,—and from your resources pay myself for my trouble.” This is a well-known human attitude, visible in every boy as he comes to adolescence: it marks the beginning of a normal mental expansion for the boy, the family-founding instinct, political capacity, professional life. It is the destiny of every mature human being to take care of more than himself, implying more reciprocity than the adolescent perceives: in the end, it is the destiny of everybody to take care of the whole community,—the psychological basis of democracy. In this natural, and at first one-sided, overflow of will, an element of the “boss” and an element of desire to help usually combine. Kant makes it the essence of morality to consider oneself (in imagination) a lawgiver for a universal community: such morality visibly begins with adolescence!

In this respect, states are like individuals. The national impulse, as it ripens, is not destined to be satisfied with a local self-determination. With maturity, the impulse will always arrive to give advice, to administer beyond its borders, to imagine itself a universal empire. In this, as with individuals, there is also the germ of morality: with the domineering is mixed an ingredient of desire to serve, of good omen for the future world if it can be rid of its alloy. Cured by a sturdy reciprocity on the part of other overflowing wills, it forecasts the time when each state, mentally taking care of the world-community, finds its place in a democratic world of independent states. When, on the other hand, the expansion of will meets no adequate answering expansion the ethical difficulties begin: the natural shades into the abnormal. When one nation assumes to do all the functions of will and mind for another, the self of the included nation is supplanted; the expanding will

makes an imperfect biological connection with the controlled body, and there is partial death. These are the dangers.

Expansion, however, is only partly a deliberate process, subject to ethical judgment: as a fact in the world, it is largely involuntary and quasi-automatic. Wherever power is concentrated, there it tends to flow outward, whether it is in the form of capital, or science, or technique, or the art of organizing, or spiritual elevation itself. It flows because people want it: the craving for power, fundamental in the human soul, can satisfy itself most readily by deriving power from one who has it. For, while power is neither good nor bad, a neutral something to be used well or ill, powerlessness of mind or body or estate is felt to be somehow less than right. Thus power in the form of science flows out through education, and through all forms of communicating ideas. The centers of knowledge exert a silent and universal sort of power known as "authority": they have power *over* men by first having power *for* them. Power in the form of technique exports itself first in the form of machine-made goods, which displace hand-made goods by their utility and cheapness, and which then incite the users and repairers to learn to make them. Power in the form of capital exports itself largely through the desire for technology: to industrialize a nation is to capitalize a nation. And to do this out of the national savings while industry is being established is too slow; the desire for liberty through technique may lead to a certain loss of liberty through borrowing, though it is the nature of borrowing for production to liberate, not to enslave. The export of capital is normally a mutual advantage.

There is one aspect of the export of power not sufficiently observed, that of organizing skill. It is not enough to export knowledge and technique without sending with

them an art of human arrangement: a dividing and dovetailing of labor which canalize the wills of many at once to a single result. This unifying order must be caught from an already ordered life: hence organization must spread from centers where it is high.

If a nation were at once backward, self-sufficient, and self-satisfied, refusing to let itself be stirred into new wants, none of this expansion need cross its borders: it could avoid all forms of dependence by remaining fixed in its own ways. When Patagonians are content to be Patagonians, they buy no goods from outside, accept no ideas, borrow no capital, require no imported managers. If, however, they conceive an idea of becoming world-citizens, thinking and acting with the rest in any general enterprises involving communication, the process of expansion begins. A general waking in this way is the striking phenomenon of today in all hitherto secluded corners: to this extent expansion also is a universal affair.

Now, expansion of this quasi-automatic sort has no ethical quality. If it is good that a world mind and a general practical interdependence among men should be established, then the process is auspicious. It is a peculiarity of all these forms of power that they can be exported without diminishing the source: the normal effect of expansion is simply to add to the total of human power over nature and over human nature. The ethical questions enter when expansion becomes a deliberate push from these centers outward. The expansion we think of under the name of "imperialism" begins not with the need of Patagonia for something—let us say in America; but with the need of America for something in Patagonia. To "expand" in that direction means, not coming to the aid of Patagonia with instruction or with a loan, but going to Patagonia with a

polite request for a concession: "Give us what we want, and we will offer you something which you may be imagined to want, not too costly to ourselves, and which it will not be wise for you to refuse." If Patagonia happens to have an enemy, we may offer it "liberation." In any case, we make our own bargain, and bring Patagonia under our influence, exclusively if possible. The influence, which may operate through the Patagonian Government, secures our continued hold on the object of our desires. This imperial process differs from the less voluntary expansion in three ways: the loss of initiative in Patagonia, the lack of real equivalence in the gift we are pleased to confer in the exchange, the corruption of Patagonian local authority.

Now, I am not disposed to make an ethical issue of the transfer of initiative: conversations may begin from either side. I am not prepared to assert the right of Patagonians to be let alone. For beneath these processes of expansion there is a more subtle and silent spread of the lines of interdependence destroying isolation: the simple mobility of mankind is bringing every spot into some line of travel, and the health and habit of nothing more of each spot begin to concern mankind. Let Patagonia be unknown, and a famine or a plague in Patagonia is nobody's business: let Patagonia become known, and these are at once everybody's business. It may be that Patagonia ought to be secluded and kept from intrusion as a sort of human forest-reserve:¹ in that case, in this aggressively mobile world, the seclusion becomes an active charge of some outside Power. There must be a degree of intrusion to ward off intrusion. There can be no absolute right to be let alone.

But on these other points, the iniquitous exchange and

¹ Cf. p. 527, below.

the corruption of local authority, the ethical issue is definitely raised.

It is usual to try to evade this issue by representing the process of imperialism as inevitable. Capital, we say, requires a growing field of application; there is this sacred world-demand which places its hand on resources here and there, and claims access; there is the "tentacular" character of the industrial state and of the great commercial organisms. There is the self-propagating character of culture; the irresistible impulse to spread one's type of mind; the occultly competitive and masterful nature of the racial-national urge; the march of the Idea! All impersonal necessities, of which our personal greeds, cruelties, deceptions, are but the instruments. Solemn scientific or philosophic humbug! Economic determinism, or any other kind of over-ruling fatalism in this matter of the imperial process is the fraudulent cloak of a fraudulent mentality. Deliberate expansion is made up of a thousand private transactions, each one of which is honest or dishonest. When the Rev. John Wheelwright, antinomian leader, banished from Massachusetts Colony, assembled in 1638 the sachems of the northern province, and for the consideration of certain "coats, shirts and kettles" bought a large tract of what is now New Hampshire, even his antinomian conscience must have instructed him of the nature of his bargain: he was under no necessity of claiming so much or of offering so little. To say that the voluntary element of expansion must be corrupt, tyrannical, grasping and indecent is but a western form of fatalism invoked to escape responsibility, beside which all the fatalism attributed to Islam is pure innocence.

It is as if one said that the interest on the Egyptian debt had to be fixed at from ten to fifteen per cent, or that Admiral Seymour was obliged to bombard Alexandria, or

that Cromer could not have tried to educate young Egypt, or that America and South Africa were compelled to push the reds or the blacks into their scanty reservations;

It is as if one said that General Gouraud had to expel Feisal, or that General Sarraill could not help but destroy a quarter of Damascus;

It is as if one said that a local official in the colonies is by necessity the catspaw for some rubber-grubbing or mineral-mining concern, unable to care for native labor or for any other thing than the service of distant shareholders;

It is as if one said that hypocrisy is forced by higher Powers on all colonial policy, compelling governments to profess the ideals of trusteeship while carrying out in action the plan of keeping the backward back by color bars, wage limits, pass laws, educational and suffrage exclusions, and by every expedient preventing the natural rise of a growing race;

It is as if one said that there are no alternatives open to us but two,—complete and ruthless self-assertion, or complete let-alone and get-out; which is as much as to say that there is no more intelligence nor invention left in the human mind.

Our determinists hold in effect that the race besides being caught in a mechanical crime-factory is incapable of learning anything from experience. It is true that our cruder interests are slow to learn anything contrary to their direct drive. Hence our desires choose our officers; and these tend to be men of the "executive" or imperial type, men who like our former Egyptian High Commissioner, Lord Lloyd, are good at showing determination and keeping the governed in their place, but who never learn. All this absurd passivity in the presence of the

moral issues of expansion must be recognized for the despicable thing it is.

Why must a railroad built by western capital be a curse to an oriental country instead of a benefit? Why must Mexico and Turkey resolve to go starving for capital rather than become debtors of the sort we make? Why must our intervention be of such a quality and sequel that when a great people like the Chinese are in desperate need of a steady hand that help cannot be given?

We have so colored with our guilt certain normal functions in the intercourse of peoples that we cannot propose to do the normal deed without exciting suspicion, as an offer of food alarms the wild animal that has once been shot at. Our greed has made such good use of our benevolence that we are crippled. And the greed is still there. Statistically, one may say, we have no right to depend on our own virtue; what we have done, we shall continue to do. Governments will be governed by the dominant drives of the popular psychology; and the West, in spite of its Christian traditions, is now driving in the interest of its belly. My judgment is that the West is rather driving blind than in any clear-held interest; and that it is ready to accept an idea, if it can come to believe in it. In any case, we have as little right to succumb to our own evil habits as to the alleged laws of economic necessity. We have first to make an effort to see the normal way.

It is the truth that there are vast and impersonal forces at work giving human history its general shape, forces beyond our control and beyond our present powers of analysis. It is not in any human power to halt the processes of expansion: the "hunger of capital for investment" and the "demand of productive power for enlarging markets" are realities not to be banished. But, when these forces operate through our individual decisions, the quality they

carry is in our control. More than that, we can learn to guide and direct them as we direct the powers of nature: *power over economy* will be the next step beyond power over nature. Economic laws, since they work in human heads, are laws by leave, half-laws or pseudo-laws, frequently laws only for men asleep, to be shaken off when we see whither they propose to take us.

Consider this law of the enlarging field for capital. The more capital, the more production, the more production the more development of markets, the more markets the more capital,—an infinite progression. All such linear progressions, like those which govern the multiplication of men, or of insects, are to be suspected in advance of overlooking some factor of mortality which spoils the Malthusian calculation.² But, apart from that, an enlarging market is not necessarily a market committed to geographical expansion: a deepening market will do as well. It is a simpler and more profitable matter to elicit new wants in a people accustomed to the introduction of new comforts than in a people accustomed to poverty.³

² Following other European countries, Italy now reports a declining rate of increase in population: an alarm is sounded, probably too soon, that in ten years the race will cease to grow in numbers.

³ In his book, *Business Adrift*, Dean W. B. Donham of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, urges a slackening of the pressure in America to develop foreign trade, and a concentration of interest on home markets here and in various regions of the world. His book is a rational protest against the tradition of passivity toward the major trends of business, not unmindful of the "planning" enterprise of Russia, where, in spite of the prevalence of the Marxian theory of economic determinism, the human will proposes to take economy under its direction. But, having in mind the swarm of busy drummers who, like ants, hurry over the new roadways of the Orient, determined to drum the world into the circuits of our trade, and ready to weep when there are no more worlds to drum in, I enquire of Dean Donham how this "irresistible force" of trade expansion is to be curbed. He replies that leadership will do it: "If we can get the right kind of leadership started, these leaders may convince American business of the wisdom of relying on the home markets rather than on the expansion of foreign markets." Dean Donham evidently believes that the human will has a voice in the matter. Is there any sane doubt of it?

The following propositions, then, I deny:

That western civilization must control the world, or perish;

That capital requires a market expanded by pressure regardless of the quality of the means used; .

That the rate of expansion cannot be controlled;

That an honest and disinterested service to other states is impossible;

That the amount we charge for our services to peoples backward in any respect must always be the maximum obtainable;

That this charge must include political control.

What I assert is that, in all these matters, the ethical question is pertinent, and ethical action within our power. What, then, are the principles that can be applied?

II

Begin with the extremest inequalities we have. On what sort of basis ought the most advanced of peoples to deal with the most primitive?

Here our practice has shown an interesting confusion: from the beginning of western expansion in the fifteenth century we have been approaching the primitive peoples with merchant adventurers and with priests. The priests assumed that the savages had souls; the traders that they were somewhat between man and animal, a fair field for exploitation. In latter years, the doctrine of evolution has rendered the priestly attitude more difficult, and has correspondingly aided the tendency of the trader, who is chiefly impressed by the vastness of the difference. If he invokes ethics at all, it is likely to be a mixed ethics, including a degree of animal kindness but admitting also a goodly proportion of utilizing the primitive for our ends.

We shall have to begin by asking how much fundamental equality, in view of the doctrine of evolution, is left; and whether Kant's old maxims are of any value in such situations. Never use any person, he said, as a mere means to your ends, no matter how important you think your ends are. And, while Kant was thinking of relations between persons, the same would hold of groups: no nation would be justified in using any person, that is, any clear member of the human family, as a mere means to its august ends. It would follow that the moral freedom of any primitive population would be considered to outweigh in importance—if it came to this harsh alternative—the world's access to land, forest, oil, rubber, gold. Are we prepared, in view of such conclusions, to retain the principles?

Kant thought that he could mark humanity off from the rest of creation, sharply and clearly, by one quality, freedom. The human being need not be governed, like an animal, by natural impulses: he has a capacity to act according to reason, to "keep nature under," whether he always does so or not. He is a full-fledged animal; but he has the remarkable, one might say miraculous, power to aim at things quite beyond the animal level, and to keep his animal nature definitely trained to serve these objects. Such "freedom" appeared to Kant as deserving of absolute respect.

Kant's views need revision. It is not so much the fact of freedom that deserves respect as the use a man makes of his freedom. It is not the will, but the good will, which makes a person an end in himself, and forbids treating him as a mere means. Further, freedom is a matter of degree. Men are mixtures of freedom and mechanism, instinct, subconscious drive, habit: all men are such mixtures, not primitives alone. Men may use their freedom to burn up their capital of freedom and slump deeper

into the animal character. Shall we give such men the benefit of the Kantian rule? Shall we treat persons or groups who are clearly making animals of themselves, or letting animality have its unresisted way with them, as ends in themselves? The modern eye, having in it a legitimate glint of realism, inclines to discriminate. It would substitute for Kant's rule this one,

Treat beings as what they are:

treat persons as persons, things as things, mixtures as mixtures. There is neither objective truth nor good sense, it would say, in treating a half-person as a full-person. Respond to whatever good will and human aspiration you have before you with absolute respect; but don't assume it nor try to respond to it when it is not there.

We can never have too much realism in ethics, if realism means seeing things as they are, and responding truthfully. I am prepared to accept the rule, Treat beings as what they are, as the whole duty of man. Such a rule, however, makes it of first rate importance to be sure what beings are; and there is a danger we shall not be realistic enough. What a living thing is, seldom appears on the surface: in a *man* there is a vast amount of latent motion, and of a still more intangible thing, *possibility*, in the form of desire, purpose, hope. Take your scientific measures, physical and mental, of any man or race of men: the more accurate your report of the static object, the falser it may be as an account of the mental creature who lives half way between now and the future. Most of our current "realism" is, on this account, a travesty of the truth. To treat men as what they are, it is necessary to

Treat men as what they may become.

It is for this reason that the unborn child is regarded as having legal rights, and the procuring of abortion as a phase of murder. Unless, then, we can find some undevelopable or ineducable human group, no adjustment to facts as they are, including all the facts of inequality, will allow us a comfortable license to use the human being as a means to our ends. Our question about the primitive is not, What is he? but, What can he grow into? On this point we should like to have, if possible, the hard objective truth.

In all the volumes of anthropological data now at hand regarding the capacities of different races, there is, I think we must say, nothing to help us. Aspiring to be "scientific," as they must, these data fall under the spell of the static measurement: what is potential eludes them. We may go farther. No data at hand either now or in the future can exclude the hypothesis that racial stocks are *equivalent in possibility*. What science can do is to show how much climate and habitat affect racial traits, how much heredity does to keep them fixed in their mold, how much they may be altered by sexual and other selection. But without waiting for these measurements let us accept what our eyes tell us, that all of these factors have their rôle to play. Accept the great force of heredity, instead of trying (as some do on behalf of a misplaced liberalism) to minimize or deny it. Racial heredity is an immense thing; but it is something short of Fate: it is a sort of biological momentum, difficult to change like the plane of a gyroscope, but nevertheless deflectible. A Bechuana baby will not become French by being brought up in Paris; but, keep this stock as pure as you like, in the x th generation born and brought up in Paris you will have the French trait: this variable number, x , measures the biological momentum. In effecting the change, the French climate will do much; the French world-view will also do much; for what we call "race" is

a product of at least three factors, stock, habitat, philosophy. A race is most easily altered by altering its ideas. And since all conversation assumes that ideas can be shared, whoever interferes with any race—short of exterminating it—is bound to impute to that race a rational capacity equivalent in the end to his own. *Thus the hypothesis of equal racial potency is the only possible basis for an expanding world intercourse.*

There is, indeed, one way to test this hypothesis. That is, not to take measurements, but to try with might and main to see what can be made of the several stocks of mankind over the course of, let us say, a thousand years. So far, the priest is the only man who has had the courage to initiate this experiment; your true missionary is here your only true scientist. The typical trader we have spoken of has simply abandoned the effort to be thoroughly realistic. Meantime, for the world at large, there is nothing in the theory or the facts of evolution to alter the primary obligation, to treat humanity in all its forms as an end and never as a means only.

This being once established, inequalities—since they can never break over into another species—assume at once a more tolerable aspect. All the spontaneous adjustments we were mentioning, of older to younger, of stronger to weaker, of wiser to less wise, become pertinent to our search for principle.

The earliest and the most obvious ethics of inequality is the aristocratic view of Plato and Aristotle that the more limited reason should serve and the fuller reason command. Such an arrangement is to the interest and happiness of both, as the reverse arrangement would be disastrous to both. If we are talking about the guidance of common action, and not about life servitudes, no one can reasonably doubt that authority ought to go to the wisest,

if there is any way of identifying the wisest for the action in hand. But, if we are thinking of permanent stratifications, castes, political subordination, it is hard to find persons or groups ready to accept the fixed, congenitally fixed, limits to the development of *their particular reasons* which the application of the theory requires. Spontaneous aristocracy, the assuming of authority and the accepting of authority, works best in the family, between parents and children in early years. And this is true, in part, surely, because the limits of reason of the obedient ones are recognized as moving limits: the greater-less relation is merely a matter of the stage of growth. There is, therefore, no sting in it; especially since the authorities in the case appear engaged in an effort to overcome what difference there is by the process called "education." The great defect of the aristocratic principle lies in the *passivity of the observer*, who simply accepts as final the differences in reason he discovers. To treat human beings as what they are is not merely to treat them according to what they may of themselves become, or as what they may become in some orderly social scheme of our devising in which each man knows his place,—it is to

*Treat human beings according to what they may
become with the best available aid, and our own.*

In such a relation, there is authority, command, obedience, without foreclosure of the prospect that he who obeys to-day may tomorrow command, if he is fit, in another human grouping. And, if he is not fit, he knows that his inferiority in some particular human respect is not fastened upon him by an arbitrary decision of those accidentally well-placed.

Carry this principle over to the relations between groups. Suppose differences of cultural level to be—what they chiefly are—differences of the stage of growth. De-

stroy the notion of fixed racial better- and worse-ness; and therewith of a final one-way aristocracy in the world of states. Then one might expect the natural subordinations which accompany these differences to become as innocuous as in the family. Tutelage would appear a normal and desirable relationship. "Backward" peoples would have no more reason to blush for their backwardness than the young to blush for their youth. Political equality in any moment of the world's history would cease to be important. Liberty itself, if it meant absence of guidance, would be anything but the greatest of political blessings; it would be a deprivation. Get rid of those rooted racial and cultural presumptions,—no easy matter,—and then get an honest spirit of education animating the political relation of the advanced and the backward,—also no easy matter,—and most of the poison of that relationship will be drawn. I am not disturbed by the strange fact that in a world so full of tutelage this psychological pattern fails to resemble closely any that we have observed. Our first question is whether we have here a valid principle in the ethics of inequality; our second, by what steps we can get it into action.

I have no doubt that the spirit of education, well enough recognized in our lip-service, is a near solution to our problem. We are using the word "honest," to exclude for the moment the adulteration of that spirit by motives of economy and security. Cut away from the educator's attitude both apology and conceit; relieve it of the pretence of infallible and final knowledge: let it be governed by a desire for sharing experience and for a mutual advance and we set things nearly right. Educating drives out exploiting, or is driven out by it: the two are incompatible. It cures realistic taking-peoples-for-what-they-are. It corrects the aristocratic inherent-authority illusion. Have we

not at various points in our study come to it as the remedy for a specific malady? In Egypt, the spirit of education, we thought, would inspire some sacrifice of guarantees;⁴ in the mandates, it would overcome the dilemmas of administration;⁵ in the problems of forced labor, it cuts away the hyprocrisies of the drivers;⁶ in judging our fitness to manage a dependency it furnishes a test,—we must be able to supply, not executives alone, but educators.⁷ With this spirit, the problem of “prestige” takes care of itself and force is spared; for as honesty and competence enter into the tutelage we undertake, a normal prestige finds its way to whom prestige is due.

And, however far we may be from complying with the conditions under which this spirit can have its full effect, it will be worth while even now, I judge, for our administrators to take the idea of education seriously. The function of educating belongs to politics as well as to the schools. Since we have interfered, we cannot escape the responsibility: it becomes a practical demand that *Wherever we interfere, we must educate*. This requirement alone begins to stir up many dead bones in the international valley. Every system, we say, is wrong which makes it of interest to advanced nations to keep other peoples at a low stage of knowledge or skill, or which allows a nation's wealth to be drafted away from its schools.

But there is something unsatisfactory in the practical alliance of education and politics, as we have so far worked it out. Education lives a hampered life in the atmosphere of control. It prefers a freely chosen relationship. Wherever it is *imposed*, the will of the imperial state tends to mask, cover, exclude the will of the guided people.

⁴ Cf. p. 139, above.

⁵ Cf. p. 307, above.

⁶ Cf. p. 416, above.

⁷ Cf. p. 202, above.

Protectorates, too well protected, are emasculated; and an education which is not an education in character is a monstrosity. After all, education is an art: it is capable of reaching a certain height in personal relations, but how can a *group* display art in its dealings with-another? Considering the rarity of the great teacher, it would seem almost a matter of accident if an entire administration could be informed by this type of genius.

Perhaps a more serious difficulty is that of keeping intact any ethical attitude whatever when it is transmitted by intermediaries and across national boundaries. Any boundary between one group and another tends to set up in our minds a sort of moral insulation. The pleasures and pains of distant and foreign folk go for less than par in the ethics of "weighing values": what is felt in a remote corner is not felt here, and may be disregarded in the calculation. The ethics of cause-and-effect has the same trend: for all the reactions of an injured alien are likely to spend themselves within the circumference of his own group, and his face does not return in the streets of one's own city. So with the ethics which consists in serving well one's own society: so long as stirred angers do not rise to the point of group conflict, he who defrauds a stranger to enrich his own may feel himself a peculiarly loyal member. The biases of ethical psychology thus conspire against the spirit of education-at-a-distance. As the world tends to unity, these biases weaken: but the unity comes slowly in fact, and still more slowly in temper. And there is yet another barrier, that of the chain of middlemen through whom our deeds in remote parts are done. High organization must interpose many links between a purpose and its agents of fulfilment. Through these links it is always easier to transmit our desires than our scruples. On this account it is just the highly organized societies that tend to go bad at the

point of contact between their lowest ranks of agents and the people they deal with. It is not France who wills what happens in Syria; it is not the United States who wills what happens in the interior of the Philippines. But so far as the will fails to reach these distant places, it is folly to pretend to serve as educator.

It is true, we cannot acquiesce in these impediments. We are bound, if we have any ethical sense at all, to get it to work across all these barriers. In place of that annoyed preference not to know what our agents are doing, which makes us at once an accomplice of the nethermost of them, we must accept the responsibility. *Wherever we interfere, we must know what we do.* The cost of knowledge must become a fixed charge in every foreign enterprise.

But, even so, we cannot assume this accomplished until it is accomplished. Supposing, then, that there are places on the planet where tutelage is in order, and we are qualified to undertake it. Where differences in advancement are very wide, and chiefly in one direction, there is a possibility, let us say, of a genuine educational deed,—an abstract possibility. Can we, in view of these unresolved difficulties, rightly undertake it? Considering how easily we are bribed by our own advantage, how readily we fall into a deadly hypocrisy about the civilizing mission of our political doings, it becomes doubtful whether we can be trusted with any further political effort of this sort. Where is there a clear case of success, even within the reasonable allowance for human fallibility? Having traveled so far in our study, we shall not point to “benefits conferred” as an argument for interference: we know that all interference confers both benefit and injury. And a lively sense of the likelihood of injury, and especially of unperceived injury, to the vital and sensitive aspects of an alien type of life, heavily loads the scale against any such further ventures.

The educative principle is a valid principle: it is almost a solution of the ethical problem of inequality. But we are not yet fit to realize its advantages.

We shall hardly be fitter until we cease in practice to regard the economic-scientific measure of advancement as sufficient and final. In northern Africa and in Asia, there is little of the simple one-way inequality we have been assuming. The differences here are differences of proportion in the several phases of development: we have no clear up-and-down relation, but rather individual uniqueness which the course of future history is to preserve, not wipe out. Wherever, as in the Near East, there are marked superiorities on both sides, whatever tutelage there is must be far more reciprocal and free than the mandate principle as now used permits. These peoples are ready to define their own needs in the way of guidance and advice, and to choose their own advisers. If in the 1870's Egypt under Ismail was already reaching out for a Gordon to aid in ending the Sudan slave-traffic, the Near East of sixty years later may be trusted to work out its own means of education. There is no good reason why this part of the promise of the original mandate-idea should not now be fulfilled to the letter.

Meantime, there remains something unsatisfactory in the spirit of education itself. It is not a perfect solution, but only a near-solution: it hardly escapes the suggestion of non-mutuality. So long as A thinks of himself as lifting B, even if he is doing so, there is a thorn in the relationship. The true educator is continually trying to become something else, and the ethics of inequality remains an ethics of unstable equilibrium. It must end in setting up a complete co-operation between both sides in a common labor of growth.

CHAPTER XXXI

PERSONS AND PROPERTY

FOR nigh a hundred years, the relations of peoples have been governed chiefly by the interest in property. Many who decline to follow Karl Marx into socialism are following him, knowingly or not, in the belief that the economic drive is the dominant history-making force, the bottom law of the world. This volume has been a running attack on that illusion. So long as economy works through human heads, and so long as these heads have their beliefs, prides, resentments, loves, hates, just so long will our problems of economy depend for their solution on problems of social ethics. We are now at the point of history when this—which has always been true—is becoming evident through the universal break-down of a self-sufficient economic leadership; and we are ready to take as the major practical principle that the interests of persons are to be set above the interests of national property and domain.

But let us avoid a false antithesis; for property also is a personal interest, and is normally a part of the satisfying and making of men. The thing is to consider property once more as an ethical concern and not as a controlling force: there is a “right” of property. What is that right?

At the outset, we opened the hypothesis that property in things ought by right to go to the best user, a principle welcome to the imperial temperament when abroad. We have been following the fortunes of this hypothesis in various fields: we have now to make up our account with

it. We find at least one radical difficulty in this principle: the "power to use" is ambiguous. For there are many uses of any given thing; and the most significant use may be no surface matter, discernible on inspection. A's prompt assurance that he can use B's goods better than B must fade if he considers the variety and versatility of "use." Europe can make great use of some of the wealth derived from Africa: it transforms this wealth, let us say, into energy for European artists, scientists, manufacturers. Some of it goes to make a number of portly people a little more portly, a phenomenon in which the world has, we presume, but a minor interest. Some of it enters into a million articles of ivory, stone and gold used pleasantly here and there, lifting by small increments a large number of standards of living. Meantime, the African's standard of living is being altered also; and not by small increments but by great. He had a power to use some of the things we have taken, and still more, the setting in which these things were found; his uses may have escaped our notice. He was using his landscape, forest, rivers, running his habits through them, feeding his imagination on them, mixing his rude piety with them: to our practical sense, this hardly counts as "using" the place,—its raw materials for our bijoux all untouched, the whole countryside lying idle, doing nothing at all, nothing except to produce a certain type of man. I am not raising the question whether this type of man could be improved; I am calling attention to a certain kind of "using" the land. If we incline to disregard this use as relatively unimportant, let us recall that Europe sets aside great parks, likewise unplowed and unmined, for a precisely similar purpose: the only defence of large landed property is the type of man it helps to produce. The defence is satisfactory if the type is satisfactory,—not otherwise. But the point is clear: among all the

uses of land, or other goods, the man-making use is the chief. And between this ultimate, semi-invisible use and those particular tangible uses which first catch our eye and try to pose as *the* uses, there are a hundred shades of use competing and intermingling, as navigator, astronomer, poet, make their various uses of the same stars. And no one owns the stars, the light, the air, the things most widely used. We begin to doubt whether the principle of power to use can be the basis of a workable theory of property right.

We shall make no progress until we recognize that the various uses of a piece of matter may interpenetrate. The legal interest of property is that it is exclusive: what is mine is not yours. In my property right, there is embedded the *jus prohibendi*, which may be invoked to keep you out. What would my hospitality be worth if all had the right to come unbidden? Legal property is private and solitary by definition: *that is its utility*. It is a power put into my hand, a power to exclude; but what it contemplates is not exclusion,—it is the *control and selection of users*, to reach a certain maximum of use, quality considered, which might be borne down and trodden to chaff on terms of general admission. The title of property may be exclusive: its use can never be exclusive. You wear your jewels not alone for your delectation, but for mine. Any number of enjoyments, or will circuits, may run through the same piece of matter: *property*, let us say, *is permeable*, indefinitely permeable to human uses and users. Who, then, can be called owner?

My answer is, the owner is an administrator of uses, his own and others'. We do not abandon the principle of power to use, either abroad or at home; but we perceive that use must be realized through a method called "ownership," which looks like its very negation. The owner is per-

mitted to cancel uses, in order that his imagination may be free to build his own pyramid of uses, from which will come the novelties and enrichments of the general life.

The theoretical error of communism lies in its ignoring of this paradox: the general enrichment must be promoted by a preliminary act of general renunciation, for thought, dream, imagination, are essentially private functions. There must be "owners" in any progressive society who have the right to be alone with their goods and their thoughts, not to remain alone, but to return to the common fund the gifts of solitude. The theoretical error of the private property tradition is in taking this right of exclusion as absolute, an essentially fatuous assumption that my personal enjoyment is a final goal of the world's policy. The whole system of private property-right is subject to the judgment of its yield in human uses, and especially of its building of cultures and of men. Within any society, ownership is designated by a system of law, which ought to have the merit of great stability and also another merit, that of openness to conscious well-judged change. In the wider world, the presumptions are that power to use is best served by the extant systems of ownership in all lands. No off-hand dogma to the effect that "I can obviously use your property better than you" can have any standing in the ethical groundwork of world-law. International practice will doubtless regard systems of property-right as having more or less momentum, in proportion to the total volume of property in the nation, and the amount of thought that has gone into them: the simpler property-systems are more readily changed. But, once we see that rooting up property is rooting up men, we shall treat the simplest property systems with a new deference. Our principle will be this:

The ultimate basis of all property right is power to use: but the chief of all uses is the making of men, as realized through systems of ownership.

If with this principle in mind, we were apportioning the earth *de novo*, we should doubtless give some weight to the fact that some uses are intolerant, final, destructive, preventing further uses, while others are hospitable, promoting further uses. We should incline to judge any claim in the light of the further claims it was disposed to satisfy. If Palestine, for example, were free to be assigned to some owner, there being no system to designate who that owner should be, we should consider something more than the vertical height of the culture which the different claimants were promising to build on that soil; we should consider which claimant was most preoccupied with his own power to use, and which most concerned to join his use with that of others. If one form of industrial use were destructive of the interest of sentiment and tradition, and another form were harmonious with them, we should allow the latter a prior right. Now, in general, the most hospitable use of any land is the use of the permanent resident. It is he who accepts the climate, and works out his life and his code in the concrete: the land, for him, is becoming a factor in the whole range of his being. It is most completely used by him; and it is he who can most adequately plot out its use by others, on the basis of his ownership. There is on this showing no title to property which can compete with the title of the "native." There are many uses of an advanced economy which can be made compatible with the native use, by the ingenuity and good will of both; but there is none which can rightly displace that of the native, —except one.

That one is the claim of the same native at a higher

level of his own economy. On this score, the responsibility of the intruding European, let us say, in Africa becomes twofold: he has first to see that the African's life habits are preserved; he has then to see that these same habits find their way to a better satisfaction on the same soil. We must use Africa first to make better Africans, and only then to make better Europeans. In sum, *Wherever we interfere, we must assume the problem of poverty.* Instead of mounting our own advantage upon the loss of the native peoples, on the general plan of "To him that hath shall be given," we are required, by the principle of power to use to make an improvement of the economic position of the native the first charge on the profits of our intrusion. Every policy is wrong which leads the economically advanced nations to increase the capital inequalities between themselves and the lands they enter.

Follow this clue of hospitality in power to use a step farther. Not all the users of land are now living. There are users to come after us: and it must be a principle of all property-right that *Future power to use is to be ranked with the present.* The power to use would be a deadly principle of right if it made a virtue of using things up. We cannot put the unforeseeable uses of an infinite future into the same scales with the known needs of the present; but we can distinguish between present uses which consume and present uses which conserve, and we can give the better right to the user who considers those who follow him. We can recognize it as an incidental advantage of backwardness and even of superstition that some of the coal and oil and gold of the world is *not* forthwith dug up and put into the ways of consumption. Our breathless concessionnaires and pioneers are not the pure heroes of civilization we have been making them; we should do well to give them less moral and military support, rather than more.

But the situation must be dealt with deliberately and intelligently. Latency of material resource will not be protected unless we protect it together; so long as there are competitive advantages in discovering and attacking it, we shall repeat the experience of the oil fields of America. When private holders, who regard themselves as owners, find themselves driven into such ruinous competitive waste, it is time to reinterpret their "property" on the basis of a more circumspect power to use. And where, in the wider world, property conceptions are still fluid, let us establish the principle that the undeveloped resources of the world are a common fund to be apportioned, not among ourselves, but between ourselves and future users.

From our principle of the power to use we have drawn a number of demands, not evident at first sight, tending on the whole to check the impulsiveness of our imperialistic certainty of mission-to-own. If, when we enter a backward region in the rôle of sovereign power, we are bound to educate, to attack the local problem of poverty, to consider the potential future users, and withal to know what our agents are doing toward these ends, the perspective of imperial interest is altered, probably saddened, perhaps shut off! For by increase in the costs and diminution in the profits of over-seas enterprises, the economic motive is deflated to modest proportions, and bids fair to occupy no more than its normal mental place. Speculation in mandates and colonies becomes less alluring, and the envy of those who find themselves low in colonial possessions is appeased. Bismarck's relative indifference to the world-carving enterprises of his time receives a measure of justification. We begin to realize in the field of national property-right what we have been learning in the field of individual property-right, that wealth has in fact a difficult function to perform, and that only those deserve riches to

whom riches bring a definite burden of suffering. These considerations will not cancel the lure of empire to the temperamental imperialist, but they may lessen the pressure of the urge to possess which has disfigured the past century of history. They may bring the impulse of expansion within the readier control of an international judgment.

If we can check the haste of our economic penetrators, we may be able to give weight to another aspect of the world's latent wealth, its undeveloped *human* resources. Any pool of mankind still remaining in the wild or in any degree immature is to be regarded as a possible reserve of future cultural potency. The most backward, as the most youthful, may be the most valuable asset: until we know what we are likely to destroy, there is a definite presumption against intrusion. Certainly, it can no longer be allowed to depend on the whim or interest of any one state or group of citizens whether a given terrain, or some one of the remaining primitive stocks of mankind, is seized and educated, or left fallow. This means that

The era of private intervention is ended.

If there is to be any further political advice-giving in either hemisphere, it must be by an international agreement in which the non-interested states have at least as much to say as the interested.

There is, for example, a rising among the Kurds of the Ararat region. They try to rally Armenians and Nestorians with themselves into a "Pan-Aryan Federation" and to gain Persian support. According to such knowledge as comes obscurely through the wilderness, this movement seems to consist chiefly of border raids into Turkey and Persia; and the cry of nationalism appears a brave flag raised to secure general sympathy for lusty and semi-barbaric

tribal thieveries. Having no safe basis for reaching a judgment, the world sits by while Turkey takes costly military steps "to end the Kurdish trouble once for all." Suppose these Kurds to be one of the remaining elemental peoples full of potential trouble for their neighbors, full also of distant cultural capacities of no present utility in the world, what is the alternative to letting them be wiped out by strong Turkish medicine? There is no alternative to this, or to other appalling human waste, until we are ready to bring such cases under a common human reason, and to establish by common action a fence between Kurd and Neighbor, preserving both.

All this implies increased responsibilities upon our organs for world-thinking and world-action. Some group of heads must undertake questions which Geneva now prudently avoids as politically untouchable,—questions of race, culture, immigration, the use of the earth's disposable soil; questions of status, which contain the detonating charges of future war, and which allow little entrance of pure reason or general rule. We must not give them up; we are bound to muster what wisdom we can command, in a non-political, purely advisory body, instructed to recommend political action, initiating none for itself. An institute, let us say, of conservation, understanding thereby the conserving of material and human resources; including also the art of the world which—since art is the most permeable of all property, used by a million users without being consumed—is more literally than all else the property of all. We must have world-thinking on these matters in the first place; and, if world-thinking recommends itself to our statesmen, then, world-action,—an executive at Geneva.

An executive at Geneva does not mean a world state: it means merely an arm sufficient to carry out what the com-

mon sense of mankind sees as necessary, and can do with general consent. It means that what is literally the world's work need not be undertaken by each state severally. If it is the world's business to determine a Kurdish frontier, then let the world do it and relieve Turkey of the sole responsibility. If it is the world's business to aid in the sanitation of Persia or the finance of Esthonia or the education of China, let the world undertake these things as a joint action, and relieve the several states, relieving also the states thus aided of the particular axes-to-grind of the private *entrepreneurs*.

In due time it will be seen as a part of the world's business to relieve the states of the individual burden of their own security, and therewith to remove the chief cause, after the competition for property, of our misuse of the peoples of lesser power. For among the uses we have been making of our dependencies the least defensible is the use of the human stuff there to increase our military strength. The ill of slavery is not that one serves another: this he may do and still serve himself. The ill is that one's supreme efforts and sacrifices cannot be spent according to one's own heart. This evil is at its height when a man is drafted for warfare rather than for labor. If slavery must go, then much more must there be an absolute end of the practice of using colonials in the national defence. If it is said that this practice can end only with the solution of the general problem of security, it may be replied that even now security has so far become the world's business that a nation thus corruptly extending its national force, so far from strengthening its position in the world, weakens it through exciting a general distrust.

For, even now, the security of great Powers as well as small rests chiefly on the concern of other Powers for their existence, rather than on their own forces and alliances.

The balance of power in a future conflict will rest with the spontaneous support a nation's cause may command. And this in turn will depend on the degree to which that nation has been bent to invoke reason rather than its arbitrary I-will in determining its policies. Here lies the importance of the League of Nations for the problem of security: for the League is specifically charged with admitting an element of world-thinking into the refractory questions of world politics, including the tentative settlements of Versailles. It is charged, no doubt, with maintaining these settlements against aggression; it is not charged with maintaining them against reason. The accumulation of armaments for the purpose of preventing all change in the *status quo* is the destruction of security. To admit an element of reason into the problems of boundary and existence is at once to release those tensions which threaten world peace, and with them the fears which prompt our major cruelties to those whom we consider backward.

These proposals converge upon our final judgment, that the way forward lies through the existing League of Nations, not around it; and that every state concerned to do its part in meeting problems of world-order must now act through membership in the League. Greed and national pride will not be abandoned today nor tomorrow in the policies of states: the ethical reason will not be given a free hand. But the thing is, to give it a hearing. The League is dominated to some degree by the imperial nations; yet it is the one organ in which those nations expose themselves to the considered judgment of mankind. The League has of late become more nationalistic in spirit and personnel: the cynical and envious attitude of the eternal diplomat appears in its deed and also in its lack of deed. But it can never shake off this essential virtue, that it has

committed itself to truth and to publicity; it is dealing with issues which are our issues, and it is bringing to those issues the wider horizon than ours which they demand. To be out of the League is to escape a certain entanglement and complicity: it is also to escape the consideration of one's own case and one's own duty where these are interwoven with those of other states. It is to be a pensioner on the labor and thought of others; it is to lend no shoulder to the heaving forward of the slow chariot of justice.

The process of history is twofold, a "practical" wangling of things along, adjusting, compromising; and a communing of thinkers and dreamers with their ideals, praying their God to do work in the dust of facts. Through the union of these two, the habits of the world change. The West has become too diffident about its ethical sense; it has surrendered too much to the arrogance of economy and to fear. The way of true realism is the way of ethical audacity, and of faith in the available instruments.

The League is submerged in immensities, haunted by the shades of ancient timorousness, entangled in its own complexities. It is prolific in figures, commissions, statistics preliminary to nothing. It travails like a mountain and brings forth,—a blank report. Its discussions, its oratory, have their aspects of façade, futility, waste. Yet there are achievements both invaluable and inconceivable without this particular agency. This is enough to save it. It is kept to its work, as is every honest institution, by the unremitting spur of its original motive. That motive is in no sense a *beau geste* nor a grandiloquent phrase nor a dreamy sentiment, but an item of suffering or despair in some corner of an ill-connected world. All this paper work, bureau business, committee vamping, stand for the desti-

nies of unique lives which will be either known about, thought about, and eventually helped, or else silenced, crushed without recourse, because some one of those interests we call political, unconscious if only by its magnitude, sweeps ignorantly over their heads.

APPENDIX I

Account of the March on Damascus and of the Deposition of Feisal: Part of a general memorandum on the status of Syria, hand-written by a member of Feisal's suite for presentation to the League of Nations, but not presented. The text as here given is that of a typed copy in the Widener Library, Harvard University, with slight errors corrected if seemingly due to mistyping or inability to decipher the writing, but without alteration of the author's individual French diction, idiom and verb forms.

La forte concentration des troupes françaises à la suite de l'arrivée de nouveaux échelons après l'armistice conclu avec les Kémalistes et du débarquement de nouvelles troupes, les infractions continuelles des accords, l'attitude provocante du Commandement n'avaient fait qu'augmenter toujours plus le soupçon de l'Emir à l'égard des véritables intentions des Français.

Le général Gouraud invité à donner des explications par écrit sur ce qu'il entendait faire, répondit vaguement que le Commandant français n'aurait jamais pu entreprendre une opération militaire quelconque, sans l'ordre du gouvernement de la République. Voilà une réponse qui n'était pas faite pour dissiper les soupçons.

Les événements successifs démontrèrent assez clairement l'intention des Français de ne vouloir pas perdre et même de créer, le moment venu, les prétextes pour marcher vers l'intérieur, et les mouvements des troupes semblaient prédisposés à un coup de main sur Alep.

Dans cette situation et le malaise du pays croissant toujours, vu l'impossibilité d'une entente quelconque avec le général Gouraud, l'Emir se décida à partir pour l'Europe et il en informa le général en date du 9 juillet 1920. Le général Gouraud, en date du 11 juillet, répondit qu'il avait des conditions à imposer, au passage de l'Emir, ajoutant qu'avant leur exécution il ne pouvait autoriser son départ pour l'Europe.

Voici les conditions :

- 1°) Occupation militaire française de la ligne Alep-Rayak;
- 2°) Acceptation pleine et inconditionnée du mandat français en Syrie;
- 3°) Acceptation dans la zone est de billets de la banque de

Syrie (monnaie qui avait donné lieu à la spéculation la plus effrénée et produit un arrêt dans la vie économique de la Syrie) ;
4°) Abolition du service militaire obligatoire.

Le général menaçait enfin d'occuper Damas dans le cas que Faissal fût parti tout de même pour l'Europe, suivant la voie de Haïfa. Il l'avertissait qu'en cas de refus des conditions, il n'aurait pas été reçu à Paris.

Après cette communication l'Emir Faissal adressait une note aux représentants étrangers du corps consulaire à Damas, les priant d'intervenir, dénonçant les concentrations des troupes françaises et proposant de former, pour la solution du conflit, une commission mixte d'après l'accord 25 novembre 1919. La réponse immédiate du général Gouraud consista dans l'avancement qu'il ordonna à ses troupes sur Dija Sadyour (frontière nord de la zone est) et dans l'occupation de Rayak en Bekaa et El Muallaka moyennant des mitrailleuses. L'Emir Faissal protesta encore une fois auprès du marquis Paternò, consul-général d'Italie, doyen du corps consulaire. Il protestait non seulement contre les occupations françaises, au sujet desquelles il adressait au général Gouraud lui-même une protestation, mais aussi contre les conditions que le général prétendait lui imposer, et qui constituaient une violation de la souveraineté nationale. Il ajoutait que ces occupations étaient évidemment le prélude d'une attaque générale contre la zone est.

Cette protestation n'eut d'autre effet que celui de provoquer de la part du général l'envoi d'un autre ultimatum, dont la teneur est vraiment incroyable. Commencant par affirmer que la France par le fait même d'avoir accepté de devenir le guide désintéressé du nouvel état, avait donné la mesure de sa dévotion pour la Syrie, le général Gouraud exprime une série de lamentations contre le gouvernement de Damas et conclut par rendre encore plus graves les conditions qu'il avait déjà mises au départ de l'Emir. Les nouvelles conditions étaient les suivantes :

- 1°) Droit absolu de disposer du chemin de fer Rayak-Alep pour tous les transports ordonnés par les autorités françaises. Cette disposition sera garantie par l'occupation des gares de Rayak, Baalbek, Homs, Hamah et Alep ;
- 2°) Abolition de la conscription ;
- 3°) Acceptation du mandat français ;
- 4°) Acceptation de la monnaie syrienne.

5°) Châtiment des coupables les plus compromis par leurs actes d'hostilité envers la France. Les conditions devaient être acceptées ou refusées en bloc. Le délai accordé par le général Gouraud était de quatre jours à partir du 15 juillet, 0 heure jusqu'au 18, 24 heures.

Malgré l'émotion profonde causée par cet ultimatum et les difficultés d'exécution de ces conditions contraires au droit des peuples de se gouverner eux-mêmes, contraires aux engagements des Alliés et à l'art. 22 du pacte de la Société des Nations, malgré la volonté de la nation de se défendre contre l'agresseur coûte que coûte, le roi Faissal, d'accord avec son gouvernement, se plia aux conditions du général Gouraud, afin d'éviter l'effusion du sang et pour tâcher de conserver jusqu'au dernier moment l'amitié des Alliés. Il fit part de son acceptation au général, par l'entremise de M. le colonel Cousse, officier français à Damas, lui demandant une prolongation de délai. La demande fut acceptée et le délai prolongé de 24 heures. Dans la journée du 19, l'Emir communiqua par note officielle au général l'acceptation de ses cinq conditions et demanda un nouveau délai supérieur à 24 heures, lui permettant de prendre des mesures pour leur application. Le général répondit par écrit, portant le délai définitif au 20 juillet 24 heures. En attendant, le général Gouraud divulguait sous toutes les formes l'acceptation de l'ultimatum de la part de l'Emir en ce qu'il en donna communication à la presse de Bagdad et fit jeter des manifestes sur Alep par un aéroplane. L'Emir Faissal tâcha d'exécuter avec plus grand zèle les conditions imposées. Les troupes syriennes étaient rapidement démobilisées sous l'œil des représentants des Puissances et des officiers français à Damas. Des ordres furent donnés pour la remise, aux autorités militaires françaises, d'Alep et d'autres localités prévues par l'ultimatum. Le Congrès syrien qui prêchait la résistance fut dissous.

Nous devons croire que le général Gouraud ne s'attendait pas à une aussi grande soumission de la part de l'Emir, et que les conditions avaient été mises pour obtenir, avant que les troupes françaises avançassent, le désarmement des Arabes et pour se délivrer ainsi de tout obstacle aux opérations. Le fait est que dans sa réponse le général prenant acte de l'acceptation officielle de ses conditions et déclarant être au courant des mesures effectives prises par le gouvernement de l'Emir pour l'exécution de

l'ultimatum prétendit une acceptation particularisée et rédigée dans des termes fixés par lui-même. Même cette acceptation particularisée et rédigée dans les termes précis du général fut consignée au colonel Cousse à 17 heures 30', 6 heures et demie avant l'expiration du délai définitif. Le général Gouraud affirme n'avoir vu cette note que le lendemain matin. Par ce retard il justifia l'ordre donné à ses troupes de marcher sur Damas.

Le jour suivant, l'Emir Faissal envoya un message au général Gouraud pour demander une explication au sujet de cette marche qui avait lieu malgré l'acceptation et l'exécution de toutes les conditions de l'ultimatum. L'envoyé, le ministre de l'instruction publique Saty bey, quitta Damas le 21 juillet à 7 heures du soir, accompagné par le colonel Toulat et par Djemal bey. A peine arrivé à Djudeidé il eut une entrevue avec le général Goybet, qui ne put lui déclarer autre chose sinon qu'il aurait attendu les ordres du général Gouraud sous certaines conditions de caractère militaire, qui furent acceptées tout de suite. Le matin du 22 l'envoyé eut une entrevue avec le général Gouraud, il lui posa minutieusement tout ce que le gouvernement avait déjà fait pour l'exécution des conditions, suppression de conscription, démobilisation de l'armée, acceptation de la monnaie syrienne, communication à Homs, Hamah et Alep de la prochaine occupation des gares. L'envoyé signala aussi toutes les difficultés du gouvernement pour lutter contre l'opinion publique, qu'il avait dû suspendre le matin les séances du Congrès syrien et avoir recours le soir à la force armée. L'envoyé enfin lui décrivit l'effervescence de l'opinion publique aussitôt qu'elle avait appris la marche des troupes françaises après tant d'actes officiels et surtout après la démobilisation de l'armée. Le général Gouraud répondit dans ces termes: "Oui, le colonel Toulat vient de me mettre au courant de tout cela; je reconnais que la conduite de votre gouvernement a été correcte dans tout cela: mais je n'ai pas reçu votre réponse à temps: j'ai attendu jusqu'à minuit dix, et après j'ai donné l'ordre de marcher."

Quant à la dépêche il prétendit que la cause de son retard était une bande qui avait coupé les lignes télégraphiques, et il ajouta: "Comme les bandes sont le produit de la politique antérieure de votre gouvernement la responsabilité de ce retard doit retomber sur ce gouvernement même."

L'envoyé lui fit alors observer qu'un télégramme d'acceptation

en bloc lui avait été déjà expédié, et qu'il l'avait bien reçu puisqu'il avait exprimé sa satisfaction à son sujet: que le retard dont il s'agissait concernait tout simplement le télégramme de confirmation détaillée de cette acceptation déjà annoncée et que le retard survenu dans la transmission d'une telle dépêche de formalité ne devait pas le pousser si précipitamment à donner l'ordre de marcher. . . .

Le général répondit: "Mais vous savez bien que je n'exigeais pas seulement l'acceptation, j'exigeais en même temps l'exécution."

L'envoyé lui répliqua qu'il n'exigeait pour le 20 juillet que "la consécration de la réponse par des actes officiels" et qu'il fixait le terme de l'exécution intégrale pour le 31 juillet 24 heures; que son armée dès ses premiers pas avait dû trouver les preuves matérielles de l'exécution de la plus importante condition de l'ultimatum, en ce qu'elle avait dû constater la démobilisation complète de l'armée arabe.

Mais comme le général Gouraud maintenait son point de vue et ne cessait de dire: "Mais le télégramme n'est pas arrivé à temps," l'envoyé comprit qu'il était inutile de continuer de discuter sur ce point et ajouta: "Mais enfin le matin vous avez reçu le télégramme et vous l'avez remis à votre officier de liaison 6 heures avant le délai fixé . . . alors vous auriez dû arrêter la marche de vos troupes . . ."

Le général avança des considérations militaires lui faisant observer qu'une armée en marche ne peut pas s'arrêter d'un seul coup, mais doit arriver à un emplacement où elle peut s'installer sans danger et trouver l'eau nécessaire à sa subsistance. Il était évident que tous ces arguments n'avaient aucune valeur. Il était beaucoup plus facile aux troupes de revenir sur leurs pas une demi-heure que de marcher toute une journée en avant, à travers les défilés étroits et escarpés de l'Anti-Liban. Au lieu d'insister sur ce point l'envoyé lui dit: "Eh bien, maintenant je crois qu'il ne reste plus aucune difficulté pour retirer ces troupes; nous vous prions de les retirer." Le général fit un geste brusque et dit: "Ça, non, nous n'avons pas confiance en vous . . . pour ça, nous vous demanderons des garanties."

Sur ces entrefaites il commença à lire et à interpréter à l'envoyé la note qu'il venait de faire préparer. L'envoyé eut alors la certitude que le général Gouraud était décidé à entrer coûte que

coûte à Damas, et qu'il n'avait préparé cette nouvelle note que dans la double intention d'arracher un document excusant l'agression qu'il avait faite la veille, et de se fournir de prétexte pour la nouvelle agression qu'il projetait. Sans entrer en discussion sur les clauses de la note, l'envoyé demanda un délai de 24 heures pour rentrer à Damas et consulter ses collègues. Le général refusa tout d'abord ce délai; mais l'envoyé lui dit: "Nous ne nous serions jamais imaginé de nous trouver au devant d'une nouvelle note et de nouvelles conditions. Nous croyions fermement qu'aussitôt que vous auriez été mis au courant de tout ce que le gouvernement avait fait, vous n'auriez point hésité à retirer vos troupes et à les faire rentrer aux endroits désignés dans votre propre ultimatum. C'est pourquoi je ne puis pas assumer la responsabilité de décider sur les clauses de cette note inattendue sans consulter mes collègues." Après une longue discussion, puisque l'envoyé continuait d'insister, le général Gouraud finit par lui accorder un délai de 24 heures pour rentrer à Damas et consulter ses collègues.

En attendant, dans la ville de Damas, la population était indignée contre la soumission du gouvernement, et réclamait la résistance à tout prix. Des Arabes déchiraient leur certificat d'exemption qu'ils avaient obtenu et payé, et demandaient d'être enrôlés. Le gouvernement parvenait à comprimer le mouvement avec beaucoup de difficulté et faisait même usage des armes contre la foule.

Le 23 juillet le général Gouraud avançant avec ses troupes occupait les positions dominantes sur la route de Damas.

L'Emir fit des efforts suprêmes pour conjurer quand même la crise. Mais le général Gouraud, tout en étant renseigné au sujet des efforts de l'Emir, qui avait sacrifié à la paix avec les Alliés sa popularité; tout en ayant reçu une réponse favorable à toutes ses exigences; tout en ayant réussi à faire démobiliser l'armée arabe aux ordres de l'Emir, et peut-être même à la suite de ce dernier résultat, présenta des conditions nouvelles qui cette fois devaient être inacceptables à moins que l'Emir n'eût voulu se déshonorer vis-à-vis du monde et perdre tout prestige sur son peuple; ce qui d'ailleurs aurait rendu inutile l'acceptation des conditions. Ces dernières étaient les suivantes:

1°) Publication de la part du gouvernement de Damas d'une note dans laquelle on aurait dû déclarer que le gouvernement

français était pleinement d'accord avec le gouvernement de l'Emir, et que celui-ci consentait à l'avance française la croyant justifiée, en d'autres termes assumant lui-même la responsabilité;

2°) Pleine disposition du chemin de fer Rayak-El Tequieh;

3°) Repliement des troupes du Chérif retournées au front après la rupture de l'accord; et faculté d'occuper la dernière ligne de défense de Damas;

4°) Dissolution des bandes, et désarmement de la population;

5°) Installation à Damas d'une commission française qui aurait dû assumer le gouvernement.

Il paraît clairement que le général Gouraud s'était proposé et avait comme mission d'ébranler la position de l'Emir Faissal par ses demandes extravagantes et de chercher des prétextes pour intervenir, soit dans le cas que l'Emir se fût refusé d'accepter les nouvelles conditions, soit dans le cas qu'il les eût acceptées, car cette acceptation aurait provoqué certainement une révolution. L'Emir répondit qu'il ne voulait pas la guerre, mais que l'acceptation des nouvelles conditions aurait sans doute déchaîné la guerre civile, de sorte qu'il ne pouvait pas en assumer la responsabilité.

La faible résistance opposée aux troupes du général Gouraud, résistance que des rapports français ont enflée, a été soutenue presque exclusivement par la population civile. À l'unique engagement de Khan Meisseloun du 23 juillet seulement 200 réguliers arabes prirent part, des réguliers qui avaient été maintenus pour la garde des dépôts, après la retraite antérieure des troupes ordonnée par l'Emir. Ce sont les patriotes arabes, sans armes, sans ordre, qui ont soutenu le choc des troupes françaises, Sénégalais pour la plus grande partie, munies de tous les engins de destruction moderne. Le combat commença dans la matinée du 23 juillet. La résistance désespérée des volontaires civils et du détachement précité fut vite brisée par le feu des avions, des tanks, et des mitrailleuses françaises. Passons sur le déplorable procédé des troupes sauvages expédiées par la France dans le but de civiliser la Syrie; les blessés furent laissés trois jours sur la route et périrent la plupart à défaut de soins; les soldats ne s'approchèrent d'eux que pour les voler. Dans le combat de Damas le ministre de la guerre même tomba et une tank française passa sur son cadavre par mépris. Cette guerre qui parmi ses buts avait celui de combattre le militarisme des peuples civilisés, a établi le mili-

tarisme des sauvages sénégalais contre un peuple civilisé qui avait été un des Alliés le jour avant.

Les Français entrèrent à Damas le 24 juillet, occupant aussi les départements publics. Alep, Hamah, Homs, s'étaient déjà rendues sur les instructions antérieures de l'Emir. Le représentant britannique à Damas exprima publiquement sa désapprobation pour ces actes. Le Commandant français qui s'était permis de blâmer en public même l'Emir Faissal, auquel on ne pouvait reprocher que d'avoir agi avec trop de loyauté envers les Alliés et d'avoir cru jusqu'au dernier moment les représentants de la France incapables de manquer à leur parole, lui imposa comme condition à sa permanence en Syrie de présenter ses excuses au gouvernement de la République pour tout ce qui était arrivé et de transmettre tout pouvoir au haut Commissaire français, moyennant une déclaration écrite dans laquelle il s'obligerait à ne pas s'opposer à quelque mesure que les autorités françaises auraient prise à l'avenir.

L'Emir répondit pour la dernière fois que seulement le concours financier et technique de la France était compatible avec l'indépendance du pays. A la suite de cette déclaration l'Emir fut informé que le gouvernement français ne le reconnaissait plus. On lui intima le jour 27 de quitter Damas avec sa suite. Avant de laisser la Capitale l'Emir adressa une dernière note de protestation au corps consulaire, et envoya au général Gouraud même une lettre pleine de fierté au sujet de la conduite que le général avait tenu envers lui-même, l'Emir, et son peuple, conduite contraire à tous les principes et à toutes les lois de l'honneur. Il partit ensuite pour se rendre à Haïfa. A son passage les fidèles Druses de l'Haourân par de touchantes démonstrations de dévotion se soulevaient se déclarant prêts à attaquer Damas; ce à quoi l'Emir opposa son refus, les exhortant à attendre de meilleurs temps. En attendant, à Damas l'administration française imposait une contribution forcée de 200,000 dinars en or (10 millions de fr.); on fusilla plusieurs individus et 37 personnes furent condamnées à mort, leurs biens restant confisqués parce qu'ils avaient pris part pour l'ennemi de la France. Et l'ennemi était l'Emir Faissal, celui-là même qui jusqu'au dernier moment avait cru dans la parole des Alliés. C'est ainsi que la Syrie, pays indépendant, était traité comme un territoire annexé à la France sans même un décret d'annexion.

APPENDIX II

EMIR FEISAL'S LETTER TO PROFESSOR FELIX FRANKFURTER.

From the account of the origin of Emir Feisal's letter to him given by Professor Felix Frankfurter in the *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1930, in a contributed letter criticizing (quite justly in spots) my article on Palestine, it appears that the letter was the outcome of an interview with Emir Feisal, as representing Arab interests, arranged on the initiative of Professor Frankfurter, then representing American Zionists, at which Colonel Lawrence acted as interpreter.

Previous conferences between Feisal and Dr. Weizmann had given the interlocutors reason to expect that Feisal would make a favorable response to the general plan of Zionism as then outlined. The interview was the basis for an exchange of letters written for publication, Colonel Lawrence formulating in English the substance of the views expressed by Feisal, and Professor Frankfurter in an answering letter embodying the views expressed by him. Lawrence's letter was read to Feisal in an Arabic translation, and Feisal's signature was then attached. The English version was published in the *New York Times*, March 5th, 1919, and also, in a slightly different form, in the *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1930, as follows:

DÉLÉGATION HEDJAZIENNE
Paris, *March 3, 1919*

Dear Mr. Frankfurter,

I want to take this opportunity of my first contact with American Zionists to tell you what I have often been able to say to Dr. Weizmann in Arabia and Europe.

We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, having suffered similar oppressions at the hands of powers stronger than themselves, and by a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step towards the attainment of their national ideals together.

We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper. We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through: we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home.

With the chiefs of your movement, especially with Dr. Weizmann, we have had, and continue to have, the closest relations. He has been a great helper of our cause, and I hope the Arabs may soon be in a position to make the Jews some return for their kindness. We are working together for a reformed and revived NEAR EAST, and our two movements complete one another. The Jewish movement is national and not imperialist. Our movement is national and not imperialist, and there is room in Syria for us both. Indeed I think that neither can be a real success without the other.

People less informed and less responsible than our leaders and yours, ignoring the need for coöperation between Arabs and Zionists, have been trying to exploit the local difficulties that must necessarily arise in Palestine in the early stages of our movements. Some of them have, I am afraid, misrepresented your aims to the Arab peasantry, and our aims to the Jewish peasantry, with the result that interested parties have been able to make capital out of what they call our differences.

I wish to give you my firm conviction that these differences are not on questions of principle, but on matters of detail such as must inevitably occur in every contact of neighboring peoples, and as are easily adjusted by mutual goodwill. Indeed nearly all of them will disappear with fuller knowledge.

I look forward, and my people with me look forward, to a future in which we will help you and you will help us, so that the countries in which we are mutually interested may once again take their places in the community of civilized peoples of the world.

Believe me,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) FEISAL.

It is of interest to note that in giving this letter Feisal acted wholly outside his instructions, in direct opposition to the wishes of his father, Hussein, whom he was supposed to be representing, and contrary to the desires of his colleagues in the Delegation. Mr. Ameen Rihani writes:

“Hussein was the only one authorized to say the final word about anything that related to Arab policy. And his final word about a Jewish National Home was always the same, ‘No.’ Conclusive proof of this is his refusal to sign the treaty with the British Government in 1925, one of the causes for his downfall. Hussein never forgave his son Feisal for sending that letter to Mr. Frankfurter.”

It is to be remembered also that Feisal was at this time ruling in Damascus; that he was concerned for his security there; that he was wholly dependent on British support, and therefore accepting British advice, via Colonel Lawrence; and that he could still hope that Great Britain would receive the as yet unassigned mandate for Syria as well as for Palestine, so that the Zionist colony, still an ideal, would be within an Arab state protected by England. The reader will note Feisal’s expression, “there is room in Syria for us both.”

The Zionist interlocutors on this occasion cannot have been unaware of the divergence between Feisal’s attitude and that of his colleagues. But, even if Feisal’s view had been more widely indicative than it was of intelligent Arab opinion, at that time when Zionism was still an untried ideal, what Feisal thinks of Zionism today would be more significant than anything he may have thought in 1919. And on that point we have very clear information. It will be sufficient to refer to an exchange of telegrams which took place during the sessions of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in Palestine, 1929:

To His Majesty the King of Iraq, Baghdad:

It has been said before the Enquiry Commission that in your letter to Mr. Frankfurter you consented to the Zionist policy. Please cable me to correct this report.

(Signed) Auni Abdul Hadi.

Advocate Auni Abdul Hadi, Jerusalem:

His Majesty does not remember having written anything of that kind with his knowledge.

(Signed) HAIDER (SECRETARY TO FEISAL).

APPENDIX III

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE: DRAFT CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE AT ITS FOURTEENTH SESSION, 10 JUNE—28 JUNE, 1930. CMD. 3693, 1930.

DRAFT CONVENTION CONCERNING FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOUR.

The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation of the League of Nations,

Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, and having met in its Fourteenth Session on 10 June 1930, and

Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to forced or compulsory labour, which is included in the first item on the Agenda of the Session, and

Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of a draft international convention,

adopts, this twenty-eighth day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty, the following Draft Convention for ratification by the Members of the International Labour Organisation, in accordance with the provisions of Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles and of the corresponding Parts of the other Treaties of Peace:

Article 1.

Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention undertakes to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period.

With a view to this complete suppression, recourse to forced

or compulsory labour may be had, during the transitional period, for public purposes only and as an exceptional measure, subject to the conditions and guarantees hereinafter provided.

At the expiration of a period of five years after the coming into force of this Convention, and when the Governing Body of the International Labour Office prepares the report provided for in Article 31 below, the said Governing Body shall consider the possibility of the suppression of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms without a further transitional period and the desirability of placing this question on the Agenda of the Conference.

Article 2.

For the purposes of this Convention the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall mean all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Convention, the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include:

(a) any work or service exacted in virtue of compulsory military service laws for work of a purely military character;

(b) any work or service which forms part of the normal civic obligations of the citizens of a fully self-governing country;

(c) any work or service exacted from any person as a consequence of a conviction in a court of law, provided that the said work or service is carried out under the supervision and control of a public authority and that the said person is not hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies or associations;

(d) any work or service exacted in cases of emergency, that is to say, in the event of war or of a calamity or threatened calamity, such as fire, flood, famine, earthquake, violent epidemic or epizootic diseases, invasion by animal, insect or vegetable pests, and in general any circumstance that would endanger the existence or the well-being of the whole or part of the population;

(e) minor communal services of a kind which, being performed by the members of the community in the direct interest of the said community, can therefore be considered as normal civic obligations incumbent upon the members of the community, provided that the members of the community or their direct representatives shall have the right to be consulted in regard to the need for such services.

Article 3.

For the purposes of this Convention the term "competent authority" shall mean either an authority of the metropolitan country or the highest central authority in the territory concerned.

Article 4.

The competent authority shall not impose or permit the imposition of forced or compulsory labour for the benefit of private individuals, companies or associations.

Where such forced or compulsory labour for the benefit of private individuals, companies or associations exists at the date on which a Member's ratification of this Convention is registered by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, the Member shall completely suppress such forced or compulsory labour from the date on which this Convention comes into force for that Member.

Article 5.

No concession granted to private individuals, companies or associations shall involve any form of forced or compulsory labour for the production or the collection of products which such private individuals, companies or associations utilise or in which they trade.

Where concessions exist containing provisions involving such forced or compulsory labour, such provisions shall be rescinded as soon as possible, in order to comply with Article 1 of this Convention.

Article 6.

Officials of the administration, even when they have the duty of encouraging the populations under their charge to engage in some form of labour, shall not put constraint upon the said

populations or upon any individual members thereof to work for private individuals, companies or associations.

Article 7.

Chiefs who do not exercise administrative functions shall not have recourse to forced or compulsory labour. •

Chiefs who exercise administrative functions may, with the express permission of the competent authority, have recourse to forced or compulsory labour, subject to the provisions of Article 10 of this Convention.

Chiefs who are duly recognised and who do not receive adequate remuneration in other forms, may have the enjoyment of personal services, subject to due regulation and provided that all necessary measures are taken to prevent abuses.

Article 8.

The responsibility for every decision to have recourse to forced or compulsory labour shall rest with the highest civil authority in the territory concerned.

Nevertheless, that authority may delegate powers to the highest local authorities to exact forced or compulsory labour which does not involve the removal of the workers from their place of habitual residence. That authority may also delegate, for such periods and subject to such conditions as may be laid down in the regulations provided for in Article 23 of this Convention, powers to the highest local authorities to exact forced or compulsory labour which involves the removal of the workers from their place of habitual residence for the purpose of facilitating the movement of officials of the administration, when on duty, and for the transport of Government stores.

Article 9.

Except as otherwise provided for in Article 10 of this Convention, any authority competent to exact forced or compulsory labour shall, before deciding to have recourse to such labour, satisfy itself:

- (a) that the work to be done or the service to be rendered is of important direct interest for the community called upon to do the work or render the service;

(b) that the work or service is of present or imminent necessity;

(c) that it has been impossible to obtain voluntary labour for carrying out the work or rendering the service by the offer of rates of wages and conditions of labour not less favourable than those prevailing in the area concerned for similar work or service; and

(d) that the work or service will not lay too heavy a burden upon the present population, having regard to the labour available and its capacity to undertake the work.

Article 10.

Forced or compulsory labour exacted as a tax and forced or compulsory labour to which recourse is had for the execution of public works by chiefs who exercise administrative functions shall be progressively abolished.

Meanwhile, where forced or compulsory labour is exacted as a tax, and where recourse is had to forced or compulsory labour for the execution of public works by chiefs who exercise administrative functions, the authority concerned shall first satisfy itself:

(a) that the work to be done or the service to be rendered is of important direct interest for the community called upon to do the work or render the service;

(b) that the work or the service is of present or imminent necessity;

(c) that the work or service will not lay too heavy a burden upon the present population, having regard to the labour available and its capacity to undertake the work;

(d) that the work or service will not entail the removal of the workers from their place of habitual residence;

(e) that the execution of the work or the rendering of the service will be directed in accordance with the exigencies of religion, social life and agriculture.

Article 11.

Only adult able-bodied males who are of an apparent age of not less than 18 and not more than 45 years may be called upon for forced or compulsory labour. Except in respect of the kinds of labour provided for in Article 10 of this Convention, the following limitations and conditions shall apply:

(a) whenever possible prior determination by a medical officer appointed by the administration that the persons concerned are not suffering from any infectious or contagious disease and that they are physically fit for the work required and for the conditions under which it is to be carried out;

(b) exemption of school teachers and pupils and of officials of the administration in general;

(c) the maintenance in each community of the number of adult able-bodied men indispensable for family and social life;

(d) respect for conjugal and family ties.

For the purposes of sub-paragraph (c) of the preceding paragraph, the regulations provided for in Article 23 of this Convention shall fix the proportion of the resident adult able-bodied males who may be taken at any one time for forced or compulsory labour, provided always that this proportion shall in no case exceed 25 per cent. In fixing this proportion the competent authority shall take account of the density of the population, of its social and physical development, of the seasons, and of the work which must be done by the persons concerned on their own behalf in their locality, and, generally, shall have regard to the economic and social necessities of the normal life of the community concerned.

Article 12.

The maximum period for which any person may be taken for forced or compulsory labour of all kinds in any one period of twelve months shall not exceed sixty days, including the time spent in going to and from the place of work.

Every person from whom forced or compulsory labour is exacted shall be furnished with a certificate indicating the periods of such labour which he has completed.

Article 13.

The normal working hours of any person from whom forced or compulsory labour is exacted shall be the same as those prevailing in the case of voluntary labour, and the hours worked in excess of the normal working hours shall be remunerated at the rates prevailing in the case of overtime for voluntary labour.

A weekly day of rest shall be granted to all persons from whom forced or compulsory labour of any kind is exacted and this day shall coincide as far as possible with the day fixed by tradition or custom in the territories or regions concerned.

Article 14.

With the exception of the forced or compulsory labour provided for in Article 10 of this Convention, forced or compulsory labour of all kinds shall be remunerated in cash at rates not less than those prevailing for similar kinds of work either in the district in which the labour is employed or in the district from which the labour is recruited, whichever may be the higher.

In the case of labour to which recourse is had by chiefs in the exercise of their administrative functions, payment of wages in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be introduced as soon as possible.

The wages shall be paid to each worker individually and not to his tribal chief or to any other authority.

For the purpose of payment of wages the days spent in travelling to and from the place of work shall be counted as working days.

Nothing in this Article shall prevent ordinary rations being given as a part of wages, such rations to be at least equivalent in value to the money payment they are taken to represent, but deductions from wages shall not be made either for the payment of taxes or for special food, clothing or accommodation supplied to a worker for the purpose of maintaining him in a fit condition to carry on his work under the special conditions of any employment, or for the supply of tools.

Article 15.

Any laws or regulations relating to workmen's compensation for accidents or sickness arising out of the employment of the worker and any laws or regulations providing compensation for the dependents of deceased or incapacitated workers which are or shall be in force in the territory concerned shall be equally applicable to persons from whom forced or compulsory labour is exacted and to voluntary workers.

In any case it shall be an obligation on any authority employing any worker on forced or compulsory labour to ensure the subsistence of any such worker who, by accident or sickness arising out of his employment, is rendered wholly or partially incapable of providing for himself, and to take measures to ensure the maintenance of any persons actually dependent upon such a worker in the event of his incapacity or decease arising out of his employment.

Article 16.

Except in cases of special necessity, persons from whom forced or compulsory labour is exacted shall not be transferred to districts where the food and climate differ so considerably from those to which they have been accustomed as to endanger their health.

In no case shall the transfer of such workers be permitted unless all measures relating to hygiene and accommodation which are necessary to adapt such workers to the conditions and to safeguard their health can be strictly applied.

When such transfer cannot be avoided, measures of gradual habituation to the new conditions of diet and of climate shall be adopted on competent medical advice.

In cases where such workers are required to perform regular work to which they are not accustomed, measures shall be taken to ensure their habituation to it, especially as regards progressive training, the hours of work and the provision of rest intervals, and any increase or amelioration of diet which may be necessary.

Article 17.

Before permitting recourse to forced or compulsory labour for works of construction or maintenance which entail the workers

remaining at the workplaces for considerable periods, the competent authority shall satisfy itself:

(1) that all necessary measures are taken to safeguard the health of the workers and to guarantee the necessary medical care, and, in particular, (a) that the workers are medically examined before commencing the work and at fixed intervals during the period of service, (b) that there is an adequate medical staff, provided with the dispensaries, infirmaries, hospitals and equipment necessary to meet all requirements, and (c) that the sanitary conditions of the workplaces, the supply of drinking water, food, fuel, and cooking utensils, and, where necessary, of housing and clothing, are satisfactory;

(2) that definite arrangements are made to ensure the subsistence of the families of the workers, in particular by facilitating the remittance, by a safe method, of part of the wages to the family, at the request or with the consent of the workers;

(3) that the journeys of the workers to and from the workplaces are made at the expense and under the responsibility of the administration, which shall facilitate such journeys by making the fullest use of all available means of transport;

(4) that, in case of illness or accident causing incapacity to work of a certain duration, the worker is repatriated at the expense of the administration;

(5) that any worker who may wish to remain as a voluntary worker at the end of his period of forced or compulsory labour is permitted to do so without, for a period of two years, losing his right to repatriation free of expense to himself.

Article 18.

Forced or compulsory labour for the transport of persons or goods, such as the labour of porters or boatmen, shall be abolished within the shortest possible period. Meanwhile the competent authority shall promulgate regulations determining, *inter alia*, (a) that such labour shall only be employed for the pur-

pose of facilitating the movement of officials of the administration, when on duty, or for the transport of Government stores, or in cases of very urgent necessity, the transport of persons other than officials, (b) that the workers so employed shall be medically certified to be physically fit, where medical examination is possible, and that where such medical examination is not practicable the person employing such workers shall be held responsible for ensuring that they are physically fit and not suffering from any infectious or contagious disease, (c) the maximum load which these workers may carry, (d) the maximum distance from their homes to which they may be taken, (e) the maximum number of days per month or other period for which they may be taken, including the days spent in returning to their homes, and (f) the persons entitled to demand this form of forced or compulsory labour and the extent to which they are entitled to demand it.

In fixing the maxima referred to under (c), (d) and (e) in the foregoing paragraph, the competent authority shall have regard to all relevant factors, including the physical development of the population from which the workers are recruited, the nature of the country through which they must travel and the climatic conditions.

The competent authority shall further provide that the normal daily journey of such workers shall not exceed a distance corresponding to an average working day of eight hours, it being understood that account shall be taken not only of the weight to be carried and the distance to be covered, but also of the nature of the road, the season and all other relevant factors, and that, where hours of journey in excess of the normal daily journey are exacted, they shall be remunerated at rates higher than the normal rates.

Article 19.

The competent authority shall only authorise recourse to compulsory cultivation as a method of precaution against famine or a deficiency of food supplies and always under the condition that the food or produce shall remain the property of the individuals or the community producing it.

Nothing in this Article shall be construed as abrogating the obligation on members of a community, where production is

organised on a communal basis by virtue of law or custom and where the produce or any profit accruing from the sale thereof remain the property of the community, to perform the work demanded by the community by virtue of law or custom.

Article 20.

Collective punishment laws under which a community may be punished for crimes committed by any of its members shall not contain provisions for forced or compulsory labour by the community as one of the methods of punishment.

Article 21.

Forced or compulsory labour shall not be used for work underground in mines.

Article 22.

The annual reports that Members which ratify this Convention agree to make to the International Labour Office, pursuant to the provisions of Article 408 of the Treaty of Versailles and of the corresponding Articles of the other Treaties of Peace, on the measures they have taken to give effect to the provisions of this Convention, shall contain as full information as possible, in respect of each territory concerned, regarding the extent to which recourse has been had to forced or compulsory labour in that territory, the purposes for which it has been employed, the sickness and death rates, hours of work, methods of payment of wages and rates of wages, and any other relevant information.

Article 23.

To give effect to the provisions of this Convention the competent authority shall issue complete and precise regulations governing the use of forced or compulsory labour.

These regulations shall contain, *inter alia*, rules permitting any person from whom forced or compulsory labour is exacted to forward all complaints relative to the conditions of labour to the authorities and ensuring that such complaints will be examined and taken into consideration.

Article 24.

Adequate measures shall in all cases be taken to ensure that the regulations governing the employment of forced or compulsory labour are strictly applied, either by extending the duties of any existing labour inspectorate which has been established for the inspection of voluntary labour to cover the inspection of forced or compulsory labour or in some other appropriate manner. Measures shall also be taken to ensure that the regulations are brought to the knowledge of persons from whom such labour is exacted.

Article 25.

The illegal exaction of forced or compulsory labour shall be punishable as a penal offence, and it shall be an obligation on any Member ratifying this Convention to ensure that the penalties imposed by law are really adequate and are strictly enforced.

Article 26.

Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention undertakes to apply it to the territories placed under its sovereignty, jurisdiction, protection, suzerainty, tutelage or authority, so far as it has the right to accept obligations affecting matters of internal jurisdiction; provided that, if such Member may desire to take advantage of the provisions of Article 421 of the Treaty of Versailles and of the corresponding Articles of the other Treaties of Peace, it shall append to its ratification a declaration stating:

- (1) the territories to which it intends to apply the provisions of this Convention without modification;
- (2) the territories to which it intends to apply the provisions of this Convention with modifications, together with details of the said modifications;
- (3) the territories in respect of which it reserves its decision.

The aforesaid declaration shall be deemed to be an integral part of the ratification and shall have the force of ratification.

It shall be open to any Member, by a subsequent declaration, to cancel in whole or in part the reservations made, in pursuance of the provisions of sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article, in the original declaration.

Article 27.

The formal ratifications of this Convention under the conditions set forth in Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles and in the corresponding Parts of the other Treaties of Peace shall be communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for registration.

Article 28.

This Convention shall be binding only upon those Members whose ratifications have been registered with the Secretariat.

It shall come into force twelve months after the date on which the ratifications of two Members of the International Labour Organisation have been registered with the Secretary-General.

Thereafter, this Convention shall come into force for any Member twelve months after the date on which the ratification has been registered.

Article 29.

As soon as the ratifications of two Members of the International Labour Organisation have been registered with the Secretariat, the Secretary-General of the League of Nations shall so notify all the Members of the International Labour Organisation. He shall likewise notify them of the registration of ratifications which may be communicated subsequently by other Members of the Organisation.

Article 30.

A Member which has ratified this Convention may denounce it after the expiration of ten years from the date on which the Convention first comes into force, by an act communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for registration. Such denunciation shall not take effect until one year after the date on which it is registered with the Secretariat.

Each Member which has ratified this Convention and which

does not, within the year following the expiration of the period of ten years mentioned in the preceding paragraph, exercise the right of denunciation provided for in this Article, will be bound for another period of five years and, thereafter, may denounce this Convention at the expiration of each period of five years under the terms provided for in this Article.

Article 31.

At the expiration of each period of five years after the coming into force of this Convention, the Governing Body of the International Labour Office shall present to the General Conference a report on the working of this Convention and shall consider the desirability of placing on the Agenda of the Conference the question of its revision in whole or in part.

Article 32.

Should the Conference adopt a new Convention revising this Convention in whole or in part, the ratification by a Member of the new revising Convention shall *ipso jure* involve denunciation of this Convention without any requirement of delay, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 30 above, if and when the new revising Convention shall have come into force.

As from the date of the coming into force of the new revising Convention, the present Convention shall cease to be open to ratification by the Members.

Nevertheless, this Convention shall remain in force in its actual form and content for those Members which have ratified it but have not ratified the revising Convention.

Article 33.

The French and English texts of this Convention shall both be authentic.

The foregoing is the authentic text of the Draft Convention duly adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation during its Fourteenth Session which was held at Geneva and declared closed the 28th day of June 1930.

558 THE SPIRIT OF WORLD POLITICS

IN FAITH WHEREOF we have appended our signatures this twenty-fifth day of July 1930.

The President of the Conference.

E. MAHAIM.

The Director of the International Labour Office.

ALBERT THOMAS.

RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING INDIRECT COMPULSION TO LABOUR.

The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation of the League of Nations,

Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, and having met in its Fourteenth Session on 10 June 1930, and

Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to indirect compulsion to labour, which is included in the first item on the Agenda of the Session, and

Having determined that these proposals should take the form of a recommendation,

adopts, this twenty-eighth day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty, the following Recommendation, to be submitted to the Members of the International Labour Organisation for consideration with a view to effect being given to it by national legislation or otherwise, in accordance with the provisions of Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles and of the corresponding Parts of the other Treaties of Peace:

Having adopted a Draft Convention concerning forced or compulsory labour, and

Desiring to supplement this Draft Convention by a statement of the principles which appear best fitted to guide the policy of the Members in endeavouring to avoid any indirect compulsion to labour which would lay too heavy a burden upon the populations of territories to which the Draft Convention may apply,

The Conference recommends that each Member should take the following principles into consideration:

I.

The amount of labour available, the capacities for labour of the population, and the evil effects which too sudden changes in the habits of life and labour may have on the social conditions of the population, are factors which should be taken into consideration in deciding questions connected with the economic development of territories in a primitive stage of development, and, in particular, when deciding upon:

(a) increases in the number and extent of industrial, mining and agricultural undertakings in such territories;

(b) the non-indigenous settlement, if any, which is to be permitted;

(c) the granting of forest or other concessions, with or without the character of monopolies.

II.

The desirability of avoiding indirect means of artificially increasing the economic pressure upon populations to seek wage-earning employment, and particularly such means as:

(a) imposing such taxation upon populations as would have the effect of compelling them to seek wage-earning employment with private undertakings;

(b) imposing such restrictions on the possession, occupation, or use of land as would have the effect of rendering difficult the gaining of a living by independent cultivation;

(c) extending abusively the generally accepted meaning of vagrancy;

(d) adopting such pass laws as would have the effect of placing workers in the service of others in a position of advantage as compared with that of other workers.

III.

The desirability of avoiding any restrictions on the voluntary flow of labour from one form of employment to another or

from one district to another which might have the indirect effect of compelling workers to take employment in particular industries or districts, except where such restrictions are considered necessary in the interest of the population or of the workers concerned.

The foregoing is the authentic text of the Recommendation duly adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation during its Fourteenth Session which was held at Geneva and declared closed the 28th day of June 1930.

IN FAITH WHEREOF we have appended our signatures this twenty-fifth day of July 1930.

The President of the Conference.

E. MAHAIM.

The Director of the International Labour Office.

ALBERT THOMAS.

RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF FORCED OR COMPULSORY LABOUR.

The General Conference of the International Labour Organisation of the League of Nations,

Having been convened at Geneva by the Governing Body of the International Labour Office, and having met in its Fourteenth Session on 10 June 1930, and

Having decided upon the adoption of certain proposals with regard to the regulation of forced or compulsory labour, which is included in the first item on the Agenda of the Session, and

Having determined that these proposals shall take the form of a recommendation,

adopts, this twenty-eighth day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty, the following Recommendation, to be submitted to the Members of the International Labour Organisa-

tion for consideration with a view to effect being given to it by national legislation or otherwise, in accordance with the provisions of Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles and of the corresponding Parts of the other Treaties of Peace:

Having adopted a Draft Convention concerning forced or compulsory labour, and

Desiring to give expression to certain principles and rules relating to forced or compulsory labour which appear to be of a nature to render the application of the said Draft Convention more effective,

The Conference recommends that each Member should take the following principles and rules into consideration:

I.

Any regulations issued in application of the Draft Convention concerning forced or compulsory labour, as well as any other legal provisions or administrative orders, existing at the time of the ratification of the said Draft Convention or thereafter enacted, governing the employment of forced or compulsory labour, including any laws or administrative orders concerning compensation or indemnification for sickness, injury to, or death of workers taken for forced or compulsory labour, should be printed by the competent authority in such one or more native languages as will convey their import to the workers concerned and to the population from which the workers are to be drawn. Such printed texts should be widely exhibited and, if necessary, arrangements made for their oral communication to the workers and to the population concerned; copies should also be made available to the workers concerned and to others at cost price.

II.

Recourse to forced or compulsory labour should be so regulated as not to imperil the food supply of the community concerned.

III.

When recourse is had to forced or compulsory labour all possible measures should be taken to ensure that the imposition

of such labour in no case leads indirectly to the illegal employment of women and children on forced or compulsory labour.

IV.

All possible measures should be taken to reduce the necessity for recourse to forced or compulsory labour for the transport of persons or goods. Such recourse should be prohibited when and where animal or mechanical transport is available.

V.

All possible steps should be taken to see that no alcoholic temptations are placed in the way of workers engaged in forced or compulsory labour.

The foregoing is the authentic text of the Recommendation duly adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organisation during its Fourteenth Session which was held at Geneva and declared closed the 28th day of June 1930.

IN FAITH WHEREOF we have appended our signatures this twenty-fifth day of July 1930.

The President of the Conference.

E. MAHAIM.

The Director of the International Labour Office.

ALBERT THOMAS.

[The Draft Convention concerning the Regulation of Hours of Work in Commerce and Offices and various allied Recommendations follow.]

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